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Chapter 1
Introduction
With the rise of civil wars since the end of the Cold War, dealing with post-conflict situa-
tions has become a major concern for policy-makers and analysts. Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Macedonia, Burundi or Sierra Leone are among the large group countries affected by this
upsurge of armed conflict. Libya, where an intense civil war erupted a few weeks before
these lines were written, may become the most recent example. All of these countries have
been subject to external stabilization attempts, guided by the assumption that they can
be transformed into full democracies within a relatively short amount of time. However,
plenty of empirical evidence suggests that only a small minority of them successfully
makes the transition towards consolidated statehood, whereas the majority exhibits a strong
resilience to externally induced change. Countries such as Kosovo, Afghanistan or Liberia
illustrate that the legacy of civil war continues to have a strong impact on politics even
in the so called ‘post-conflict’ phase. Furthermore, virtually all post-conflict countries
have experienced a strong involvement of external actors into domestic governance, which
generally continues for years after the conflict has officially come to an end. This often
accounts for politics in these countries to differ significantly from ‘ordinary’ democracies.
Despite that, little efforts have been made for comprehending these differences in the
past. Post-conflict countries are either simply treated as in-between-stages on the way to
western-type statehood or as rather hopeless cases of failed statehood. The goal of this
dissertation is to fill this gap in the literature by going beyond existing conceptualizations
of post-conflict situations as either failed states or countries in transition to democracy.
Comparing a broad set of countries affected by civil wars in the post-Cold War period, it
attempts to answer the question how and by whom governmental authority is executed
in post-conflict countries and what this implies for their dynamics and development
prospects. This results in a focus on the permanent and idiosyncratic features of post-
conflict situations rather than on their prospects for becoming established democracies.
This shift in perspective is emphasized in this dissertation by the concept of post-conflict
polities, which are understood as specific forms of political regimes. The dissertation is an
attempt to take stock of the existing variety of post-conflict polities, and for this reason
a typology of post-conflict polities is developed and empirically illustrated. Six types of
post-conflict polities are distinguished, called ‘Let’s Share’ polities, ‘Doomed to Share’
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polities, ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities, ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities, ‘You Stay
Out’ polities and ‘Benevolent Intrusion’ polities.1 Before going into detail about what
these polities signify, this chapter places the topic of this dissertation into a broader context
and sheds light on its relevance for either analysts or practitioners of peacebuilding.
1.1 Context and Research Problem
Dozens of countries have been drawn into civil wars since the end of the Cold War. The
Balkans were torn apart by ultra-nationalist ideologies, East Timor was devastated by
vagabonding Indonesian militias punishing the region for its pro-independence vote, West
Africa experienced a series of complex armed conflicts ravaging Liberia, Sierra Leone and
Côte d’Ivoire, and Rwanda witnessed an unprecedented genocide killing nearly a million
of its inhabitants – to mention only a few examples. All of these conflicts clearly differed
from one another with regard to their characteristics and the underlying ‘root causes’, the
broader cultural context in which they took place and the degree of international attention
they could provoke, along with a multiplicity of other factors. However, in all these cases
people sharing the same nationality – or the same passport, at least – were killing each
other, more often than not precipitating their countries into chaos and destruction. In the
majority of these cases, the international community was involved in bringing an end to
the conflict, maintaining ceasefires, providing emergency aid or (re-)building political
institutions.
These activities are generally subsumed under the heading post-conflict peacebuilding
or statebuilding2 and can be defined as the effort to “design states that contain the threats
to stability posed by arbitrary power and factional conflict and to encourage society to
begin conferring legitimacy on the new institutions” (Barnett 2006: 89; see also Fukuyama
2005: 85; Schneckener 2007: 384).3 Since the end of the Cold War, becoming engaged
during or after civil wars has become a frequent activity of the international community.
This has been facilitated by at least three developments: a steep increase in the number of
civil wars; a qualitative transformation of warfare; and a transformation of the international
normative environment:
1Note that the last type, ‘Benevolent Intrusion’ polities, is not discussed in this dissertation in detail because
it is for the most part identical with the well-established category of cases of transitional administration.
2The terms peacebuilding and statebuilding are used interchangeably throughout this dissertation, unless
explicitly stated otherwise. The reason is that peacebuilding and statebuilding, although analytically
distinguishable, have in practice often converged to one dominant paradigm (see e.g. Call 2008; see also
Jeong Barnett et al. 2007: 42–43; Barnett and Zürcher 2009; Jeong 2005: 12).
3Aside from this ‘social engineering’ perspective, the term statebuilding is also used from a historic
perspective, which views statebuilding as a long term and often contingent historic process that brought
forward the modern nation-state (see e.g. Cramer and Goodhand 2002: 890–892; Krause and Jütersonke
2005). Different aspects of this state-formation process have been portrayed colorfully by Skocpol
(1979); Tilly (1985), Spruyt (1994) and others.
2
1.1 Context and Research Problem
First, the developments associated with the end of the Cold War have significantly
challenged the world view previously upheld by scholars of International Relations (IR).
Before, most of them equated war with interstate and in particular great with power wars.
It was only after 1989 that IR scholars have begun to acknowledge the importance of
intrastate or civil wars (see Levy 2002: 351; Schlichte 2002). This is reflected in figure 1.1,
which depicts the incidence of armed conflict and UN peacekeeping operations in the 1945-
2008 period based on data from the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’ (version 4-2009)
and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. A quick glance at the chart indicates that,
overall, the incidence of armed conflict has reached its peak shortly after the end of the
Cold War, with more than fifty armed conflicts occurring in the early 1990s. Since then it
declined steadily to about thirty armed conflicts in early 2000 before exhibiting again a
modest upwards trend. The chart furthermore confirms that civil wars4 have accounted
for an ever higher proportion of total wars over time. There were even times in the early
1990s in which all wars that occurred were civil wars. We can conclude from this that
classical wars have lost a great deal of importance whereas civil wars have become hard to
ignore. In response to these developments, the international community’s attention has
shifted more and more towards the prevention or resolution of intra-state wars.
Second, aside from the mere increase in the number of civil wars, scholars and policy-
makers throughout the 1990s increasingly came to the recognition that intra-state warfare
poses a potential threat to transnational security in an increasingly integrated world (see
Zangl and Zürn 2003: 224–245), accompanied by the perception that warfare has under-
gone a significant qualitative transformation.5 The general argument is that the end of the
Cold War has altered the opportunity structures in which warfare is carried out, which has
effectively fostered the participation of private actors in armed conflicts and eroded the state
monopoly on the use of force in parts of the world (see Heupel 2005; Heupel and Zangl
2004: 346; Kaldor 1999; Münkler 2002). Unlike their historical precedents, these ‘new’
wars do not contribute in any sense to the formation of states (as hypothesized by Tilly
1985), but instead promote the emergence of collapsed states, in which violence becomes
the dominant characteristic of all kinds of social exchange (Münkler 2002: 135–136; see
also Schlichte 2003: 28).6
Third, the normative and legal underpinnings that define if and how intervention may
legitimately occur have significantly changed since the end of the Cold War (see e.g.
4‘Internal armed conflict’ and ‘internationalized internal armed conflict’ in the terminology of the ‘UCDP/
Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’.
5The first to make this argument, independently from the end of the Cold War, was Martin van Creveld in
his book ‘The Transformation of War’ (1991; see also 2002). For a critique of van Creveld’s interpretation
of Clausewitz, see Gantzel (2001; 2002: 8).
6Note that scholars are divided over the question whether or not the conceptualization of contemporary
armed conflicts as new wars is adequate or not. For critical views, see e.g. Gantzel (2002), Schlichte
(2006: 548–549) and Ferdowsi and Matthies (2003a: 17–18). Yet, it is undeniable that the ‘new war’
hypothesis had a strong impact on policy-makers and has elevated external actors’ inclination to engage
in armed conflicts (see also Levy 1995: 35).
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Figure 1.1: Armed Conflict and UN Peacekeeping, 1945-2008
Senghaas 2008: 175–177). Under the leadership of the United Nations a far-reaching
re-orientation process was initiated for which Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 report ‘An
Agenda for Peace’ (United Nations 1992) and the ‘Supplement to an Agenda for Peace’
(United Nations 1995) are generally seen as the starting point (see also Richmond and
Franks 2007: 28; Seibel 2008: 503–505). Boutros-Ghali’s call for a more pro-active
engagement of the international community in armed conflicts yielded a spectacular echo
and has frequently been used as the normative reference point for later attempts to expand
the scale and scope of UN peace operations (see e.g. Debiel 2002; Doyle and Sambanis
2006: 10). These ideas were carried further by Boutros-Ghali’s successor Kofi Annan,
which is most clearly reflected in the doctrine of the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P).7
It proposes a shift away “from sovereignty as control to sovereignty as responsibility in
both internal functions and external duties” (ICISS 2001, par. 2.14, emphasis original)
and implies not only a ‘responsibility to react’, but also a ‘responsibility to prevent’ and a
7The Responsibility to Protect was developed by the International Commission on Intervention and State
Sovereignty – an independent body mandated by Kofi Annan. Its recommendations had a strong impact
on Annan’s attempts to restructure the UN system as embodied most clearly in his 2004 report ‘A more
secure world: Our shared responsibility’ (United Nations 2004a, see also Ozgercin and Steinhilber 2005).
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‘responsibility to rebuild’ (par. 2.19). This is the result of a fundamental re-interpretation
of sovereignty as it has taken place in the past two decades.8 Once construed as a principle
which clearly demarcates states from the ‘outside’ world (see Krasner 1999; 2001; Walker
1993), the granting of sovereignty is increasingly tied to certain minimum requirements of
internal governance (see e.g. Senghaas 2004: 17–20; Zangl and Zürn 2003: 154).9 This
paved the way for proactive and comprehensive external interventions and led the UN
Security Council to adopt a “strikingly intrusive interpretation of UN Charter Chapter VII
[. . . ]”, triggering a “radical expansion in the scope of collective intervention” (Doyle and
Sambanis 2006: 1).
In conjunction, these developments gave rise to the emergence of complex peace opera-
tions combining civil, political and military components (see Durch 2006: 3). With the
notable exception of the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), missions going
beyond traditional peacekeeping were virtually non-existent before the end of the Cold War
(see e.g. Chesterman 2004; Durch 2006: 3; Rondinelli and Montgomery 2005: 16). Terms
such as multi-dimensional peace operations, humanitarian interventions, peace enforce-
ment missions, coercive missions, expanded peacekeeping missions or wider peacekeeping
missions give a good illustration for the expansion of activities. This ‘new interventionism’
(Caplan 2005: 5–11; Doyle 2001; Doyle and Sambanis 2006: 6–10; Stedman 1992: 3) is
clearly reflected in the frequency of post-conflict engagement since the end of World War
II (see figure 1.1 on page 4).
More importantly still, it stands for a striking convergence of the goals and strategies
that underlie post-conflict engagements. In theory, peacebuilders may dispose of a variety
of different tools and strategies when attempting to restore peace in conflict shattered soci-
eties. The standard toolbox contains at least four fundamental approaches to post-conflict
intervention: a ‘liberalization first’ approach, focusing on democratization, economic
reform and world-market integration; a ‘security first’ approach, focusing on strengthening
the monopoly of the use of violence; a ‘stateness first’ approach, focusing on strengthen-
ing political and administrative structures and the rule of law; and a ‘civil society first’
approach, focusing on improved opportunities for civil society participation (Fukuyama
2004a; 2004b; 2005; Schneckener 2007: 386).
In practice, however, these different strategies have often converged to one dominant
peacebuilding approach: the paradigm of ‘liberal peacebuilding’ (or: ‘liberal interna-
tionalism’), which has served as the blueprint for all larger peace operations carried out
8It also reflects a modified understanding of liberalism: away from a ‘liberalism of restraint’ towards
the more demanding notion of a ‘liberalism of imposition’ – the latter implying that “comprehensive
action is necessary in order to remove the grave obstacles to freedom” (Sørensen 2007: 367). It has also
affected the legal position of individuals: by assigning international legal personality to them, the new
interpretation of sovereignty has partly turned them into holders of rights, which – as an option of last
resort – can be enforced by the international community (see Beck 2005: 9; Chandler 2006a).
9As Dieter Senghaas argues, before the end of the Cold War the mere presence of a domestic monopoly of
force has long been the sole condition for a state to acquire external sovereignty, regardless of its quality:
it could be a “crude” one, as long as it was present (Senghaas 2004: 17–20; Zangl and Zürn 2003: 154).
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since the end of the Cold War (see Barnett 2006: 88; Lyons 2004; Ottaway 2002; Paris
1997; 2004).10 In the formulation of Roland Paris, “[t]he central tenet of this paradigm
is the assumption that the surest foundation for peace, both within and between states,
is market democracy, that is, a liberal democratic polity and market-oriented economy”
(Paris 1997: 56; see also Paris 2004).11 It is based on the premise that “[a]ll aspects
of the state, society, and economy are to be rebuilt around liberal principles” (Barnett
2006: 89; see also Bertram 1995: 391; Chandler 2006a: 477). In particular in the context
of weak or dysfunctional statehood, this often also requires to recreate state structures
(in the sense of a ‘Weberian’ monopoly of force) in the target countries.12 In fact, the
intervening parties view Western-type statehood as the ‘teleological’ or natural end-point
of post-conflict interventions of all kind – based on the assumption that “an externally
driven ‘social (re)engineering’ project can accelerate or substitute for a more ‘organic’
historical process of state-building” (Krause and Jütersonke 2005: 451) or that “in more
or less short order, targeted states can function effectively on their own” (Krasner 2004:
86–87). In fact, the normative dominance of statehood as the ideal end-point has been
so large that it is even considered an ideology (Schlichte 2004). This is reflected in the
perception that post-conflict statebuilding processes automatically lead to consolidated
statehood in the end. Thomas Carothers called this perspective the ‘transition paradigm’
(2002; see also 2007a; 2007b).13 Consequently, the paradigm of liberal internationalism
also implies that wherever state structures are absent, weak or considered dysfunctional,
attempts are made for restoring the monopoly of force and (re)installing a liberal state as
the dominant social organization.
The liberal peacebuilding paradigm can hence be characterized by two major claims:
that (a) external actors are able to build lasting peace by establishing liberal institutions
and (b) that, once triggered, these processes of transition have a natural end-point: a liberal,
democratic state. In line with this paradigm, some interventionist states have deliberately
10The main assumption behind the liberal peace project is that liberal institutions foster peace, as emphasized
by the democratic peace theory and the numerous empirical tests it brought forward (e.g. Doyle 1983;
Maoz and Russett 1993; Oneal and Russett 1999; Owen 1994; Russett 1994; Spiro 1994). The roots of
this argument can be traced back to Woodrow Wilson (see Chandler 2006a) and to Immanuel Kant (see
Doyle 1983; Huntley 1996; Mitchell 2002; Spiro 1994: 52).
11Note that Paris proposes an alternative approach called institutionalization before liberalization (IBL),
which works “by constructing the foundations of effective political and economic institutions before the
introduction of electoral democracy and market-oriented adjustment policies” (Paris 2004: 179).
12Max Weber argued that, due to the multitude of possible ends, a state can only be defined by focusing
on the means it employs, and he believed one such means to be constitutive of a state: the monopoly
on the legitimate use of force (see Weber [1918] 1988: 505–506). According to Markus Jachtenfuchs
the monopoly of force is “not a field of state activity like any other”, but rather “penetrates the core of
human existence [. . . ] since it has the potential to take away people’s life and freedom” (2005: 38).
13In this context, Joel Migdal has pointed out that the strong focus on Max Weber has had the effect
that scholars have taken his ideal type of statehood for the normal type, which has masked “situations
where authority is fragmented and contentious” (Migdal 2001: 14; see also Schlichte 2000). Along a
similar line, Klaus Schlichte has pointed out that Weber’s image has influenced theories of the state by
“attribut[ing] it with a functional core, namely an apparatus of coercion and control with a capacity of
extraction and an ability to set and enforce rules” (2003: 29).
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portrayed themselves as liberators of suppressed regimes, although the attempt to mask
other, more trivial interests was at times very obvious. For instance, unforgotten are George
Bush’s numerous justifications of the Iraq war by the ‘evilness’ of the country’s regime and
the duty of the United States to spread democracy, as in a speech entitled ‘End of Major
Combat in Iraq’ held in San Diego, California on 1 May 2003:
“We’re helping to rebuild Iraq, where the dictator built palaces for himself, instead of
hospitals and schools. And we will stand with the new leaders of Iraq as they establish
a government of, by, and for the Iraqi people. The transition from dictatorship to
democracy will take time, but it is worth every effort. Our coalition will stay until our
work is done. Then we will leave, and we will leave behind a free Iraq.”14
However, cases such as Iraq and Afghanistan also illustrate the inherent difficulties of
liberal peacebuilding. More generally, whether one considers this paradigm as a success or
a failure depends greatly on the standard one applies. Those who believe that maintaining
a crude ‘negative’ peace (the end of mutual atrocities) is already a sufficient indicator of
success will find that the track record of post-conflict interventions carried out since the end
of the Cold War is modestly encouraging.15 It is often possible to disarm the belligerents
and hold elections within relatively short periods. However, in the vast majority of
cases, ‘success’ has not gone far beyond that. The establishment of stable, not to speak
of accountable and democratic, states – the ultimate goal of the liberal peacebuilding
paradigm – succeeded in very few cases. In many cases, the seeming achievements are
more ‘virtual’ than real (see e.g. Heathershaw 2009b; Lidén 2009; Lidén et al. 2009;
Richmond and Franks 2007). Therefore, those who derive their indicators of success from
the actual promises of the liberal peacebuilding paradigm clearly need to be disillusioned
by the track-record of post-conflict statebuilding efforts.
1.1.1 Research Problem
The tension described above is at the heart of the contemporary practice of reconstructing
war-torn countries and builds the central background for this dissertation. Empirical
evidence strongly pulls the success of the classical approach to post-conflict intervention
into question. Although some partial achievements could be made in many cases – most
often with regard to ending violence16 – a far-reaching transition to consolidated statehood
14This and other presidential speeches can be found online at: http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeche
s/05.01.03.html. Downloaded on 2 January 2010.
15The distinction between ‘negative peace’ and ‘positive peace’ goes back to Johan Galtung (1969; also
1985).
16There is a persistent and highly influential myth that about half of all cases of post-conflict intervention
relapse into violence within the first five years, which implies that efforts for restoring peace fail in about
half of all cases. The figure mainly goes back to the work of Paul Collier (2003: 83). However, as Astri
Suhrke and Ingrid Samset (2007) have shown, the actual risk of conflict recurrence is lower: 20 percent
within the first four years and about 30 percent within the first five years after the end of a civil war. This
puts the effectiveness of peacekeeping and peacemaking endeavors in a much better light.
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hardly ever takes place (see e.g. Willett 2005). Most of these problems are not specific
to post-conflict environments; they have also been widely discussed, for instance, in the
literature on democratic transitions (see Carothers 2002; Diamond 2002; Elster et al.
1998; Linz and Stepan 1996; van de Walle 2002). But in post-conflict countries they are
particularly problematic, in part because these countries are notoriously fragile, but in
part also because external actors have tended to view them as something like a “blank
slate” where new institutions can be built from scratch without caring too much about the
historical pedigree of a particular case (Cramer 2006: 14). As Doyle and Sambanis put it,
“[s]uccessful peacebuilding is the surprise, not the expectation” (2006: 19).17
This indicates that external actors often sharply over-estimate their transformative
capacity in the initial phase of post-conflict engagements, only to be surprised a few years
later that the expected transition to democratic statehood is faulty and incomplete (see e.g.
Krause and Jütersonke 2005). Even in those cases where supposedly legitimate formal-
political institutions were ‘successfully’ imposed by outside forces, the conflict parties
often continue pursuing goals that are detrimental to the official statebuilding agenda.
Examples for this phenomenon abound. A good example are the peacebuilding efforts
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). The international community made
tremendous efforts for stabilizing the power-sharing arrangement between Joseph Kabila
and Jean-Pierre Bemba (along with various other rebel factions) and facilitating democratic
elections. Though for years considered to be a comparatively constructive partner, Kabila
showed his true face within weeks after the elections by ousting his political opponents,
threatening the opposition and introducing a largely undemocratic, authoritarian leadership
style (Autesserre 2009; see also sections 4.2 and A.7).
In Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Liberia and Burundi, to mention only
a few examples, the problem is similar: besides the existence of a thin and largely powerless
layer of democratic rule at the surface, closed networks or clans continue to dominate
politics from below that surface. This phenomenon has been discussed under labels
such as ‘hybrid regimes’ (Diamond 2002), ‘electoral authoritarianism’ (Schedler 2006),
‘neopatrimonial politics’ (Bratton and van de Walle 1994) ‘warlord politics’ (Reno 1999)
or simply ‘failed states’.18 Although these terms describe slightly different phenomena,
their common bottom-line is obvious: triggering processes of transition is tricky and often
unsuccessful. At best, partial successes can be achieved, for instance by establishing
17Tobias Debiel and Daniel Lambach come to a similar conclusion: “Experience from case studies confirms
that ideal-type models of state-building are never implemented. Instead, we find a great variety of
sociopolitical orders and very different development paths in the emergence or non-emergence of
statehood” (2009: 22).
18There was a tremendous wealth of literature of the topic of state failure in recent years (see e.g. Gros
1996; Joseph and Herbst 1997; Krasner 2005; Milliken 2005; Milliken and Krause 2002; Tetzlaff 2003;
Yannis 2002). It has triggered a great deal of attention among policy makers, who have identified them as
a central source of instability in an increasingly ‘de-nationalized’ world (see also Zangl and Zürn 2003:
172–206).
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new institutions or organizing popular elections. Often, these institutions remain heavily
contested and lack a basic level of acceptance or support from the population.
In consequence, the transformational optimism on which the intervening parties have
relied in the past is severely challenged by the processes and dynamics on the ground.
Despite some attempts by scholars and practitioners to formulate alternative statebuilding
models,19 there is currently no viable alternative in sight on which to base peace operations.
For a long time, the international community has been unaware of or ignorant about this
problem, which either resulted in lengthy commitments without clear exit strategies (as
in Afghanistan or Kosovo), or to a hasty withdrawal amidst an incomplete statebuilding
agenda (as in Angola or Liberia during Charles Taylor’s reign). For statebuilding pessimists,
this is a proof that the allegedly ‘self-sustaining’ liberal peace is actually the opposite of
what it claims to be: it is always at the brink of collapse unless heavy external support is
guaranteed throughout the medium and long run. This has produced a vast body of critical
literature on the practice of statebuilding, which has raised many important concerns and
gave many new impetuses to the discipline.20
Out of the conviction that it is necessary to “rethink several core concepts, such as
state-building, security, development aid, civil society, sovereignty” (Schwarz 2005: 444),
a rising number of works has addressed this problem in the recent past. One example is the
conceptualization of post-conflict situations as post-conflict spaces, formulated by Daniel
Lambach and David Heathershaw (Heathershaw and Lambach 2008; Lambach 2007). A
post-conflict space, in their words, is “a field of power relations where multiple ‘sovereigns’
negotiate rule across multiple spaces of political authority” (Heathershaw and Lambach
2008: 278). Along the same line is Christoph Zürcher’s suggestion to think of post-conflict
situations as representing specific “configurations of statehood”, in which different public
goods are provided by a division of labor between domestic and external actors (Zürcher
2006: 14). Another set of suggestions is less specific in its focus in that it addresses more
generally the study of political authority beyond classical models of statehood. Instead of
concentrating on the dysfunctional characteristics of supposedly ‘failed’ states it focuses
on the inner dynamics unfolding in these situations. This flows from the observation that
19Michael Barnett, for instance, has formulated an alternative to the liberal statebuilding model: the paradigm
of republican peacebuilding. It emphasizes the role of deliberation in order to allow “space for societal
actors to determine for themselves what the good life is and how to achieve it” (2006: 92). A similar
approach was also suggested by Carlos Yordán (2009). Another suggestion is to leave the question of
institutional design entirely open. Drawing on the work of Karl Popper, Krause and Jütersonke have
suggested a “piecemeal engineering” approach to peacebuilding, which confines itself to addressing the
“greatest evils” threatening post-conflict societies (2005: 458–459).
20Some critics are disappointed by the poor track-record of post-conflict statebuilding endeavors and argue
in favor of more effective approaches to post-conflict intervention (e.g. Barnett 2006; Call 2008; Paris
2004; Paris and Sisk 2009b). Others raise more fundamental concerns about the practice of post-conflict
intervention (for instance Chandler 2006a; 2006b; Duffield 2001: 31–34; Richmond and Franks 2007),
and again others propose alternative approaches for achieving a more sustainable post-conflict peace (e.g.
Barnett 2006; Lederach 1997; Paris 2004; Roeder and Rothchild 2005). It is beyond the scope of this
dissertation to give a comprehensive account of these different branches of critique. For an informative
overview see Oliver P. Richmond (2010).
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these ‘Areas of Limited Statehood’21 are not simply disrupted and anarchical units, but
that in most cases there exists some form of governance beyond ordinary state structures,
which can at times be unexpectedly effective and functional (Draude 2007; Risse 2007).
This has prevented scholars from comprehending that their apparent indicators for success
are capturing, at best, ‘virtual’ and largely superficial changes at the surface. Meanwhile,
below that surface there is mostly little or no transition taking place.
However, much less has been written about the analytical implications entailed by
these compromised statebuilding attempts: given that the goal to build ‘normal’ states
often remains elusive, how should such incomplete statebuilding projects be treated an-
alytically? This builds the starting point for this dissertation. It is primarily driven by
the following question: If most post-conflict countries are neither phases of transition
towards consolidated statehood nor can be regarded (with few exceptions) as the result
of concluded processes of statebuilding, then how can we conceive of them at all? This
question is primarily an analytical one, but one with direct practical relevance. In recent
years, a sharply rising interest in the dynamics unfolding in post-conflict situations could
be observed inside and outside academia. A number of policy initiatives during the last
years were explicitly established with the aim of addressing the common challenges of
post-conflict countries. This is reflected for instance in the creation of a post-conflict unit
within the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), or the establishment of a
post-conflict Peacebuilding Commission as a new intergovernmental body within the UN
system. Inside academia, it seems that some form of reification of post-conflict situations
has taken place, which can be observed by the widespread use of the prefix ‘post-conflict’
as an analytical category of its own right in terms like post-conflict countries, post-conflict
states, post-conflict territories, post-conflict situations, post-conflict environments, post-
conflict settings or post-conflict space(s). The problem of these conceptualizations is
their lack of precision and substantive meaning. With the exception of the latter (which
was introduced and defined by Heathershaw and Lambach 2008) they are typically used
interchangeably and tend to lump different situations together into one large post-conflict
category without drawing any further differentiations. This greatly hampers attempts to
deal with post-conflict in an analytically adequate manner. As Brown et al. observe,
“[t]here is a tendency [. . . ] to place countries into a single ‘post-conflict’ category [. . . ]
[although] it is apparent that post-conflict countries differ in many important respects, and
require different policies” (2008: 7). This dissertation attempts to figure out in which
respects exactly they differ.
21This term is used by the Berlin-based ‘Collaborative Research Center 700’ in order to refer to territories
in which statehood is significantly limited. Using a Luhmanian “equivalence functionalist” approach,
the project aims at identifying “non-Western, non-modern solutions to problems in view of certain
governance tasks” (Draude2007: 9).
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1.1.2 Main Arguments
The goal of this dissertation is to contribute to the gap in the literature described above by
turning the attention to the phenomenon of hybrid political order22 in post-conflict settings.
Countries such as Côte d’Ivoire, Kosovo or Cambodia depict characteristics of ‘ordinary’
states but continue to be strongly influenced by their history of armed violence. They have
in common that they cannot simply be understood as countries in transition to democracy
or consolidated statehood – either because the conflict has produced deep societal wounds
which are difficult to heal, or because their modus operandi differs markedly from that
of more established democracies. However, simply calling them ‘post-conflict countries’
does not help much either because of the vast diversity these cases embody. At first glance,
Mozambique – pacified for more than fifteen years and generally considered to be an
established democracy – has little in common with the Democratic Republic of the Congo
– a country that is by many considered to be the ‘epitome of a collapsed state’ (UCDP
2010a).
In an attempt to go beyond the democracy in transition vs. failed state dichotomy, I
suggest to treat post-conflict countries as specific forms of polities – political systems
that follow their own internal logic and that may be rather resilient to externally induced
change. In a second step I suggest to shed light on the differences existing among the
broad group of post-conflict countries by drawing a distinction between different types of
post-conflict polities. In a third step, I analyze what it implies for a post-conflict country to
belong to a specific post-conflict polity type. The focus here lies on determining how the
basic constellation of a certain polity affects the interaction between different post-conflict
actors on the ground (and thereby implicitly also their statebuilding prospects, although
this is not the primary focus of this dissertation).
The polity-concept puts structural differences between post-conflict situations into the
center of attention and then determines how these differences affect the dynamics and
interactions between post-conflict actors on the ground. A post-conflict polity is defined as
a specific constellation of interactions and relations among diverse authorities that emerges
after the settlement of a civil war. The concept focuses on the interface between formal and
informal structures of authority on the one hand, and between domestic and external claims
to power on the other hand.23 For practical purposes, this requires to restrict the analysis to
the elite level. Power-elites in post-conflict societies are almost always recruited from the
22For a definition of this term, see Clements et al.: “’[H]ybrid political orders’ combine elements of the
introduced Western model and elements stemming from local indigenous traditions of governance and
politics. Hybrid political orders differ considerably from the modem Western-model state. Governance is
carried out by an ensemble of local, national and international actors and agencies. In this environment,
state institutions are dependent on the other actors – and at the same time are restricted by them. Hybrid
political orders can also be perceived as, or can become, ’emerging states”’ (2007: 50).
23This perspective shares certain fundamental assumptions with the conception of post-conflict spaces
suggested by Heathershaw and Lambach, most importantly as both of them are “guided by the argument
that post-conflict spaces cannot be understood as a process (whether positive or negative)” – that is, as a
sequence of steps with a clear beginning and a clear end-point (Heathershaw and Lambach 2008: 278).
11
Chapter 1 Introduction
former warring parties, that is, the former government-side and one or various rebel-groups.
Once violence ends, these two antagonistic groups of elites typically continue to compete
for political power. Who of them has access to formal governmental power (and who has
not) is a crucial factor in the internal dynamics of post-conflict societies. External actors
are often heavily intertwined with these dynamics, either because they are trying to impose
a certain regime-type onto the target-countries or simply because they try to keep or build
a sustainable peace between the belligerents. Thus, the focus lies on the former warring
parties, their access to formal or de facto power and the engagement of external actors
into these dynamics. Although this requires to fade out many other potentially relevant
groups of actors (for instance civil society organizations) and conflates many of the actual
dynamics taking place in post-conflict countries, such analytical restriction is necessary for
the framework to be applicable to a broad set of cases. As a result, cases such as Liberia,
Rwanda or Guatemala can then be understood as specific kinds of political systems rather
than anomalies of the state system or deficient democracies.
This new analytical approach builds the basis for drawing a distinction between different
types of post-conflict polities. In accordance with the above definition of the post-conflict
polity concept, the typology aims at capturing structural differences in the manner authority
is generated and executed in post-conflict polities or, in short, different patterns of post-
conflict authority. The focus lies on the interface between local post-conflict elites, their
struggle for political power and the effect external actors have on these dynamics. The
typology developed here aims at offering a better description of the phenomenon of
post-conflict situations but not at explaining why post-conflict statebuilding succeeds or
fails. Though it relies on certain theoretical assumptions and analytical restrictions, the
greater part of the construction process goes back to empirical case-work, most notably a
‘structured, focused comparison’ of 18 post-conflict countries with the aim of extracting
different typification criteria. This amounted to a lengthy collection of material, which
can be found in appendix section A starting on page 325 (for a detailed overview of the
typification process, see also sections 1.2.3 and B). The typology that emerged as the result
of this process consists of three analytical dimensions:
The first dimension addresses the distribution of formal authority between the former
warring parties in a post-conflict polity. It encompasses two possible categories: sharing
and domination. This distinction is generally used as an analytical category in works
of comparative politics (for example Lijphart 1999), but it has also sparked a normative
controversy about the most suitable distribution of governmental authority for ‘divided
societies’ in general (Lijphart 1980) and for post-conflict countries in particular (see e.g.
Mehler 2009; Rothchild and Roeder 2005; Spears 2000; 2002; Tull and Mehler 2005).
Here, it is used as an analytical category. Sharing describes a situation in which the
former opponents in a civil war share governmental power both formally and, at least
to some extent, also in effective terms. In contrast, domination describes a situation
in which one of the former warring factions (or a coalition of wartime allies) either
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enjoys exclusive access to formal governmental authority, or in which it is de facto
dominating all members of the government such that power-sharing becomes merely
cosmetic (for a more detailed discussion of this dimension, see section 2.2.1). For instance,
in Mozambique the government-side during the conflict, FRELIMO (‘Frente de Libertação
de Moçambique’), won the first post-conflict elections in 1994 and has since then dominated
the government, whereas its main opponent during the civil war, RENAMO (‘Resistência
Nacional Moçambicana’), has been thoroughly excluded from access to formal power. In
contrast, during the National Transitional Government established after the conclusion of
the second civil war in Liberia the various conflict parties have all shared a fraction of
governmental power in the post-conflict phase.
The second dimension captures the relations between the warring parties themselves.
It is classified as either constructive or obstructive. A constructive relationship can be
assumed when both parties appear ready to make concessions in the interest of finding
a settlement. The clearest indicator for this is that the parties accept outcomes or stick
to past agreements even though they turn out disadvantageous for them. In contrast, an
obstructive relationship can be assumed if the major parties do not exhibit any disposition
to subordinate their own goals or interest in the name of peace. For instance, in Macedonia
the conflict parties adopted a particularly pragmatic stance in the settlement and post-
settlement phase of the conflict. Despite persisting tensions both of them depicted a
genuine interest in peace. In contrast, the notorious ‘Revolutionary United Front’ in Sierra
Leone can at no time during the conflict be regarded as a constructive party. The fact
that it has broken virtually all its promises indicates that its support of various peace
agreements was merely the result of its pronounced opportunism. However, characterizing
a party as obstructive does not necessarily imply that it is always opposed to settlements,
but that it only commits to agreements that enhance its bargaining position or leave it
unaffected. Clearly, constructive relations are likely to increase the chances for lasting
peace, but it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for peace. There are cases
where the recurrence of violence could be prevented despite clear signs that the relations
are obstructive (for instance Liberia) and there are cases where commitments collapsed
despite the presence of constructive relations (for instance Burundi) (for a more detailed
discussion of this dimension, see section 2.2).
The third dimension has to do with the manner by which external parties intervene in post-
conflict environments. The range of potential dimensions here is large. It could include,
for instance, the level of ‘intrusion’ by external parties, organizational characteristics of the
peace missions, or the amount of resources devoted to a post-conflict situation – to mention
only a few examples. Here, the focus lies on the manner in which external parties (for
instance UN peacekeepers, regional peacekeepers or foreign troops) position themselves
towards the former warring parties. It comprises three possible categories: mediative,
partisan and supreme intervention. Mediative intervention implies that external actors are,
by and large, intervening in a non-discriminative manner, that is, they attempt to reconcile
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between the former belligerents without openly taking sides. Partisan intervention is
present when external systematically and intentionally take sides for one of the warring
parties and discriminate against the other(s), in the extreme case by fighting them militarily.
Supreme intervention implies that external parties become themselves the sovereign in
a post-conflict polity, thereby positioning themselves above the warring factions (for a
more detailed discussion of this dimension, see section 2.2). Cases such as Mozambique
Macedonia, where external actors have no particular ties with any of the conflict parties
and in which they would in general accept both of them as heading the government, are
examples for mediative external engagement. By contrast, Afghanistan and – on a less
extreme scale – Rwanda and Tajikistan are examples in which external actors have strong
objections against some of the former conflict parties (the Taliban in the case of Afghanistan
or the génocidaires in the case of Rwanda). In all of these cases, they systematically and
intentionally support the incumbent regime and its efforts to keep the opposition out of
the government. Finally, Kosovo or East Timor are the prime examples for cases in which
external actors intervened in a supreme manner, i.e. by placing themselves above the
conflict parties.
In conjunction, these three dimensions yield the aforementioned six types of post-conflict
polities. First, cases in which the former warring parties share formal governmental power,
maintain comparatively constructive relations and in which external actors are engaged in
a mediated manner; so called ‘Let’s Share’ polities. Macedonia and Burundi fall under
this category, discussed in detail in chapter three. Second, cases identical to the former
type, with the only difference that a basic consensus between the former warring parties
about the distribution of formal authority is lacking; so called ‘Doomed to Share’ polities.
Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) fall under this category,
discussed in chapter four. Then there are cases in which one of the former warring parties
dominates the government while the other(s) are effectively excluded from access to formal
authority. The third type are cases of formal-political domination in which the excluded
parties gave their consent to the distribution of formal authority and in which external
actors are engaged in a mediative manner, so called ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities.
Mozambique and El Salvador fall under this category, discussed in chapter five. The
fourth type differs from the third only with respect to the relations of the former warring
factions. The excluded party contests its own exclusion from power; a basic consensus
about the distribution of formal authority is lacking. This type is called ‘The Winner
Took it All’ polities. Liberia (after Charles Taylor’s victory in the 1997 elections) and
Côte d’Ivoire form part of this type, which is discussed in chapter six. The fifth type
is identical to the fourth, with the only difference that external actors are engaged in a
partisan rather than a mediative manner. Instead of trying to mitigate the tensions between
the former warring parties, they openly take side for the party in power and – directly
or indirectly – assist it in its attempts perpetuate the exclusion of its opponents. These
cases are called ‘You Stay Out’ polities. Rwanda and Tajikistan are discussed as notable
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examples of this type in chapter seven. The sixth type, finally, contains cases in which
external actors themselves become the supreme authority in a post-conflict polity. They
are called ‘Benevolent Intrusion’ polities in the context of this dissertation. This type
is already well-established in the literature on post-conflict interventions; therefore it is
not discussed in detail here. However, some cases that fall under this category, notably
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and East Timor can be found in the appendix.
Overall, the post-conflict polity perspective and the systematic classification of post-
conflict polity cases into a typology of post-conflict countries has a number of advantages
over existing conceptualizations. Most importantly, classifying a broad set of post-conflict
cases into relatively few types of post-conflict polities allows analysts and practitioners
to significantly reduce real-world complexity without necessarily oversimplifying. This
enables readers to recognize commonalities between cases hitherto believed to be rather
diverse. For instance, it might at first glance appear fruitless to compare post-genocide
Rwanda with post-conflict Tajikistan. Yet, as argued in chapter seven, both of these
cases fall under the ‘You Stay Out’ polity type, in which external actors are engaged in
a partisan manner on behalf of the incumbent regime and in which the tensions between
the government and the (thoroughly excluded) opposition remain relatively tense. In
addition, the typology forces decision-makers to recognize the hybrid character of most
post-conflict states. Analysts have emphasized in recent years that “[r]ecognising the
hybridity of political order should be the starting point for any endeavours that aim at
conflict prevention, development and security” (Clements et al. 2007: 50). Therefore, the
shift in perspective advocated in this dissertation may, in turn, be the starting point for
improving both the acceptance and the effectiveness of future post-conflict interventions.
1.2 Methods and Research Design
The remainder of this introduction deals with the ‘mechanics’ of this dissertation. The
following two sections give an overview of the research process (1.2.1), the methodological
background for the construction of the typology (1.2.2), the process of typology construc-
tion (1.2.3), the operationalization of some key concepts (1.3) and, finally, the empirical
cases that form the background of this dissertation (1.4). This discussion clarifies many
issues and answers many questions that may come up later in the dissertation. However,
since it is not essential for following the main line of argument, the impatient reader is free
to jump directly to the detailed discussion of the typology and its different dimensions in
chapter two.
1.2.1 Research Process and Structure of the Dissertation
Using a broad brush, the research process consisted of six main steps: (1) defining and op-
erationalizing the concept of post-conflict polities, (2) distinguishing the ‘universe of cases’
that matches these definitions, (3) selecting appropriate cases for the further empirical
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analysis, (4) collecting relevant background information on these cases, (5) developing the
typology and classifying the cases, (6) characterizing the types and identifying empirical
regularities. For most of them, various sub-steps and sometimes even different research
methodologies can be distinguished. Figure 1.2 on page 17 provides a more detailed
overview of the different steps involved.
The definition of the post-conflict polity concept (step one) is based on a review of
theoretical literature about post-conflict situations and the practice of post-conflict recon-
struction contained in the introduction and the subsequent section. The insights gained
from this analysis contributed to the analytical framework for the analysis of post-conflict
situations developed in section 2.1. This analytical framework can be regarded as a sub-
stantive definition of the post-conflict polity concept. In the next step, this was transformed
into an operational definition of post-conflict polities – that is, concrete criteria for deciding
if a particular case should be included into the analysis or dropped (step two). The result of
this process can be found in section 1.3. These criteria were then applied to a quantitative
dataset on armed conflicts, the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’, for identifying rele-
vant cases (step three). The criteria and the resulting list of cases can be found in section
1.4. The next step (step four) was to characterize these cases on the basis of the analytical
framework. More specifically, it required collecting some basic information on the coun-
tries’ recent history, conduct a background research on the armed conflicts that occurred
in these cases in the period under investigation and to distinguish relevant post-conflict
episodes for each of the cases. The results of this process form the empirical background
for the typology and can be found in section A in the appendix. The construction of the
typology itself (step five) was a process that involved both deductive (finding suitable
analytical dimensions on which to base the typology) and inductive analysis (extracting
abstract analytical dimensions from the empirical material), as described in more detail in
the next section. This led to the final step in the research process: empirically illustrating
the different types and carving out regularities that can be attributed to the overall polity
constellation of a certain case. The results can be found in chapters three to seven.
1.2.2 Typification as a Research Method
This dissertation is based on various different social-scientific methods. Since a large part
of the work consisted of comparing different empirical cases, the ‘comparative method’
(Lijphart 1971) certainly played a central role for the writing of this dissertation. The
characterization and classification of the different cases contained in the appendix roughly
followed what George and Bennett (2004) call a ‘structured, focused comparison’. How-
ever, the central methodology was without any doubt ‘the method’ of typification. I used
quotation marks here in order to underline that there is hardly any method of typification
in the singular. Typification should rather be seen as an umbrella term for a broad and het-
erogeneous and sometimes even contradictory set of methods. The following sections shed
a brief light on typologies in general and some of the controversies revolving around their
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use, before the specific goals of the typology constructed in the context of this dissertation
are highlighted.
a) On the Use of Typologies in the Social Sciences
Typologies are a classical analytic tool for social inquiry. The probably best-known
typology in the political sciences goes back to Aristotle’s distinction of various political
regime types. More recent examples include Max Weber’s distinction between different
types of leadership (Weber [1922] 2006), Arend Lijphart’s work on Patterns of Democracy
(Lijphart 1999), or Peter Hall’s and David Soskice’s work on Varieties of Capitalism (Hall
and Soskice 2001). Despite being in use for so long, typification has remained a somewhat
ambiguous methodology and typologies are frequently scrutinized as ‘unscientific’, overly
simplifying or incomplete. Also, scholars aiming at the construction of typologies often
are under high pressure to justify why they engage in the construction of typologies. Arend
Lijphart calls this the ‘so what’ question, which he, as the author of his well-known
typology of democratic systems (Lijphart 1999), faced himself.24 Out of these reasons, it is
necessary to discuss a few methodological issues related to the construction of typologies.
In the most general sense, typologies can be understood as attribute or property spaces
(Bailey 1994: 9; Barton 1955; Lazarsfeld 1962), or more precisely as “the selection of a
certain number of combinations of groups of variables” (Capecchi 1968: 9). Unlike ‘factor-
centered’ research designs – which focus on individual explanatory factors – typologies
always look at clusters of at least two dimensions or variables (see also Winch 1947).
Ideally, the different types or classes emerging from typologies fulfill two conditions: they
are both exhaustive and mutually exclusive. This means (a) that all instances belonging to
the group of objects to which the typology refers – be it people, countries, fruits or cars –
can be subsumed under one class of the typology (exhaustiveness), and (b) that the classes
must not be overlapping (mutual exclusivity) (see Bailey 1994: 3). Following Bailey,
any typology should further seek to maximize both internal homogeneity (i.e. the objects
forming part of the same type should be as similar as possible) and external heterogeneity
(i.e. the different types should be as different as possible) – always with regard to the
dimensions measured (1994: 1–2; see also Kluge 2000). In other words, typologies can be
understood as a combination of attributes that allows a meaningful distinction between
different classes (types) of a particular phenomenon.
Typologies have unique advantages (but also some marked disadvantages) when com-
pared with other methodological approaches.25 As George and Bennett point out, the
advantages lie in their “ability to address complex phenomena without oversimplifying,
clarify similarities and differences among cases to facilitate comparisons, provide a com-
prehensive inventory of all possible kinds of cases, incorporate interactions effects, and
24With respect to Lijphart’s work, this question is about the following: “[D]oes the type of democracy make
a difference for public policy and for the effectiveness of government?” (1999: xii).
25For a short discussion of advantages and disadvantages see also Bailey (1994: 11–16).
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draw attention to ‘empty cells’ or kinds of cases that have not occurred and perhaps can-
not occur” (2004: 233). Typification further allows us to reduce real-world complexity,
identify similarities and differences that were so far invisible and to conceptualize given
phenomena in a new and more refined manner (Bailey 1994: 12–14, see also Lauth 2009:
154). However, the construction or use of typologies can also entail some marked dangers
or disadvantages. Sartori pointed to the problems of ‘conceptual traveling’ (in how far can
existing concepts be applied to new cases?) and ‘conceptual stretching’ (in how far can new
empirical findings be associated with pre-existing types even if they do not perfectly match
them?) that are particularly acute in the context of typologies (Sartori 1970: 1033–1036;
see also Lauth 2009: 155). Associated with this are the risks of reification and ‘puzzle
relabeling’ that may emerge with the use of typologies: it is tempting to impose the logic
of certain theoretically derived or heuristic types on actual empirical cases and thereby
‘reify’ a theoretically formed concept, or to simply relabel an existing problem or puzzle
by the use of seemingly new types (see Elman 2005: 320 and Bailey 1994: 16).
The use of typologies has given rise to profound mistrust among parts of the academic
community against their application as a systematic research methodology. They persis-
tently carry a reputation as being “rather mysterious” methodological tools (Bailey 1994:
1; see also Kluge 2000 and Elman 2005: 296). This is in part confirmed by authors of
typologies themselves, who tend to highlight the poor methodological underpinnings of
typification methods and sometimes portray them as ‘underdeveloped’ research tools (see
e.g. Elman 2005). This stems, on the one hand, from the large diversity of tasks for
which typologies are used, which contributes to a vast array of different kinds of typologies.
Thinking only of ideal, real, empirical, explanatory, constructed, classificatory, descriptive,
extractive, heuristic, existential or normative types – and this is not the end of the spectrum
– gives a vivid illustration for the potential confusion stemming from the use of typologies.
On the other hand, the seemingly primitive character of typologies in comparison to more
‘advanced’ methodologies is certainly also propelled by the fact that most typologies
indeed are non-scientific. Organizing empirical phenomena into different types constantly
occurs during everyday life, and most of the terms and concepts we naturally use are in
fact the result of implicit or explicit typologies – so called ‘folk-typifications’ (McKinney
1969). Hence, typification is much less a method than a universal analytical activity that is
implicitly or explicitly involved in all kinds of cognitive processes (see Bailey 1994: 1).
As a consequence of the mistrust and general confusion revolving around typologies in
the social sciences, a self-imposed degree of analytical rigidity is particularly important
for authors of typologies. As a starting point, researchers interested in their practical use
typically begin by explicitly stating the purpose and nature of their typology, which often
amounts the construction of yet another ‘typology of typologies’ in order to relate the own
typology to other forms. The drawback, obviously, is that this “wastes time much better
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spent on substantive research” (Elman 2005: 294).26 However, it indeed often helps to
clarify (even for the researcher) what the ultimate nature of the typology is. Therefore, it
appears necessary to ‘recreate’ some central thoughts on typologies here, too. This is done
in the following section, where another ‘typology of typologies’ is presented.
b) A Typology of Typologies
In the context of this work, the necessity to formulate yet another ‘typology of typologies’
stems from a feeling of dissatisfaction about how different kinds of typologies are typically
distinguished. As indicated above, typologies can fulfill many different purposes and
can be constructed by different techniques. These two aspects – the manner in which a
typology is derived and its actual purpose – are two distinct features that should be kept
apart from one another but that are unfortunately often conflated.
Backing this claim requires some elaboration about the nature of these two dimensions.
The first dimension deals with the way by which the typology is derived. In principle,
this can be done either through empirical observation (inductive) or logical deduction
(deductive) – a distinction that goes back to the so called ‘heuristic-empirical’ divide
(Bailey 1973: 18) so prominently discussed in the methodological literature on typologies.
A common vocabulary to differentiate these terms is lacking. Inductive typologies are
referred to as empirical, descriptive, classificatory or extractive typologies and sometimes
also as taxonomies (see e.g. Bailey 1994; Elman 2005; Lehnert 2007). In contrast,
deductive typologies are referred to as abstract, ideal, heuristic or explanatory typologies
(see e.g. Capecchi 1968; Elman 2005; Lehnert 2007; Winch 1947). The second dimension
has to do with the purpose of the typology. Typologies in the social sciences often aim at
either describing or explaining a certain phenomenon. This reflects the two fundamental
goals of social sciences as they can, for instance, be found in King et al.: descriptive and
causal inference (1994: 34). Descriptive inference, according to them, aims at “infer[ring]
information about unobserved facts from the facts we have observed” (1994: 34). For
instance, when we are able to classify someone we observe as, say, a choleric person by
making use of a pre-existing typology, we can infer many more characteristics about him
than the ones we have actually observed. Causal inference, in contrast, generally aims at
establishing cause-effect relationships between independent and dependent variables (King
et al. 1994: 76).27 Typologies can be used for causal inference when they establish a link
between the type of a phenomenon (i.e. the box in which the phenomenon can be located)
and a specific outcome. Unlike in factor or variable-centered research designs, where
the aim is generally to isolate the independent effect of a specific explanatory variable,
26Capecchi’s ‘typology of typologies’, for example, is extremely helpful for mapping the varieties of
existing typologies, but with its seven dimensions overly complex for researchers seeking guidance in
the construction of a typology.
27For an informed review of different kinds of causal explanation see in particular Brady (2002).
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typologies can necessarily only demonstrate the combined effect of the different variables
upon which it relies (see Lehnert 2007).28
The problem, now, is that many writings on typologies implicitly seem to assume
that deductively derived typologies always aim at explanation, while inductively arrived
typologies are limited to description.29 In other words, a typology’s purpose often is
conflated with the way the typology is derived – although those are two entirely different
things. Here, it is argued that it is necessary to distinguish these two aspects. In principle,
nothing speaks against using an inductively constructed typology for explaining, or using
a deductively arrived typology for describing something. In other words, a typology’s
purpose depends on the logic of inference one is trying to establish and is not already
determined by the way the typology was constructed. Combining these two dimensions
into a small two-by-two matrix generates four possible types of typologies, as depicted in
table 1.1. The cells on the left hand side contain those typologies that aim at establishing
descriptive inference. Of these, the upper-left cell contains inductively derived typologies,
which are simply called taxonomies here. They attempt to shed light on the question
by which clusters of attributes a phenomenon is structured. The lower-left cell captures
deductively derived typologies that aim at establishing descriptive inference. They are
called property spaces (Elman 2005) here and aim at answering the question by which
combinations of attributes a phenomenon could be structured. The right-hand side of the
table contains those typologies that aim at establishing causal inference. These typologies
generally are constructed for the purpose of explaining a certain outcome of interest and
therefore typically contain at least one dependent variable. But, again, these typologies
may be derived both inductively and deductively. The upper right cell contains inductively
derived typologies aiming at establishing causal inference; they are called explorative
typologies here. The relevant question is how different clusters of attributes are linked to
the outcome of interest. The lower right cell captures typologies that aim at explanation
and are derived deductively. They are called explanatory typologies and focus on the
question what outcome we can expect from different combinations of groups of variables.
This distinction is relevant for the typology of post-conflict polities, because the con-
struction of the latter involved various steps that each led to the creation of a different
temporary typology. Locating these steps in the above framework helps to understand their
distinct purposes and limitations. However, the four types of typologies outlined above
implicitly suggest a clear-cut divide between inductive and deductive ways for deriving
28The most well-known illustration of the practical use of this technique stems from Elman (2005; 2009).
Using the example of Stephen Walt’s ‘balance of threat’ theory, John Mearsheimer’s theory of ‘offensive
structural realism’ and Randall Schweller’s neoclassical ‘balance-of-interests’ theory, Elman intends to
illustrate a number of techniques for refining explanatory typologies as well as some potentials perils and
pitfalls associated with the use of typologies in the social sciences.
29For instance, what Lehnert (2007) calls ideal (deductive) and extractive (inductive) typologies is synony-
mous to what Elman (2005) calls explanatory and descriptive/ classificatory typologies, respectively. It is
hence implicitly assumed that deductively arrived typologies always aim at explaining social phenomena
and inductively derived typologies at describing social phenomena.
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Table 1.1: A Typology of Typologies
a typology. In most cases, the construction of typologies is rarely completely inductive
or completely deductive. The two categories must rather be seen as the end-points of
a continuum. In practice these two procedures are almost always intermingled to some
degree. Even the most inductive researcher necessarily has a system of concepts in mind
(McKinney calls them ‘folk-typifications’) by which she structures reality. By the same
token, most ‘pre-existing’ analytical categories are in some sense linked to prior experience.
Thus, whether a typology is constructed inductively or deductively is a gradual rather than
a categorical question, and sometimes both approaches can be combined fruitfully. In this
sense, the types identified above can be regarded as ideal types – that is, types that can
only be matched to a certain degree in reality, but never fully.
1.2.3 The Process of Typology Construction
As stated in the previous section, any researcher attempting to construct a typology should
first of all make a choice with regard to the purpose of that endeavor: does the typology
aim at describing or explaining a certain phenomenon? The purpose of the typology
of post-conflict polities developed here is clearly about description. Since there is no
systematic distinction with regard to different patterns of post-conflict authority, the aim
is to construct one. As Bailey highlights, “[c]lassification is the premier descriptive tool”
and the main advantage of typologies lies in their ability to “provide an exhaustive and
perhaps even definitive array of types” by which cases can be classified (Bailey 1994: 12).
The process of constructing the typology in this dissertation was multi-faceted and relied
on both deductive reasoning and empirical research. The procedure roughly followed a
four-stage model for constructing so called ‘empirically grounded’ typologies30 formulated
by Susann Kluge. In an attempt to formulate a generic procedure for the construction
of typologies, she proposes the following four steps: (1) establishing relevant analytical
dimensions, (2) classifying cases and analyzing empirical regularities, (3) analyzing the
context/ coherence of the classes and reducing them into materially relevant types, (4)
characterizing the types in an empirically rich manner (1999: 260–288; see also Kelle
30In German: “Stufenmodell empirisch begründeter Typenbildung” (Kluge 1999).
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and Kluge 2010: 91–107; Kluge 2000). The procedure chosen here loosely followed this
procedure:
1. Deriving a taxonomy of post-conflict polities: The first step involved in the con-
struction of the typology of post-conflict polities was to identify relevant analytical
dimensions on which the further work could be based. With this in mind, an empiri-
cal analysis on a subset of cases31 contained in the universe of cases followed (see
1.3). Based on the framework of analysis (see 2.1.2), the purpose was to identify
clusters of cases depicting fundamentally different characteristics with regard to the
interactions unfolding between the former warring parties, external actors and the
formal government. The end-product of this process was, in the above terminol-
ogy, a taxonomy of post-conflict polities containing a number of implicit analytical
dimensions.
2. Formulating a property space and classifying cases: The goal of the second step
was to extract those analytical dimensions implicitly contained in the taxonomy
yielded in step one and rearrange them into a property space in the name of the above
typology. This process was a truly retroductive32 activity that involved both inductive
and deductive reasoning. The starting point was a study of theoretical literature
on post-conflict settings with the aim of identifying possible analytical dimensions
(an analytical toolbox) relevant for characterizing post-conflict authority. The end
result of this step comes closest to what is called a property space in table 1.1 above.
As required by methodological writings on the topic, this property space should
ideally establish classes that are both mutually exclusive and exhaustive, that is, each
potential polity case should fit into one (and only one) box of the property space.33
This property space was then used as the basis for classifying a broad set of cases
contained in the universe of cases. However, the careful classification of the cases
required a somewhat detailed knowledge of the respective conflict and post-conflict
contexts that cannot readily be found in qualitative or quantitative databases. In an
effort to make the classification of the cases as transparent as possible, a detailed
analysis of the background of all cases was therefore carried out, amounting to
hundreds of pages of empirical material. These reports can be found in appendix A,
beginning on page 325.
3. Formulating semantically meaningful types: The property space formulated in step
two is a map listing possible classes of post-conflict polities and associating different
31It included the following cases (in alphabetical order): Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Côte d’Ivoire,
East Timor, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone.
32This term goes back to Charles Ragin (1994), who introduced it in order to denote research strategies that
rely on a sequential application of both inductive and deductive methods. A similar concept underlies
Jean-Paul Sartre’s theory of progressive and regressive methods of phenomenology (see e.g. Smith 1979).
33The result of this process is presented in section 2.2, for more information on the process of compression
and expansion, see section B in the appendix.
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empirical cases with them. However, this is not yet the same as deriving semantically
meaningful types of post-conflict polities. It was hence necessary to condense the
property space such that it contains (a) only those types that are internally coherent,
and (b) those types that actually appear in the real world. This became possible
through a process of both logical and empirical compression and expansion (Elman
2005) (or, in Lazarsfeld’s (1937) classical terminology, as a process of substruction
and reduction). Logical compression implies erasing all cells that appear logically
inconclusive, whereas logical expansion implies adding classes based on an abstract
combination of the different analytical dimensions. By the same token, empirical
compression means erasing cells that do not appear in the real world,34 while
empirical expansion is about adding meaningful classes for those cases that are not
adequately represented by an existing property space (see Elman 2005). At the
end of this process stood a typology consisting of six types of post-conflict polities,
which is depicted in table 2.1 on page 44. In the above typology of typologies, this
would be located somewhere between ‘taxonomies’ and ‘property spaces’. (For
more detailed information on the process of compression and expansion, see section
B in the appendix).
4. Characterizing the types: The final step in the establishment of the typology aimed
at a rich empirical characterization of the types. When looking only at the boxes
of the refined property space, we do not learn much about the different types. The
boxes tell us little about the common characteristics and specific dynamics of the
cases they comprise. What does it mean for Côte d’Ivoire to be classified as a ‘The
Winner Took it All’ polity? What can be inferred from this knowledge about other
instances of this type? The interest here lies primarily on those common dynamics
that can be interpreted as specific polity characteristics.
At the end of this chain stands a property space that consists of the three analytical
dimensions described above: the distribution of executive power between the former
belligerents (power-sharing vs. domination), the relations between the former warring
parties (constructive vs. obstructive) and the manner by which external actors are engaged
in a post-conflict polity (mediative vs. partisan vs. supreme). All of these dimensions
are measured in a categorical manner, i.e. they only include two or – in one case – three
categories. For the distribution of executive power, for example, this implies that the cases
are put in one of the two boxes ‘power-sharing’ or ‘domination’, whereas the degree of
power-sharing or domination is not measured. This, obviously, is a very rough measure
that conflates many of the differences existing within the category of power-sharing itself
(for instance: is power-sharing a constitutional requirement or an ad hoc measure imposed
34However, although these cases do not form part of the actual empirically grounded typology, the classes
erased because they do not occur in the real world should still be retained in the property space since
they could potentially occur at some point in the future.
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by external actors? How equal is the distribution of power between the former belligerents?
Is power-sharing effectively applied or is it more a masquerade set up in order to satisfy
Western donors?), and it necessarily invokes the cutting-point or threshold problem (see
e.g. Lauth 2009: 157–158). Undoubtedly, each of the dimensions could be refined to
include further categories or could, theoretically, even be measured on a continuous scale.35
However, aside from the fact that this would lead to an exponential rise in the number
of cells soon reaching the point where the typology becomes meaningless (see Bailey
1994: 4), it also violates the purpose of the typology to be a simple and parsimonious tool
by which to structure reality. In addition, starting at a rougher and more abstract level
does not automatically imply to remain silent on possible within-type differences. In the
in-depth characterization of the different types, many such differences will be spelled out
and highlighted.
1.3 Operationalizing Key Concepts
George and Bennett have pointed out that “the cases in a given study must all be instances
[. . . ] of only one phenomenon” (George and Bennett 2004: 69). This can be achieved by
explicitly defining the ‘universe of cases’ before conducting any empirical analysis. In
order to do so in the context of this dissertation, it is necessary to operationalize the key
concepts on which this dissertation is based – most notably the post-conflict polity concept.
This requires to address three separate but interrelated questions: what counts as an armed
conflict, what counts as a post-conflict situation, and what qualifies any given post-conflict
situation as a potential post-conflict polity case?
1.3.1 Operationalizing Armed Conflicts
‘What is a civil war and how do I recognize one if I see it?’ This question is not always easy
to answer. In general, a civil war can be understood as a specific type of armed conflict.
Not all conflicts are armed; the majority of conflicts proceeds peacefully and leads to
constructive outcomes (Bonacker and Imbusch 2006: 67; Cramer 2006; Kriesberg 2002).36
Whether or not conflicts turn violent depends, among other things, on the existence of
social institutions designed for mitigating them (see Koehler and Zürcher 2003). In the
greater part of the world, and in the non-OECD context in particular, such institutions are
only partially present or are lacking entirely, which increases the risk of conflicts becoming
35On the aspect of dichotomous vs. continuous coding see in particular Collier and Adcock (1999).
36As Dieter Senghaas reminds us, conflict is inherent to all kinds of human interaction – even if we apply
a ‘best-case anthropology’ (1994: 18). Also Miall et al note that conflict is an “intrinsic and inevitable
aspect of social change” (1999: 4). For a systematic comparison of different conflict definitions, see
Putnam (2006).
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violent (see e.g. Senghaas 1994; 2004).37 Conflicts that become violent are classified
according to their intensity. The highest level of intensity for an armed conflict is war,
which is traditionally defined by International Relations scholars as “large-scale organized
violence between politically defined groups” (Levy 2002: 351). Void of much substantive
meaning, the understanding of this definition depends on the interpretation of the terms
‘large-scale’, ‘organized’ and ‘politically defined’. The Correlates of War (COW) project
(Sarkees and Schafer 2000; Singer 1972; Small and Singer 1982) – the oldest and most
widely used dataset on armed conflict – has originally defined war as “sustained combat
between/among official military contingents involving substantial casualties” (see Sarkees
and Schafer 2000: 124).38 Civil wars are defined by the same project as wars that are
“fought against the regime of a state member” in which four additional criteria are met: “(a)
military action was involved, (b) the central government at the time was actively involved,
(c) effective resistance (as measured by the ratio of fatalities of the weaker to the stronger
forces) occurred on both sides, and (d) at least 1,000 battle deaths resulted during the
civil war” (Sarkees and Schafer 2000: 129).39 However, rigidly applying these criteria
to existing cases is not always easy. As Nicholas Sambanis notes, “too many cases are
sufficiently ambiguous to make coding the start and end of the war problematic and to
question the strict categorization of an event of political violence as a civil war as opposed
to an act of terrorism, a coup, genocide, organized crime, or international war” (2004: 815).
In addition to that, the standard definition of civil wars has been considered unsatisfactory,
since armed conflicts below the level of a war may still have far-reaching effects. This gave
rise to a number of alternative datasets, most notably the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict
Dataset’ (Gleditsch et al. 2002), which is by now the second most frequently used dataset
on armed conflict. It generally defines armed conflict as
“a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use
of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state,
results in at least 25 battle-related deaths” in one calendar year (UCDP and PRIO
2008: 1).40
37Modern, pluralistic and politicized societies as they first emerged in Western Europe dispose of a dense web
of such institutions – for example a state monopoly of power, the rule of law or democratic participation –
that interdependently support peaceful ways of conflict transformation (see Senghaas 1994: 17–30).
38Thereby, they have effectively reproduced the discipline’s bias towards interstate wars (see Eberwein and
Chojnacki 2001: 2; Levy 2002: 351; Sarkees and Schafer 2000: 124–135). This is striking, as wars
taking place within states have by far outnumbered those taking place between states ever since the end
of World War II (see also page 3).
39This strongly resembles the definition used by Doyle and Sambanis, who additionally require that fighting
is “relatively continual”, that it “takes place within the country’s boundaries”, and that “the rebels must
recruit mostly locally, controlling some part of the country’s territory” (2006: 31).
40In the UCDP/ Prio terminology, conflicts in which the number of battle deaths observed in one calendar
year falls between 25 and 999 are called “minor armed conflicts” if the total number of battle deaths
observed over the course of the conflict remains below 1,000 and “intermediate armed conflicts” if the
total number of battle deaths lies above 1,000. Those conflicts in which 1,000 battle deaths or more were
reached in one calendar year alone are called “wars” (Gleditsch et al. 2002: 619).
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Lowering the threshold of violence from 1,000 to 25 has a number of advantages. Although
it still is an arbitrary figure, the risk of excluding salient cases that fall short of the threshold
is much lower. The conflict in Haiti is a case in point: although coded as a ‘minor armed
conflict’ in the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’, it triggered tremendous international
attention and led to the deployment of a UN peacekeeping mission (MINURCAT). The
same holds true, for instance, for the conflicts in Côte d’Ivoire or Macedonia. Out of these
reasons, the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’ (in the version 4-2009) was used here
as the basis for identifying relevant cases of civil wars, defined as intra-state conflicts41 in
the dataset.
1.3.2 Operationalizing Post-Conflict Situations
Deciding what counts as a post-conflict situation is intimately linked to a prior definition
of armed conflicts. However, a post-conflict situation is not necessarily synonymous with
the absence of conflict but represents a significant reduction of conflict activity, mostly
accompanied by some sort of settlement (a ceasefire, peace-agreements, secession, etc).
Because of this ambiguous meaning of the term ‘post-conflict’, some scholars prefer the
term ‘post-settlement’ instead (see van der Du Toit 2003; Miall et al. 1999). However, for
pragmatic reasons it still makes sense to speak of post-conflict situations – most notably
because this term continues to be widely used in academic and policy debates.
In general, the termination of an internal armed conflict is the starting point for any
post-conflict situation. There are many reasons why an armed conflict can be considered
terminated – including peace or ceasefire agreements and one-sided victories among the
most important ones. But some conflict simply end by conflict inactivity. Since this does
not delineate the conflict from the post-conflict period clearly enough, those cases in which
the conflict ended out of a mere conflict inactivity were excluded from the analysis.42
Related to that, the question emerged how long (or based on which criteria) a country
continues to be characterized as a post-conflict situation. For practical reasons, most
analysts of post-conflict situations additionally use a five-year criterion in order to define
the end of a post-conflict period (see e.g. Elbadawi 2008; Suhrke and Samset 2007; Zürcher
2006). Here, such an arbitrary criterion is not applied. The reason is simply that countries
differ too strongly in their rate of post-conflict development. Some countries are able to
leave the armed conflict behind relatively quickly, while in others the dynamics that gave
41An additional distinction is drawn between internal armed conflict and internationalized internal armed
conflicts, depending on whether they were purely internal or whether external parties were involved.
42The main conflict table in the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’ itself does not contain information
about the manner of conflict termination; therefore, this information was taken from the ‘Armed Conflict
Termination Dataset’(Kreutz 2006) – a dataset that is based on and fully compatible with the main
conflict table. It contains six possible categories of conflict termination: peace-agreements, ceasefire
agreements, ceasefire agreements with conflict regulations, victory, ‘no or low conflict activity’, and
‘other’ (see Kreutz 2008; par. 3.1.2). Cases falling into category five (‘no or low conflict activity’) were
excluded from the universe of cases.
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rise to the armed conflict remain virulent much longer than only five years. Macedonia, for
instance, is a country that experienced a low-intensity conflict and was able to get back
to ordinary politics relatively quickly, although it certainly remained influenced by the
preceding armed conflict (see 3.2 and A.14). The Democratic Republic of the Congo (see
4.2 and A.7) or Liberia (see 6.2 and A.13), in contrast, are countries that are still highly
fragile, although the official settlement took place several years ago. As this indicates,
deciding whether or not it is adequate to reduce a country to its characteristics as a post-
conflict case depends on the concrete circumstances of a given case rather than any general
criterion. Out of this reason, I avoid to define a general end-point criterion for post-conflict
situations. The only exception is when a post-conflict situation is disrupted by the outbreak
of a new war.
The ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’ (in the version 4-2009) covers all armed
conflict that occurred between 1 January 1946 and 31 December 2008. Here, the period of
investigation is confined to the post-Cold War period – both for pragmatic and substantive
reasons. As argued above, the end of the Cold War has clearly heightened external actors’
willingness and capacity to intervene in internal conflicts. Many of the core concepts
and approaches that today shape external actors’ interventions, including the concept of
post-conflict peacebuilding itself, were only established in the post-Cold War period (see
page 2). Therefore, only those armed conflicts are taken into consideration that ended after
1989. In addition to that, since the April 2009 version of the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict
Dataset’ was used, the cutoff-point for armed conflicts to be taken into consideration is 31
December 2008. Therefore, conflicts that were terminated after that date, like the civil war
in Sri Lanka, are ignored here. Likewise, if in any given case the conflict activity recurred
between the end of 2008 and the time of this writing, this development is not accounted
for in this dissertation (unless stated otherwise). Combining these different criteria leads to
the following operational definition of a post-conflict situation: A post-conflict situation
can be defined as a period following the termination of an intra-state conflict episode as
defined by the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’, which was terminated between 1990
and 2008 by any means other than conflict inactivity.
1.3.3 Operationalizing Post-Conflict Polities
Based on this definition of post-conflict situations, the post-conflict polity concept can
now be operationalized. As noted above, it aims at capturing hybrid patterns of authority
unfolding at the nexus between domestic actors on the one hand and between domestic and
external actors on the other hand. This requires that for any given post-conflict situation
to qualify as a post-conflict polity case, two additional criteria must be met. The first
criterion requires that the preceding conflict was not limited to a sub-region of the country
in question, unless it has successfully led to a secession and international recognition of
the territory as an independent state. The reason for this criterion is simply to exclude
situations like that in Russia, which is contained in the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict
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Dataset’ as a civil war case because of the secessionist war in Chechnya. Although this
case is fully in accordance with the conflict definition this dataset uses, it would seem
absurd to treat Russia as a whole as a post-conflict polity because of the civil war in
Chechnya; but it would be in contrast to the post-conflict polity concept to consider
Chechnya as a case despite the fact that it remains a part of Russia. East Timor, in contrast,
has successfully seceded from Indonesia and was recognized as an independent state by
the international community (see A.8). In this case, it makes sense to consider East Timor
alone as a post-conflict polity case. Kosovo is an in-between case. Though the country is
currently not (yet) an internationally recognized state, it unilaterally declared independence
in 2008. In addition to that, as a territory administered by the international community
since 1999, Kosovo has depicted a degree of autonomy that justifies to include it as a de
facto independent case (see A.12).
The second criterion requires that the country in question experienced a significant effort
for post-conflict reconstruction during or after the settlement of the conflict. Since the
post-conflict polity concept is targeted at the nexus of authority unfolding between external
and domestic actors, it is obviously necessary that external actors were actually involved
in the polity. The presence of a UN peacekeeping mission is the best indicator for that,
since the UN is the organization most frequently involved in conflict and post-conflict
settlements. Although there are cases in which the main peacekeeping responsibility
rested on the shoulders of another agency – for instance the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia (see A.13) or NATO in Kosovo (see A.12) – the UN is
almost always present through at least a small peace support mission organized by the UN’s
Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Therefore, the existence of a UN peacekeeping
mission in a given post-conflict situation can be used as a proxy for determining the
presence of external actors in general.43 In conjunction, these factors lead to the following
operational definition of the post-conflict polity concept: A post-conflict situation (as
defined above) qualifies as a candidate for a post-conflict polity case if the preceding
conflict was not confined to a sub-region of the country and if a significant engagement of
external actors in the post-conflict phase can be observed, determined by the presence of a
UN peacekeeping mission. Table 1.2 on page 30 provides an overview of all case selection
criteria.
1.4 Cases and Case Selection
Applying the above criteria to the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’ and filtering them
for the existence of a UN peacekeeping mission yields 22 countries that have experienced
at least one post-conflict period between 1 January 1990 and 31 December, 2008. Of those,
four countries were later excluded from the analysis upon closer qualitative investigation
43This was determined on the basis of those missions listed on the website of the UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2010) as of 21 April, 2009.
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Criterion Description
Conflict
Type
’Internal Armed Conflict’ as defined by UCDP/ Prio
Armed Conflict Data set
Outcome
The conflict was terminated by any means other than
conflict inactivity
Conflict
Termination
The conflict was terminated between 1 January 1990
and 31 December 2008
Intervention
The conflict has led to the deployment of a UN Peace-
keeping mission
Territorial
Spread
The conflict was not limited to a sub-region of a state
unless this region successfully seceded from the main
state
Table 1.2: Criteria for the Universe of Cases
because they could, overall, not be treated as true post-conflict situations.44 Table 1.3
on page 31 contains an overview of the remaining 18 countries and, for each of them,
lists pre-conflict, during-conflict and post-conflict episodes. Note that the number of
actual post-conflict polity-cases (28) is higher than the number of post-conflict countries.45
This is the case for two reasons. First, some countries (for instance Angola, Liberia or
Haiti) experienced two conflict episodes in the period under investigation. The resulting
post-conflict periods are regarded as different post-conflict polity cases. Second, there are
also some cases in which, within one post-conflict polity period, two different post-conflict
polity types materialized due to significant changes in the constellation of post-conflict
authority (for instance in Côte d’Ivoire).
1.4.1 Overview of the Case Material
As table 1.3 illustrates, the countries included in the analysis represent a broad geographical
variety. Most of them are located in Africa (Angola, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic
Republic of the Congo, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone). They are followed
by four Asian cases (Afghanistan, Cambodia, East Timor and Tajikistan), three European
countries (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Kosovo) and three countries located in the
Americas (El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti).46 In addition to that, the countries differed with
44These were the Central African Republic, Chad, Croatia and Somalia. For further reasons for their
exclusion, see appendix A.
45For an overview of the classification results, see table A.1 on page 327 in appendix A.
46The distinction between these regions and the classification of the cases to them is taken from the ‘UCDP/
Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’ (version 4-2009).
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Year 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Afghanistan ←
Angola ←
BiH
Burundi
Cambodia ←
Côte D’Ivoire
DRC
El Salvador ←
Guatemala ←
Haiti
Kosovo
East Timor
Liberia
Macedonia
Mozambique ←
Rwanda
Sierra Leone
Tajikistan
Legend: = pre-war = minor armed conflict = war = post-conflict
Table 1.3: Overview of Post-Conflict Cases
regard to the intensity of the armed conflicts that took place. Of the 21 armed conflicts
included in the sample, the majority (15) reached the intensity of a war (that is, they
experienced more than 1,000 battle-related deaths in any year of the conflict) while the
remaining six are classified as ‘minor armed conflicts’ in the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict
Dataset’ (that is, they experienced between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths).
There are also various other characteristics based on which the cases can be differentiated.
They are not contained in the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’ itself, but can be
inferred from the qualitative case characterizations contained in the appendix. By definition,
in all of the cases some contender was fighting against the government. However, this
happened for different motives. In the majority of cases, the civil wars had a strong ethnic
or tribal component. This was the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kosovo, Liberia, Macedonia and Rwanda. Though it
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would be false to reduce the origins of the conflict to ethnic differences per se, ethnic or
tribal factors clearly stood out as decisive factors in these cases.47 In the other cases, this
ethnic component was either lacking or was overshadowed by other dynamics that proved
more important. In some of the cases included in the sample the conflict was primarily
about ideological differences between the conflict parties, as in Angola (during the first
conflict episode), Mozambique and El Salvador and Cambodia. With some reservations,
Afghanistan and Tajikistan can be added to this list, too. Another group of conflicts
contained in the sample was more clearly about the control of a specific territory, most
notably Kosovo and East Timor (although these conflicts were sparked by ethnic factors
as well). Finally, the last group of conflicts was driven primarily by struggles over who
controls the government, without large ethnic, ideological or territorial underpinnings.
This group consists of the conflicts in Sierra Leone and Haiti.
The cases also differ greatly in the degree of third-party involvement they enjoyed.
While all countries were subject to at least one UN peacekeeping mission in the period
under investigation, the size, strength and mandate of these missions differed greatly. Some
cases enjoyed more traditional peacekeeping missions (for example: Mozambique, El
Salvador or Côte d’Ivoire); others hosted complex, multi-dimensional peace-enforcement
missions based on a robust (Chapter VII) mandate (for example: Liberia or the Democratic
Republic of the Congo); and again others even were subject to a direct involvement of
third parties in their post-conflict governance structures (Bosnia-Herzegovina, East Timor
and Kosovo).
1.4.2 Criteria for Case Selection
All of the cases mentioned above are discussed in the appendix. Of those, ten cases
were chosen as the basis for the detailed characterization of the different polity types
contained in chapters three to seven – i.e. two cases per polity type. In order to select
those, two criteria were applied. First, the goal was to select typical cases48 (see e.g.
Seawright and Gerring 2008), which are understood here as cases that can be unequivocally
classified and match the characteristics of one type very closely. Although all cases could
be subsumed under either of the different polity types, the classification was in some cases
more clear-cut than in other cases. Because the goal of the empirical case studies was to
demonstrate typical polity characteristics, it was necessary to choose cases which are most
representative for the given polity types. The second criterion used for selecting cases
derived from the goal of ensuring a broad geographical variety in the different case studies.
It is the stated goal of the typology to identify differences which go beyond the historical
47See also the discussion on conflict theories in section C in the appendix.
48The term ‘typical case’ is mostly applied in the context of causal models. Seawright and Gerring describe
it as a case which is “well explained by an existing model” and is representative for a specific “cross-case
relationship” of interest (2008: 299). Here, the term is used in a descriptive sense. As case is typical or
representative for a specific polity type if its main characteristics are well described by the theoretical
dimensions of this type.
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or geographical idiosyncrasies of the different cases. The best mechanism for ensuring
this is to select two cases from diverse geographical backgrounds for each of the polity
types (where possible). This strengthens the argument that the observed dynamics are
not merely regional contingencies, but that they represent factors that can be attributed
to the specific polity types. However, there are some occasions where the two selection
criteria are in conflict – i.e. where ensuring a broader geographical variety would imply to
choose a case that is less typical. In these cases, preference was given to the first criterion:
identifying typical characteristics is considered more important than ensuring geographical
variety (and risking that the results are overshadowed by a less than ideal fit between the
polity types and the selected cases). This was mainly the case for ‘The Winner Took it
All’ polities: both of the cases – Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire – are geographically located
in West Africa and even share a long border. Yet, as argued in more detail in chapter six,
these two cases promised the best fit to the overall polity characteristics and were therefore
chosen instead of alternative, non-African cases (Cambodia after the elections in 1993 or
Haiti in the post-Aristide period). A third factor that played a role for the case selection
process was to avoid using countries twice for demonstrating the characteristics of different
polities. Hence, those countries in which different polity types materialized in consecutive
post-conflict phases – for instance Sierra Leone, Liberia or the Democratic Republic of the
Congo – were each only used in one of the empirical chapters below.
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Patterns of Post-Conflict Polities
In the introduction it was argued that the end of the Cold War has brought forward a vast
diversity of post-conflict countries which differ in many respects. Cambodia, a country
where roughly one-fifth of the population was extinguished during the Khmer Rouge’s
terror regime (see A.5), is rather remote from countries such as Macedonia (see A.14) or
Haiti (see A.11), where not more than a few hundred people fell victim to internal violence.
Sierra Leone, a country that became tragically known for a ruthless campaign of plundering
and self-enrichment (see A.17), can hardly be compared with Mozambique (see A.15),
which suffered from an ideologically adorned Cold-War conflict. Seemingly anarchic
countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia that occupy bottom
ranks on all development indicators obviously face different challenges than countries
such as Bosnia and Herzegovina or Kosovo, which are comparatively well-off and located
in the center of Europe. While these examples illustrate the necessity to draw further
differentiations within the broad category of post-conflict polities, they also highlight the
inherent difficulty of this task.
This chapter presents the theoretical foundations and the actual, empirically derived
typology for dealing with this problem. Section 2.1 develops the post-conflict polity
concept as an alternative conceptualization and presents the analytical framework that
was used for constructing the typology. This section also formulates a simple model of
interactions in post-conflict polities, which provides the basis for the analysis of post-
conflict interactions in the empirical chapters later in this dissertation. The final typology is
presented in section 2.2. Most importantly, this section contains a theoretical discussion of
the different dimensions of the typology. Section 2.3 provides an overview of the different
polity types and points out some of their main characteristics. Finally, section 2.4 contains
a discussion about the internal dynamics of the different polity types.
2.1 Post-Conflict Situations as Post-Conflict Polities
The introduction highlighted a profound dilemma of conceptually dealing with post-
conflict situations: if most of them are neither phases of transition towards consolidated
statehood nor can be regarded (with few exceptions) as the result of concluded processes
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of statebuilding, then how can we conceive of them at all? The post-conflict polity
concept suggests analyzing post-conflict situations as instances of a very specific social
phenomenon that can best be understood as political systems characterized by overlapping
and multi-layered patterns of authority. This general idea is now spelled out in more detail
and then converted to a general framework of analysis.
2.1.1 Polities and the Study of Fragmented Authority
The use of the polity-concept in the context of fluid and multi-layered systems of authority
– as they are present in post-conflict situations – requires some justification. The discipline
of comparative politics has developed several different concepts for capturing the nature of
politics. In their “structural-functional system framework”, Almond et al., for instance,
differentiate between systems, structures and functions as the basic underlying analytical
categories. According to this framework, a system can generally be defined as an “object
having moving parts, interacting with a setting or an environment”, whereas political
systems are defined as “a set of institutions and agencies concerned with formulating and
implementing the collective goals of a society or of groups within it.” Structures in the
context of a political system are then understood as “specialized agencies” or institutions
carrying out certain functions, which are in turn understood as the implementation of
policies (2004: 34–36).1
The last aspect, political structure, is the primary object of interest here. Political struc-
tures are about those elements of political systems that are most stable and resilient to
change. A typical example are constitutional provisions – as opposed to, for instance, sim-
ple laws. For this, the term polity is often used, which needs to be distinguished from both
politics (political processes) and policies (political programs or concrete decisions). The
polity concept is generally taken to refer to those characteristics of a political community
that determine the rules of the game, rather than the game itself (see e.g. Easton 1965).
In particular during the post-World War II period, the term was equated exclusively with
formal-institutional factors – for instance with regard to electoral systems or the role of the
executive vis-à-vis the legislator – and was seen as the guarantor of stability in otherwise
fluid political systems (see e.g. Hajer 2003: 182).
However, it has increasingly been questioned whether formal-institutional structures
are really the sole determiner of the ‘rules of the political game’ in recent years. For
the OECD world, this problem is reflected in the ‘de-nationalization’ debate (see e.g.
Habermas 1998; Zangl and Zürn 2003; Zürn 1998) and the accompanying discourse about
the ‘transformation of the state’ (see e.g. Leibfried and Zürn 2006), which stipulates a
general loss of regulatory power for domestic state institutions in the face of increasingly
transnational policy challenges. Marteen Hajer, for instance, is convinced that polities,
understood in the classical sense as constitutional rules, “do not tell us about the new
1The conceptualization of politics as a system goes back to David Easton (1953; 1957: 383).
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rules of the game [anymore]”, and he beliefs that the concept “thus becomes a topic for
empirical analysis again” (Hajer 2003: 176). For the non-OECD world, the importance of
informal factors in politics has been recognized much earlier. Unlike in Western Europe,
the state there has generally not emerged through a process of historical evolution but is
rather the product of an abrupt and inherently violent infusion of state-like institutions by
imperial powers (see e.g. Senghaas 1998). This process of state-infusion clashed with
pre-existing local traditions, which gave rise to a liaison of external and local traditions of
statehood (see Schlichte 2000: 164).2 This resulted in states in which formal-institutional
factors co-exist with informal and traditional modes of governance and in which the latter
often play a more dominant role. Studies on post-colonial politics (in particular in Africa)
have underlined the importance of (neo-)patrimonial networks based on clan affiliation or
kinship and have underlined the hybridism of these regimes (see e.g. Bayart 2000; 2006;
Bayart et al. 1999; Bratton and van de Walle 1994; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Jackson 1990;
Migdal 2001; Reno 1999).
The recognition that an exclusive focus on the hierarchical, formal-institutional charac-
teristics of political regimes is insufficient is one of the factors that has inspired the shift
away from ‘government’ towards the more open and fluid perspective of ‘governance’
(Benz 2004; Rosenau and Czempiel 1992; Schuppert and Zürn 2008; Senghaas 1993).
This has also fostered a broadening of the polity concept and has given rise to various
attempts for reconciling this concept with the fluid, non-hierarchical modes of coordination
that are generally subsumed under the heading ‘governance’. For instance, it has become
rather common in recent years to speak of the ‘global polity’, either in a normative or in a
descriptive-empirical sense (see e.g. Ougaard and Higgott 2002) and the polity concept
is frequently applied in the context of the European Union (see Christiansen et al. 1999
and Balli 2009: 17). R.W.A. Rhodes, one of the pioneers of the governance concept,
used the notion of a “differentiated polity”, characterized, among other things, by the
“fragmentation of policies and politics” (Rhodes 1997: 33), and based on this Chris Ansell
(2000) has introduced the notion of a ‘networked polity’ for describing the fluid character
of the European Union.3 A more flexible use of the polity concept can also be observed in
the discipline of comparative politics. Georg Tsebelis, for instance, has extended the notion
of polities by including not only formal-institutional characteristics of political systems,
but also configurations of actors. In ‘Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work’ he
2“Dort [außerhalb der OECD] ist der Staat nur als Resultat des Zusammenwirkens imperialer Politik –
nämlich des kolonialen Exports anstaltsstaatlicher Elemente – und lokaler Tradition zu verstehen. Diese
historisch hybriden Formen staatlicher Herrschaft stehen in der Zweiten und Dritten Welt fast überall in
unumstrittener Konkurrenz zu anderen Instanzen sozialer Kontrolle” (Schlichte 2000: 164).
3Note that this alleged ‘polity turn’ in EU research is somewhat ambiguous. Following Volker Balli, there
are two established perspectives on the EU as a polity: (a) as institutionalized political authority; and (b)
as community of communication (Balli 2009: 24–33). While the former essentially replicates the formal-
institutionalized understanding of polities as it is traditionally used in comparative politics, the latter
conveys an understanding of polities that sharply deviates from formal-institutionalist understandings. It
asks for the sociological underpinnings that are constitutive for polities (Balli 2009: 30).
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suggests focusing on the number of veto players as the main criterion for distinguishing
political systems, which includes both institutional veto players (determined by the consti-
tution) and partisan veto players (determined by the political system) (Tsebelis 2002: 1–2).
This suggests that the polity concept can potentially be applied to non-hierarchical, fluid,
multi-layered or fragmented modes of coordination and that it is therefore applicable to
post-conflict situations.
The post-conflict polity perspective as it is presented in the next section is a governance
perspective. Rather than focusing on formal-institutional structures, it views structures as
relations between actors. This is also the common denominator of the governance literature.
Most of its core concepts – policy networks, advocacy coalitions, actor constellations,
regimes – focus on relations between actors, rather than the actors themselves. Gunnar
Folke Schuppert, for instance, understands governance as coordination among state and
non-state actors within and through regulative structures (2008: 23).4 According to this
definition, the essence of governance is coordination, and this is a concept that is distinctly
relational – one cannot coordinate alone.5 This focus on relations allows for a tremendous
flexibility of the governance perspective with regard to fluid and fragmented political
structures, as they are present for instance in ‘Areas of Limited Statehood’ (see Draude
2007; Risse 2008) or, more generally, situations of fragmented authority (Migdal 2001).
2.1.2 Framework of Analysis
Frameworks of analysis serve as analytical lenses allowing the observer to look at the
social world from a certain viewpoint. Charles Ragin describes them as “a detailed
sketch or outline of an idea about some phenomenon” (Ragin 1994: 58). Here, the
phenomenon of interest are post-conflict situations, and the underlying idea is that they can
be conceptualized as specific political entities (polities) characterized by multi-layered and
overlapping patterns of authority between external and domestic actors. More specifically,
the argument emphasized here is that post-conflict situations can be understood as specific
forms of fragmented authority in which the main dynamics unfold (a) at the nexus between
formal (state-like) and informal (non-state) authority, and (b) at the interface between
domestic and external authority. This puts a strong emphasis on the de facto exercise of
political authority through a diverse set of actors that have a potentially strong role to play
in the majority of post-conflict environments.6
4Own translation from the German original: “[. . . ] Koordination staatlicher und nichtstaatlicher Akteure in
und durch Regelungsstrukturen”.
5Along a similar line, Claus Offe remarks that governance is a peculiarly ‘subject-less’ process – it is not
driven by subjects (or: actors) themselves. Though actors can coordinate, they cannot do governance,
which is why the outcomes of the coordination process are always at least partially indeterminate and
cannot be anticipated even by the participating actors themselves (2008: 61–62).
6The dichotomy between formal-institutional and substantive-material perspectives is also at the heart
of most writings by the political philosopher Amartya Sen. In his recent book ‘The Idea of Justice’
(2009), he frames this dichotomy as one between arrangement and realization based positions in order to
underline the inadequacies of political theories (or theories of justice, more specifically) that privilege
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The main assumption behind the analytical framework is that the most important dy-
namics in post-conflict environments are those that are located at the interface between
antagonistic domestic power-elites on the one hand and at the interface between these
elites and external actors on the other hand. This implies to restrict the analysis to the elite
level. There are good reasons for this analytical restriction. Elites have increasingly been
recognized as a crucial yet underrated factor in post-conflict reconstruction processes (see
e.g. Sesay et al. 2009). As, for instance, the literature on spoiler management (Greenhill
and Major 2007; Stedman 1997) highlights, the characteristics, preferences or decisions
of single individuals – the leaders of rebel groups or breakaway factions – often play a
crucial role in the aftermath of civil wars. At the same time, a priori confining the analysis
to elites undoubtedly conflates many of the actual dynamics taking place in post-conflict
countries. In some situations Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs), local civil society
organizations, or certain informal authorities (religious leaders, local strongmen and the
like) play a vital role that may only be insufficiently captured by the perspective chosen.
For instance, the Roman Catholic Church has played the key role in brokering the General
Peace Agreement in Mozambique (see e.g. Manning 2002). This is not denied here, but
when attempting to develop a general framework for the comparative analysis of post-
conflict situations, such analytical self-restriction (and the possible loss of information
entailed by it) is unavoidable. ‘Blackboxing’ some complexity is necessary for establishing
an analytical commonality between different historical cases. Otherwise, a typification is
hardly possible because the number of possible categories would soon exceed the number
of actual cases.
Two groups of post-conflict actors stand in the center of attention: the former warring
parties and external actors.7 The former warring parties are often the dominant political
forces in post-conflict environments. They are the ones who have fought the war and
therefore can be held accountable for a possible recurrence of war in the future. By
definition, the warring parties in civil wars can be divided into the government and the
rebel side (see 1.3). The analytical framework takes up this distinction and divides the
group of former warring parties into two poles, Side A and Side B, and each of them
is construed as a post-conflict actor of its own. Of course, there are many situations in
which there were more than two conflict parties, but often it is the case that the different
factions align to loose coalitions, which allows to treat them as one single group. Each
institutions and procedures over actual outcomes. Elsewhere, I have therefore used Sen’s approach to
the standard of living (Sen et al. 1987) as the basis for measuring statebuilding success (see Reisinger
2009a). Note that this section is based on parts of this article.
7These analytical categories are certainly very broad. For instance, the category ‘external actors’ masks
many of the differences and contradictions that usually revolve around external engagement in post-
conflict environments. It certainly makes a difference whether the dominant external actors in a specific
situation are the United Nations (and, if so, whether it is, for instance, the Department of Peacekeeping
Operations – DPKO, or the Department of Political Affairs, DPA), the European Union, or the World
Bank. However, this indeterminacy is necessary in order to use the analytical framework on a broad set
of cases.
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of them may either possess formal or de facto power, or a combination of both. External
actors, in the most general sense, can be all those who have an influence on the governance
of a post-conflict country and who are perceived as ‘outsiders’ by the conflict parties
and/ or parts of the population.8 The probably most frequent case is a UN peacekeeping
mission that is engaged in a post-conflict country for various purposes. Other examples
include regional peace operations, multinational military forces outside the framework
of the United Nations (the NATO engagement in Kosovo, the multinational troops in
Afghanistan and Iraq) or bilateral engagements (the role of the United Kingdom in Sierra
Leone, France’s engagement in Côte d’Ivoire).
These parties are treated as unitary actors here, i.e. actors that are able to express
coherent preferences and take intentional actions (see Walt 1999: 10–11). Though unitary
actors are often equated with individuals (for instance individual rebel leaders), one can
also construe different groups of people as unitary actors if we can assume that they may
act as if they were single social entities (see e.g. Zürn 1992: 40). This is assumed for the
different actors identified above. For instance, civil war factions are typically organized
in a highly hierarchical manner and it can be assumed that, in the majority of cases, the
actions taken by the leaders of these organizations are the ones that count most.9 By the
same token, though the term ‘external actors’ denotes a rather diverse group of actors
that often expresses contradictory preferences and opinions, there are always some more
powerful actors who are able to thrust less powerful actors aside. When focusing on the
overall effect of external actors on a given post-conflict country it is therefore reasonable
to assume that power hierarchies among external actors makes it possible to analyze them
as if they were unitary actors.
In addition to merely identifying the different actors, it is also necessary to formulate
some assumptions about their respective roles in the post-conflict polity, their goals
and preferences and the general constraints and opportunities affecting their actions and
decisions. This amounts to a simple generic model10 of post-conflict interactions. A
graphical illustration is found in figure 2.1 on page 42. This model serves as the basis
for more specific models of post-conflict polities developed for each of the polity types
8The term ‘external actors’ is preferred here over the term international community. The reason is simply
that external actors may not necessarily be international, they may as well be single nation states or
regional peace initiatives.
9The empirical discussions below contain many cases where the cohesion of certain rebel groups was
rather poor and in which they split up into several splinter-groups – for instance in Liberia (see A.13).
However, if this happens the various splinter-groups typically enter coalitions of convenience with other
groups such that, in most cases, the number of splinter groups can be reduced to just a few coalitions.
For instance, a rebel splinter-group may temporarily align with the government-side in order to defeat its
old rival. This happened in Sierra Leone, when the ‘Armed Forces Revolutionary Council’ (AFRC), once
an ally of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), broke with the rebel group and began to support the
government in its efforts to capture RUF leader Foday Sankoh (see A.17).
10A model can generally be understood as a “simplification of, and approximation to, some aspect of the
world” (King et al. 1994: 49). The model developed here is mainly descriptive and does not aim at
explaining any statebuilding outcomes for the different polity types.
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below. It is based on the following assumptions, which are derived from the theoretical
discussions contained in this dissertation11:
First, I assume that the former warring parties have an interest in increasing their
share of power in the post-conflict phase and that none of them is likely to give away
power voluntarily. This assumption is warranted on the ground that power is – despite
the multitude12 of possible causes and driving forces of armed conflicts (see C.1) – often
a necessary means for achieving all other goals. If parties in power nonetheless give
away a fraction of their power, they must have good reasons. This may for instance be
strong external pressure combined with a conditional threat in case of non-compliance, a
power-imbalance relative to the contenders, or incentives/ benefits by which their loss of
power is compensated.
Second, I assume that parties constantly strive for enhancing both formal and de facto
authority. Above, it was pointed out that informal powers and structures are often as
important as or even more important than formal structures in post-conflict environments.
The Taliban in Afghanistan possess de facto power in large parts of the country, while the
formal government possesses little real power outside of Kabul (see A.1). UNITA, the
Angolan rebel group, possessed little formal and no de facto power after the assassination
of its leader Jonas Savimbi in 2002 (see A.2). Sometimes, de facto power can be used in
order to obtain formal power. The Liberian rebel leader Charles Taylor won the elections
in 1997 precisely because he could convince the electorate of his qualities as a spoiler
with considerable de facto power in case another candidate won the elections (see 6.2).
And often, parties in possession of formal power can use it to maintain or enhance their
share of de facto power – in the crudest way through locking away opposition politicians
and controlling the state media (as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo after Joseph
Kabila’s electoral victory, see 4.2) and in the ideal case by implementing policies that
enhance the legitimacy and acceptance of the regime among critics and antagonists (as it
initially was the case in Macedonia, see 3.2).
Third, I assume that, in the most general sense, external actors affect the domestic
constraints and opportunities through their engagement in post-conflict environments. This
can be inferred from the above discussions about the dominant statebuilding practice as
well as from pre-existing models of post-conflict intervention (e.g. Barnett and Zürcher
2009), which suggest that external actors do not confine themselves to conflict settlement
11More specifically: the discussion on the practice of post-conflict intervention (section 2.1), the discussion
of the typology and its different analytical dimensions (section 2.3), and the discussion of theories about
the origins and settlement of armed conflict (contained in section 11 of the appendix).
12There are cases in which gaining control of the government and the benefits associated with it is the
primary goal of rebel groups (and in these cases the rational model holds quite well), cases in which
rebellions are motivated by certain grievances or ideologies (and in which controlling the government may
be one way among many others to redress or realize them), cases in which ancient antagonisms between
religious or ethnic groups are important driving forces (possibly propelled by ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’),
and cases in which structural factors play a dominant role in explaining the outbreak or escalation of
internal conflicts.
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Figure 2.1: Generic Model of Post-Conflict Interactions
or peacekeeping tasks. However, the degree of foreign ‘intrusion’ into the domestic affairs
of states differs from case to case, ranging from a direct physical presence on the ground to
an indirect influence on the polity exercised, for instance, through the loan conditionality
of International Financial Institutions.
Fourth, I assume that external actors constantly look for exit options in post-conflict
polities and prefer a more indirect (and less costly) engagement over long term, costly
commitments. External actors not only set constraints for domestic actors, but they are
themselves subject to various external constraints. The history of post Cold War en-
gagement in conflict zones suggests that sustained external engagement in post-conflict
environments is costly – in financial and sometimes also in political terms. As a result,
many post-conflict interventions are driven by short-term agendas and aim at the realization
of quick goals, while long or even medium-run engagements are rare.
Fifth, I assume that external actors constantly seek achievements which they can ‘sell’
as significant statebuilding successes to their respective constituencies. External actors
have a preference for visible and easily identifiable success factors derived from the stan-
dard model of post-conflict statebuilding. These ‘milestones’ include popular elections,
institution-building measures like capacity building, economic liberalization, the strength-
ening of the state monopoly of force and the like. Since, in external actors’ standard
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interpretation, the route to consolidated statehood appears linear and uni-directional, they
have an inclination to sell each of these achievements as a step that inevitably leads into
the right direction.
Sixth, I assume that the warring parties strive for the benefits (or incentives) offered by
external actors but seek to avoid the costs (or sanctions) associated with external influence.
As noted above, external actors strive for influencing the constraints and opportunities of
post-conflict environments. This generally takes place through a combination of both sticks
and carrots. For instance, the disbursement of funds or other material benefits by external
actors (or the avoidance of sanctions) is typically tied to fulfilling certain conditions. Often,
they take the form of concrete policy prescriptions, for instance related to the acceptance
of human rights standards, the fight against corruption or the implementation of other good
governance principles. For instance, during the transitional government implemented in
Liberia after Charles Taylor’s forced resignation, corruption played such an important role
that the international community established the so called ‘Governance and Economic
Management Assistance Programme’ (GEMAP) that has “in effect put Liberia under a
form of international supervision for three years” (Ellis [1999] 2007: xxvii; Reno 2008:
387; see also A.13). Since measures of this kind further constrain the scope of action for
domestic actors, the parties in power are likely to sideline these forms of foreign influence
where possible – though there are a few instances in which the policy priorities of the
domestic parties are closely in line with external demands, as in El Salvador (see 5.3).
As the case studies below highlight, this leads to very particular patterns of post-conflict
interaction between domestic and external actors.
In conjunction, these factors lead to the generic model of post-conflict interactions
as shown in figure 2.1 on page 42. It builds the basis for the systematic comparison of
post-conflict situations contained in appendix A and is the major stepping stone for the
typology presented in the next section.
2.2 The Typology
Now that the analytical framework has been presented, we can finally turn to the typology.
This section confines itself to presenting the results of the typification process and to
discuss its various analytical dimensions, but it does not give a detailed overview about
the process of typology construction. It should suffice to underline once again that the
typology is descriptive rather than explanatory and that it is the result of a combination
of inductive and deductive methods of inquiry. The characterization and classification of
18 post-conflict cases contained in appendix A is the major empirical groundwork for the
typology as it is presented here (see 1.2.3 and appendix B for a more detailed account).
The typology relies on three analytical dimensions: the distribution of executive power
between the different post-conflict actors, the relations between the former conflict parties
and the manner of external intervention, discussed in detail in sections 2.2.1, 2.2.2 and 2.2.3,
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Table 2.1: Typology of Post-conflict Polities – compact view
respectively. Table 2.1 depicts the entire property space that emerges when combining the
three analytical dimensions and their different categories – i.e. all logically conceivable
types. However, only for six of these types, actual empirical cases can be found in the
sample of 21 potential post-conflict polities on which this dissertation relies (see 1.4).
These are the dark-shaded boxes in table 2.1. The light-shaded boxes are those types
which can be logically deduced from the abstract combination of the different analytical
categories but for which no empirical cases can be found in the sample. This does not
necessarily imply that they are irrelevant because they may be part of another sample of
cases or may occur at some point in the future. However, the fact that this dissertation is
based on a broad variety of post-conflict cases renders it relatively unlikely that these types
play any significant role.13
The typology differentiates between four power-sharing cases and six cases of political
domination. The first column depicts cases of power-sharing in which external actors are
engaged in a mediative manner, i.e. where they do not systematically take side for either of
the conflict parties and try to mitigate conflicts occurring between the former belligerents.
These are ‘Let’s Share’ polities, in which the former warring parties maintain constructive
relations (i.e. they engage in power-sharing in earnest), and ‘Doomed to Share’ polities,
in which the former conflict parties maintain obstructive relations (i.e. they are highly
reluctant to share power). Both of them can be found in the sample and are discussed in
13In addition, though all of the types are logically conceivable some of them are substantively inconsistent.
For instance, it is not reasonable to assume that external actors would engage in an existing power-sharing
arrangement in a partisan manner and take sides with only one of the conflict parties. On the contrary, the
cases discussed in this dissertation highlight that power-sharing arrangements are often only established
after significant external pressure and generally with the aim to accommodate both of the former warring
factions.
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detail in chapters three and four. The second column contains those power-sharing cases in
which external actors are engaged in a partisan manner, i.e. in which they support one of
the conflict parties in a systematic and intentional manner. No empirical examples for the
latter two types were found in the sample of cases.
The rest of the table contains situations of political domination, i.e. cases in which one
group of actors enjoys exclusive access to formal authority, while the other(s) are politically
excluded. Column three shows those cases of domination in which external actors are
engaged in a mediative manner: ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ and ‘The Winner Took it All’
cases. In the former, the relations between the warring parties are constructive, that is, the
excluded party accepts its own exclusion from formal authority (constructive relations),
whereas in the latter a general consensus about who governs is lacking (obstructive
relations). Both cases can be found in the sample and are discussed in chapters five and six,
respectively. Column four depicts cases of domination in which external actors are engaged
in a partisan manner, i.e. in which they intentionally and systematically take side for one
of the former conflict parties. Cases in which the relations between the former belligerents
are obstructive, so called ‘You Stay Out’ polities, can be found in the sample of cases and
are discussed in chapter seven. However, no case was found where external actors have
intervened in a partisan manner despite the presence of constructive relations. The last
column contains cases in which external actors essentially become the sovereign of a post-
conflict polity themselves (‘supreme intervention’). This may theoretically happen despite
the presence of constructive relations between the former belligerents, but no evidence for
this was found in the sample. The more likely scenario is supreme engagement amidst
obstructive relations. These are called ‘Benevolent Intrusion’ polities, which are essentially
identical with the well-established type of international transitional administrations, as they
were established for instance in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina or East Timor or Cambodia.
As already noted, this type is not discussed in detail in this dissertation.
A more detailed overview of the different types is contained in section 2.3. In the
following sections, the three analytical dimensions of the typology are discussed in some
more detail.
2.2.1 Distribution of Executive Power
The first dimension of the typology captures the distribution of formal authority between
the former belligerents in post-conflict situations. Gaining access to formal governmental
power is one of the fundamental motivations to start rebellions – either because controlling
the government is associated with significant material benefits or because it is necessary
for abolishing grievances that affect certain parts of the population (see C.1). Knowing
who controls the government – and who does not – is therefore an important aspect of
post-conflict order.
Most peace agreements contain provisions about who is to control the executive. The
two general options are to share governmental power, or to allow one party to control
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the executive alone – in most cases, this is either the winner on the battlefield or the
prospective winner of post-conflict elections. These are also the two categories of the
typology. Power-sharing describes a situation in which the former opponents in a civil
war share governmental power both formally and, at least to some extent, also in effective
terms. Domination, in contrast, indicates that one of the former warring factions (or a
coalition of wartime allies) either enjoys exclusive access to formal governmental authority,
or effectively dominates all members of the government such that power-sharing becomes
merely cosmetic. These two options – sharing and domination – should be seen as the end-
points on a continuum describing the actual distribution of governmental power between
the warring parties. They are widely discussed in the literature on post-conflict intervention
as the two fundamental alternatives for designing post-conflict institutions (e.g. Crocker
and Hampson 1996; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Mehler 2009; Rothchild and Roeder 2005;
Schneckener 2002: 237–333; Spears 2000; 2002; Tull and Mehler 2005).14 Scholars have
disagreed over the question which strategy is more suitable for bringing lasting peace to
conflict-ridden societies. In the following, both approaches are portrayed:
a) Power-Sharing
Power-sharing is endorsed by the literature as an effective tool of conflict resolution (see
e.g. Hartzell and Hoddie 2003 and Crocker and Hampson 1996).15 In general, power
sharing institutions are concerned with defining “how decisions are to be made within a
divided society and the distribution of decision-making rights within a state” (Hartzell
and Hoddie 2003: 318). Power-sharing generally differs from a mere division of power
in that governmental authority is ideally distributed “across institutions and not specific
groups” (Barnett 2006: 106). However, it is important to note that power-sharing can
mean different things. There are at least two competing theoretical models for ideal power-
sharing institutions: the so called consociational model formulated by Arend Lijphart and
the so called integrative approach associated with Donald Horowitz and Seymour Martin
Lipset (see Sisk 1996: 5).
Lijphart’s model (see Lijphart 1980, see also Lijphart 1999) has clearly been more
influential both in the academic debate and as a normative reference point for the actual
design of power-sharing institutions. He generally understands consociational democracy
as “government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with a fragmented political
14Most studies on power-sharing in the context of post-conflict countries look at three aspects of power-
sharing: political power-sharing, military power-sharing and economic power-sharing. Here, only the
first dimension (political power-sharing) is taken into consideration.
15However, the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of power-sharing provisions is ambiguous. Hartzell
and Hoddie (2003) put forward the general and widely-cited argument that power-sharing provisions
increase the duration of peace, but they do not distinguish between different forms of power-sharing (e.g.
political, military or territorial). When they introduce this differentiation two years later, they find that
only territorial and military power-sharing has a positive effect on the duration of peace, while political
power-sharing has not (Hartzell and Hoddie 2005; see also Jarstad and Nilsson 2008).
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culture into a stable democracy” (Lijphart 1969: 216). Analytically, he developed this
notion out of a critique of Gabriel A. Almond’s typology of political systems by identifying
a group of countries that is stable despite being politically fragmented. He called them
‘consociational democracies’ and argued that they were characterized by “deliberate efforts
to counteract the immobilizing and unstabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation” (Lijphart
1969: 212).16 The consociational model has been heavily promoted as a role model for
societies divided by deep-rooted cultural cleavages (see in particular Lijphart 1980; see also
Schneckener 2002: 237–333). Consociational power-sharing rests on four key principles.
It requires (1) a broad-based parliamentary coalition ensuring that “the minority is not
permanently excluded from political power”, (2) an institutionalized veto-right endowed to
the minority group on issues of “vital interest”, (3) the introduction of the proportionality
principle on all levels of decision-making with the aim of giving “minority groups power,
participation and influence commensurate with their overall size in society”, and (4) a high
degree of autonomy for the different segments of society (either territorial or non-territorial)
with regard to those issues that are predominantly intra-segmental concerns (Sisk 1996:
36–38).
The second branch of power-sharing literature takes a different stance. Donald Horowitz,
who stands behind the integrative approach to power-sharing, is a pronounced critic of
consociationalism, for the most part due to its elite-centric focus and because it recreates
or reifies societal cleavages (for instance by the mutual veto-power) rather than fostering
integration (Horowitz 1991: 137–145, Horowitz 1993; 2002: 20–23; see also Sisk 1996: 40–
41). He is therefore interested in an approach to power-sharing in which more pronounced
incentives for cross-segmental cooperation are present and in which, as Sisk puts it,
“moderates must be rewarded [and] extremists sanctioned” (1996: 41; see also Horowitz
2002: 23). According to Horowitz, incentives are superior to constitutional provisions
because they offer ‘reasons’ for moderate instead of ‘obstacles’ against extremist behavior.
In Horowitz’s eyes, different institutions and practices may provide such reasons for cross-
segmental cooperation. Federalism, if well institutionalized, may help to ensure that some
conflicts are solved on the local or regional level and do not affect politics at the center; it
may also prevent majority parties to dominate the entire country. More importantly, inter-
ethnic bargaining may be encouraged by a well-designed electoral system, for instance by
requiring political parties to produce ethnically mixed lists (this happened for instance in
Burundi, see section 3.3 below) or by requiring a subsequent-preference voting system.
Furthermore, Horowitz believes presidentialist systems to be superior to parliamentarist
systems, since a strong president elected with cross-segmental popular support can play a
more unifying role than a Prime Minister voted by the majority coalition in the parliament
(see Sisk 1996: 42–44).
16Almond (1956) drew a threefold distinction between Anglo-American, Continental and ‘third kind’
political systems based on two characteristics of the political system (political culture and political
structure), and established a link to political stability.
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Power-sharing has become particularly influential in the context of post-conflict societies.
Hartzell and Hoddie, for instance, find that “[t]he more extensive the network of power-
sharing institutions contending parties agree to create, the less likely they are to return to
the use of armed violence to settle disputes” (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003: 330). However,
not everybody shares the general enthusiasm for the conflict-resolving capacities of power-
sharing. René Lemarchand argues that there is “every reason to entertain the strongest
doubts about the virtues of a formula that proved sadly inadequate to prevent the eruption
of violent conflicts in settings as diverse as Angola and Liberia, Somalia, and Ethiopia” –
although he still believes that “if properly implemented, and given the ‘right’ conditions,
the Lijphart formula could well provide the best chances for a successful sharing of power
among competing groups” (2007: 2). Critics of power-sharing have pointed out a range
of flaws and dangers associated with this approach to conflict settlement. Denis Tull
and Andreas Mehler have raised the concern that the wide-spread application of power-
sharing arrangements as a means to resolve civil wars may actually provide incentives for
insurgents to fight. The reason is that examples of power-sharing “indicate that would-be
leaders have some reason to conceptualize the organization of violence as a viable path
to occupying at least parcels of state power” (2005: 376). A similar argument is put
forward by Donald Rothchild and Philip G. Roeder. They do not generally question that
power-sharing might work as a mechanism for conflict regulation, but have doubts with
regard to its applicability in ethnically divided societies:
“The sad irony of power-sharing institutions is that when extended to ethnically
divided societies they have created both motives and means for the ethnic elites
empowered by power sharing to escalate ethnic conflicts. No matter whether the
ethnic elites intended it or not, this escalation has tended to threaten the consolidation
of peace and democracy” (2005: 36).
Ian Spears, another pronounced critic of power-sharing arrangements, is convinced that
they “are inherently unstable or are contingent on long-term international commitments,
and are therefore not always conducive to durable peace” (Spears 2002: 129). He points
out a number of conceptual problems power-sharing is suffering from: First, the condition
of a perceived external threat – which Arend Lijphart believed to be a favorable condition
for the establishment of coalition governments in divided societies – is almost always
lacking in most (African) post-conflict states. The threats rather have domestic roots and
are therefore unlikely to promote cooperation among the different groups (2002: 125).
Second, drawing on the South African case, Spears points out that consociationalism is
often not the cause for tolerance between the belligerents, but the result of it. From this, he
concludes that “power-sharing is most likely to succeed where it is least needed” (2002:
132). Critics of power-sharing offer several alternative approaches as ‘solutions’ to civil
wars. Rothchild and Roeder, for instance, propose “power dividing” as an alternative and
offer evidence for its superiority when it comes to “deterring the escalation of normal
ethnopolitical conflict into ethnonational crises” (2005: 51). This approach seeks to
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empower “multiple majorities, each construing the public interest somewhat differently, in
separate, independent organs of government”, and by “balancing and checking a majority
in one governmental organ against several majorities in other organs” it provides “more
credible commitments to the rights of all minorities” than the consociational model does
(2005: 52).
b) Domination
Aside from these rather moderate alternatives to power-sharing, there are also some who
propose much more radical ‘solutions’ to civil wars. Convinced that power-sharing will
fail in the long run, it is sometimes suggested that the strongest warring party should be
given exclusive access to formal governmental authority. Domination of the executive
by one of the former warring parties typically implies the total or near total exclusion
of other groups from political power. In societies divided by a history of ethnic conflict
(for instance Burundi, Macedonia or Rwanda), ethnicity becomes the sole pillar for
political power and “provides clear lines to determine who will be included and who
will be excluded” (Horowitz 1993: 18). In those cases where the dividing line was more
ideological than based on ethnic factors (as in Angola or Mozambique), the dominant
party typically controls access to political power based on party membership or based on
personal loyalties and patronage networks, as it was vividly illustrated during the period of
Charles Taylor’s presidency in Liberia.
Advocates of an essentialist or primordialist worldview are convinced that civil wars – in
particular ethnic conflicts – are the result of deep-rooted hatred between antagonistic groups.
They believe the enmity between the groups to be so large that political or institutional
measures designed to bridge the tensions are doomed to failure (see e.g. Geertz 1963;
Shils 1957; see also C.1). Chaim Kaufmann, for instance, is convinced that “restoring civil
politics in multi-ethnic states shattered by war is impossible because the war itself destroys
the possibilities for ethnic cooperation” (Kaufmann 1996: 137). He therefore proposes to
physically separate the different (ethnic) groups into “defensible enclaves” because this
reduces both the incentives and opportunities for future combat (Kaufmann 1996: 137; see
also Kaufman 1996).17 His policy recommendation is rather sobering:
“This means that to save lives threatened by genocide, the international community
must abandon attempts to restore war-torn multi-ethnic states. Instead, it must facili-
tate and protect population movements to create true national homelands. Sovereignty
is secondary: defensible ethnic enclaves reduce violence with or without independent
sovereignty, while partition without separation does nothing to stop mass killing
(Kaufmann 1996: 137).”
17Nicholas Sambanis offers an empirically founded critique of this viewpoint. His starting point is that
partition theorists offer little proof for their claims going “beyond a handful of self-selected cases”.
Sambanis therefore conducts a large-n, quantitative analysis in order to test the effectiveness of partition
as a solution civil wars. He comes to the conclusion that “partitions do not help prevent recurrence of
ethnic war and that they may not even be necessary to stop low-level ethnic violence” (2000: 439).
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Some essentialists and staunch realists even go beyond that. The most pronounced and
cynical position views war not as an expression of political conflict, but as a way to resolve
it. This leads to the proposition to ‘let them fight it out among themselves’ (see also
Collier 2003). In his controversial essay ‘Give War a Chance’ (published in Foreign
Affairs) Edward N. Luttwak makes precisely this argument. He mourns that “[s]ince the
establishment of the United Nations [. . . ] wars among lesser powers have rarely been
allowed to run their natural course” (Luttwak 1999: 36; emphasis added). For him, “the
key is that the fighting must continue until a resolution is reached”, which can either be
a stalemate or a decisive victory by one party (1999: 36). A somewhat similar argument
was suggested by Jeffrey Herbst in his article ‘Let them Fail: State Failure in Theory and
Practice’, in which he argues that state failure has many historical precedents and should
again be seen as a “‘normal’ aspect of global society” (2004: 311–316). In accordance
with these propositions, some civil wars in the past two decades indeed ended through a
one-sided victory by one of the belligerent groups. In most cases, the winning party was
the government-side already during the conflict, which means that it simply continued
to dominate the government in the post-conflict era. (This was the case, for instance, in
Angola after the effective defeat of the UNITA rebels, see section A.2). There are hardly
any cases in which the rebel-side yielded control of the government through a military
victory. Liberia under Charles Taylor comes closest to this constellation, but his rule was
not based directly on a military victory, but rather on a peace-agreement struck after a
military stalemate, followed by his successful showing in the national elections in 1997
(see 6.2). Cases in which the ‘winner’ is generated through elections rather than a military
victory are far more frequent. Examples include Mozambique (see 5.2), El Salvador (see
5.3) or Côte d’Ivoire (see 6.3).
To sum up, the distribution of executive power is one of the crucial questions to address
in post-conflict societies. The two options – power-sharing vs. domination – denote the two
poles of a highly controversial normative debate about the right way to govern post-conflict
societies. This normative controversy shall not be in the center here. ‘Power-sharing’ and
‘domination’ are rather viewed as analytical categories, depicting merely if and how gov-
ernmental power is distributed between the former warring factions. However, it must be
kept in mind that what we are interested in are not merely formal-procedural characteristics
of power-distribution, but the effective distribution of power across the former warring
parties.18 Often, parties engage in political power-sharing agreements without the actual
will to share power with their opponents (see e.g. Jarstad and Nilsson 2008: 211) and
sometimes power-sharing agreements become a mere facade to the continued domination
of the government by one of the conflict parties. This was for instance the case in Rwanda
(see sections 7.2 and A.16) or in Tajikistan (see sections 7.3 and A.18). Such situations are
treated here as instances of political domination rather than of power-sharing.
18As Florian Bieber reminds us: “When either devising a power sharing system or examining an existing
case, it is important to make sure that the institution [. . . ] actually has power. Without power, there can
be no power sharing” (2005: 86).
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2.2.2 Relations Between the Former Belligerents
The second dimension captures the relations between the warring parties themselves and,
contained therein, their commitment to peace. The key question here is the extent to
which the former warring parties in post-conflict polities are able and willing to engage
in true and honest cooperation. The literature on peacemaking distinguishes two groups
of arguments that may account for a possible lack of cooperation: a) those claiming that
“combatants do not want to reach a settlement”, and b) those claiming that “combatants
cannot agree on a settlement” (Walter 1999: 130–131). Although both statements refer to
pre and during-settlement phases, they are just as relevant in post-settlement environments
where agreements are implemented.
The first group of explanations focuses on the belligerents’ motivations and attributes the
failure to strike or implement peace agreements to a lacking willingness to commit to peace.
The literature on the origins of armed conflict – which focuses on belligerents’ motivations
for starting rebellions – is of great help here. In recent years, this literature has been
dominated by a distinction between ‘greed’ and ‘grievance’ as two competing explanations
for the outbreak of civil wars (see e.g. Collier and Hoeffler 2002; 2004).19 Greed-based
theories explain the outbreak of insurgencies by the private gains they produce for the
insurgents. In this logic, rebels start rebellions in order to gain control of valuable resources
or because of the rents and benefits associated with the control of the state apparatus (see
C.1.1 for further detail). The belligerents’ willingness to commit to peace depends on the
overall opportunity structures offered by peace and war, respectively. Insurgents engage
in peace negotiations if a) they promise to change the rebels’ payoff-matrix such that
fighting becomes only the second-best option, or b) out of purely tactical considerations,
for instance in order to deceive their enemies about their true intentions, gain international
recognition, gain time to re-arm and the like. Any settlement is doomed to failure as soon
as fighting, in the cost-benefit calculations of the insurgents, becomes more beneficial or
‘profitable’ than maintaining the status quo. As Isak Svensson puts it, “[f]uture incentives
for exploitation will make it difficult for an actor [. . . ] to credibly commit to uphold
mutually beneficial deals” (2007: 179). The general assumption of economic explanations,
therefore, is that “[e]lites make agreements with their adversaries only when it suits their
interests” (Spears 2000: 108).20 Grievance-based theories explain the outbreak of armed
conflicts with reference to political grievances – injustice, discrimination, repression,
social exclusion, etc. – that certain groups within a society are subject to and which they
19Note that this distinction is criticized for being reductionist and misleading. In the appendix, a more
fine-grained distinction of conflict theories is contained that incorporates a greater variety of factors (see
C.1). However, for the sake of simplicity I confine myself to these two perspectives here.
20Spears makes this argument with a specific focus on Africa, but, as the case studies confirm, it seems to
hold true as a general statement about post-conflict elites as well. See on this aspect also Stef Vandeginste,
who argues: “[D]es leaders politiques peuvent bien faire semblant d’accepter un arrangement consociatif,
et même de souscrire formellement à une constitution un tel arrangement. En réalité, dans un contexte de
méfiances et de craintes mutuelles entre ‘ennemis de longue date’, ils le font pour des raisons stratégiques
et avec comme objectif ultime un contrôle au lieu d’un partage du pouvoir” (2008: 58–59).
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want to redress by resort to armed force. Peace agreements, in this logic, are likely to
be successful only to the extent that they promise to address these grievances, and the
insurgents’ commitment to peace in the post-settlement phase depends on the degree to
which these promises are met (see C.1.1 for further detail).
Aside from the greed/ grievance dichotomy, the literature on armed conflict has identified
many other factors which potentially determine whether belligerents behave constructively
or obstructively. For instance, there is the argument, going back to I. William Zartman,
that a certain level of conflict escalation is imperative for the parties to seek settlements
and accept negotiated settlements in the first place. In this logic, the more hurting a civil
war is perceived by both parties, the more likely they will stick to a negotiated settlement
(see Zartman [1985] 1989; 1993; 2000b; 2001b, see also section 11.2.1 in the appendix).21
There is also the counterargument that the parties’ inclination for constructive relations
declines with a rising level of conflict intensity and duration. This logic can also be found
in the ‘conflict trap’ argument (Collier 2003; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; 2006), which
basically states that the “characteristics or attributes of the previous war [. . . ] explain why
a second or third war might occur” (Walter 2004: 372).
The second group of explanations addressed above stipulates that belligerents can often
not agree to settlements despite the fact that all of them have a preference for peace, or they
fail to meet their commitments in the implementation phase of agreements. The argument
is that structural characteristics of settlement of post-settlement situations impede effective
cooperation between belligerents although both of them have benevolent intentions. This
aspect has become known as the ‘commitment problem’ in the literature (Fearon 1995;
2004; Gilady and Russett 2002; Mattes and Savun 2009; Powell 2006; Walter 1997;
1999). Rooted in the rational-choice tradition of conflict analysis – which conceptualizes
armed conflict as “a continuous bargaining process” (Gilady and Russett 2002: 396) – the
commitment problem arises because “the inability to make credible commitments under
anarchy can make it impossible for disputants to locate a bargain that would avoid a costly
fight” (Fearon 1995: 6). This problem often emerges with regard to the disarmament and
demobilization of the factions. Although factions may be willing to disarm, they can never
be sure whether their opponents actually fulfill their disarmament commitments as well.
Since no party can be assured that the adversary fulfills its obligations, a considerable
leap of faith from both parties is required. The lack of trust and the inability to make
credible commitments prevent each side from making the first step. This problem is
particularly pronounced in post-conflict environments because these suffer from “deeper
societal cleavages, more fragile institutions, and greater temptations toward exploitation
21This argument also matches the empirical evidence that shorter wars tend to recur more frequently than
longer wars (see Walter 2004: 373). Note, however, that Walter relates this not only to a lack of
commitment of the former warring parties, but also to the signaling effects wars have on other potential
rebel groups: “Governments that fought a short war against one set of challengers and governments that
ended a previous war in partition were significantly more likely to face a violent challenge from a new
rebel group. [. . . ] One war does appear to provide important information to other potential combatants
about the potential costs and outcome of their own contest” (2004: 385).
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than any other kind of state attempting to democratize” (Walter 1999: 139). Overcoming
commitment problems requires security guarantees by third parties. Walter defines them as
“any implicit or explicit promise given by an outside power to protect adversaries during
the treaty implementation period” (1997: 345).22
When analyzing existing post-conflict environments, the key question is therefore to
determine how honest and cooperative the former belligerents actually are or how the
problems inhibiting successful cooperation can be overcome. Are post-conflict elites
“easily brought into the opportunism of statesmanship and commitment to undertaking
genuine reconciliation and peace building in the immediate post-war era” or do they “carry
on with business as usual, hardly differentiating between warlordism and statesmanship”
(Sesay et al. 2009: 6)? Two simple analytical categories are introduced here in order to
capture this difference: constructive and obstructive relations. In the first case, both conflict
parties accept the status quo of the post-conflict situation, whereas in the second case at
least one of the conflict parties is interested in changing the status quo and improving its
position – disregarding the fact whether this party is in a position to actually set this change
in motion.23 Both dimensions shall now briefly be described.
a) Constructive Relations
Post-settlement situations are generally difficult environments to evoke cooperation among
the former belligerents. The atrocities committed during the war or the benefits to be
gained from continued rebellion may reduce the parties’ commitment to peace. There are
nonetheless situations in which the warring parties switch to a conciliatory modus operandi
in the post-conflict period, and in which they engage in true and honest cooperation. This
is subsumed here under the category of constructive relations. The presence of constructive
relations can be assumed whenever there is indication that all conflict parties a) seem to
believe that maintaining peace is preferable to recourse to violence, and b) stick to past
agreements even if they turn out as disadvantageous for them. This does not imply that
the former adversaries suddenly have to ‘like’ one another, but simply that – for whatever
reason – they are committed to maintain the post-settlement status quo.
Based on the discussion above, one factor that may explain this commitment are benevo-
lent intentions. This may have several origins. There are situations in which the insurgents
only had limited goals, which were effectively fulfilled by the provisions of the peace
22Concrete mechanisms for overcoming commitment problems are discussed in the next section on the
manner of external intervention in post-conflict environments.
23A similar distinction is used by Barnett and Zürcher, who distinguish between four kinds of peacebuilding
outcomes: cooperative, compromised, captured and conflictive peacebuilding (2009: 24–25). A similar
distinction can also be found in Clements et al, who argue that “[t]he relationship between state institutions
and other sources of social order may be constructive, but it might also be destructive or neutral”
(Clements et al. 2007: 59). Here, the focus is on the former warring parties in general (which may or
may not be part of formal state institutions), and ‘neutral’ relations (if this exists) are subsumed under
the category of constructive relations.
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agreement. Macedonia, where many of the ethnic-Albanian demands were accommodated
in the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’, is a case in point (see 3.2). In such circumstances
where the ‘root causes’ of the conflict are addressed, the relations of the rebels may be
more cooperative than in situations where this is not or only partly the case. In addition to
that, there are also situations in which one side – typically the rebels, but sometimes also
the government – accepts being defeated. In ideological conflicts, the reason for this may
lie in a change in the broader ideological environment – most importantly the end of the
Cold War. This factor undoubtedly played a role in Mozambique (see 5.2).
Another possibility is that – with the help of third-party mediators – an arrangement is
found that satisfies all participants to a degree that makes fighting an unattractive option.
As highlighted in the next section, external actors have a number of opportunities to
promote cooperation among civil war antagonists both during and after peace settlements,
and some of these options also address the belligerents’ inclination to recourse to arms.
By facilitating side-payments or other forms of compensations, rebel leaders may be
accommodated such that cooperating becomes more attractive for them (see e.g. Gilady
and Russett 2002). Or, the credible threat of coercion communicated by third parties impels
them to give up their obstructive intentions.24 When applied as an analytical category for
capturing the relationship between antagonistic elites in post-conflict environments, the
actual causes behind rebel leaders’ constructive stance are secondary. What matters is the
presence of relations that can be called constructive. The clearest indicator for this is when
the warring parties make concrete steps for implementing the promises made during peace
negotiations.
b) Obstructive Relations
Unfortunately, the adversaries in post-conflict situations do not always have good intentions.
There are many cases in which “civil war combatants have no real desire to negotiate
and simply go through the motions because outside pressure, military considerations,
or reputational concerns encourage them to do so” (Walter 1999: 133). Among those,
Ian Spears draws a distinction between “unreformable extremists who would profit from
continued violent conflict [. . . ] and hard-liners who ultimately have an interest in peace
even if they do not care for their power-sharing partners [. . . ]” (2002: 134). But even if
they have good intentions, cooperation among the former belligerents in post-settlement
situations may fail due to the impossibility to make credible commitments, as noted
above. Independent of its origins, such limited levels of commitment or cooperation
between power-elites in post-conflict societies are subsumed here as obstructive relations.
Obstructive relations imply that the signatories of peace-agreements are in principle ready
to go to war, and will do so whenever they believe it to be necessary or beneficial.
As highlighted above, obstructive relations may arise because self-seeking rebel leaders
forestall the implementation of peace agreements or defect from past promises in order
24For the theoretical underpinnings of this strategy of ‘coercive diplomacy’, see Alexander George (1991).
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to realize private gains. This problem is discussed most prominently in the literature
on civil war spoilers (Greenhill and Major 2007; Stedman 1997). Stedman’s spoiler
framework has been a significant contribution in that it shifted the focus to agents and their
characteristics, and offered strategies for ‘spoiler management’. Spoilers are “leaders and
parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview,
and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it” (Stedman 1997: 5).
Spoilers, therefore, only emerge “when there is a peace process to undermine” (Stedman
1997: 7). Stedman distinguishes between limited, greedy and total spoilers, depending
on their goals and commitments. Limited spoilers follow certain limited goals to whose
realization they are nonetheless strongly committed. Total spoilers, in contrast, are driven
by radical ideologies and are determined to realize their goals by all means. A medium
position is occupied by greedy spoilers, whose goals are contingent upon cost-benefit
calculations (Stedman 1997: 9–11).25 Greedy spoilers generally do not have a genuine
interest in peace, but rather “participate in seemingly endless negotiations for the sake
of material benefits [. . . ]” (Tull and Mehler 2005: 392). If an agreement is nonetheless
reached, they constantly tend to undermine it in order to gain additional benefits that are
otherwise unreachable.
However, as captured by the concept of total spoilers, we cannot assume that the
conflict parties may always act rationally. Though there might be cases in which the
parties’ “attachment to a political agreement is a function of one’s relative power, what
one anticipates the power balance to be in future, and one’s observations of an opponent’s
previous behavior” (Spears 2002: 128), such pure cost-benefit calculations are certainly
not always the main driving force of post-war relations. Obstructive relations may, for
instance, arise because the parties feel a deep-rooted contempt for one another and carry
their mutual hatred into the post-settlement phase. The literature on the origins of armed
conflict contains a number of arguments that go beyond rational or structural explanations,
for instance those that conceptualize ethnic cleavages as arising from ‘ancient hatreds’
and unalterable (primordial) differences (Horowitz 1999: 346; see also Kaufmann 2005:
197). Since it is, after all, implausible to assume that armed conflict can be traced back to
monocausal factors,26 the sources of obstructive behavior are likely to be multiple (for a
systematic discussion of different conflict theories, see C.1). Which theory holds better
depends on the characteristics and goals of the warring parties and the history of the
underlying conflict.27
25For a refined version of the spoiler framework, see Greenhill and Major (2007).
26See on this aspect in particular Christopher Cramer (2006). He reminds us that already Clausewitz, who is
often reduced to an entirely instrumental understanding of warfare, was convinced that the initiation of
warfare requires a multitude of different factors, and he explicitly included emotional factors.
27I. William Zartman for instance, who generally believed that belligerents follow cost-benefit calculations
and only seek peace negotiations when a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’ is reached, admitted himself that
some conflicts are rather driven by “true believer” cultures, in which the conflict parties act largely
irrational (2000b: 240).
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The more tragic (since avoidable) source of obstructive post-war relations stems from
the structural environment in which conflicts and their settlements take place. relations
may be obstructive although none of the conflict parties actually wants this. The main
reason here lies in the lack of guarantees to ensure that the other parties will fulfill their part
of the deal. Following this logic, the greatest impediment to the implementation of peace
agreements in post-conflict polities is the lack of security guarantees among the parties,
which gives rise to a situation similar to the security dilemma in classical International
Relations theory, the so called domestic or ethnic security dilemma (Kaufman 1996; Posen
1993; Roe 1999; Rose 2000). This becomes apparent with regard to the disarmament
provisions contained in many peace agreements. Walter vividly illustrates the dilemma
faced by parties willing to disarm:
“As groups begin to disarm, they create an increasingly tense situation. The fewer
arms they have, the more vulnerable they feel. The more vulnerable they feel, the more
sensitive they become to possible violations. And the more sensitive they become to
violations, the less likely the are to fulfill their side of the bargain” (1999: 134).
In sum, the distinction between constructive and obstructive relations captures the warring
parties’ actual commitment to civil war settlements. This distinction helps to distinguish
between cases of actual commitment to peace and situations in which the parties’ commit-
ment to peace does not go much beyond a mere lip-service. However, it should be noted
at this point that this distinction potentially bears a great potential for misunderstandings,
because it may easily be taken to be tautological if constructive relations are equated with
peaceful and obstructive relations with conflicting outcomes. This objection is only par-
tially valid. Clearly, constructive relations may increase the chances for lasting peace, but it
is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for it. There are cases where the recurrence
of violence could be prevented despite clear signs that the relations are obstructive, and
there are situations where commitments collapsed despite the presence of constructive
relations. This will be illustrated more vividly in the case studies below.
2.2.3 Intervention by External Actors
The third dimension of the typology describes how external actors influence local dynamics.
It captures the relations between external actors and the former warring parties. Is external
influence targeted at both conflict parties equally or does it affect one of the conflict
parties more than another? In other words, to which extent can external engagement be
conceptualized as partial? Due to the large variety of external actors’ engagement in post-
conflict environments, selectivity and abstraction are necessary when comparing external
influence across a larger set of cases. As explained in the analytical framework (section
2.1.2), the focus here lies on the most influential external actors, i.e. those who have enough
leverage in order to convince or coerce domestic actors to behave in a specific manner.
UN missions, engagements by powerful state-like actors (for instance the engagement of
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the United Kingdom in Sierra Leone or of the EU in Macedonia), or regional alliances
and initiatives (for instance the ECOWAS engagement in Liberia) certainly fall under this
category.
As already argued in the introduction, the normative underpinnings of external engage-
ments in post-conflict environments have been subject to significant transformation in
the past decades. This has found its expression most notably in the altered standing of
the neutrality principle. For many decades the guiding principle for the UN-led external
engagements, it has clearly lost in importance in light of such developments as robust
peace-enforcement missions and the emergence of new forms of interventionism (see e.g.
Chesterman 2004; Doyle and Sambanis 2006: 1; Durch 2006: 3; see also page 5). New
norms such as the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ require to go beyond neutrality because they
are contingent upon the willingness to use force in a partial manner if necessary (see e.g.
Doyle 2001; Doyle and Sambanis 2006: 1). The literature on third party mediation – which
has for a long time embraced neutrality as its key value (see e.g. Bercovitch 1985: 739) –
has also come to the recognition that partial forms of mediation are often more effective
(see Kleiboer 1996: 369; Mayer 2004; Svensson 2007). This illustrates that neutrality can
no longer be assumed as a guiding principle for post-conflict interventions. This is most
vividly illustrated in Afghanistan or, more recently, Libya, but also in robust UN peace
operations like the one in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
This has been reflected for instance in attempts by third parties to address commitment
problems, which nowadays often require to abandon the neutrality principle. With regard to
external security guarantees, a general distinction can be drawn between “fear-reducing” or
“cost-increasing” provisions (Mattes and Savun 2009: 742). The deployment of traditional
peacekeeping troops is the classical example for fear-reducing provisions. By monitoring
the implementation of agreements and implementing, for instance, buffer-zones between
the warring parties’ territories they can effectively reduce the concerns of both parties and
hence induce cooperation. This may, depending on the situation, still count as a neutral
manner of engagement. Cost-increasing provisions are present when third parties make
credible efforts to deter spoiler behavior, for instance by deploying peace-enforcement
missions backed by a robust mandate. By definition, this requires the willingness to engage
in a partial manner. As Dennis Tull highlights, “robust peacekeeping requires more than
rhetorical acrobatics by UN officials [. . . ]” (2009: 227). In particular with regard to peace
spoilers (see 2.2.2), a consensus has emerged that it is sometimes necessary to “neutralize”
them if buying off or accommodating turns put as insufficient (see Spears 2002: 134).
However, it must be noted that the degree of partiality is not something that external
actors can control by themselves. It is “essentially a matter of perceptions of the parties
in conflict” (Kleiboer 1996: 369). As perceptions in post-conflict environments are
particularly sensitive, hardly any case of post-conflict intervention would count as entirely
impartial in the eyes of domestic actors. Here, the focus is not on perceptions of the
domestic parties but rather on external actors’ intentions. This is expressed by the categories
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mediative and partisan intervention. Mediative intervention implies that external parties
attempt to reconcile between the conflict parties without openly privileging either of the
two conflict parties. This engagement may or may not be perceived by the parties as
impartial. What matters is the extent to which external actors are truly interested in easing
the tensions between the belligerents. Partisan intervention, in contrast, means that external
actors intentionally and systematically privilege one of the conflict parties at the expense
of others. Obviously, if this is the case, all parties will also perceive the intervention as
being partial (this is discussed in more detail below).
Most cases of external engagement in post-conflict environments can be coded as either
mediative or partisan, although there are some in-between cases which lie somewhere
between the two categories. However, during the classification of the cases contained in
appendix A it became clear that a third category of external engagement is necessary in
order to capture those cases in which external actors position themselves above (and not
only between) domestic actors. This is for instance the case when external actors establish
transitional administrations in post-conflict countries, as in Kosovo or East Timor (see
e.g. Chesterman 2004 and Caplan 2005). These are cases of supreme intervention in the
terminology of the typology. Though, in effect, transitional administrations are often set
up in order to support the cause of one specific group and in this sense are highly partisan
(for instance the Albanians in Kosovo or the Timorese in East Timor), they are still of a
different quality than other forms of intervention, and must therefore be subsumed under
their own category. All three categories are now discussed in further detail.
a) Mediative Intervention
In most cases of post-conflict intervention, external actors attempt to mediate between the
conflict parties and encourage mutual cooperation (though they often fail to achieve this
goal). This can take many forms. Classical peacekeeping missions aim at ensuring that
ceasefire and peace agreements are respected by the parties. In addition to that, external
actors may promote institutions for reconciliation, establish institutions for transitional
justice, promote the demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, organize
elections, or engage in activities of a similar kind. The ultimate aim of these different
measures is to stabilize peace settlements and prevent the recurrence of violence in the
future. However, as mentioned in passing above, mediative intervention does not necessar-
ily imply that external actors never show any bias for either of the conflict parties, or that
they are perceived by them as impartial. There are many situations in which mediation
succeeds because external actors have a certain bias (see Kleiboer 1996 and Svensson
2007). Sometimes, a bias against certain parties is clearly necessary in order to discourage
spoilers and prevent them from torpedoing settlements. The main difference to cases of
partisan intervention is that this bias is merely tactical, but not systematic or strategic.
External actors can perform a number of other mediating functions in post-conflict
societies below the threshold of direct military engagements. One of them is the construc-
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tive settlement of disputes that may occur between the conflict parties in the post-conflict
period. This role is often performed by those parties that were already involved in the
negotiation of the peace agreements, like the International Contact Group in Liberia (see
A.13) or the ‘troika’ consisting of the US, the (former) USSR and Portugal in Angola (see
A.2). There, too, the dividing line to partisan engagement is thin. As Ian Spears puts it:
“The international community can have an important role in pressuring local actors
to abide by the terms of an agreement or in protecting uncertain and vulnerable
partners in a peace process, but this pressure and protection can also obscure the
actual character and intentions of local actors” (2002: 132).
This, once again, indicates that there may be important differences between the intentions
and the effects of external intervention. Even if the intentions of external parties are
mediative, the local parties may perceive it as an intrusion into their internal affairs.
Especially when external actors intervene on behalf of minority groups, the majority
population tends to perceive this as an illegitimate and unfair form of intervention. This
was, for instance, visible in Macedonia, where a number of powerful external states
significantly backed up the Albanian minority (see 3.2).
b) Partisan Intervention
Partisan intervention describes the other end of the spectrum of third party intervention. It
implies that external actors’ behavior is partisan both in its effects and its intentions. In
other words, it means that external actors do not even try to behave in a neutral manner,
but that they openly support only one group of post-conflict actors at the expense of
the other(s). Partisan intervention usually occurs whenever external actors conceive of
one of the conflict parties as being illegitimate, mostly because their core values appear
incompatible with those promoted by external actors. As noted above, external actors’
inclination to engage in a partisan manner has been increasing in recent years. Two factors
have played a role here: First, the emergence of new forms of intervention has generated a
new normative environment for all forms of external intervention, including post-conflict
engagements. Second, the new security environment after 9/11 has generated a general
mistrust against certain groups suspected of supporting international terrorism.
In cases of partisan intervention, external actors effectively impose their own agenda
on the target countries and do not refrain from engaging in active and prolonged combat
against certain groups declared as enemies of the values or the political system their were
trying to impose. This may occur on different levels. The most obvious case is that
of a military intervention, which explicitly aims at defeating one of the conflict parties.
Afghanistan, where external actors have strategically supported the so called “Northern
Alliance” in an attempt to gain the upper hand against the Taliban and other declared
enemies of the western statebuilding projects, is a case in point (see A.1). A one-sided
military intervention of this kind has little resemblance with ordinary peace operations,
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and statebuilding efforts in such places must rather be considered post-invasion than post-
conflict interventions (see e.g. Barnett and Zürcher 2009; Paris and Sisk 2009a). Due to its
central importance in the statebuilding literature, Afghanistan is included in the group of
cases discussed in the appendix, but other cases – most notable Iraq, are omitted.28
However, external actors may be highly partisan also below the level of direct military
intervention. Especially during the Cold War, the ‘great powers’ have developed strong
biases for or against certain groups that have sometimes persisted beyond the end of the
superpower confrontation. In Angola for instance, the United States were reluctant to give
up its support for UNITA – its former ally against the Marxist-Leninist MPLA – in the
immediate Cold War period although UNITA increasingly acted as a peace spoiler. For
a while, this prevented the US administration to recognize MPLA as Angola’s official
government despite the fact that they were democratically legitimized (see A.2). In a
similar fashion, a number of states – most notably Russia – still deny Kosovo official
recognition and therefore prevent the country from reaching the required majority in
the UN General Assembly that is necessary to become recognized as a new state (see
A.12). Below, Rwanda and Tajikistan are discussed as examples for partisan forms of
external engagement. In both cases, the engagement by external actors remained below
the threshold of direct military engagement. As this shows, external actors have a number
of different possibilities for acting in a partisan manner below the level of direct military
intervention.
c) Supreme Intervention
The third category – supreme intervention – links back mainly to the debate about transi-
tional administrations (see Caplan 2005; Chesterman 2004). Cases of transitional admin-
istration differ from ‘ordinary’ post-conflict interventions by the fact that external actors
effectively become the primary sovereign authority in a foreign territory. This is not in itself
a new phenomenon. As Simon Chesterman points out, historical precedents include the
mandates system established on behalf of the Covenant of the League of Nations after the
end of World War I, the administration of foreign territories by the League under the Treaty
of Versailles (most notably: the Saar Basin, the Free City of Danzig, and Upper Silesia),
the allied occupation of Germany between 1945 and 1949, the United Nations trusteeship
system, and the administration of ‘non-self-governing territories’ by UN member states
(2004: 12–47). In most contemporary cases, supreme external engagement is designed
as a temporary measure to stabilize post-conflict countries, often in order to bridge the
time until certain domestic actors have acquired enough capacity in order to take matters
in their own hand. Chesterman views transitional administrations as a special (and less
28Iraq is not part of the sample of cases discussed in this dissertation since the US-led intervention was not
preceded by a civil war. In this sense, Iraq is much more clearly a case of ‘post-invasion’ intervention
than Afghanistan, which had suffered a long and bloody civil war between the end of the Cold War and
the Western invasion.
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common) form of statebuilding “directed at constructing or reconstructing institutions of
governance [. . . ] in which these ends have been pursued by assuming some or all of the
powers of the state on a temporary basis” (2004: 5).
In the context of the recent discussion about collapsing and ‘failing’ states, supreme
intervention was sometimes portrayed as the only effective means to stabilize war-torn
societies. Reacting to the common reproach that post-conflict peacebuilding is too colonial,
Simon Chesterman has provocatively argued that post-conflict engagements are “sometimes
[. . . ] not colonial enough”, and has specifically used cases of supreme intervention as a role
model for better post-conflict interventions (2004: 12). Along a similar line, Steven Krasner
has suggested ‘shared sovereignty’ as a solution to the problem of state failure, which
he understands as an “engagement of external actors in some of the domestic authority
structures of the target state for an indefinite period of time” (2004: 108, emphasis added)
that does not stem from a unilateral decision of external actors, but rather from a “contract
between external and domestic actors who would guarantee international legal sovereignty”
(2004: 115, emphasis added). Not surprisingly, these suggestions have created quite a stir
among scholars and policy-makers inside and outside of the Western hemisphere (see Paris
and Sisk 2009a).
Aside from these normative concerns, supreme intervention is used exclusively as an
analytical category here. The focus is on the effective degree of authority that external
actors have in any given post-conflict situation. Determining this is a gradual rather
than a categorical question, since different degrees of ‘intrusion’ into domestic affairs
can be distinguished within this category. Kosovo and East Timor, where full fledged
administrative apparatuses were set up by external actors, are clearly more far-reaching
examples of external intervention than Eastern Slavonia or Bosnia. Therefore, it is not
always easy to determine when an intervention should be viewed as a case of supreme
intervention. One clear indicator for supreme intervention is when institutions populated
by external parties effectively fulfill core functions of domestic state institutions, including
law-making and law-enforcement. Thus, whenever external actors make use of their
authority to make or override domestic decisions, we can assume external intervention
to depict supreme characteristics. However, if external actors are merely involved in the
delivery of certain public goods (including security) while the core governing functions –
including law-setting among the most important ones – are still provided by the domestic
government, the threshold of supreme intervention is not reached.
2.3 Overview of the Polity Types
The typology presented in section 2.2 above consists of six different types of post-conflict
polities for which actual empirical cases can be found (see also table 2.2 on page 62). Two
of them are based on power-sharing and the others are characterized by the domination of
the executive by one of the conflict parties. The aim of this section is to briefly characterize
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Government Intervention Polity Type Chapter
Power-Sharing mediative Constructive Power-Sharing with
mediative external intervention
(‘Let’s Share Polities’)
Chapter 3
Obstructive Power-Sharing with me-
diative external intervention
(‘Doomed to Share Polities’)
Chapter 4
Domination mediative Constructive Domination with me-
diative external intervention (‘Let
the Winner Take it All Polities’)
Chapter 5
Obstructive Domination with media-
tive external intervention
(‘The Winner Took it All Polities’)
Chapter 6
partisan Obstructive Domination with parti-
san external intervention
(‘You Stay Out Polities’)
Chapter 7
supreme Obstructive Domination with
supreme external intervention
(‘Benevolent Intrusion Polities’)
Appendix,
sections
A.3; A.8;
A.12
Table 2.2: Overview of the Polity Types
these polity types and to point out their general features and differences before they are
described in detail in the ensuing five chapters.29 A general overview of the conflict and
peacebuilding characteristics for these cases can be obtained from appendix A.
2.3.1 Power-Sharing Polities
As can be inferred from table 2.1 on page 44, two types of power-sharing polities can be
empirically distinguished: cases of mediated, constructive power-sharing and cases of
mediated obstructive power-sharing. Both are situations in which some effective degree
of executive power-sharing is present and in which external actors attempt to mediate
between the conflict parties.30 The two polity types only differ with respect to the relations
29As already noted, the sixth polity type, ‘benevolent intrusion’ polities, is excluded from this detailed
analysis because it exclusively comprises cases belonging to the category of transitional administrations
(Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, East Timor). As this is already a well-established and well-studied
analytical category (see e.g. Caplan 2005; Chesterman 2004), it is unnecessary to discuss them again in
this dissertation.
30Cases of power-sharing in which external actors intervened in a partisan manner proved empirically
irrelevant.
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between the former belligerents. Ian Spears – a pronounced critic of power-sharing –
rightly pointed out that “power-sharing cannot be about coalitions between friends, but
rather must be about reconciliation between enemies” (Spears 2002: 126). However,
the case material reveals great differences with regard to the manner by which these
‘enemies’ treat one another. In some cases the former belligerents show at least a basic
commitment to the provisions of the power-sharing arrangement and maintain a basic
degree of cooperation. These constructive power-sharing cases are also called ‘Let’s
Share’ polities here. Unfortunately, this basic level of cooperation is lacking in many other
power-sharing cases. There, effective cooperation between the conflict parties fails, either
due to a lack of trust or real commitment to the terms of the power-sharing arrangement.
These obstructive cases of power-sharing cases are henceforth also called ‘Doomed to
Share’ polities in order to underline the reluctant manner by which the parties commit to
power-sharing.
a) ‘Let’s Share’ Polities
‘Let’s Share’ polities describe a situation in which the conflict parties cooperate construc-
tively, share governmental power effectively (though not necessarily equally), and in which
tensions, if they occur, are settled by external actors mediating between the conflict parties.
Although this appears to be a rather idealistic account of post-conflict dynamics, there are
a few cases that at least approximate this ideal, albeit often with major restrictions. Only
two cases in the sample were classified as instances of ‘Let’s Share’ polities: Macedonia31
and Burundi (see table A.1 on page 327). Though both cases differ greatly with regard to
their conflict and some of their post-conflict characteristics (among many other factors),
they are both unusually constructive cases of power-sharing. The Macedonian insurgency –
a minor armed conflict with not more than a few hundred casualties – ended with a broad-
based power-sharing agreement struck, after considerable external mediation, between the
ethnic-Albanian insurgents and the predominantly ethnic-Macedonian government (see 3.2
and A.14). In contrast to that, Burundi suffered a decade-long civil war fought between
the Tutsi-dominated government and various Hutu rebel groups, which cost an estimated
200,000 lives. Despite that, the government and one of the main insurgent groups could
agree on a wide-ranging power-sharing formula in 2002 that, initially at least, marked
a promising and widely-hailed end to a bloody civil war (see 3.3 and A.4). (Over time,
however, more and more tendencies for an increasing domination of the political system
by the ruling party have become apparent based on which it could plausibly be argued that
Burundi is in the process of switching to an authoritarian, domination-style system.) This
polity type is discussed in detail in chapter three.
31Note that, for pragmatic reasons, the name ‘Macedonia’ is used here instead of the official name FYROM
(Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia).
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b) ‘Doomed to Share’ Polities
Power-sharing is a frequent feature of peace-agreements, and it is often advocated for
its qualities to resolve armed conflicts. However, the number of cases that can actually
live up to this ideal is surprisingly small. Only two cases fell into the ‘Let’s Share’ type
discussed in the previous chapter. Far more frequent are cases in which power-sharing
is in fact applied, but where it deviates markedly from the ideal consociational polity
advocated by the power-sharing literature. Analyzing the empirical material indicates that,
often, wide gaps exist between the rhetoric of power-sharing and the actual implementation
of it. While situations labeled power-sharing are frequent, its implementation is often
hampered by a lack of cooperation among the former belligerents. This is expressed in
the second post-conflict polity type, ‘mediated, obstructive power-sharing’ or ‘Doomed
to Share’ polities, which stand for a particular kind of power-sharing situations in which
the parties are only reluctantly engaged. In some cases, it becomes obvious that power-
sharing is often not more than a pretext allowing one of the conflict parties to continue the
concealed domination of the other. As the goal of this dissertation is to privilege the de
facto characteristics of a political system over the formal ones (see 2.1.2), such polities are
rather treated as situations of domination ‘in disguise’ than power-sharing cases. However,
empirically distinguishing actual from ‘virtual’ situations of power-sharing is often not
easy. There exists a considerable gray-zone of cases which could arguably be classified
as both cases of power-sharing or cases of domination, depending on the standard one
applies. The criterion used here is whether the power-sharing arrangement constitutes an
effective check to the executive or whether it is merely an attempt to mask the latter’s
exclusive hold on power. In total, five cases are treated as instances of this type here:
the government of national unity (GURN) in Angola (1997 – 1998), the power-sharing
arrangement implemented after the Lomé peace accords in Sierra Leone (1999 – 2002), the
National Transitional Government (NTGL) in Liberia (2003 – 2005), the power-sharing
arrangement implemented as part of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (2003 – 2006), and the power-sharing mechanism implemented
after the adoption of the Ouagadougou Accords in Côte d’Ivoire (2007 – 2010) (see table
A.1 on page 327).32 Two of them – Sierra Leone and the DRC – are discussed in more
detail in chapter four below; the others are discussed in appendix A.
32Obviously, all four cases are African cases, but this does not imply that this polity type is confined to
the African continent. This outcome is rather the result of the large number of African cases relative to
those in Asia, Europe and Latin America (which, in turn, is a direct consequence of the high incidence of
armed conflict in Africa). In principle, ‘Doomed to Share’ polities can (and possibly will) emerge outside
the African continent. That two cases (Liberia and Sierra Leone) are West-African cases is likewise a
coincidence. Although the two conflicts were closely intertwined (see the respective case discussions),
there was no systematic bias for power-sharing arrangements, and other settlement arrangements have
been tried out at earlier stages in both conflicts.
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2.3.2 Domination Polities
Despite the dominance of power-sharing institutions as a normative role-model for civil
war settlements, power-sharing cases are comparatively rare. In the majority of post-
conflict situations, one of the former conflict parties effectively enjoys exclusive access
to formal governmental authority. These cases fall in the category of domination polities.
Domination polities may come into being for several different reasons. Sometimes, one
of the conflict parties simply defeats all others on the battlefield and emerges as the
uncontested governing authority in the new polity, as it recently happened in Sri Lanka.
More often, it is the case that one of the parties wins a clear majority during post-war
elections. If, at the same time, the political system is strongly centralized and does not
contain any clear-cut rules for political power-sharing, the winning party becomes – at least
in formal terms – the dominant authority of a post-conflict territory. Proponents of power-
sharing conceive of domination polities as inherently conflict-prone, but there is significant
variation with regard to its effect on the stability of peace. In some cases, the exclusion
of one of the conflict parties from governmental power was accompanied by a relatively
constructive post-conflict order (as in Mozambique), while in other cases it became evident
that transferring power exclusively to one of the conflict parties was counterproductive
(as in Angola after the 1991 Bicesse Accords, see section A.2 or in Liberia after Charles
Taylor won the elections, see sections 6.2 and A.13). In the former case, the excluded
parties more or less accept that they have lost the war and/ or the electoral contest. Instead
of rebelling against the dominant party, they rather seek to increase their influence through
future electoral contest. These are situations of constructive domination. In contrast, in
the latter case a basic consensus about the post-conflict order is lacking and the excluded
parties resist their own expulsion from political power. These are cases of obstructive
domination.
Furthermore, in the case of domination polities the distinction between the different
categories of external intervention (mediative, partisan and supreme intervention) becomes
relevant. In a number of cases, external actors are clearly trying to mediate between
the conflict parties and make sure that conflicts emerging in the polity are settled in a
constructive manner. This was the case for instance in Mozambique or Côte d’Ivoire
(see sections 5.2 and 6.3, respectively). In other cases, it is evident that external actors
collaborate with one of the conflict parties – typically the one controlling the government
– and direct their actions against the other (excluded) party. This happened most notably
in Afghanistan (section A.1) but, on a different level also in cases such as Rwanda or
Tajikistan (sections 7.2 and 7.3, respectively). Finally, as noted above, there are situations
in which external actors intervened in a post-conflict situation in a supreme manner, i.e. by
becoming the central governing authority themselves. This leads to four different kinds
of domination polities (excluding those for which no empirical cases were found): Two
types in which external actors intervened in a mediative manner (‘mediated, constructive
domination polities’ and ‘mediated, obstructive domination polities’, or ‘Let the Winner
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take it all’ polities and ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities, respectively), one type in
which external actors intervened in a partisan manner (‘partisan, obstructive power-sharing
polities’, also called ‘You Stay Out’ polities), and one type in which they intervened in
a supreme manner (‘supreme obstructive domination polities’, also called ‘Paramount
Intrusion’ polities).33
a) ‘Let the Winner take it all’ Polities
Post-conflict polities that fall under the category mediated, constructive domination have
in common that the former conflict parties maintain by and large constructive relations
despite the fact that only one of them is actually participating in the government. Those
parties not represented in the government accept the fact that they are effectively excluded
from political participation and that one of their former enemies is now ‘running the show’
alone. This is why they are called ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities. External actors
are engaged in this situation in a mediative manner, by attempting to settle conflicts that
may – despite the presence of constructive relations – occur, and by running all kinds of
supportive activities ranging from the delivery of aid to the maintenance of security. The
reasons for the high level of constructiveness prevailing in this polity type may vary. It
may for instance be the case that the rebels pursued limited goals which do not necessarily
require being in control of the government, and that these goals were addressed by the
peace agreement. Or it may happen that one side was thoroughly defeated on the battlefield
and therefore effectively surrendered by accepting a peace-agreement (or the outcome
of elections) although it is detrimental to the realization of its own goals. Although, at
first glance, stipulating that the defeated parties will simply accept the fact that they are
excluded from the governance of a polity about whose control they have fought a bloody
civil war appears unrealistic, there is a number of cases that actually falls into this category.
In total, four cases are subsumed under the ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ category: El
Salvador, Guatemala, Mozambique, and Sierra Leone after the elections in 2007 (see table
A.1 on page 327). Mozambique and El Salvador are discussed in more detail in chapter
five below, the others are discussed in the appendix.
33Cases in which external actors intervened in a partisan manner while domestic actors maintained construc-
tive relations make little sense, and no empirical cases for this phenomenon are contained in the sample
of cases underlying this dissertation. However, when including historical cases of external engagement,
one could subsume many colonial interventions under this class. Colonial powers frequently became
engaged in a previously constructive situation and then decided to support specific local groups or tribes
at the expense of others. The most tragic examples for this are clearly Rwanda and Burundi, where
power-struggles propelled by this artificial distribution of power led to prolonged civil wars and even
triggered genocides in both countries (see A.4 and A.16). The same holds true for cases of supreme
intervention. In all cases contained in the sample, the warring parties maintained obstructive relations.
However, the case of supreme, constructive intervention makes at least sense theoretically. It would
denote a situation in which external actors, with the consent of domestic parties, agree to take on key
government functions, for instance due to a severe lack of domestic capacity.
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b) ‘The Winner took it all’ Polities
Unfortunately, it happens rarely that parties excluded from participation in the government
simply accept their own defeat, be it in on the battlefield or the ballot-box. More frequent
are situations of domination amidst obstructive relations. The clearest indicator is when
the excluded party rejects being dominated by any means that fall short of organized mass
violence (otherwise we could not speak of a post-conflict situation). This can range from
passive resistance to open hostility, with a lot lying in between. But it might also be
that the governing party (ab)uses its authority in order to suppress the excluded party –
obviously in this case the relations must be regarded obstructive, too. ‘The Winner Took it
All’ polities subsume cases of obstructive domination in which external actors intervene
in a mediative manner. Because the excluded parties typically do not give their consent
to political domination, this polity type also carries the name ‘The Winner Took it All’
polities. This highlights the lack of consent and cooperation between the conflict parties. In
total, nine cases are subsumed under this polity type: Cambodia (after the 1993 elections),
Côte D‘Ivoire (the period between the adoption of the ‘Linas-Marcoussis Agreement’ of
January 2003 and the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement of March 2007), Sierra Leone (the
period starting with the election of May 2002), the DRC (the period following Joseph
Kabila’s election for president in 2006), Haiti (the period between Aristide’s downfall
and the elections in 2006), Angola (since 2002), Tajikistan (between 1996 and 2001) and
two Liberian cases (the period of Charles Taylor’s presidency and the situation after the
elections in 2006) (see table A.1 on page 327). Liberia during the presidency of Charles
Taylor and Côte d’Ivoire are discussed in detail in chapter six.
c) ‘You Stay Out’ Polities
The two cases of domination described above had one central communality: the fact that
external actors intervened, in a mediative manner. Although they sometimes pressure the
warring parties to commit to the terms of the respective peace agreements – and although
a clear preference for either of the warring parties is often expressed – the ultimate goal
of the engagement is to monitor or enforce a settlement between the parties. This is not
always the case. There are cases in which external actors explicitly align themselves with
one of the conflict parties and mostly act in their favor. This may be the case because they
have a vested interest in the stability of the country in question (for instance due to security
concerns or access to natural resources) or because they view the contending party as
dangerous or illegitimate (for whatever reason). In the terminology of this dissertation, this
is referred to as a partisan form of intervention. Afghanistan is the clearest contemporary
example for this manner of external engagement, but it is strictly speaking not a classical
case of post-conflict intervention. There, external actors have done more than trying to
mediate between different groups of post-conflict actors. They have not only started a
war, but have also systematically taken sides for certain conflict parties (most notably
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those from the so called ‘Northern Alliance’) in the post-settlement phase. This effectively
excluded the Taliban and other groups considered to be incompatible with their liberal
statebuilding project from political participation (see A.1). Next to Afghanistan, there
are a number of cases in which the partisan characteristics of external intervention were
less clearly visible: Haiti (after Bertrand Aristide was reinstalled in office), post-genocide
Rwanda and Tajikistan since 2001 (see table A.1 on page 327). The two latter cases are
discussed in detail in chapter seven.
d) ‘Benevolent Intrusion’ Polities
The last group of post-conflict polities comprises those situations in which external actors
not only intervene in a post-conflict situation in a mediative or partisan manner, but in which
they effectively become the supreme authority in the country themselves. By definition,
this is a situation of political domination; therefore the category supreme intervention
only exists for domination polities. In theory external actors can attempt to become the
sovereign in a territory despite the presence of constructive relations between the warring
parties. This situation would come close to what happened during the colonial period, but
(luckily) there are no cases fitting into this type in the post-Cold War period. Therefore, all
cases of supreme domination fall under the obstructive category. Typically, external actors
intervene in a supreme manner because they see this as the only possibility to enforce peace
between the conflict parties. At least the external actors themselves typically perceive their
engagement as benign, therefore this polity type can also be called benevolent intrusion.
Currently, there are three cases that fall under this polity type: Bosnia and Herzegovina,
Kosovo and East Timor, discussed in sections A.3; A.8; A.12, respectively.
2.4 Patterns of Interaction in Post-Conflict Polities
Next to constructing the typology and classifying the various cases, the second declared
goal of this dissertation is to identify differences in the interactions of the warring parties
in the different polity types. This requires identifying a) within-type similarities, i.e.
similar patterns of interaction for those types that fall within one type, and b) across-type
differences, i.e. differences in the interactions of post-conflict actors that can be attributed
to the structural characteristics of the various polity types. Ideally, this allows us to gain
further information about what being part of a certain polity type implies for a specific
post-conflict country. For instance, knowing that Macedonia is classified as a ‘Let’s Share’
polity, what implications does this have for the inner dynamics at work in this polity? Does
this tell us something about how ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians compete for
political power? Or about the prospects for promoting good governance in post-conflict
Macedonia? More generally the question is whether certain regularities can be identified
which allow observers to infer characteristics about a post-conflict country by knowing
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Figure 2.2: Basic Patterns of Interaction
that it forms part of a particular polity type. If so, the typology would have fulfilled its
purpose of enabling descriptive inference (see 1.2.2).
In order to capture differences in the post-conflict dynamics of the various polity types,
a common vocabulary is helpful which stretches through the different polity types. This
section presents a number of possible patterns of interaction with which the heterogeneity
of post-conflict interactions can be captured in a systematic manner. These are relatively
abstract concepts by which a broader range of actual empirical modes of interaction can
be subsumed. For instance, one of these patterns of interaction, ‘virtual cooperation’,
describes a situation in which parties pretend to cooperate while, in reality, at least one
of them tacitly but willingly undermines this cooperation. This can then be applied to
interactions among warring parties (for instance between Joseph Kabila and various other
rebel groups in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) or to interactions between warring
parties and external actors (for instance the attempts of the RUF rebels in Sierra Leone
to make the international community believe that they are interested in peace). During
the work on the cases it became apparent that all of the observed patterns of interaction
can be ordered into a simple analytical matrix that consists of two dimensions: whether
the parties’ interactions are based more on cooperation or confrontation, and whether the
parties’ gestures and actions are more genuine or more virtual (see figure 2.2 on page 69).
This matrix can be applied both to the interactions between the former warring parties
themselves and to their interactions with external actors. This leads to the eight basic
patterns of interaction discussed below. They can be used to complement the analytical
framework developed above, as shown in figure 2.3 on page 72.
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2.4.1 Patterns adopted by the Warring Parties
Genuine Cooperation. Genuine cooperation is a pattern the warring parties may adopt
when dealing with each other or with external actors. It implies that the parties engage in
true and honest cooperation and that there is a close match between their rhetoric and their
actual behavior. Genuine cooperation is most likely the case when the relations between
the belligerents are constructive, but it does not necessarily follow from the presence
of constructive relations. There are cases where, despite the presence of constructive
relations, the relations between the warring factions are more closely following the ‘virtual
cooperation’ pattern described below. Burundi is a case in point. Though, overall, the
relations at the beginning of the post-conflict polity can be described as constructive,
genuine cooperation between the belligerents has been becoming rare over the course of
the polity (see 3.3). Genuine cooperation strategies can find their expression in a number of
specific gestures the parties may adopt. One of these gestures is called ‘demonstration of
goodwill’. It denotes a strategy that is likely to be applied when parties want to underline
their willingness to engage in genuine cooperation. Especially for parties that have a
reputation as being a potential spoiler due to their past conduct, it may be important
to demonstrate their commitment to the peace process in order to avoid sanctions or
repressions from external actors. The parties’ demonstration of goodwill may be purely
rhetorical (for instance by simply re-affirming the commitment to the peace process by
making promises about future behavior), or it may require to make a number of real (and
often painful) concessions. Obviously, the latter option is more credible and effective, but
also more costly for the conflict parties.
Virtual Cooperation. The opposite of the above pattern can be called ‘virtual cooper-
ation’. It implies that the warring parties pretend to cooperate with each other while in
effect they covertly continue to follow their own, private agendas. This is a relatively
common pattern of post-conflict interactions. Often, the preceding conflict history or
the commitment problem (see 2.2) prevent the parties from engaging in true and honest
cooperation. We can assume ‘virtual cooperation’ to be the case when there is evidence
that the parties make false promises and merely pay lip service to the principles of the
post-conflict settlement. Obviously, ‘virtual cooperation’ is much more likely in cases
where the relations between the warring parties are obstructive than in situations where
they are constructive, but especially in situations with great power imbalances between
the parties it may be the case that the stronger party engages in a strategy of ‘virtual
cooperation’ despite the presence of constructive relations. One frequent mechanism by
which ‘virtual cooperation’ strategies become apparent are ‘foot dragging’ gestures. ‘Foot
dragging’ is a strategy that the warring parties adopt towards external actors when they
want to gain access to benefits or avoid sanctions without actually fulfilling external actors’
demands. The difference between ‘virtual cooperation’ and ‘foot dragging’ is that the
former strategy is mainly applied among the warring parties themselves, whereas the latter
70
2.4 Patterns of Interaction in Post-Conflict Polities
is addressed to external actors. ‘Foot dragging’ is a very frequent pattern of interaction, and
as the case studies suggest, it is among the more successful strategies which the warring
parties can choose when aiming at averting external pressure. It consists of a prolonged
strategy of making promises and then seeking excuses why they cannot be met.
Genuine Confrontation. Genuine confrontation is a pattern of interaction that is char-
acterized by confrontational measures which go beyond rhetorical or symbolic hostility.
Genuine confrontation implies that a party intentionally adopts measures which interfere
with the goals of other parties and which may lead to an escalation of the tensions prevail-
ing between two parties. It can be adopted by a conflict party either with respect to their
(former) enemies or with respect to other external actors. For instance, the Revolutionary
United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone was strongly opposed to the enforcement of its disar-
mament obligations by the United Nations and therefore adopted a highly confrontational
approach with regard to the international community. The rebel group took about 500
UNAMSIL peacekeepers hostage and systematically seized weapons and ammunition
from the UN peacekeepers. These gestures were clearly more than symbolic attempts to
demonstrate their discontent against the extension of the disarmament efforts to its core
areas (see 4.3.2). A more specific mechanism identified in the case studies that can be
subsumed here are calculated escalation strategies. They imply that a party intentionally
adopts confrontational means because it expects specific gain and benefits. For instance,
some ethnic Macedonian hardliners in Macedonia repeatedly tried to torpedo the peace
agreement struck with the ethnic Albanian minority in an attempt to gain more political
support from the conservative electorate. By engaging in such attempts for political com-
petition ‘on the cheap’ they took an escalation of the political tensions into account (see
3.2.2).
Virtual Confrontation. In contrast to genuine confrontation, virtual confrontation de-
scribes a pattern of interaction in which parties adopt various confrontational gestures
which do not aim at bringing about an escalation of the relations. Instead, their goal is
to underline their willingness and ability to obstruct the peace process if its demands are
not met. One specific attempt to make use of virtual confrontation strategies are Saber
rattling gestures in which one of the warring parties aims at underlining its ability to derail
the peace process if certain demands are not met. The ability to credibly adopt ‘saber
rattling’ gestures requires the party to possess at least a certain degree of de facto power.
Such a strategy is generally chosen whenever a party is unable or unwilling to make the
necessary concessions demanded by external actors or the other group of former warring
parties. An example for the use of ‘saber rattling’ gestures is the former Ivorian president
Laurent Gbagbo, who orchestrated anti-UN riots in an attempt to protest against the UN’s
attempts to clear the way for presidential elections (see 6.3.2). The success of ‘saber
rattling’ gestures depends on many variables, including external actors’ willingness and
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capability to constrain the spoilers. Another strategy that the warring parties may apply
when interacting with external actors is called blaming and shaming. It is a strategy by
which the conflict parties mutually try to marginalize and delegitimize each other in the
face of the international community. The general idea is to convince external actors of
one’s own virtues while pointing at the same time to the deficiencies of their enemies.
Often, the ultimate rationale is to persuade external actors to switch from a mediative to a
partisan manner of engagement to one’s own benefit.
2.4.2 Patterns adopted by External Actors
Genuine Accommodation. Genuine Accommodation is a pattern of interaction by
which external actors seek to maintain peace or post-conflict stability through accom-
modating the wants and needs of one or more of the warring parties. An example for this
is the attempt to bridge the asymmetry that may exist between the former belligerents by
giving financial benefits to the weaker party and enable it, for instance, to successfully run
an electoral campaign. This played a role for instance in Mozambique and El Salvador
(see chapter 5). More general examples include external actors’ attempts to overcome
72
2.4 Patterns of Interaction in Post-Conflict Polities
commitment problems by providing security guarantees to specific parties. This has played
a role in many of the cases discussed below.
Virtual Accommodation. Virtual accommodation differs from genuine accommodation
in that external actors’ only adopt symbolic attempts to accommodate the conflict parties’
wants and needs. It involves certain concessions awarded to the former belligerents but they
often only fulfill the purpose of masking a more coercive strategy. Virtual accommodation
strategies have played a role during the National Transitional Government in Liberia,
which was established after Charles Taylor’s resignation in 2003. In order to accommodate
the warlords’ hunger for political power, external actors enabled them to gain a fraction
of governmental power by allowing them to participate in a transitional government.
Although they bolstered themselves that they were heading “an administration for warring
factions” in which civilians have nothing to say (International Crisis Group 2004f: 13),
the international community at the same time adopted measures that “in effect put Liberia
under a form of international supervision for three years” and greatly limited the warlords’
room of maneuver (Ellis [1999] 2007: xxvii). Hence, virtual accommodation strategies
almost always imply a readiness to use more coercive measures in case the buying-off
strategy fails.
Genuine Enforcement. Of course, there are also cases in which the international com-
munity does stand firm and is really willing to enforce its vision of post-conflict order. This
can be called genuine enforcement. It implies that external actors are both able and willing
to use coercive measures in an attempt to impose specific provisions on the former warring
parties. Genuine enforcement often requires that external actors are willing to remain
engaged in a post-conflict situation in the long run and not only for a short temporary
period. Genuine enforcement can be observed for instance in present-day Liberia, where
external actors have been engaged through the UNMIL mission since 2003 and where they
continue to play a vital role for the maintenance of peace and security (see A.13).
Virtual Enforcement. Virtual enforcement occurs when external actors pretend to use
coercive means while in reality they fail to effectively constrain the warring faction’s scope
of action. This situation occurs because external actors lack the willingness or the ability
that is necessary for genuine enforcement measures. The result is a halfhearted attempt
for peacebuilding in which external actors’ official goals and actual achievements diverge
drastically. There are various examples for virtual enforcement strategies. The attempts to
stabilize the power-sharing government in the DRC are a case in point. Despite a robust
peace-enforcement mission, external actors repeatedly failed to prevent the resurgence of
combat activities or atrocities committed against the civilian population (see 4.2).
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2.4.3 Dimensions of the Empirical Analysis
When trying to empirically illustrate the dynamics unfolding in the different polity types, it
is warranted to confine the analysis to specific dimensions of interest rather than focusing on
the interactions as a whole. This enables a better comparability of the different cases (both
with regard to within-type and across-type differences) and allows to make more specific
statements about the observed dynamics. Four such dimensions or overarching themes
turned out as the most relevant ones during the empirical investigation: the prospects for
overcoming commitment problems in the post-settlement phase, the manner of competition
for attaining formal authority, potential threats to the stability of the polity, e.g. arising
from imminent political crises, potential spoilers or other destabilizing elements, and
the prospects for promoting good governance in the various post-conflict polity types.
These four themes also provide the structure for the case studies below. They were chosen
because they are widely discussed in the literature and because they are potentially relevant
in all polity types, irrespective of their individual characteristics.
Dealing with commitment problems has been discussed above (section 2.2.2) as one of
the core problems in the initiation phase of post-conflict polities, but it is also a problem
that remains highly relevant in the implementation phase of peace agreements. Political
competition is another core theme in the literature on post-conflict peacebuilding and plays
a central role for instance in Roland Paris’s work (2004 and 1997). Given the highly diverse
characteristics of the different polities, it can be suspected that the manner of political
competition differs widely across polity types. Dealing with threats and imminent political
crises, for instance due to the presence of spoilers, is a third core theme in the literature on
post-conflict peacebuilding. Issues related to that are discussed at various places in this
dissertation, most notably in section 2.2.2, but also in the appendix, section C.2.1. The
promotion of good governance is possibly the most widely addressed aspect in the literature
on post-conflict peacebuilding. Chapters one and two highlighted that promoting good
governance has become the dominant goal of post-conflict interventions in the post-Cold
War era but at the same time made clear that the shift from murky post-conflict situations
to consolidated, democratic states succeeds hardly anywhere. It therefore makes sense to
investigate how the promotion of good governance principles differs across post-conflict
polity types.
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As highlighted above, power-sharing is a frequent feature of civil war settlements, but its
actual qualities may differ drastically. Ideally, the belligerents in post-conflict situations
are all committed to the idea of power-sharing and engage in at least a basic level of
cooperation. Although this is what the proponents of power-sharing often assume in their
models, a glance at actual cases suggests that such constructive examples of power-sharing
are relatively rare. Only two cases in the sample fall into this category: Macedonia after
the adoption of the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’, and the early period of the power-
sharing agreement struck after the latest civil war in Burundi (see table A.1 on page 327).
Admittedly, both cases are so different from one another in terms of their historical and
socio-cultural backgrounds that comparing them might appear like an unfruitful exercise
at first glance. To mention only a few differences: Burundi is a post-colonial country,
whereas Macedonia has a post-communist background. They are geographically remote
and at strikingly different stages of development.1 Although they are both slightly smaller
than Belgium, Burundi has about four times as many inhabitants – around eight million –
as Macedonia (see Coleman 2008j and Coleman 2008c). However, the cases also have a
few important things in common. In both of them, the armed conflicts were terminated
through the implementation of power-sharing arrangements. Compared to other cases of
power-sharing (in particular those classified as ‘Doomed to Share’ polities, see chapter
four), the warring parties maintained relatively constructive relations in the settlement
phase and at the beginning of the ensuing post-conflict situation. Furthermore, external
actors intervened in these cases in a mediative manner, i.e. with the overarching goal to
mitigate tensions occurring between the belligerents.
In addition to that, there are a few commonalities that go beyond the typology itself. In
both countries, the population is ethnically divided into a majority and a minority group.
Two thirds of Macedonia’s population are ethnic Macedonians (and Roman Catholics),
whereas about one fourth are ethnic Albanians (and Muslims) (see Coleman 2008j: 2).
By the same token, in Burundi members of the Hutu ethnic group comprise around 85
percent of the population, while members the Tutsi ethnic group only represent about
1In 2008, Macedonia was on the 68th rank of the Human Development Index, Burundi on the 172th rank
(see UNDP 2008).
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14 percent (see e.g. Uvin 1999: 256).2 As will be argued below, these particular ethnic
constellations mattered for the outbreak of both conflicts and constitute the background
against which the major post-conflict dynamics unfolded. Also, both cases are examples
in which power-sharing was not simply a transitional measure for bridging the time until
national elections took place, but where power-sharing provisions became permanent
features of the countries’ constitutions.
3.1 A basic Model of ‘Let’s Share’ Polities
Before going into detail about the two cases, this section aims at adapting the generic model
of post-conflict interactions (see figure 2.1 on page 42) to the specific context of ‘Let’s
Share’ polities. The goal is to specify the general assumptions made about post-conflict
interactions in section 2.4 to this particular environment. For each of the four dimensions
of interest (overcoming commitment problems, manner of political competition, threats
from within, and promoting good governance), I develop stipulations about the dynamics
and interactions that can be expected to occur in this polity type. These stipulations do not
serve as hypotheses which I try to prove in the empirical chapters, but rather as a foil for
the actual dynamics and interactions observable in the cases.
The basic features of ‘Let’s Share’ polities are schematically sketched in figure 3.1 on
page 77. As the figure illustrates, the two groups of the former warring parties (called
‘Side A’ and Side B’ in the figure) are both part of the formal government and maintain
constructive relations (illustrated by the two black arrows connecting them). At the same
time, external actors have a mediative and non-discriminatory influence on the dynamics
unfolding between the warring parties (as illustrated by the arrow connecting external
actors and the dashed line around the former belligerents). What can be inferred from
this basic constellation about the interactions between the different parties? In general,
it seems fair to assume that the former warring parties engage in genuine (rather than
merely virtual) cooperation and that they do not in principle refuse to share power with
their former enemies. It is reasonable to assume that they accept the status quo and come
to terms with the provisions of the power-sharing arrangement. External actors’ main
goal is to stabilize the post-conflict situation by mediating conflicts occurring between
the conflict parties as well as by trying to influence the domestic environment according
to their own understanding of a ‘good’ post-conflict peace. It can be assumed that the
constructive stance of the former belligerents requires a less costly and potentially also
shorter engagement than it is the case in obstructive polity types. This potentially increases
external actors’ inclination to engage in ‘genuine enforcement’ efforts. However, even
‘Let’s Share’ polities may confront external actors with unforeseen developments requiring
2This is similar to Rwanda. In both countries the colonial powers capitalized on these differences through
supporting centralized Tutsi rule as the means of administration. At independence, the Hutu seized power
in Rwanda, but Burundi became a Tutsi monarchy (see Uvin 1999 and UCDP 2010a).
76
3.1 A basic Model of ‘Let’s Share’ Polities
Formal Government
Former Belligerents
Constructive
-
ff
6
M
ed
ia
tiv
e
In
flu
en
ce
Side A Side B
External Actors
Figure 3.1: ’Let’s Share’ Polities (simplified illustration)
a decisive reaction. It depends on the particularities of the cases whether external actors
are able and willing to react to these challenges in an adequate manner. In the following,
these assumptions are specified further with respect to the four polity dimensions on which
the analysis focuses.
Overcoming Commitment Problems. Above, it was noted that commitment problems
may arise either due to malevolent intentions held by the former belligerents, or due to
problems in the structural environment of settlement and post-settlement situations (2.2.2).
While both of these problems may arise in ‘Let’s Share’ polities, it is reasonable to assume
that they pose less difficulties than it is the case in other polity types, for two reasons: First,
the fact that both of the former belligerent groups hold a share of formal authority and
thereby a certain control over the means of coercion (most notably the command of the
national army) ensures that none of them will be entirely marginalized in the post-conflict
polity. Second, a proven record of constructive relations (for instance with regard to the
negotiation of a peace treaty) potentially increases mutual trust. Both factors favor the
overcoming of commitment problems. In addition to that, the successful establishment of
power-sharing is often a reflection of a strong external influence in the initiation phase of
the polity, which is often accompanied by granting effective security guarantees (see 2.2).
All this indicates that ‘Let’s Share’ polities offer a fruitful environment for overcoming
commitment problems in the post-settlement phase.
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Manner of Political Competition. One of the defining characteristics of ‘Let’s Share’
polities is that the parties do not generally contest the current distribution of formal
authority. Both of them accept the status quo and are ready to share power. However, based
on the assumption that all parties in post-conflict polities (even relatively constructive ones)
in principle strive for increasing their relative share of power in the future (section 2.4),
the parties are likely to engage in intense political competition after a certain while. In
power-sharing cases, the incentive to squeeze one’s opponent out of the government in the
future may be particularly high, which may account for the relations between the parties to
become more confrontational.3 In this process, the power-sharing provisions are likely to
not only regulate political competition, but to become themselves the subject of political
competition over time. As the critics of power-sharing have pointed out, this may foster
‘centrifugal tendencies’ (see 2.2), the ‘reification’ of ethnic identities and the socio-cultural
segregation of the different communities (see Sisk 1996: 39).
Threats from Within. In all post-conflict situations – whether constructive or obstructive
ones – there is a heightened potential or ‘greater temptation’ for political hardliners or
ethnic entrepreneurs to exploit political opportunities for realizing private gains than in
other contexts (section 2.2.2). In particular in relatively constructive situations, political
hardliners have strong incentives to engage in attempts for political mobilization ‘on the
cheap’ by portraying constructive politicians as traitors of their cause. In power-sharing
situations in divided societies, there is the constant possibility that influential individuals
or radical parties use the allegedly ‘unfair’ power-sharing provisions as a pretext for
triggering diffuse fears against the minority population. And even for moderate politicians,
the temptation to employ sectarian policies in order to yield a better starting position
in the future may be present.4 Therefore, it cannot be ruled out that single parties fall
back to some of the more detrimental maneuvers like ‘calculated escalation’ strategies
(by which a party aims at artificially provoking a crisis from which it expects to gain
politically) or ‘foot dragging’ strategies (by which a party takes a gradual undermining
of the power-sharing principles deliberately into account). This may give rise to political
crises with the potential to destabilize the polity over time. These crises potentially provide
a slippery slope, causing the relations between the parties to become more confrontational
over time. This makes it necessary for external actors to go beyond the role of passive
bystanders. Most notably, they must be able and willing perform the role of a watchdog
– i.e. to observe the political developments in the polity and be prepared for short-term,
decisive interventions if the conditions on the ground call for it. Whereas external actors’
willingness is predominantly a political question, their ability mainly hinges upon their
3Note that this is the main argument emphasized by Roland Paris (2004), i.e. that political competition is a
potentially destabilizing factor in post-conflict environments.
4See, on this aspect, the discussion about ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ in section C.1.4 in the appendix.
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control of credible and effective sticks and carrots with which they can influence the
situation on the ground.5
Promoting Good Governance. One of the main assumptions made about the interac-
tions between the various post-conflict actors in section 2.1.2 above is that external actors
seek to affect local dynamics by influencing domestic constraints and opportunities, but
that domestic actors have strong reservations against external attempts for promoting good
governance. They strive for the benefits (or carrots) offered by external actors but seek to
avoid the costs (or sticks) associated with external influence. In ‘Let’s Share’ polities this
pattern of interaction could be particularly pronounced because external actors are likely
to engage in a genuine (and not merely virtual) manner of enforcement. However, we can
also expect them to hail ‘Let’s Share’ polities as show-cases for successful post-conflict
peacebuilding. This potentially causes them to lose the critical distance necessary for a
grounded assessment of the developments taking place on the ground and renders them
incapable of sharply conceiving the shortcomings and dangers occurring in this polity.
This problem is referred to as ‘euphemistic blindness’ in section 2.4 above and may induce
external actors to interpret formal successes as real achievements without cross-checking
whether they actually match the political realities on the ground. This, in turn, enables
domestic actors to engage in extensive ‘virtual cooperation’ strategies with which they are
able to keep external influence at arm’s length.
3.2 Macedonia
Macedonia6 was once one of the six constituent republics of the Yugoslav Federation until
it declared independence in 1991. The country is an unusual post-conflict case, for the
simple reason that it has not experienced any large-scale armed conflict at all. It was spared
the tragic fate that some of its neighboring states on the Balkans went through. However, it
5In IR theory, a similar theme is discussed in the context of theories on ‘coercive diplomacy’ (George
1991). Coercive diplomacy is a strategy which states use in order to compel other states to take specific
actions or refrain from taking specific actions. It consists of a legitimate demand, backed by clearly
communicated and credible threat that certain sanctions will follow if the target state does not comply.
In this theory, the credibility of the threat depends on the demonstrated willingness and capability of
the intervening state to implement the threat (see Craig and George 1995: 180). Although the theory
of coercive diplomacy does not apply in this context, the criteria ‘willingness’ and ‘capability’ can be
transferred as critical conditions for the credible disbursement of benefits and the imposition of sanctions
in the context of post-conflict environments.
6Note that the name Macedonia is ambivalent, as it refers at the same time to the larger historical area
called Macedonia, a Greek province, and the nation-state officially called Former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia (FYROM). After Macedonia declared its sovereignty, this triggered a name dispute with
Greece, which prevented its recognition as a sovereign state by the European Community. Responding
to Greek objections, Macedonia was recognized by the United Nations as a sovereign state under the
name Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in 1993 (Coleman 2008j: 7–11). Unless otherwise
stated, the term Macedonia (as in ‘Republic of Macedonia’) is used here for referring to the Macedonian
nation-state.
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was still the site of a six-months long insurgency (fulfilling the requirements for a ‘minor
armed conflict’ in the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’) that left a few hundred people
dead, and that could have turned into a larger armed conflict at any time (see Chivvis 2008:
144). Despite its low intensity, the armed insurgency left heavy marks in Macedonia’s
political landscape and gave rise to an entirely different political framework than before
the outbreak of the conflict.
Macedonia is an ethnically and religiously heterogeneous country. About 67 percent of
the population are ethnic Macedonians of Roman Catholic belief, while some 23 percent
are ethnic Albanians of Muslim belief. The remaining ten percent of the population
consists of Turks, Serbs and Roma and other minorities (Coleman 2008j: 2).7 This makes
Macedonia today “one of the last truly multi-ethnic states in the Balkans” (Chivvis 2008:
142). This plurality has not been without problems. As the International Crisis Group
remarked, the different ethnic groups have “co-existed uneasily” since the country had
declared independence in 1991, but nonetheless managed to maintain by and large peaceful
relations (2001f: 1). The Albanian insurgency that erupted in 2001 suddenly ended this
state of coexistence.8 The key driving force behind the conflict was the perceived political
and cultural marginalization of the Albanian minority, which motivated the main rebel
group – the NLA (‘National Liberation Army’) – to carry out attacks against government
institutions (International Crisis Group 2001f: 1; see also Stanisevski and Miller 2009: 557
and Kim 2001: 4–5).9 What started as a single attack by the NLA against a police station
in the town of Tearce on 22 January 2001 over time turned into an enduring insurgency
driven by sporadic attacks against Macedonian security forces.
Unlike in most other cases discussed in this dissertation, the rebels had rather limited
goals. Instead of trying to gain the control of the capital or following a secessionist agenda,
the NLA’s main goals were to rectify the constitutional bias favoring ethnic Macedonians
(referred to by Albanians as ‘constitutional nationalism’), to demand recognition for the
Albanian minority as a “second official constituent nation”, and to eliminate a number
of linguistic and educational disadvantages from which Albanians had been suffering for
years (see Bieber and Keil 2009: 345–346).10 The NLA leadership underlined that it was
7Note that, unlike the Tutsi in Burundi, the Albanian minority geographically concentrated in the West (see
Friedman 2005: 386).
8For a concise overview of the Macedonian conflict, see for instance Alice Ackermann (2002).
9Reducing this conflict to ethnic factors as such, however, would be wrong. As Stephen Hensell (2003)
points out, the Albanian uprising should rather be seen as a resistance of excluded, mostly rural Albanians
that were denied access to both ethnic-Macedonian and ethnic-Albanian patronage networks. The sources
for these exclusion processes, he argues, can be found in the incomplete modernization process that
Macedonia underwent both in the socialist and in the post-socialist period.
10The Macedonian constitution contains a number of ambiguous provisions that – either symbolically or in
material terms – clearly is to the benefit of the Macedonian majority. In Bellamy’s words: “On one hand
it guarantees the equality of all its citizens regardless of sex, race, nationality or religion (Article 9). [. . . ]
However, the constitution also describes Macedonia as, ‘the state of the Macedonian people’ (preamble),
suggesting to the country’s minorities that the ethnic Macedonians have a higher status” (Bellamy 2002:
124).
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fighting to keep Macedonia together, not to divide the country. As its leader Ali Ahmeti
stated, the main Albanian concern was about living “as equals in our land and be treated
as citizens” (quoted in Bellamy 2002: 120). These limited goals, in conjunction with
the absence of atrocities committed on a large scale, put Macedonia in a relatively good
starting position to seek a quick resolution to the conflict.11
Although various measures to accommodate the Albanian insurgents were implemented
soon after the outbreak of the rebellion, violence did not stop before August 2001, when the
parties signed the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ after extensive international pressure. In
the course of this, the Macedonian-dominated government agreed to address key Albanian
concerns, while the NLA in turn accepted to be disarmed by an international force. The
‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ underlined that “Macedonia’s sovereignty and territorial
integrity” as well as the “multi-ethnic character of Macedonia’s society must be preserved”
(Government of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2001; par. 1.2 – 1.3) and
outlined a range of constitutional amendments to be adopted in the ensuing months (Annex
1). This marked the beginning of the post-conflict phase, in which many of the provisions
of the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ were implemented.
3.2.1 Macedonia as a ‘Let’s Share’ Polity
The ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ was drafted as a “compromise that reflects the interests
of the three major negotiating actors: the Macedonian government, the ethnic Albanians,
and the international community (the United States and the European Union)” (Stanisevski
and Miller 2009: 559). This gave rise to a political constellation that fulfills the require-
ments of a ‘Let’s Share’ polity: an effective degree of power-sharing between the parties,
the prevalence of constructive relations between the former belligerents, and a mediative
engagement by external actors.
Effective Power-Sharing. Macedonia is one of the few post-conflict countries with a
history of pre-war power-sharing governments involving the belligerent parties. Since
the country’s independence in 1991, Albanian parties had frequently been included in
government coalitions (see e.g. Stanisevski and Miller 2009: 557). Despite that, “the
political domination of the majority ethnic Macedonians was evident” and often led to a
feeling of misrepresentation and suppression among ethnic Albanians (Stanisevski and
Miller 2009: 557). Thus, the political participation of Albanian parties in the government
prior to 2001 must not be seen as an expression for an equal political status of both ethnic
groups but rather as a sign for the relative political impotence of the Albanian part.12 The
11Comparing Macedonia to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Florian Bieber argues that “[i]t is considerably easier to
make peace after 8 months of skirmishes with around 200 victims than after 3 1/2 years of war and over
100,000 dead” (2008b: 7).
12See on this aspect also Stephan Hensell, who argues that the Macedonian leadership was effectively forced
to include Albanian parties in order to fulfill external expectations for democratization. However, as
Hensell points out further, this process must be seen as a clientellistic inclusion of single Albanian parties
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‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ marked a clear break with the past and fundamentally raised
the political status of the Albanian minority. It modified Macedonia’s political landscape
according to the principles of consociational democracy, for instance by strengthening the
principle of proportional representation of ethnic groups and introducing a minority veto
in order to block decisions that threaten the Albanian cultural identity (Stanisevski and
Miller 2009: 557–558). The ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ was widely credited for the
wide range of power-sharing provisions it contained, and observers remarked that it came
“as close as you can get to the ideal of a civic democracy in an ethnically divided society”
(Nicholas Whyte, quoted in Trbovich 2008: 397).
Unlike in some other cases of power-sharing, the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ was not
a temporary power-sharing instrument devised to bridge the time until national elections
provide for a new stable (and possibly non-inclusive) government to take over, but that it
triggered an ambitious political reform process requiring a number of constitutional amend-
ments to be passed over the subsequent months and years. In late 2001 and early 2002
the Macedonian parliament adopted a number of amendments that, among other things,
established Albanian as an official language, set up a system of equitable representation
in the public administration, and implemented a number of decentralization measures
(Bieber 2008b: 17; see also Friedman 2009: 216). However, the agreement did not contain
formal provisions requiring at the establishment coalition governments. Power-sharing was
targeted at other concerns, most notably regarding the use of the Albanian language in the
parliament, public positions reserved for national minorities and the requirement to revise
the constitution’s preamble, whose pro-Macedonian bias was at the heart of the Albanian
uprising (see Bellamy 2002: 139). These provisions are well in line with consociational
theory:
“The provisions of the Framework Agreement are generally based upon the ele-
ments of consensual democracy as devised by Lijphart: government comprised of
multi-ethnic coalition (although this is not explicitly anticipated with the Framework,
it does function as a tradition since the early 1990s); obligation to provide equal
representation in the state institutions for the minority communities; special parlia-
mentary procedures (the right to a veto) and devolution of power via decentralization”
(Mehmeti 2008: 73).
In conjunction, they guarantee an institutionalized form of power-sharing to which the
parties have to adhere. Macedonia’s political landscape in the post-Ohrid period can
therefore safely be considered an example for genuine (and not merely virtual) power-
sharing. It has “effectively transformed Macedonia from an uneasy nation-state with some
elements of accomodation to a power-sharing system which has opened the state to the
Albanian community [. . . ]” (Bieber 2008b: 9).
into a Macedonian-dominated patronage-regime controlled by the president (2003: 138). In the German
original: “Weil die demokratische Regierung wie auch das sozialistische Regime davor wesentlich auf
Patronagesystemen ruhte, vollzog sich die Integration der albanischen Minderheit als klientelistische
Einbindung einzelner Parteien in ein vom Präsidenten dekretiertes Konsensregime.”
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Constructive Relations. The ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ addressed a range of del-
icate issues regarding both symbolic and material aspects of ethnic cohabitation. From
an ethnic-Macedonian perspective, this could have been perceived as a threat to long-
established practices and privileges, triggering anti-Albanian sentiments and creating an
obstructive and competitive atmosphere between Macedonia’s two largest ethnic groups.
There was some indication for this to be the case. Parts of the ethnic-Macedonian majority
believed the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ to be “imposed on them by ‘pro-Albanian’
Western powers” (Engström 2002: 2) and ethnic-Macedonian media has at times portrayed
the agreement as “a fatal indulgence to ‘terrorism’ which would put the country’s future
existence under threat” (Brunnbauer 2002: 8). A number of Macedonian parties – usually
those in the opposition – also tried to capitalize on criticizing or rejecting the ‘Ohrid
Framework Agreement’ (see e.g. Hensell 2003: 138). Most notably, two years after the
agreement was signed two of the agreement’s signatories – among them the former Prime
Minister Ljubco Georgievski – challenged the document as being impossible to implement,
and formulated plans for a secession of the country in an influential newspaper article (see
Bieber 2008b: 35).
However, these events are not representative for the Macedonian-Albanian relations as a
whole – neither for the political elites nor for the population. Plans for a secession of the
country gained little political leverage and were rejected by a majority of the population
(see Bieber 2008b: 36). As Brunnbauer makes clear, “[o]pposition to the Ohrid Agreement
was mostly aired by nationalist intellectuals, the Macedonian media and political hardliners
who all should not be taken as representative of the whole ethnic Macedonian population”
(2002: 17–18). The population clearly illustrated its preference for constructive relations
by voting against the conservative VMRO-DPMNE (Internal Macedonian Revolutionary
Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity) and for the more moderate
SDSM (Social Democratic Union of Macedonia) in the 2002 parliamentary elections. This
strongly accelerated the implementation of key provisions from the ‘Ohrid Framework
Agreement’ (International Crisis Group 2003d: i). The overall relations between the former
belligerents can therefore be considered constructive if one abstracts from the usual degree
of political opportunism that all parties adhere to.
Mediative Intervention. Macedonia has experienced the engagement of numerous ex-
ternal actors before, during and after the conflict. It is widely credited that they have played
a crucial role for preventing the escalation of violence and in bringing about a settlement
to the conflict. As Chivvis remarks, “[i]t is highly unlikely that Macedonia would have
remained stable without the political and security support provided by NATO and the EU
[. . . ]” (2008: 154). This firm grip of third parties is no surprise given its proximity to some
of the most conflict-ridden states on the Balkans and its geographical position in the center
of Europe. Having learned from the experiences elsewhere on the Balkans, the focus of
this engagement lay on conflict prevention. Between 1995 and 1999, Macedonia hosted
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the United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP), the first preventive force
ever deployed by the United Nations (Bellamy 2002: 127). Before the eruption of the
2001 violence, Macedonia was therefore often “paraded as a prime example of successful
conflict prevention” since it “had managed, by and large, to address internal grievances
peacefully” until then (Bellamy 2002: 127).
After the events in 2001, external actors played a key role for preventing the escalation
of the insurgency into a full-fledged armed conflict and for enforcing a peaceful settlement
on the parties. The EU and NATO took the lead in this regard, as both of them were
highly concerned that Macedonia would turn into the site of another large-scale armed
conflict on the Balkans. NATO forces were engaged at the time of the 2001 incident in
neighboring Kosovo as part of the KFOR mission, and two years earlier NATO had initiated
a large-scale bombing campaign in Serbia after the failed peace talks in Rambouillet (see
e.g. Dziedzic 2006: 324–326). NATO’s potential force and its demonstrated willingness
to use it if necessary clearly were important reasons to dispel a possible escalation of the
violence in Macedonia. Immediately after the beginning of the clashes, NATO increased its
control of the Kosovo-Macedonian border and deployed an emergency team in Macedonia
(Balalovska et al. 2002: 21). Thus, even without the use of a strong actual force, the
NATO presence in the region must be seen as a factor that prevented a further escalation of
violence and that had mediative effects on the belligerents.
In the post-Ohrid period, the European Union played out its repertoire of carrots and
sticks in order to support a quick and complete implementation of the provisions contained
in the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ (see e.g. Balalovska et al. 2002: 34). As Stanisevski
and Miller point out, the agreement was only “accepted under intense pressure from
the international community (the European Union and the United States) and with the
possibility of a bloody civil war looming in the background” (2009: 561). External actors
also played a key role in managing a number of political conflicts that emerged in the
newly created polity over time, most notably in 2004 and 2006 (see Chivvis 2008: 154; see
below for more detail). In general, the opinion prevails that “the International Community
played a positive role [. . . ] with its firm handling of the process of conflict management”
(Atanasov 2006: 183). Thus, although determining whether external intervention is
mediative or partisan is very much a matter of perspective – and ethnic Macedonians in
particular resented “the international pressure that was put on their politicians to sign the
peace accord and proceed toward the implementation of its terms” (Ackermann 2002:
79) – the overall impression is that external actors were mainly concerned with finding
a compromise between the parties and that their agenda was not driven by a systematic
bias for any of the two sides. All in all, external engagement in Macedonia is therefore
regarded as mediative here.
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3.2.2 Polity Dynamics in Macedonia
The case of Macedonia confirms the plausibility of many of the assumptions made about
‘Let’s Share’ polities above. This is illustrated below with regard to the four overarching
themes: dealing with commitment problems, competition for power, threats from within,
and external engagement for good governance.
a) Overcoming Commitment Problems
The general model of ‘Let’s Share’ polities suggests that this polity type offers a particularly
fruitful environment for overcoming the commitment problems that often hamper the
settlement of conflicts or the implementation of peace agreements. Three factors play
a role here: First, the constructive environment that prevails in this polity type makes it
easier for the armed groups to develop a basic level of trust that may lower their hesitations
against handing in their guns. Second, the prospect to share a certain degree of formal
governmental power in the post-settlement phase may elevate the rebels’ willingness to
engage in DDR activities in earnest. Third, the relatively firm role typically played by
external actors in the initiation phase of this polity type allows them to give significant
security guarantees by which the rebels’ concerns can be further dispersed.
Macedonia generally confirms these assumptions, but it must also be noted that the case
certainly offers a ‘most-likely case’ scenario13 that is unlikely to be present in all ‘Let’s
Share’ polities. The short duration of the armed conflict in conjunction with external actors’
strong engagement offered an environment in which it was relatively easy to implement
confidence building measures and create the level of trust necessary for the successful
implementation of the Ohrid Agreement. NATO was responsible for the disarmament
of the Albanian insurgents, contributing 4,500 forces as part of the ‘Operation Essential
Harvest’ (Kim 2001: 1). This task was completed already by September 2001 – after only
thirty days – and the mission collected even more weapons than originally agreed (Chivvis
2008: 150). However, it is also true that the number of collected weapons was only a small
fraction of the total number of weapons circulating in Macedonia. There are estimates
that up to 100,000 illegal arms (among them 50,000 military weapons) still circulate in
Macedonia (see Atanasov 2006: 186). Macedonian hardliners attempted to use this as a
pretext for declaring disarmament as a failure, but this missed the main purpose of the
disarmament operation, which was “to build confidence in the framework and amnesty
agreement with the rebels” (Chivvis 2008: 150). After that, NATO remained engaged only
through a small follow-up mission, by which the observers of the ceasefire were to be
protected.
As this suggests, overcoming the commitment problems that often hamper the successful
conclusion and implementation of peace agreements was a relatively straightforward affair
13 A ‘most-likely case’ is one in which “the independent variables posited by a theory are at values that
strongly posit an outcome or posit an extreme outcome” (George and Bennett 2004: 121).
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in the case of Macedonia. Though this outcome is certainly in good part the result of
the positive ‘baseline conditions for peace’ present in Macedonia, it also supports the
plausibility of the assumption that ‘Let’s Share’ polities in general offer a conducive
environment for overcoming commitment problems. The case of Burundi, where the
conditions were much less favorable but where the commitment problems were nonetheless
effectively handled (see 3.3) adds further support to this argument.
b) Manner of Political Competition
The overall polity constellation also has an effect on the manner by which the former
warring parties compete for political power. Due to the general consensus about the
current distribution of governmental power between the parties, it is unlikely that they will
constantly try to gain more power by booting their opponents out of the power-sharing
arrangement. However, as they are still concerned about their share of power in the future
– for instance after the next round of elections – a competition for future power is likely
to set in. In this regard, ‘Let’s Share’ polities are not different from other functioning
democratic states, and the very fact that political competition is directed at future power
can be taken as an indicator for the progress these countries have made. However, since
‘Let’s Share’ polities are still countries that have experienced an armed conflict, there
exists a heightened potential that even ordinary competition may aggravate the tensions
between the belligerents and may give rise to centrifugal tendencies. In Macedonia, it
can be shown that the sharpening competition before the 2006 parliamentary elections
has fostered the societal cleavages between the two ethnic groups and has led to their
increasing socio-cultural segregation.
In general, the constructive spirit of the Ohrid Agreement effectively altered the rules of
the political game and was crucial for translating the confrontations between the formerly
antagonistic parties into ordinary political competition. Although parts of the ethnic-
Macedonian population were opposed to the far-reaching transfer of power to the Albanian
minority, the compromise ultimately reached found the consensus among the vast majority
of Macedonia’s political elite. In the initial years of the Ohrid Agreement, it is evident
that the majority of the Macedonian population accepted power-sharing as a legitimate
form of political rule. The clearest sign for this can be seen in the parliamentary elections
that took place in 2002, one year after the adoption of the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’.
Despite single attempts by political hardliners to capitalize on existing cleavages, the –
more moderate – opposition parties won the majority of votes in the elections. This gave
rise to a coalition between the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia (SDSM) and the
Democratic Union for Integration (DUI) (see International Crisis Group 2003d: i).
As in any other post-conflict country, a peaceful transition of governmental power from
one party to another can per se be considered a sign for success, for the simple reason
that politics in post-conflict environments tends to be inherently more conflict prone than
elsewhere. However, more relevant in this case is the fact that the electorate voted for
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a governmental coalition that was decidedly more moderate and constructive than the
conservative VMRO-DPMNE ruling previously (see International Crisis Group 2003d: i).
The SDSM was a signatory of the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ itself and “continued
to give its full support in the post-conflict phase, both when it was in opposition (until
2002) and when it was in government (2002-2006)” (Ilievski and Taleski 2009: 359).
Therefore, under its reign the implementation of the agreement progressed quickly, which
is an important reason why today all key provisions have been translated into national law
(Mehmeti 2008: 85). The share of ministries held by Albanians also significantly increased
during the SDSM-DUI coalition, which is another indicator that the coalition was indeed
willing to put the principles of power-sharing into practice (Bieber 2008b: 26–27).14
However, in the ensuing years the adverse effects of a sharpening competition for
future political power soon became apparent. The outvoted VMRO-DPMNE was eager
to return to power in 2006, and in order to achieve this goal it heavily capitalized on
ethnic-Macedonian resentments and anxieties against the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’
and “strengthened its public support by criticizing the agreement” (Mehmeti 2008: 85):
“Campaigning actively against the participation of former rebels15 in electoral pol-
itics, the VMRO-DPMNE attempted to style itself as the guardian of Macedonian
sovereignty, accusing the SDSM of collaborating with ‘the enemy’. The strategic shift
away from the principles of the Ohrid agreement and towards a position of restrained
hostility towards both the ethnic Albanian population and the international community
coincided with a marked increase in violence and insecurity” (Grillot et al. 2004: 8).
Conservative politicians also attempted to gain politically by rejecting some provisions
of the Ohrid agreement because they allegedly over-compensated the Albanian minority.
Indeed, the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ allotted more powers and rights to the Albanian
minority than it ‘deserved’ on the basis of its relative demographic strength. The clearest
example for this is the requirement of a double-majority. It changed the legislative process
in such a way that certain forms of legislation16 require not only a majority in the parliament,
but also a majority among those representatives that form part of the ethnic minority group
– or, in the words of the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’, among those “[r]epresentatives
claiming to belong to the communities not in the majority in the population of Macedonia”
(Government of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2001, Art. 5.2; see also
Chivvis 2008: 149 and Bieber 2008a: 208). The same holds true for some Constitutional
14Albanians held five out of 18 ministries, including health, justice, communication and education. “While
these ministries are less sensitive than defense or internal affairs, they yield considerable financial
resources and impact large parts of the public administration” (Bieber 2008b: 26–27). Albanians further-
more held post as deputy-ministers in all ministries held by ethnic Macedonians, just as Macedonians
held deputy ministers in Albanian ministries (see Balalovska 2006: 25).
15The DUI was the party formed mostly out of former NLA rebels.
16More precisely: “Laws that directly affect culture, use of language, education, personal documentation,
and use of symbols, as well as laws on local finances, local elections, the city of Skopje, and boundaries
of municipalities” (Government of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2001, Art. 5.2).
87
Chapter 3 ‘Let’s Share’ Polities
amendments, for which the consent of a majority of these minority-representatives is
required next to a general qualified two-thirds majority in the parliament (Government
of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2001, Art. 5.1). The rationale behind
these provisions is obvious and well in line with consociational theory: by giving the
minority group (in this case Albanians) a veto-right against certain kinds of legislation,
this group can be effectively protected against potentially harmful laws imposed on them
by the majority group (in this case Macedonians). In Arend Lijphart’s phrase, this amounts
to a guarantee for the minority group “that it will not be outvoted by the majority when its
vital interests are at stake” (1977: 118).
These provisions effectively rectified some of the most pronounced forms of discrim-
ination that ethnic Albanians were exposed to.17 Yet, opportunistic politicians have
successfully portrayed them as an unfair form of ‘over-compensation’ of the Albanian
minority imposed by external forces. From a political standpoint, this strategy was not
without success. The VMRO-DPMNE’s victory in the 2006 parliamentary elections can in
part be explained by its successful mobilization of the electorate and an electoral campaign
that was explicitly directed against the provisions of the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’.
Albanian politicians – even moderate ones like DPA leader Arben Xhaferi – were, for
instance, “usually portrayed by the Macedonian media as the devil who wanted to destroy
Macedonia and employed ‘terrorists’ to achieve this aim” (Brunnbauer 2002: 16). This
explains why “proposals to separate the Republic’s titular nationality from its largest
minority may well continue to enjoy a degree of currency among the country’s major
political figures, as well as among its citizens” (Friedman 2009: 217).
Such attempts for political mobilization ‘on the cheap’ left their marks in the country’s
political culture. Even opportunistic attempts for capitalizing on societal cleavages for the
sake of exploiting short-term benefits – like the anti-Ohrid referendum discussed below
– may have detrimental effects in the long run. Analysts of the Macedonian case have
observed a curtailing of cross-cultural communication and an increasing segregation of
the two communities (see Holliday 2005: 154 and Bieber 2008a: 210).18 According to
Stanisevski and Miller, there is some indication that the “two communities in Macedonia
remain distinctly separated from each other”, which leads to a “continuing persistence
17Prior to the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’, Albanians were underrepresented both in the private and
public sector. With a share of 7.5 and 10 percent, respectively, they stood significantly below their
share of the population (see Brunnbauer 2002: 13). This “cannot be explained only by their lower
qualifications and their more rural life-styles but is more likely the result of ethnically discriminatory
recruitment patterns” (Brunnbauer 2002: 13). Today, the number of ethnic Albanians working in the
public administration is much higher than the pre-Ohrid level, and there is a more general trend that “the
widespread discrimination many Albanians experienced has largely ended” (Bieber 2008a: 207; see also
Stanisevski and Miller 2009: 559). Also a number of other grievances of the Albanian community – in
particular the lack of higher education opportunities in Albanian language – have been addressed by now
(Bieber 2008a: 207).
18But, as Bieber also argues, “most of the instances of segregation since 2001 are not a direct consequence
of the Framework Agreement, but [. . . ] rather a corollary, resulting from the increased political power of
the Albanian community and the polarized social climate as a consequence of the violence” (2008b: 39).
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of tendencies toward majoritarian democracy” (2009: 562; 568). More and more people
also tend to view political competition as a zero-sum game whereby “the gain for one
community inevitably must signify the loss for another” (Bieber 2008a: 208). A clear
indicator for this is the perception prevalent among ethnic Macedonians that the Ohrid
Agreement was generally too generous to the Albanian population and was by some
even construed as a threat to the very core of Macedonian identity. To give an example,
in a survey conducted in 2004 (i.e. after the implementation of the ‘Ohrid Framework
Agreement’) two-thirds of the ethnic Albanians felt to have fewer rights than the majority
population, whereas nearly half of the ethnic Macedonians in turn believed that ethnic
Albanians had more rights than other citizens (see Stanisevski and Miller 2009: 562). In
a similar fashion, Brunnbauer argues that one of the major political consequences of the
Ohrid Agreement was a rising level of mistrust between the two ethnic groups, and, in
particular, a general suspicion among ethnic Macedonians that “Albanians have a hidden
agenda” (2002: 16). More discomforting, even, is the fact that more and more ethnic
Macedonians and (to a lesser degree) also ethnic Albanians believe that another ethnic
conflict might erupt in Macedonia in the near future (see Stanisevski and Miller 2009:
563).19 This confirms that one of the primary drawbacks of consociationalism, namely the
reification of ethnic identity as the result of “reinforcing and entrenching ethnicity in the
political system” (Sisk 1996: 39), indeed seems to take hold in the case of Macedonia. The
sharpening political competition between the parties has not only triggered inter-ethnic, but
also intra-ethnic rivalries and tensions. The ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ is associated
with so many benefits to the Albanian community that the two largest Albanian parties
(DPA and DUI) could not agree “which party contributed more to the concessions secured”
(Ilievski and Taleski 2009: 359). This may lead to an increased (rather than a reduced)
danger to frame political conflicts exclusively in ethnic terms, which may propel the further
segregation of the two communities. It is for this reason that Bieber warns us that the
Ohrid Agreement “remains a potent force in the political debates of the country”, since
“many Macedonians consider the agreement as a ‘loss’ which was ‘won’ by Albanians”
(Bieber 2008a: 207; see also Brunnbauer 2002: 16–17).
In sum, the above paragraph illustrates that the parties initially maintained a consensus
about the status quo and took genuine efforts for implementing the provisions of the
‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’, in particular after the victory of the moderate SDSM/DUI
coalition in the 2002 elections. However, the outvoting of the conservative VMRO-
DPMNE exposed the manner of political competition to increasing centrifugal tendencies,
which fostered the socio-cultural segregation of the two communities. This demonstrates
that not even ‘Let’s Share’ polities are immune against the dangerous effects of political
competition.
19Prior to the conflict, in 2000, only 14.4 percent of ethnic Macedonians and 22.9 percent of ethnic Albanians
believed interethnic tensions to be a potential source of insecurity. In 2004, this figure rose to 76.6
percent and 38.8 percent, respectively, and in 2008 again to 82 percent and 60 percent, respectively see
Stanisevski and Miller (2009: 563).
89
Chapter 3 ‘Let’s Share’ Polities
c) Threats from Within
As noted above, competition for future political power in ‘Let’s Share’ polities can have
adverse effects on the prospects for peace and reconciliation. A related source of tensions
are deliberate attempts by spoilers or hardliners to derail the peace process by triggering
political crises that require an imminent (domestic or external) reaction. This falls within
the range of what was called ‘calculated escalation’ strategies above: intentional attempts
by one party to adopt confrontational means because it expects personal gains and benefits.
In Macedonia such strategies indeed played an important role, but their harmful poten-
tial could be defused by external actors who – playing the role of a ‘watchdog’ – took
immediate precautions.
The first attempt for provoking a rift in the governing coalition goes back to VMRO-
DPMNE leader Georgievski during the time when his party was in opposition. In 2003, he
published an influential newspaper article in which he suggested various theses about the
‘survival of the Macedonian nation and state’. Among other things, he claimed that “[t]he
Ohrid Agreement definitively marked the end of a Macedonia which we recall from history
and from the ideals of all the fallen Macedonian patriots” and suspected the Albanian
population of attempting to ‘conquer’ a number of municipalities where they were in the
minority (quoted in Friedman 2009: 214). Although the government coalition and large
parts of the political elite rejected his position, the proposal had decomposing effects on the
inter-ethnic relations in Macedonia (Friedman 2009: 214). As such, the newspaper article
did not lead to an imminent political crisis that would require an immediate resolution, but
it must be seen as the starting point for a series of other events.
One year later, in the wake of the implementation of the decentralization provisions
provided for in the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’, the opposition carried its provocations
one step further. The rationale behind the decentralization provisions was to “give the
communities (municipalities) a great share of privileges and responsibilities towards
public services, urban and rural planning, protection of the environment, local economic
development, culture, local finances, education, and social and health care” (Atanasov
2006: 189). When the government acknowledged to realize these plans in 2004, the ethnic
Macedonian opposition parties exploited this as an opportunity to evoke public resistance
against the agreement. Through a group called ‘Citizens’ Movement for Macedonia’
they organized a plebiscite against the decentralization provisions. Although officially
acknowledging that the referendum was not about the Ohrid Agreement in general but
merely about “the manner by which the new law was negotiated and adopted” (Ilievski and
Taleski 2009: 362), it did effectively become “a referendum on Ohrid itself, threatening to
derail more than three years of progress” (Chivvis 2008: 152).
The opposition parties nearly succeeded in their strategy, but ultimately the referendum
failed – a fact that is generally attributed to well-timed external intervention. The EU and
the US, worried that the referendum could reverse the progress already achieved, used their
leverage in order to soften the referendum’s potentially harmful effects. The single most
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influential factor was that the US announced to recognize Macedonia by its constitutional
name just three days before the elections. The resulting public enthusiasm led to a very low
turnout in the referendum – less than 25 percent – which caused it to fail despite the fact
that 94 percent of the participants voted against the decentralization provisions (Ilievski
and Taleski 2009: 362; see also Atanasov 2006: 189). External actors, therefore, were
crucial in averting a crisis that may have had the potential to entirely derail the Macedonian
peace process (Chivvis 2008: 152).
Another example was the parliamentary crisis that materialized after the 2006 elections.
The winner of the elections, the conservative VMRO-DPMNE that was outvoted four years
earlier, refused to coalesce with the largest Albanian party, the DUI, and instead chose
the smaller Albanian party (the DPA) as their coalition partner. This was not in itself
unconstitutional, since the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ lacks any rigid power-sharing
formula and does not even require the formation of coalition governments. While this
flexibility has some advantages – it allows, for instance, for a more flexible division of
powers – it can become problematic once certain parties feel excluded from power. It
also implies that there are little safeguards against parties willing to break with the power-
sharing tradition (see Bieber 2008b: 28). Rejecting its own exclusion, the DUI argued that
it had the right to join the government as the strongest Albanian party. As a consequence,
it boycotted many decisions for which the double-majority requirement applied (Bieber
2008b: 25). This gave rise to a severe parliamentary crisis in January 2007, when the
DUI left the parliament in order to protest against the fact that the coalition had passed a
number of laws requiring the double-majority principle by relying on the votes of the DPA
and those of a number of non-Albanian minorities, thereby circumventing the DUI and
depriving it of its de facto veto power. As a condition for returning to the parliament, the
DUI demanded to re-negotiate its rights and its position in the Macedonian polity with the
government. External actors pressured the government to seek negotiations with the DUI
by making Macedonia’s invitation to NATO accession conditional on the DUI’s return to
parliament and threatening to prolong the start-date for the negotiations on EU accession.
The government, therefore, had little choice but to comply, which culminated in a secret
agreement with the DUI in which a number of sensitive issues were settled (see Ilievski
and Taleski 2009: 362–363). This so called “May Agreement” was never published, but
is generally seen as “an ‘unofficial and unconstitutional’ de-facto constitutional reform”
(Goio and Marceta 2009: 5).
As this suggests, ‘Let’s Share’ polities do not offer any guarantee against the gradual
erosion of the very constructive foundations on which they rest. In Macedonia, external
actors play a particularly important role when it comes to mediating political tensions,
taming hardliners and ensuring that politics continues to follow a constructive modus
operandi. This supports the argument made above, i.e. that ‘Let’s Share’ polities may
require a sustained effort by external actors to avert imminent political crises. Successfully
playing this role of a ‘watchdog’ requires external actors to possess both the will and
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the means – in terms of effective sticks and carrots – to prevent an escalation of political
tensions. In other words, not even in ‘Let’s Share’ polities it is enough for external actors to
confine themselves to the role of passive bystanders. This is vividly illustrated in Burundi,
where external actors played a much more passive and ambiguous role.
d) Promoting Good Governance
Next to the intervention in imminent political crises, external actors are also more generally
involved in post-conflict polities through their engagement for good governance, broadly
conceived. It was stipulated above that, sufficient political will and effective leverage
provided, ‘Let’s Share’ polities offer a conducive environment for the promotion of good
governance principles. However, it could also occur that the seemingly ideal constellation
this polity type embodies keeps external actors from recognizing potential threats and
dangers in a timely manner or that they turn a blind eye to certain shortcomings in the
realm of good governance which could undermine their success story.
Macedonia is an exceptional case with respect to the promotion of good governance
principles because external actors had both the political will and determination to make
sure that the parties stick to the principles set out in the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’.
Unlike in many other cases, they disposed of unusually effective sticks and carrots: the
prospect of a Macedonian membership in both EU and NATO. This enabled them to exert a
strong influence on domestic dynamics over a rather long period. For this end, the carrot of
an EU membership perspective was “sliced in small pieces – Commission progress reports,
securing candidate status, securing a date for the start of accession negotiations” (Ilievski
and Taleski 2009: 360). Macedonia was officially given EU candidate country status in
December 2005, and since then five years have passed without much being achieved (see
Ilievski and Taleski 2009: 360). The EU has made further benefits conditional on domestic
progress. This was based on the Copenhagen Criteria, which require, among other things,
“stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect
for and protection of minorities” (see European Commission 2009: 6). In addition to that,
the European Commission regularly examined Macedonia’s ability to implement the Acquis
Communautaire, which required a detailed assessment of Macedonia’s performance with
regard to 33 different issue areas – among them such diverse issues as the free movement
of goods, fisheries and education and culture (European Commission 2009: 31–75).
This enabled external actors to call for ongoing and far-reaching improvements in the
realm of good governance on the basis of concrete criteria. However, there is also some
indication that external actors’ willingness to commit to past promises is lower than what
it initially looks like. In recent years, the membership process has severely slowed down.
Although the EU Commission has proposed the initiation of membership negotiations in
its progress report published on 14 October 2009 (see European Commission 2009), as
of now not even an official start-date for the negotiations has been announced. Despite
external actors’ rhetoric, there is some indication that a realistic perspective for an EU
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membership for Macedonia is still a long way off. Two factors propel such concerns.
First, Greece has – due to the unresolved name dispute – already used its veto in order
to block Macedonia’s NATO membership, and has threatened to do the same during the
EU membership negotiations (see Ilievski and Taleski 2009: 364–365). Second, the
EU is currently plagued by an undeniable “enlargement fatigue”, which makes a quick
announcement of membership negotiations even more unlikely. This has created “an
immense credibility problem for the EU” by removing “a major instrument for securing
compliance from the EU’s toolbox” (see Ilievski and Taleski 2009: 365). As a consequence,
even if external actors are willing to remain engaged in Macedonia’s domestic politics in
the future, their ability to perform this role effectively may simply degrade over time.
In addition, external engagement for good governance may not always have the desired
effects. There is some indication that external actors’ insistence on the Ohrid principles
and on formal progress made in the realm of good governance has contributed to a further
socio-cultural segregation of the two communities. By effectively being the guarantor
of ethnic Albanian minority rights, external actors have generally risked being perceived
by the ethnic Macedonian population as a foreign intruder that supports the Albanian
cause in a one-sided (partisan) manner (see e.g. Engström 2002: 2). Out of this reason,
“Macedonians view the Framework Agreement as an ‘internationally-induced’ arrangement
that has rewarded violence and has increased the ethnic Albanian sense of security and
identity at the expense of decreasing that of Macedonians” (Ackermann 2002: 79). Another
problem that may generally hamper the promotion of good governance in ‘Let’s Share’
polities lies in external actors’ difficulties to recognize dangerous developments in a
timely manner and take the necessary precautions. These difficulties are directly related to
external actors’ focus on formal statebuilding achievements, most notably power-sharing,
disarmament, elections and the like. Since all this worked relatively smoothly in Macedonia,
the constructive features of this polity type may easily obscure the presence of slow-moving,
long term threats. The various crises that emerged in Macedonia clearly were no isolated
events, but must rather been seen as indicators of a general degradation process. But even
when external actors became aware of more gradual developments below the level of an
imminent crisis, they were unwilling to tackle them in a decisive manner so as to avoid
undermining the remaining bits of constructive relations. This has, for instance, become
visible with regard to corruption, which has become endemic in Macedonia in recent years
(see e.g. International Crisis Group 2002b: i; Pettifer 2006: 3). As the International Crisis
Group remarked in 2003: “Left to fester and spread, it will continue to erode Macedonia’s
tenuous unity and send dangerous ripple effects throughout the Western Balkans” (2002b:
i). Nonetheless, external actors have largely ignored this problem, mainly out of conviction
that “if we push them on corruption, the government won’t cooperate on implementing
Ohrid” (International Crisis Group 2002b: i–ii). However, as the International Crisis Group
also made clear, “failure to do so undermines the very agreement on which diplomats have
concentrated their energies” (2002b: i–ii).
93
Chapter 3 ‘Let’s Share’ Polities
In sum, the above paragraph illustrates that external actors made genuine efforts to
enforce good governance standards in Macedonia. They exhibited an extraordinary will-
ingness and ability to make sure that the polity works according to established principles
of good governance as embodied by the Copenhagen Criteria. For this purpose, they made
strategic use of their leverage, which consisted most notably of the country’s member-
ship prospect in both the EU and NATO. Despite that, the phenomenon of ‘euphemistic
blindness’ played a role and caused external actors to overlook some other dangerous
developments, for instance with respect to corruption.
3.3 Burundi
The Burundian civil war was, in virtually all regards, the exact opposite of the minor armed
conflict that took place in Macedonia. It lasted for more than a decade and caused the
death of more than 200,000 and the displacement of an estimated one million people (see
e.g. Daley 2006: 658). Understandably, this triggers questions about the comparability
of the two cases: given their completely different backgrounds of the two cases, can they
be meaningfully compared at all? This section demonstrates that they can, and that the
post-conflict situations that emerged in Macedonia after 2001 and in Burundi after 2003
have more in common than what could initially be expected.
Just as Macedonia, Burundi can be considered a divided society, in which the two
main ethnic groups – the Hutu and the Tutsi – maintained highly conflictual relations
over most of the country’s post-colonial history. Although today generally perceived as
two diverse ethnic groups, the terms Hutu and Tutsi were in former times used more
as a signifier of social status, in principle allowing for Hutu to become Tutsi through
social advancement (UCDP 2010a).20 However, the colonial powers – Germany and, in
particular, Belgium – “capitalised on these existing societal divides, in essence exacerbating
them through supporting centralised Tutsi rule as the means of colonial administration”
– notwithstanding the fact that Tutsi constituted a clear demographic minority (UCDP
2010a; see also Daley 2006). Tutsi elites also remained in power in post-colonial times
although today about 85 percent of the population are Hutu. This led to a high level of
tensions between the ruling Tutsi minority and the Hutu population, which can be seen
as a direct cause for the armed conflict that erupted in 1994. The war was triggered after
Burundi, following the general trend for democratic openings in Africa in the early 1990s,
held its first democratic elections in 1993. Not surprisingly, a Hutu party (FRODEBU,
‘Front pour la démocratie au Burundi’) yielded a sweeping victory, and its leader Melchior
Ndadaye became the country’s first Hutu president in nearly three decades. Tutsi elites
20On this aspect, see in particular Patricia Dalay (2006), who sheds light on the social construction of
the cleavages between Hutu and Tutsi. By the same token, she unveils how the genocide in Rwanda
was “linked to how Hutu and Tutsi were constructed by the colonial state and the failure of Rwandan
nationalism to transcend the colonial construction of racial difference and the ‘foreignness’ it bestowed
on the Tutsis” (2006: 660).
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were highly opposed to the outcomes of the elections, and Ndadaye was assassinated
only three months after taking office and replaced by a Tutsi-dominated government (see
Reyntjens 2006a: 117). As Stef Vandeginste remarks, “[t]he overwhelming electoral
victory of the predominantly Hutu party Frodebu and its presidential candidate Melchior
Ndadaye were too threatening for the vested interests of the incumbent elite” (2009: 67).
This fostered the formation of various Hutu rebel groups initiating a fight against the
government. The most important ones were the CNDD-FDD (‘Conseil national pour la
défense de la démocratie – Forces pour la défense de la démocratie’), FNL/ PALIPEHUTU
(‘Forces nationales de libération’, formerly ‘Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu’, and
FROLINA (‘Front pour la liberation nationale’) (Reyntjens 2006a: 117).21 The armed
conflict lasted for several years and witnessed various failed termination attempts. Of these,
the most promising ones were the Arusha Accords, which began in 1998 and led to the
adoption of a Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in August 2000. However, due to the
failure to include the main rebel groups in the process, it did not lead to an end of fighting
(see van Eck 2007: 117; McClintock and Nahimana 2008: 74). It took another three years
until at least one of the main rebel groups, the CNDD-FDD, signed the ‘Global Ceasefire
Agreement’ with the government in November 2003 (see Government of the Republic of
Burundi 2003). This gave rise to a post-conflict polity that is treated here as an instance of
a ‘Let’s Share’ polity, as justified in the next section.
3.3.1 Burundi as a ‘Let’s Share’ Polity
Classifying Burundi as a ‘Let’s Share’ polity. This implies that an effective power-sharing
arrangement was implemented, that external parties intervened in the post-conflict envi-
ronment in a mediative manner, and that the relations between the former belligerents
were, by and large, constructive. The last aspect is possibly the most controversial one,
since the degree of constructiveness is more difficult to locate than in the case of Mace-
donia. Nonetheless, there is reason to argue that at least one of the rebel factions – the
CNDD-FDD – was a constructive partner since the 2003 ceasefire, and that this clearly
distinguishes this case from the instances of obstructive power-sharing discussed in the
next chapter.
Effective Power-Sharing. Burundi is one of the few African cases that witnessed a
far-reaching implementation of power-sharing measures. As in Macedonia, several power-
sharing features were formally amended to the country’s post-transition constitution. The
latter was based on power-sharing negotiations held by the parties in Pretoria throughout
21Palipehutu was founded in 1983 in a refugee camp, and soon became known for its notorious anti-Tutsi
ideology. The FNL was originally a breakaway faction of Palipehutu, but was soon recognized as its
armed wing (see Lemarchand 2006: 22). The CNDD-FDD was founded in 1994 by the popular Hutu
politician Leonard Nyangoma, and later developed into a “powerful politico-military organization” under
the leadership of Pierre Nkurunziza (see Lemarchand 2006: 7).
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2004, adopted by the parliament in October of the same year and approved by more than
90 percent of the Burundian voters in a referendum held in February 2005 (see Reyntjens
2006a: 119). This document contains a number of provisions aimed at facilitating the
political participation of both Hutu and Tutsi parties in the government, parliament and
other public institutions. In René Lemarchand’s assessment, “[n]o other state anywhere in
the continent offers a more faithful image of the ideal consociational polity” (2007: 3). Or
as he remarks elsewhere: “No other constitution in the continent enshrines the complexities
of power-sharing with greater attention to minority and women’s rights than the Burundi
constitution of 2004” (2006: 12).22
This is a surprising result given the difficulties involved in negotiating a settlement to the
conflict. Attempts to establish power-sharing started already in 1998 as part of the Arusha
Accords. This culminated in the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement in August
2000 (Government of the Republic of Burundi 2000) according to which the two parties
Uprona (Tutsi) and Frodebu (Hutu) were represented in a transitional government. However,
the main rebel groups – most notably CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL – were left
out of the agreement, and the conflict continued for six more years (see e.g. van Eck 2007:
116; McClintock and Nahimana 2008: 78). While the rationale behind this exclusionary
character of the Arusha negotiations was to focus on the more constructive elements
within the political elites, its effects were clearly counterproductive. As McClintock and
Nahimana put it, the Arusha Accord “was an exclusionary process, in the sense that it
was perceived to cater to the interests of the elite, rather than the interests of the entire
population” (2008: 74). With hindsight, this is one of the main reasons for the prolongation
of the conflict after 2000. Despite these difficulties, the Arusha Agreement provided the
basis for the post-transition constitution and can therefore be held accountable for the
wide range of power-sharing measures ultimately implemented (see also Vandeginste 2009:
72).23
The post-transition constitution provides for the cabinet and the National Assembly to
both consist of 60 percent Hutu and 40 percent Tutsi representatives, and for the Senate to
comprise an equal number of Hutu and Tutsi. Moreover, there are provisions to maintain
this balance against different electoral outcomes: “Should the poll fail to produce the
required quota of 60/40, the constitution allows ‘the rectification of the imbalances through
the co-optation mechanism provided by the electoral code’ (Article 164)” (Lemarchand
2007: 8; see also McClintock and Nahimana 2008: 79). Against this background, the
power-sharing arrangement implemented in Burundi was clearly more than a facade for
masking the CNDD-FDD’s dominance. It forced the parties to work together and it led to
an effective application of executive power-sharing.
22For an informed assessment of the power-sharing provisions implemented in Burundi, see also Sullivan
(2005), Vandeginste (2008) and Vandeginste (2009: 74–81).
23As Stef Vandeginste highlights, earlier peace agreements – most notably the Arusha Agreement and the
Global Ceasefire Agreement with the CNDD-FDD – were crucial factors causing the FNL to “moderate
its position and to enter into negotiations from early 2004 onwards” (2009: 80).
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Constructive Relations. All in all, there are signs that the post-transition period in
Burundi initially unfolded in a comparatively constructive manner and “there were many
reasons for optimism about the country’s future” (Falch and Becker 2008: 24). As
the International Crisis Group remarked in 2007, “Burundi has made relatively rapid,
substantial progress in democracy and easing of inter-ethnic tensions” (2007a: i). The high
rate of approval for the post-transition constitution by the Burundian population in the
2005 referendum (see above) is in itself a sign for a broad-based consensus, but it is even
more impressive if one recalls that the new constitution contained numerous provisions to
protect the rights of the Tutsi minority.
But also on the level of political elites participating in the coalition government, there are
clear signs for the existence of comparatively constructive and pragmatic relations.24 As
noted above, the relations maintained by the warring parties in Burundi are decidedly more
complex and contradictory than in Macedonia. However, there is evidence that at least one
of the rebel groups, the CNDD-FDD, became a constructive element after it agreed to the
terms of the 2003 ceasefire. This was also an important condition for the ‘Comprehensive
Ceasefire Agreement’ ultimately reached with the other rebel group, the FNL, in 2006 (see
Government of the Republic of Burundi 2006). Some developments suggest that tensions
were either settled by parties giving in, or by finding a broad-based compromise. This is
confirmed for instance by the elections held in 2005 on the basis of the new constitution.
They unfolded in three stages, with municipal elections held in June, elections for the
National Assembly and the Senate in July, and presidential elections in August. Unlike
during previous elections, the voters could this time choose among several Hutu and several
Tutsi parties, which competed against each other (see Lemarchand 2006: 7). As Frey and
Boshoff remarked, “[t]he whole process was carried out with far less intimidation and
violence than many observers had predicted and turnout was generally high, indicating a
considerable level of popular support for a peaceful outcome” (2005: 43). Interestingly,
tensions during the electoral campaign occurred less between parties originally belonging
to different ethnic groups (i.e. Hutu vs. Tutsi parties), but predominantly between parties
associated with the same ethnic block. The most pronounced clashes occurred between
the two Hutu parties Frodebu and the CNDD-FDD, who mutually tried to delegitimize
each other by accusing themselves of fraud and treason (see Reyntjens 2006a: 122, see
24See on this aspect in particular Vandeginste (2006), who comes to the conclusion that elite cooperation
is one of the crucial reasons that enabled the establishment of power-sharing – and with it a complete
refurbishment of the political system in Burundi – in the first place. In the French original: “[L]e Burundi
a mis fin à une transition politique par la voie négociée et en se servant de mécanismes et de stratégies
typiquement consociatifs. Un partage de pouvoir est organisé à travers des quotas ethniques et autres
équilibres contenus dans l’Accord de Paix et la Constitution. La coopération entre élites segmentaires
a permis la mise en œuvre de cette ingénierie institutionnelle avant et après les élections de 2005. Le
nouveau contexte politique et institutionnel reflète la pluralité de la société” (2006: 204). However, note
also that two years later he revises his judgment for the subsequent period and attests a lack of elite
cooperation in the implementation phase of the agreement (see Vandeginste 2008).
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also International Crisis Group 2005c: 7–9).25 Aside from that, the elections proceeded
peacefully and led to a landslide victory of the CNDD-FDD in all four stages:26
“The CNDD-FDD’s triumphant march to victory came as no surprise given the solid
support it received from the Hutu electorate, and the fact that it was able to attract
the candidacies of not a few Tutsi who, on the eve of the elections, thought it wise to
jump on the most promising bandwagon” (Lemarchand 2006: 15).
Their sweeping victory required the constitutional power-sharing provisions to be applied
for the first time, since the composition of the National Assembly fell short of the 60/
40 ratio between Hutu and Tutsi codified in the constitution (see below). Also, since the
CNDD-FDD failed to meet the two-thirds majority necessary for passing legislation, it had
to cooperate along ethnic lines (see Reyntjens 2006a).
A last indicator for the presence of constructive relations can be seen in the manner
by which the CNDD-FDD chairman Pierre Nkurunziza was elected as the new president.
As provided for in the constitution, the first post-transition president was to be elected
indirectly through a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly. The CNDD-FDD was
the only party to propose a presidential candidate, its chairman Nkurunziza, but shortly
missed the qualified majority required by the constitution. However, in the end he received
many more votes than necessary, since nearly the complete National Assembly – 94 percent
of the MPs – voted for him. This is a very clear indicator that the political elites were
willing to put ethnic differences aside and act in a concerted manner when necessary,
despite the deep cleavages and divisions that occurred during more than a decade of civil
war. As Reyntjens remarks, “[t]his was a real plebiscite across party and ethnic lines:
although the vote was secret, the results show that a number of members of Uprona and
most or all those of Frodebu and the CNDD supported the candidate” (2006a: 129).27
Finally, also the last remaining spoiler, the Palipehutu-FNL, took on a more constructive
stance by agreeing to join ceasefire talks in early 2005 (see e.g. Falch and Becker 2008:
25As Reyntjens remarks: “In a bid to discredit its rival, Frodebu drew attention to human rights abuses
by the former rebel movement and, more dangerously, played the ethnic card by suggesting that the
CNDD–FDD was a traitor to the Hutu cause because of the entry of many Tutsi into its ranks. The
CNDD–FDD accused Frodebu of having enriched itself at the expense of the population during its 12
years of partnership in power in coalition with Uprona” (2006a: 122).
26As the International Crisis Group remarked, “[t]he electoral victory of the CNDD-FDD was a shock
for the PALIPEHUTU-FNL. [. . . ] [T]he arrival in power of a Hutu rebel movement like the CNDD-
FDD and the successful integration of the FDD into the National Defence Forces (FDN) deprived the
PALIPEHUTU-FNL of much of its platform; that is, the liberation of the Hutu people and the dismantling
of the Tutsi-dominated army” (2007a: 10).
27Note, however, that the International Crisis Group came to a less optimistic assessment, since they saw
it as an indicator for the beginning of a total dominance of the CNDD-FDD: “C’est la consécration de
l’hégémonie totale du CNDD-FDD sur les principales institutions. [. . . ] Cette trop grande domination
du jeu politique et l’avantage de la légitimité des urnes pourraient peut-être amener le CNDD-FDD à
vouloir prendre des libertés par rapport à certaines dispositions de la constitution et à ses engagements
pris à Arusha, voire l’orienter vers une politique autoritaire” (2005c: 14).
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24). All these are clear indicators that the relations between the former belligerents became
moderately constructive after the CNDD-FDD put down its arms in 2003.
Mediative Intervention. As Macedonia, Burundi is an example for the comparatively
important role that regional and international facilitators can play in bringing a settlement
to an armed conflict. During the Arusha negotiations, regional powers played a key
role.28 In Lemarchand’s assessment, “[i]t is no exaggeration to say that there would
have been no accord signed, or else a very different one, without the combined pressures
of Tanzania, South Africa, and the US” (Lemarchand 2006: 12). In the first years of
the conflict, the main responsibility for peace in Burundi was purely regional, whereas
international attention devoted to the conflict was virtually non-existent. Burundi witnessed
the deployment of the first African Union Peacekeeping Mission, the ‘African Mission
in Burundi’ (AMIB), which was deployed in April 2003 and was mandated for an initial
period of one year. Its main tasks included monitoring the implementation of the then-
existing ceasefire agreements, supporting the process of disarmament and demobilisation,
and preparing the country for the establishment of a follow-up peacekeeping mission under
the auspices of the United Nations (see Agoagye 2004: 9–10 and Murithi 2008: 75).
With the adoption of Resolution 1545 in May 2004, the UN Security Council decided to
establish the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB), which was deployed on June
1 for an initial period of six months and endowed with a robust (Chapter VII) mandate
(U.N. Security Council 2004b; see also Boshoff 2004: 57). However, ONUB already
withdrew from Burundi in 2006, in part giving in to pressure exerted by the newly elected
CNDD-FDD government, which began to insist on its own sovereignty (see S. Jackson
2006: 4). While this can be taken as another indicator that Burundi was – at least in the
eyes of the international community – a relatively constructive case, it was also a risky
strategy, since the Palipehutu-FNL had at that time barely begun to support the peace
process.
Compared to this relatively firm external influence exerted on the Burundian parties
between the beginning on the Arusha Accords in 1998 and the withdrawal of ONUB in
December 2006, the external actors’ engagement in the ‘post-transition’ phase has been
much more limited. Assessing the involvement of external actors in Burundi is complicated
because there were considerable splits and divisions among the various groups of external
actors, in particular among the regional heads of states that tried to facilitate a settlement
between the CNDD-FDD and the FNL after 2005. Tanzania and South Africa, the most
influential among the regional powers involved in the post-conflict polity, had slightly
different priorities and had a different reputation among the local parties. The CNDD-FDD
was skeptical towards Tanzania’s role, which they suspected of engaging solely to the
benefit of the FNL, while in turn South Africa had strong hesitations against the Palipehutu-
FNL, which they considered to be the main spoiler to the pace process (see International
28For a detailed background on the Arusha negotiations, see in particular Patricia Daley (2007).
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Crisis Group 2007a: 14–16). As this indicates, deciding whether external involvement in
general was mediative or partisan is a matter of perspective, as the CNDD-FDD would
surely have accused Tanzania of a partisan involvement. However, given the relatively strict
definition of partisan engagement as systematic and intentional support for one conflict
party (see 2.2), it appears more plausible to argue that external engagement as a whole
aimed more at bringing an end to the hostilities and to leave the conflict behind rather than
unilaterally promoting the position of only one of the conflict parties.
3.3.2 Polity Dynamics in Burundi
As in Macedonia, the polity dynamics in Burundi support the plausibility of many of the
hypotheses made about ‘Let’s Share’ polities above. This is illustrated below with regard to
the four overarching themes: dealing with commitment problems, competition for power,
threats from within, and external engagement for good governance.
a) Overcoming Commitment Problems
With respect to overcoming commitment problems, Burundi undoubtedly represents a
more challenging environment than Macedonia. The civil war lasted for some ten years,
was of much higher intensity, and Hutu and Tutsi could look back to decades of ethnic
tensions and even genocide. One might therefore expect that overcoming the commitment
problems was tremendously more difficult. Generally speaking, this was not the case –
at least not after the adoption of the Global Ceasefire Agreement between the existing
transitional government and the CNDD-FDD in 2003.
Getting to this agreement was difficult, and commitment problems were one reason
why this process took three years. The Arusha Accords, which took place without the
main rebel groups, called for an ex post approval of its terms from the warring factions.
However, “Jean-Pierre Nkurunziza’s CNDD-FDD rejected these terms because it did not
intend to join the existing institutions without prior political and military negotiations and
refused to disarm, arguing that it should be treated the same as the FAB [Burundian Armed
Forces, CR]” (International Crisis Group 2004c: 3). As a result, the rebel group entered
into lengthy negotiations with the transitional government, which gained momentum after
a presidential changeover in April 2003 (International Crisis Group 2004c: 4). This
ultimately led to the adoption of the Global Ceasefire Agreement, which is not – like earlier
agreements – merely an annex to the Arusha Agreement but formally takes precedence over
the latter, and it grants the rebel group many more rights than earlier ceasefire agreements
(see Vandeginste 2009 and International Crisis Group 2004c: 3).
Once adopted, the implementation of this agreement worked surprisingly smooth given
the challenges the parties faced. This is most vividly illustrated by the successful integration
of fighters from the CNDD-FDD faction – predominantly Hutu – into the Tutsi-dominated
Burundian armed forces (see International Crisis Group 2007a: 1). The formation of
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joint armies is typically one of the most foremost problems of peace implementations, as
the case studies discussed in this dissertation illustrate. This adds further weight to the
achievements made in this regard. Stef Vandeginste remarks on this aspect: “It is widely
acknowledged that the successful power-sharing at the level of the defence and security
forces [. . . ] constitutes the major cornerstone of Burundi’s transition towards peace” (2009:
78).29
Attributing this outcome to the ‘polity characteristics’ alone would certainly be too short-
sighted. However, it is evident that the prospect of sharing governmental power was of high
importance for the CNDD-FDD during the negotiations. CNDD-FDD representatives were
integrated in the transitional government immediately after the adoption of the ceasefire
agreement (see Rothchild 2005: 263). The constructive stance of President Domitien
Ndayizeye, who took office in April 2003, certainly helped to create the level of trust
necessary for successful negotiations. Reportedly, CNDD-FDD combatants have already
shared some of their food rations with government soldiers in late 2003 (see International
Crisis Group 2004c: 8). What is most striking about the case of Burundi is that this not
even required a decisive intervention by external actors to provide security guarantees.
At the time when the CNDD-FDD joined the Burundian Armed Forces, only a small
AU-led peacekeeping mission comprising some 3,000 soldiers was deployed in Burundi.
Although it was mandated to support the demobilization process and provide security for
the participants of the transitional government (see Murithi 2008: 75), full deployment
was only completed by the end of the year, and the mission was certainly too small to
effectively provide for the security of some 50,000 former combatants.30 One idiosyncrasy
of the Burundian case might have helped here: the fact that there was competition taking
place between different Hutu factions and that, by supporting a ceasefire agreement, the
CNDD-FDD could gain a significant advantage over its competitors – most notably the
FNL. As the International Crisis Group noted in 2004: “The CNDD-FDD would like to
see the process succeed in order to appear to the Hutu community as the movement that
restored security and, at the same time, to justify the abuses and mistakes it committed
against this community” (2004c: 9).
The successful resolution of commitment problems also became apparent after the
elections in 2005. The disarmament of former combatants “made notable progress” in
the post-transition period, although “the reinsertion program has yet to meet the long
term needs of the majority of demobilized combatants”, as Lemarchand noted in 2006
(2006: 23). In light of these achievements, the UN Secretary General complemented
the Burundian parties for their achievements and particularly pointed out the “inclusive,
29Elsewhere, Vandeginste adds further support to this argument. In the French original: “La cohabitation
entre les anciennes forces armées burundaises et les ex combattants de l’ancien mouvement rebelle FDD
constitue sans aucun doute le pilier principal du nouveau climat de paix au Burundi. [. . . ] À aucun
moment, il n’a été question de confrontations violentes entre anciens ennemis, aujourd’hui intégrés dans
les nouveaux corps de défense (les FDN) et de sécurité” (2008: 63).
30The figure originates from a 2006 report by the International Crisis Group (see 2006a: 12). In 2003, the
figure was probably lower.
101
Chapter 3 ‘Let’s Share’ Polities
conciliatory approach [President Nkurunziza] has demonstrated so far”. He also expressed
his confidence that the latter will “continue to adhere to the principles of ethnic and
political inclusivity in making further nominations for Government positions” (United
Nations 2005d: par, 45). However, the UN Secretary General was also aware that “the
sustainability of peace after elections will require the same, if not an increased, level of
regional and international engagement [. . . ]” than it was the case in the initiation phase of
the Burundian post-conflict polity (United Nations 2005e: par. 77).
In sum, although Burundi constituted a much more challenging environment for over-
coming commitment problems than Macedonia, significant progress was made after the
adoption of the Global Ceasefire Agreement. This is most clearly illustrated by the sudden
inclusion of former CNDD-FDD fighters to the Burundian army. More striking, even,
is the fact that this happened in the absence of strong external security guarantees. This
supports the argument that ‘Let’s Share’ polities constitute a favorable environment for
overcoming commitment problems.
b) Manner of Political Competition
The general model of ‘Let’s Share’ polities stipulates that the former belligerents maintain
a general consensus about the current distribution of power, but that all parties nonetheless
strive for increasing the relative share of power in the future. In fragile post-conflict
environments, this may give rise to political tensions with a potentially destabilizing effect
on the polity as a whole.
The case of Burundi generally supports this assumption, although the manner of political
competition was very different from what could be observed in Macedonia. Most notably,
the power-sharing provisions implemented in Burundi had much more conciliating effects
on the relations between the antagonistic groups in that they effectively moderated the
incompatibilities that divided the two ethnic groups for several decades. Therefore, in the
case of Burundi it would be unwarranted to insinuate that centrifugal tendencies led to an
increasing segregation of the two communities. However, although the competition for
future power has not fostered ethnic tensions, it gave rise to political tensions with equally
destabilizing effects.
As in Macedonia, the power-sharing provisions in Burundi did not directly address the
warring parties themselves, but rather the different ethnic groups which the warring parties
claimed to represent. They led to a significant over-representation of the minority group
(the Tutsi) in some of the country’s most important political institutions. This found its
expression in a comparatively complex quota-system enforcing a minimum percentage
of Tutsi representatives in various public bodies. In order to “remedy the disparity of
size between Hutu and Tutsi the framers of the 2004 constitution have made allowance
for a system of representation which more than doubles the demographic weight of the
Tutsi minority” (Lemarchand 2006: 13; see also Falch and Becker 2008: 28). Next
to provisions affecting the composition of the National Assembly and the Senate (see
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above) the constitution also requires that at least one of the two vice-presidents must
be a Tutsi. Constraints also exist on the local level, where not more than 67 percent of
the mayorships must belong to one ethnic group (see Lemarchand 2006: 13–14). Thus,
compared to its 14 percent share of the total population, the Tutsi minority is significantly
over-represented in the country’s political institutions. These provisions were more than a
simple lip-service but effectively altered the composition of the various government bodies.
Applied for the first time after the elections in 2005, the electoral commission co-opted 18
MPs to the parliament – four Hutu, eleven Tutsi, and three Twa31 – in order to generate the
constitutionally required quotas (see Reyntjens 2006a: 126–127 and Lemarchand 2007:
8). Unlike in Macedonia, these provisions for over-representing the minority group have
not contributed to the segregation of the two communities, but served as a mechanism to
bridge the cleavages between the different ethnic groups:
“Burundi’s experience seems to contradict the classical criticism that consociational
power-sharing ‘freezes’ people’s identities and therefore deepens the segmental cleav-
ages and divisions [. . . ]. Instead, the acknowledgement and institutionalisation of
the segments’ political relevance may be seen as a first and necessary (though by
no means final) step in the process of de-ethnicising political competition and of
overcoming decades of politico-ethnic violence” (2009: 82; see also Vandeginste
2009: 76).32
Given the ferocity and long duration of the ethnic tensions in Burundi – not long ago, the
country was subject to a genocide33 – this is a surprising result. One of the main reasons
for this outcome can be found in the particular design of the power-sharing provisions in
Burundi. Though the Burundian power-sharing arrangement has been hailed as a prime
example for a consociational polity (see above), one crucial feature in its institutional design
is decidedly anti-consociational: the constitutional requirement to have ethnically mixed
party lists. The post-transition constitution requires that all parties have to be ethnically
mixed by adding members of all ethnic groups to their lists (see Reyntjens 2006a: 122
and Vandeginste 2009: 75).34 This implies that parties associated predominantly with the
31Twa is the name of the third ethnic group living in Burundi next to Hutus and Tutsis. They comprise less
than one percent of the total population (see Coleman 2008c).
32As Vandeginste remarks elsewhere: “Après avoir été dominé par un discours ethniste et ethnisant pendant
de longues années, les oppositions et mésententes au sein de la classe politique burundaise ont pris un
caractère beaucoup moins ethnique” (2008: 64–65).
33See section A.4 in the appendix.
34Article 168 of the post-transition constitution requires that the lists proposed by the parties for each
electoral district must be ‘multi-ethnic in nature’, specifying that ‘[o]f every three candidates proposed
one after the other on a list, only two shall belong to the same ethnic group, and at least one out of every
four shall be a woman’ (see Reyntjens 2006a: 126). Vandeginste sheds further light on the rationale
behind these provisions: “The reasoning behind this approach was that, while Burundi’s segmental
cleavages must be explicitly and formally recognised at the political level, it was at the same time
necessary to reduce the conflict potential of ethnicity by encouraging political parties to be ethnically
inclusive” (2009: 75).
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Hutu majority necessarily contain a significant number of Tutsi representatives, and vice
versa. During the intense constitutional debates, it was even “agreed that Tutsi members
of predominantly Hutu parties (such as the Frodebu or the CNDD-FDD) could indeed
qualify as representatives of the Tutsi community, contrary to what Tutsi hard-liners
advocated” (Lemarchand 2006: 13–14).35 This violates one of the central assumptions
behind consociationalism, namely that the interests of different segments of society are to
be represented by political parties (see Vandeginste 2008: 68). Instead, it is a suggestion
embraced by proponents of an integrative approach to power-sharing, most notably Donald
Horowitz (see 2.2.1).
However, the moderation of ethnic tensions as such does not imply that the competition
for future power is inherently less conflict-prone than, for instance, in Macedonia. The case
of Burundi illustrates that getting rid of the link between ethnic groups and political parties
also entails a significant drawback: it reduces the importance of parties as consociational
actors and therefore undermines the effectiveness of power-sharing per se (see Vandeginste
2008: 68).36 Hence, by untying ethnic representation from membership in a dedicated
party, ethnic tensions give way to political tensions and pave the ground for a domination
of the system by the politically most powerful actor. There is reason to argue that this has
changed the form, but not the substance of the competition for political power in Burundi.
There is plenty of evidence that Burundi is on its way to experience centrifugal tendencies
of another kind: the replacement of ethnic by political conflict – with equally detrimental
effects. Since ethnic cleavages ceased to be the main determinant of political affiliations,
there were less opportunities (and a lower necessity) for mobilizing societal cleavages.
Instead, the strongest party – the CNDD-FDD – more generally made use of its powers
in order to outmaneuver its opponents and secure its hold on power in the future. As
the International Crisis Group remarks, “[o]ld tensions between Hutu and Tutsi parties
were eclipsed by new ones between predominantly Hutu parties – CNDD- FDD and Front
for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) – whose bitter campaign rivalry was marred by
violence” (2006a: 1). This supports the argument that political tensions in ‘Let’s Share’
polities are likely to revolve around distribution of future political power, which has put
the CNDD-FDD under pressure to defend its position of dominance:
“Pressure from the Palipehutu-FNL and from within the party itself, along with a
failure to reach compromises with the other political parties, have plagued the first
three years of the government. In its efforts to deal with these cross-cutting forces,
the government has exhibited what some observers refer to as an ‘authoritarian drift,’
35See on this aspect in particular International Crisis Group (2004b: 6–7), where the demands of Tutsi
parties are portrayed in more detail. By and large, it confirms the pragmatic stance that major Tutsi
parties have taken with regard to the constitutional issues.
36Vandeginste highlights this aspect in some more detail. In the French original: “Par contre, la logique
consociative aurait été de favoriser plutôt le maintien de partis réellement segmentaires. Dans cette
logique, le jeu des négociations, du compromis, de la concertation, du partage des postes, etcetera, se
fait entre partis segmentaires, tandis que, dans le scénario burundais, il se fait surtout entre individus, y
compris au sein des partis. Cela réduit l’importance des partis comme acteurs consociatifs” (2008: 68).
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with a move away from the provisioned elite cooperation” (Falch and Becker 2008:
23).
In sum, political competition in Burundi initially unfolded in a very constructive manner,
and the specific power-sharing mechanisms (most notably the requirement for mixed party
lists) turned out as effective instruments for reducing ethnic divisions and de-ethnicizing
politics as a whole. However, this gave rise to an intense political competition between
different Hutu-dominated parties over the dominance in the polity, inducing the CNDD-
FDD to gradually establish a tighter grip to power.
c) Threats from Within
Whereas the power-sharing agreement in Burundi had conciliating effects on the tensions
between the ethnic groups, it also facilitated a gradual undermining of the very principles
on which it rests. In response to competition with other Hutu parties, which could threaten
the CNDD-FDD’s position of dominance, the party leadership became eager to get rid of
power-sharing immediately after their good showing in the 200 elections. They made use of
two strategies: gradually hollowing out the power-sharing provisions (while, formally, still
complying with them), and openly challenging the power-sharing provisions as unnecessary.
In this vain, the CNDD-FDD increasingly made use of informal instruments of political
competition.
The gradual hollowing-out of the power-sharing provisions in Burundi became visible
in a number of ways. Given its strong role and the lack of effective opposition against its
rule, the CNDD-FDD was able to neutralize a number of crucial power-sharing provisions.
In theory, the post-transition constitution requires that the CNDD-FDD has to “develop
partnerships across political and ethnic lines” in order to pass laws (Reyntjens 2006a: 127,
see also Lemarchand 2007: 9). In practice, however, it never had to seek such cooperation
actively. Due to the lack of a concerted opposition to challenge the CNDD-FDD, it could
effectively proceed on its course without being much affected by power-sharing at all. As
René Lemarchand remarked:
“Laws are rammed through parliament without any real debate. The state and the
party are two faces of the same coin. The grand coalition principle – identified by
Lijphart as the key to effective power-sharing – has morphed into a wobbly coalition
of party blowhards, threatened to dissolve at any moment into internecine struggles
and settling of accounts” (2006: 27).
In order to further strengthen its position, the CNDD-FDD has also “carried out sweeping
personnel changes in state companies, local administration and the court system, with
most positions going to its own members” – most notably at the expense of FRODEBU
and UPRONA loyalists (International Crisis Group 2006a: 7). The placing of its members
in the court system has turned out as a particularly useful mechanism for undermining
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the post-transition constitution. This was of great help during a parliamentary crisis in
2007 and 2008, when the CNDD-FDD lost the loyalty of 22 MPs and risked loosing its
majority in the National Assembly. The crisis came into being after the party’s chairman
and true strongman, Hussein Radjabu – he was the one to bring Nkurunziza to power – was
expelled from his party and charged with a 13-year prison sentence for an alleged coup
attempt against Nkurunziza. The 22 MPs expressed their loyalty to Radjabu and broke
with Nkurunziza, which effectively deprived the CNDD-FDD of its two-third majority it
previously held (see International Crisis Group 2008a: 2–4, Reyntjens 2008: 9–10). In
order to avert the crisis, the party successfully used all tricks to ensure the continuation of
its position of dominance. Due to the crisis, the CNDD-FDD was for a short time forced
to form a coalition government with Frodebu and Uprona, but ultimately Nkurunziza was
able to evoke a favorable court ruling allowing him to replace the 22 dissident MPs by loyal
followers. As a result, the CNDD-FDD regained its majority in the National Assembly
and “immediately broke off discussions with Frodebu and Uprona” (International Crisis
Group 2008a: 7).
Unconstitutional or informal attempts to secure its hold on power have also become
apparent with respect to the CNDD-FDD’s stance towards the PALIPEHUTU-FNL. It
repeatedly refused to sign a ceasefire with this faction and rather tried to ‘solve’ the problem
with the last dissident faction in Burundi through a military solution. Immediately after
being inaugurated, the government launched a number of military campaigns against the
Palipehutu-FNL and “imprisoned, tortured and even executed many suspected combatants
as well as civilians accused of colluding with the rebels” (International Crisis Group
2006a: i). When, under the lead of South Africa, external actors threatened to impose
regional sanctions against the Burundian government, they formally conceded and signed
the Comprehensive Ceasefire Agreement with the FNL in 2007 (see van Eck 2007: 114).
In substantive terms, however, the new agreement hardly fulfilled any of the demands
of the PALIPEHUTU-FNL and remained silent on many pressing issues, including the
integration of the movement into the country’s political institutions (see International Crisis
Group 2007a: 6).37 In this sense, the ceasefire agreement “very much seems to be more
an act of surrender than a peace agreement” (International Crisis Group 2007a: 6). It still
took more than two years until key provisions of the agreement were implemented, and
hence it was not before April 2009 that the FNL-Palipehutu was registered as a political
party (under the name FNL) and actually laid down its arms (see Vandeginste 2009: 74).
Next to this, the CNDD-FDD openly began to question the legitimacy of and necessity for
explicit power-sharing provisions in Burundi, in particular after the party could consolidate
its powers in the 2005 elections. Leading CNDD-FDD politicians claimed that power-
37The ceasefire agreement mainly contains provisions for “an immediate ceasefire between the two parties;
cessation of propaganda and other activities that could impede the implementation of the peace process;
the establishment of a Joint Verification and Monitoring Mission with international participation; the
assembly of combatants for eventual demobilization and reintegration; and oversight of the entire process
by the region’s leaders” (McClintock and Nahimana 2008: 80).
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sharing “has served its purpose and that ethnicity will no longer lead to renewed violent
conflict in Burundi” (Vandeginste 2009: 83). Also, the CNDD-FDD leadership has on
various occasions expressed its disregard for power-sharing and declared to feel “taken
hostage” by it (Vandeginste 2009: 76). Thus, similar to Macedonia, the power-sharing
provisions not only regulated political competition but became themselves the subject
of political controversy. While the political hardliners in Macedonia sought an open
confrontation or escalation of the crisis in order to capitalize politically on the effects, the
CNDD-FDD used a subtler strategy: it highlighted the success of power-sharing in order
to argue in favor of its abolishment.
As this indicates, the initial optimism attached to power-sharing in Burundi has – at least
in part – been jeopardized by the ruling party’s increasing inclination to secure its position
of dominance in the future by all means. This outcome is not surprising when recalling that
the political system in Burundi has been authoritarian ever since independence. In fact, as
Uvin argues, the political system that has emerged in Burundi since the termination of the
war is not in any substantive sense new, but the result of deeply entrenched state-society
interactions and therefore very much in line with peoples’ expectations and experiences
as to what the state can and should deliver (2008: 113). However, as the International
Crisis Group noted, “[a] contributory factor in the government’s authoritarian drift has
been the failure of the country’s institutions to provide oversight of the executive. Courts
and parliament are dominated by the CNDD-FDD, and the political opposition is divided”
(2006a: 7). These developments shed an increasingly dubious light on the Burundian
power-sharing experiment. Most importantly, there is a strong indication that ethnic and
political tensions are not completely independent from one another. If the CNDD-FDD
proceeds with its attempts to establish a one-party state, this may renew the potential for
political tensions. It is only a matter of time until ‘political entrepreneurs’ pull out the
‘ethnic card’ again. As Stef Vandeginste argues, “ethnicity is indeed no longer the main
determiner of political divisions and competition in Burundi, [but] it is very uncertain
whether its conflict potential has been irreversibly wiped out” (2009: 83).
The elections held in 2010 can be considered a litmus test for the future of power-sharing
in Burundi. Many observers looked with skepticism to the polls. Vandeginste, for instance,
stated that “[i]t remains highly uncertain whether the 2010 elections will mark a next
step towards democratisation or towards an increasingly (electoral) authoritarian political
regime” (Vandeginste 2009: 64). Not surprisingly, the latter scenario became reality.
Although the elections did not lead to a further manifestation of ethnic tensions, they in
effect fostered the near-complete domination of the political system by the CNDD-FDD. In
all five rounds of elections38 that took place between May and September 2010, Nkurunziza
and the CNDD-FDD emerged as the uncontested winners (Krempel 2010: 5–6). As it was
already the case before the elections, tensions unfolded more along party-lines than along
38These were: elections on the communal level in May, presidential elections in June, parliamentary and
Senate elections in July, and municipal elections in September (see Krempel 2010: 2).
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ethnic lines. Most enmity occurred after the main opposition parties – including the FNL,
Frodebu and Uprona – boycotted the presidential and partly also the parliamentary elections
after accusing the government of electoral fraud committed during the communal elections
held in May. Although this triggered a campaign of violence against opposition members,
international observers by and large declared most elections as being in accordance with
international standards (Krempel 2010: 2–5).
In sum, the above episodes confirm the general argument made above: that power-
sharing arrangements – even relatively constructive ones – depict an inherent tendency to
become exploited by powerful parties as a vehicle to restore their position of dominance
in the ‘next round’. This disposition is particularly high in ethnically divided societies,
because parties aligned with the larger ethnic block will almost always have more power,
despite attempts to reduce the asymmetry between the former belligerents.
d) Promoting Good Governance
Above, it was stipulated that ‘Let’s Share’ polities provide a favorable environment for
promoting good governance principles as long as external actors are able and willing
to set effective constraints and incentives for the domestic parties. This was in part the
case in Macedonia, where the ‘carrot’ of EU and NATO membership was repeatedly used
as a mechanism to ensure the compliance of the Macedonian parties with respect to a
broad catalog of good governance principles. In Burundi, the willingness and ability to
enforce good governance principles was much less pronounced among external actors.
Most notably, they have done little to counter the CNDD-FDD’s attempts to neutralize the
power-sharing provisions and reinforce the spirit of the constitution.
All in all, the CNDD-FDD’s attempts to undermine power-sharing and consolidating
its power led to clearly recognizable authoritarian tendencies and a degeneration of good
governance principles. As the International Crisis Group noted, “[t]he CNDD-FDD has
used state institutions – including the security services, state companies and courts – to
consolidate its power, often with scant respect for the rule of law and human rights” (2006a:
12). The country’s degrading human rights record became increasingly recognized as
one of the most pressing problems during the CNDD-FDD’s reign. There is widespread
evidence that the government, “instead of engaging its critics in dialogue, has resorted to
large-scale repression and human rights violations” (van Eck 2007: 114). This became
apparent for the first time in 2006, when the ruling party accused dissidents from within
the army and the FNL to have planned a coup against the government and cracked down
and tortured opposition members. Among the fifteen people accused were the former
President Domitien Ndayizeye and the former Vice President Alphonse Marie Kadege
(International Crisis Group 2006a: 3; see also United Nations 2006a; par. 15-18). In the
International Crisis Group’s assessment, “[t]he alleged coup has been the clearest example
of the deteriorating political climate” (2006a: 3). René Lemarchand, who initially was
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rather enthusiastic about the Burundian power-sharing experience (see above), made no
secret out of his disappointment over Nkurunziza’s conduct:
“Few African heads of state have come to power with a more impressive fund of
good will and popular sympathy than Pierre Nkurunziza. In the eyes of many of his
followers he stood as the man to spoke (sic!) truth to power, who fought tooth and
nail to wrest power from the Tutsi oligarchs, and who did not shy from wrestling his
internal enemies to the ground. Less than a year later, however, much of the early
popular enthusiasm for Burundi’s new leader has all but vanished. The government is
facing a major crisis of confidence within and outside his own party, in parliament,
and in the society at large” (Lemarchand 2006: 16).
The role of external actors to counter these trends, however, is ambiguous. The strongest
role they have played in Burundi was during the initiation phase of the power-sharing
arrangement. Patricia Daley conceptualizes the Burundian peace process as a struggle
“between different competing visions of peace; the neo-liberal one supported by western
donors, and that of regional actors, seeking to establish a new mode of politics on the
continent”, and contends that “without international political clout and financial resources,
regional actors conceded to the imposition of a ‘liberal peace’ [. . . ]” (Daley 2007: 334; for
a similar assessment see also Uvin 2008). As Vandeginste somewhat ironically remarked,
Nelson Mandela clearly was a decisive force behind the adoption of the Arusha Agreement,
but “indirectly, Arend Lijphart [. . . ] also held the pen when the Arusha Agreement and
the Burundian Constitution of 18 March 2005 were drafted” (2009: 65). The end-result
was highly shaped by Western ideas about the ideal features of a post-conflict society.
This becomes apparent by the insistence of both regional and international facilitators to
impose solutions on the antagonistic factions. As van Eck notes, “[d]uring the whole peace
process, not a single peace agreement was signed by the parties of their own free will”
(2007: 117). Reyntjens is even of the opinion that “on several occasions, the region put
Burundi under a de facto trusteeship” (2006a: 121).
However, in the ensuing post-conflict phase, it soon became clear that external actors
lacked both the will and ability to exert effective pressure on the former belligerents
and promote good governance principles. After the basic features of the Burundian
polity had been established, the engagement of external actors soon lacked the credibility
and commitment necessary for securing them in the long run. The United Nations –
understandably – argued that there has to be ‘a peace to keep’, and were therefore reluctant
to become engaged in the absence of a ceasefire agreement. This implied that a large part
of Burundi’s official ‘transitional period’ was already over when ONUB finally deployed
in mid-2004 (see S. Jackson 2006: 10–11). However, at that time the UN’s engagement
was seen critically by an ever more self-conscious CNDD-FDD. As Dennis Tull argues,
at the time ONUB was fully deployed the peacekeepers had already “overstayed their
welcome” (2010: 2). Soon after the 2005 elections took place – roughly eight months
after ONUB’s deployment – the victorious CNDD-FDD began to pressure the United
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Nations to withdraw, and they ultimately complied by the end of 2006 (Tull 2010: 2).39
Two factors have contributed to this result: First, the CNDD-FDD perceived the UN as
having “too much proximity to Uprona and Frodebu” due to its engagement in earlier peace
processes, and was therefore skeptical towards its continued engagement on the ground
(S. Jackson 2006: 11). Second, strengthened by its electoral victory, the CNDD-FDD
believed that external engagement was no longer needed and saw its own political autonomy
compromised by the presence of external actors (see Tull 2010: 3–4). The United Nations
were reluctant to fulfill these demands, but ultimately they had little choice to respect the
government’s will. As the UN Secretary General noted in a slightly disillusioned manner:
“It should be noted that the plan to withdraw ONUB from Burundi by 31 December
2006 [. . . ] has been developed in consultation with the Government, following
its specific and strong request for the early disengagement of the United Nations
peacekeeping presence” (United Nations 2006f: par. 86).
This backing-down has clearly reduced the resolve which would have been necessary in
order exert continued influence on the statebuilding project in Burundi (see also Vande-
ginste 2009: 83–84). Rather than becoming actively engaged for the promotion of good
governance, this reduced the international community’s role to that of a ‘passive bystander’.
After ONUB’s withdrawal, external actors were effectively deprived of much of their
leverage.
However, attributing this passive role entirely to a lacking ability to impose stronger
leverage on the Burundian parties would be shortsighted. The international community’s
passive stance was certainly also a matter of lacking political will. Ultimately, external
actors have “more power than they are willing to admit – they can refuse to go along with
all the excesses of the clientelistic state and can ensure that a multitude of mechanisms and
processes that could allow Burundians to change their state remain open“ (Uvin 2008: 115).
The International Crisis Group has repeatedly called upon external actors to take on a more
pro-active stance against the CNDD-FDD. For instance, in a report drafted in November
2006, it called upon the ‘donor community’ to “[c]ondition further budgetary support on
improvements in governance and human rights [. . . ]” and to “[f]und and otherwise support
all institutions likely to provide a check on the executive [. . . ]” (2006a: ii). Unfortunately,
this leverage was left largely unused. This becomes apparent against the backdrop of the
government’s increasingly dubious human rights record, which – in the eyes of Jan van
Eck, is “[t]he most serious challenge facing Burundi today” (van Eck 2007: 115). The first
indicators for this became visible in late 2006, precisely when ONUB was winded down.
At that time, the International Crisis Group observed a “marked deterioration in Burundi’s
political climate (2006a: i).40 Since then, external observers have repeatedly criticized
39More specifically, in January 2006 the government called upon the UN to confine its involvement to
development work, and in August 2006, it pressured ONUB’s interim head to leave, accusing him of
having “overstepped his mandate” (International Crisis Group 2006a: 11).
40For a detailed overview of the political violence and other human rights violations in Burundi, see in
particular Human Rights Watch (2009).
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the international community’s lax stance with respect to the Burundian government. For
instance, in 2009 Human Rights Watch criticized that
“[i]nternational actors have focused on establishing a formal peace and are not paying
adequate attention to current human rights violations and accountability for past
abuses. European and US diplomats responded strongly to the arrest of a prominent
opposition leader in November 2008, but have shown much less public concern about
human rights violations affecting ordinary Burundians in rural and marginal urban
areas – the most numerous victims of abuse” (Human Rights Watch 2009: 9).
In sum, this suggests that the challenges that have become apparent over the course of the
polity induced external actors to switch from ‘genuine enforcement’ to a pattern of ‘virtual
enforcement’, in which “the form is more or less there, but the substance is far removed”
(Uvin 2008: 110). As a result, external actors have tacitly accepted “more authoritarian
and less consensus and dialogue-based governance style, as long as this does not threaten
short-term stability in Burundi and the Central African region” (Vandeginste 2009: 83–84).
This has given the CNDD-FDD the opportunity to gradually undermine the principles of
power-sharing and establish the foundations for a one-party state.
3.4 ‘Let’s Share’ Polities: Conclusions
The two cases discussed in this chapter helped to specify the abstract notion developed
about ‘Let’s Share’ polities in section 2.3 above. Above all, they illustrate the important
role that power-sharing can play when it comes to ending armed conflicts. There is no doubt
that “[t]he Ohrid Framework Agreement has been a success story in ending an escalating
conflict and banning the fear of a renewed conflict” (Bieber 2008a: 207). The same
holds true for the power-sharing provisions implemented in Burundi after the ceasefire
agreement signed in 2004. However, the chapters also made clear that the constructive
relations on which ‘Let’s Share’ polities rest may erode over time – either as a result of
ordinary political competition or specific attempts of spoilers and political hardliners to
mobilize political opportunities. Table 3.1 on page 112 summarizes the observations made
about the dynamics observed with regard to the four dimensions of interest (overcoming
of commitment problems, the manner of political competition, attempts to deal with
threats from within, and attempts to promote good governance). Though the dynamics and
interactions were not identical in the two cases, a number of similarities can be identified
which can clearly be attributed to the specific constellation embodied by this polity type.
This becomes apparent with respect to the commitment problems in the implementation
phase. In Macedonia it is not utterly surprising that disarmament proceeded smoothly, since
this case offers a best-case scenario for overcoming commitment problems: a low-intensity
conflict, constructive relations among the post-conflict elites, the participation of both
parties in the government and a demonstrated willingness and ability by external actors to
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Aspect Macedonia Burundi
Commit-
ment Prob-
lems
Best-case scenario; disarmament proceeded
better than expected and served as trust-
enhancing mechanism; no strong external
security guarantees necessary for inducing
cooperation.
More challenging environment; significant
progress after Global Ceasefire Agreement
(formation of joined army and disarmament
of factions); no strong external security
guarantees necessary.
Political
Com-
petition
Consensus about the status quo; sharpening
competition for future power after VMRO-
DPMNE coalition was outvoted in 2002
(‘political competition on the cheap’); indi-
cation for centrifugal tendencies and socio-
cultural segregation.
Consensus about the status quo; power-
sharing helps to bridge ethnic divisions (due
to ethnically mixed party lists); little evi-
dence for centrifugal tendencies but strong
competition for future power between dif-
ferent Hutu parties.
Threats
from
Within
Political hardliners torpedo power-sharing
arrangement; attempts for ‘calculated esca-
lation’ lead to political crises (referendum
in 2004; parliamentary crisis in 2007); im-
mediate external engagement necessary for
defusing crises.
CNDD-FDD under pressure to defend its
position as the dominant Hutu party; grad-
ual hollowing-out of power-sharing and in-
creasing use of unconstitutional and infor-
mal instruments of political competition; by
2010 effective creation of a one-party state.
Good
Gover-
nance
Genuine enforcement both during the initia-
tion and implementation phase of the Ohrid
Framework Agreement; pronounced politi-
cal will and ability to promote good gover-
nance (Copenhagen Criteria) but effective-
ness of sticks and carrots has eroded over
time; tendency to turn a blind eye to cor-
ruption and other shortcomings that may
threaten stability.
Strong external influence in the initiation
phase of power-sharing but little engage-
ment in the initiation phase; willingness
and ability to engage in genuine enforce-
ment significantly lower; little attempts to
counter authoritarian drift; readiness to ac-
cept severe deficiencies as long as formal
statebuilding achievements remain in place.
Table 3.1: Dynamics of ‘Let’s Share’ polities
intervene if necessary. In Burundi, the baseline conditions were not as favorable, mostly
because the decade-long armed conflict left much deeper wounds and societal cleavages
and because a strong external force to induce cooperation among belligerents was lacking.
Still, the CNDD-FDD integrated its factions into the national army soon after signing the
ceasefire agreement with the government. This generally supports the assumption that
‘Let’s Share’ polities offer a favorable environment for overcoming commitment problems.
Macedonia and Burundi also support the argument that political competition in ‘Let’s
Share’ polities mainly aims at gaining political power in the future through formal-
constitutional means. However, not even ‘Let’s Share’ polities are self-reinforcing because
they provide a strong incentive for political hardliners or other potential spoilers to mobilize
public sentiments against the power-sharing provisions and engage in attempts for political
mobilization ‘on the cheap’. However, the cases also depicted some marked differences
in the manner of political competition, which can for the most part be attributed to the
different design of the power-sharing provisions. Macedonia is fully in accordance with
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the consociational model of power-sharing and has mainly confirmed what critics of this
approach have repeatedly pointed out: that consociationalism may foster the segregation
rather than the integration of the two communities. This illustrates one of the paradoxes
of consociational power-sharing: On the one hand, allotting a large range of privileges to
minority groups is the purpose of power-sharing per se, and is often necessary in order to
make these groups agree to the terms of the agreement in the first place. On the other hand,
after the adoption of agreements containing provisions for ‘over-compensating’ minority
groups, there appears to be a high risk for power-sharing institutions to not only regulate
political competition, but to become themselves the subject of political competition. As
Burundi leans more towards the integrative model of power-sharing (which is most notably
embodied in the requirement for mixed party lists), these dangers have become much less
apparent. However, this gave rise to a new set of tensions creeping in by the backdoor:
the re-emergence of political tensions and the enabling environment it provided for actors
willing to wind down power-sharing in the long run. It allowed Hutu parties to formally
fulfill the power-sharing provisions enshrined in the Burundian constitution while at the
same time competing for the dominant role in the polity.
Furthermore, the cases support the argument that even ‘Let’s Share’ polities may easily
fall prey to attempts by political hardliners or authoritarian parties to capture the polity
and undermine the constructive foundations on which it rests. The constructive relations
originally maintained by the political elites in ‘Let’s Share’ polities may become worn off
over time by the intricacies of daily politics, and constructive politicians may have a hard
time to defend themselves against opportunistic attacks by hardliners. This phenomenon
could be observed in both Macedonia and Burundi, although the exact mechanisms through
which this happened differed sharply. In Macedonia, political hardliners tried to trigger
imminent political crises with the potential to derail the peace process, which has be-
come apparent most notably through the 2004 referendum against the ‘Ohrid Framework
Agreement’ or the VMRO-DPMNE’s refusal to coalesce with the strongest Albanian party
after the elections in 2006. This led to an increasing politicization of the power-sharing
arrangement and transformed it into an instrument for political mobilization. In both cases,
immediate external engagement was necessary for preventing these crises from unfolding
their harmful potential. In Burundi, the continued refusal of the PALIPEHUTU-FNL to
support the peace process as well as the sharpened competition with other Hutu parties
posed a threat to the CNDD-FDD’s position of dominance in post-conflict Burundi. The
party reacted by increasingly falling back to informal and unconstitutional ways of dealing
with these perceived threats. This became apparent through its attempts to defeat the FNL
militarily and seek its ‘unconditional surrender’ rather than a broad-based settlement or
through its attempts to get rid of the power-sharing provisions almost immediately after
the elections in 2005. Through these instruments the CNDD-FDD gradually transformed
Burundi into a one-party state in which power-sharing is, at best, a facade to mask the
ruling party’s exclusive hold on power.
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Finally, the cases suggest a significant discrepancy between the effectiveness of ex-
ternal engagement in the initiation phase and the implementation phase of ‘Let’s Share’
polities. In both Macedonia and Burundi, external actors play a key role with respect to
implanting power-sharing provisions and providing the foundations for the establishment
of ‘Let’s Share’ polities. The cases suggest that a continued engagement is necessary in
the implementation phase. Although ‘Let’s Share’ polities supposedly provide a conducive
environment for promoting good governance principles, significant achievements require a
heightened willingness and ability by external actors to become engaged over a relatively
long period. Not surprisingly, external actors’ willingness was much more pronounced
in Macedonia than in Burundi. The perspective of becoming a member in both the EU
and NATO endowed them with long term leverage and provided strong incentives for
the Macedonian parties to comply with a broad catalog of good governance principles.
This helped to defuse the 2007 parliamentary crises already addressed above and can be
seen as a major external factor influencing the interactions between the different parties.
However, the EU’s credibility to follow up on its promises has eroded over time, which
could gradually reduce external actors’ ability to enforce the promotion of good governance
principles in the future. In Burundi, external actors’ willingness and ability to engage in
the long term promotion of good governance principles was significantly lower. The case
illustrates how powerless external actors may be when it comes to stabilizing the very
structures they implanted. ONUB’s forced withdrawal after less than two years deprived
them of the ability to control the Burundian government and intervene in a timely and
decisive manner if necessary. The remaining leverage was miniscule and not used in a
concerted or strategic way: “to the greater relief of those who benefit from the status
quo, most foreigners [did] not use their power, preferring to hide behind vague notions
of ownership, respect for local culture, public sector capacity building, and all kinds of
good words” (Uvin 2008: 114–115). This illustrates that while establishing effective and
constructive power-sharing arrangements in post-conflict situations is difficult (and rare)
enough, maintaining the foundations on which these polities rest in the medium and long
run may even be a lot more difficult. Also, in Burundi the tendencies to ‘gloss over’ these
shortcomings and hail the formal achievements of the peacebuilding project has been
very pronounced. As this illustrates, the seemingly ideal characteristics of ‘Let’s Share’
polities may provide a pretext for external actors to confine their engagement to cosmetic
or symbolic aspects.
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‘Let’s Share’ polities fulfill a number of requirements that make them quasi ideal cases of
post-conflict settlement. Nonetheless, as the previous chapter illustrated, the post-conflict
elites in ‘Let’s Share’ polities may nonetheless easily slip into a state of competition
with the potential to undermine the constructive characteristics of this polity type in the
long run. In consequence, even such promising cases require a long term engagement of
external actors by which detrimental tendencies can be curtailed. Unfortunately, the greater
part of power-sharing cases does not even possess such promising starting conditions.
They even lack a basic degree of cooperation between the warring parties. Such cases
are called ‘Doomed to Share’ polities here. In total, five cases are classified as instances
of this type: The Government of National Unity (GURN) in Angola (1997 – 1998), the
National Transitional Government (NTGL) in Liberia (2003 – 2005), the power-sharing
arrangement implemented after the Lomé Peace Accords in Sierra Leone (1999 – 2002),
the power-sharing arrangement implemented as part of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (2003 – 2006), and the renewed power-sharing
implemented after the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement of March 2007 in Côte d’Ivoire
(see table A.1 on page 327). Of those, the DRC and Sierra Leone were chosen as the
cases to be discussed in detail in this chapter because they match the case selection criteria
formulated in section 1.4.2 most closely. Since all countries are located in Africa, the
goal of selecting cases from two entirely different regions of the world was not possible to
fulfill in the case of ‘Doomed to Share’ polities. The DRC and Sierra Leone are at least
located in different regions in African (Central Africa and West Africa, respectively). In
order to avoid choosing cases from the same country twice, Côte d’Ivoire and Liberia were
dismissed because other post-conflict periods of these countries are discussed as instances
of the ‘The Winner Took it All’ polity type below. The GURN in Angola was not selected
because its power-sharing characteristics were at the low end of the scale and hence not
necessarily representative for the ‘Doomed to Share’ type as a whole (see A.2.3).
Classifying cases as instances of ‘Doomed to Share’ polities requires that three criteria
are met. First, all cases are cases of power-sharing, indicating that governmental power
is effectively shared between the belligerents at some point in the process. Admittedly,
this is not always easy to determine, as there are cases (for instance Angola) for which
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it is unclear whether they are really cases of power-sharing or situations of domination
in disguise in which power-sharing is merely cosmetic. Second, in all four cases the
belligerents maintain obstructive relations, that is, relations characterized by widespread
mistrust, deep personal animosities, and a low willingness to engage in truly cooperative
efforts. Third, the cases are similar with regard to the manner of external engagement.
They have in common that external actors are engaged in a mediative manner, i.e. without
any systematic and intentional bias for one of the former conflict parties.
4.1 A basic model of ‘Doomed to Share’ Polities
‘Doomed to Share’ polities are identical to ‘Let’s Share’ polities, with the only exception
that the former warring parties maintain obstructive instead of constructive relations. The
basic level of consent that characterizes ‘Let’s Share’ polities is absent. The basic features
of ‘Doomed to Share’ polities are schematically sketched in figure 4.1. As the figure
illustrates, the antagonists (‘Side A’ and ‘Side B’) are both part of the formal government,
but their relations are characterized by mutual mistrust, suspicion and pronounced op-
portunism. This is illustrated by the thick black line dividing the two sides. As in ‘Let’s
Share’ polities, external actors have a mediative and non-discriminatory influence on the
dynamics unfolding between the warring parties (as illustrated by the arrow connecting
external actors and the dashed line around the former belligerents).
What can be inferred from this basic constellation about the internal dynamics of this
polity type? In general, it can be assumed that the obstructive relations and the pronounced
mistrust prevailing between the parties inhibits any efforts for genuine cooperation to take
hold. Where cooperation occurs, it is likely to be virtual, i.e. marked by attempts of both
sides to tacitly undermine past agreements. As the name ‘Doomed to Share’ suggests,
neither of the belligerents is particularly fond of power-sharing for its own sake and both of
them consider rather a necessary evil. At least one of the parties engages in power-sharing
for tactical or, at best, for strategic reasons, but typically not because it seeks a genuine
settlement of the conflict. In this context, a decisive engagement by external actors is
necessary which ensures that the former belligerents maintain at least a minimal level
of cooperation. It depends on the particular cases whether external actors are able and
willing to devote the necessary time and resources that are required for stabilizing the
situation. The assumption that external actors constantly refrain from costly engagement
and seek exit-options (see 2.4) suggests that, often, they are not ready to fulfill this role to
the extent warranted by the situation on the ground. This may give rise to a strategy of
‘virtual enforcement’ in which external actors confine themselves to achieve a few visible
successes at the surface without having any significant influence on the real occurrences
on the ground.
.
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Figure 4.1: ’Doomed to Share’ Polities (simplified illustration)
Overcoming Commitment Problems. Due to the obstructive relations existing among
the rebels at the time of the settlement, overcoming the commitment problems in the
initiation phase of ‘Doomed to Share’ polities is likely to be troublesome. Even among
parties endowed with substantial goodwill, successful disarmament is difficult enough to
achieve (see 2.2.2). However, in ‘Doomed to Share’ polities there is no real commitment
to peace. Mistrust between the parties is widespread and benevolent intentions are lacking.
The motivation to share power goes back to tactical or strategic considerations – for
instance in order to gain time for rearmament or in order to gain international recognition
and access to external funding. Against this background, it is extremely unlikely that
external actors are able to yield significant successes in areas such as disarmament and
demobilization or the formation of a joined army. For rebel groups, agreeing to disarm
typically implies to give the ultimate (and often the only) means of coercion out of hand.
Now, if the parties not only suspect each other of having obstructive intentions but have
obstructive intentions themselves, facilitating a comprehensive disarmament process is
almost impossible unless external actors wield significant leverage on the parties. The
only factor that may account for at least partial successes is the presence of executive
power-sharing, because it ensures that all of the parties have a certain control of the means
of coercion. This may facilitate some symbolic successes, for instance by handing in
weapons of poor quality or maintaining secret arms caches. In addition, the belligerents
may put forward pretexts against disarmament, for instance by accusing their opponents of
failing to meet agreements (‘blaming and shaming’ strategies) or by seeking other excuses
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by which they try to justify their reluctance (‘foot dragging’ strategies). In the most blatant
cases, they may even use brute force and try to convince their opponents and/ or external
actors of their ability to disrupt the peace process (‘saber rattling’ strategies). As a result,
the disarmament process remains almost always incomplete in ‘Doomed to Share’ polities.
Manner of Political Competition. One of the crucial characteristics of ‘Doomed to
Share’ polities is that a consensus about who governs is lacking. Both sides want to
increase their relative share of power immediately. Hence, the competition for power is
not only directed at increasing one’s own share of influence in the future, but at constantly
tipping the balance of power in one’s own favor. Political competition therefore mainly
takes place through informal channels. The parties are likely to employ various overt and
covert strategies and tricks in order to improve their own position, which may give rise to
highly conflictual relations arising between the warring parties over time. This may result
in a combination of ‘virtual cooperation’ and ‘genuine confrontation’ measures. This is
pronounced by the fact that, often, not even the ‘partners’ in power-sharing governments
are on equal terms. In most cases, one of the parties has already controlled the government
previously and this party often continues to hold the presidency in the power-sharing
government.1 As a result the relations in power-sharing governments often are highly
asymmetric, with the ‘junior-partners’ having less control of the state apparatus and/ or the
means of coercion.
Threats from Within. Due to the obstructive relations between the power-sharing ‘part-
ners’, managing spoilers and dealing with imminent political crises is a central feature of
this polity type. In fact, the informal nature of political competition in ‘Doomed to Share’
polities is likely to lead to a situation where the boundaries to spoiler behavior become
blurred. A likely behavior is that one of the parties in the power-sharing government
attempts to blackmail the international community and its opponent by threatening to
derail the peace process entirely, for instance through the use of ‘saber rattling’ gestures.
In the highly obstructive environment posed by ‘Doomed to Share’ polities, there is a
high likelihood for these maneuvers to escalate into military confrontations between the
antagonistic parties. In addition, as in ‘Let’s Share’ polities it is conceivable that hardliners
or splinter-groups mobilize against the power-sharing arrangement. How the parties in
power react to these challenges is highly contingent upon the particular case, but as a
general tendency it can be stipulated that the government responds to such challenges in a
highly informal manner, possibly even by the use of force.
1This was the case for instance in Angola, the DRC and Sierra Leone. Among the group of ‘Doomed to
Share’ polities, the only exception is Liberia, where President Charles Taylor was pressured to go into
exile before a power-sharing arrangement was established (see A.13).
118
4.2 Democratic Republic of the Congo
Promoting Good Governance. The promotion of good governance in ‘Doomed to
Share’ polities can be expected to be particularly troublesome. The highly obstructive
relations between the former warring parties render it extremely unlikely that they will
voluntarily adhere to good governance principles or care about external policy preferences.
By the same token, setting incentives or promising ‘carrots’ is almost certainly not enough
for persuading the domestic parties to adhere to external policy recommendations. The
more likely scenario is that external actors need to impose constraints on domestic actors
in order to prevent at least the most blatant violations of good governance principles.
This can take the form a robust peace-enforcement mission or the imposition of sanctions
against particular parties. However, it is questionable to which extent external actors are
willing and capable to live up to this role in the long run. Their ability and willingness
to tackle the challenges on the ground may be particularly compromised in ‘Doomed to
Share’ polities, for two reasons: First, as stipulated in the generic model (see 2.4), external
actors are unwilling to commit to costly engagements and constantly seek exit-options.
Out of this reason, it is generally unlikely that they will devote the resources necessary
for constraining the domestic parties in an effective manner. This may give rise to an
inconsequential manner of external engagement in which external actors’ rhetoric is not
backed by adequate enforcement measures. Second, under the assumption that external
actors are under constant pressure to report successes in order to justify their engagement
and satisfy their own constituencies, ‘Doomed to Share’ polities run a high risk of falling
victim to a pattern of ‘virtual enforcement’ where the emphasis lies on easily attainable
successes at the surface, which go at the expense of actual substantive achievements.
Ultimately, by following a strategy of virtual enforcement, external actors effectively
create an environment in which the promotion of good governance itself becomes a largely
symbolic act.
4.2 Democratic Republic of the Congo
In light of its tragic colonial and post-colonial history, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC)2 is today often considered the ‘epitome of a collapsed state’ (UCDP 2010a).
Since the country reached independence in 1960, it experienced no less than five different
armed conflicts (see appendix section A.7). The fourth civil war erupted in 1998 and
became known as the ‘first pan-African war’ or Africa’s ‘Seven-Nation War’ (International
Crisis Group 1998a). With more than three million casualties, it generated the highest
death-toll of all wars fought since World War II (see e.g. Roessler and Prendergast 2006:
229; Rogier 2003: 25). Recalling the history of this conflict becomes complicated because
of the high number of participating parties and the fluidity of the coalitions they formed.
The first phase of the conflict began as an attempt to oust the country’s long-time dictator
2The abbreviation ‘DRC’ and the term ‘Congo’ are henceforth used as synonyms.
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Joseph Mobutu.3 It was led by a loose coalition of anti-Mobutu forces, which included
the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) and Laurent-Desiré Kabila’s ‘Alliance des Forces
Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire’ (ADFL). The contenders also enjoyed
massive support from a range of neighboring countries, including Uganda and Tanzania.
This coalition successfully overthrew Mobutu on 17 March 1997, and Kabila subsequently
declared himself president (see e.g. Olsson and Fors 2004: 324–325, Emizet 2000: 163).4
Kabila, however, soon faced his own rebellion, especially after he expressed his desire
to “shrug off his former Ugandan and Rwandan sponsors” and ordered Rwandan soldiers
serving in the Congolese army to return home (International Crisis Group 1998b: i). This
gave rise to an armed opposition against Kabila’s rule and initiated the second phase of the
conflict. Due to the involvement of neighboring countries, the conflict soon turned into a
regional war, as both Uganda and Rwanda maintained proxy forces in eastern DRC. The
main rebel factions were the ‘Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie’ (RCD), which
had initially been supported by Uganda and Rwanda and later disintegrated into various
splinter factions, and the ‘Mouvement de Libération Congolais’ (MLC) backed by Uganda
(Coleman 2008d: 14–15).5 The government-side, represented by Kabila, enjoyed support
from Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, and Chad (Tshiyoyo 2006: 25). The warring parties
soon reached a stalemate, and the country was effectively divided into two parts, with
the eastern part controlled by Rwanda and Uganda, and Kabila’s government controlling
the west and the south (Kodi 2008: 10). The first concrete step for the termination of the
conflict was the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement (Government of the Republic of Angola
1999) signed on 7 October 1999. Although it suffered from many flaws6 and did not put an
end to the violence, it established the framework for peace negotiations to be held in the
subsequent years, the so called ‘Inter-Congolese Dialogue’ (ICD) (Koko 2007: 36–37).
3Mobutu, who called himself ‘Mobutu Sese Seko’, seized power through a coup in 1965, and renamed the
former Belgian colony into Zaire. Presenting the country as a “bastion of anti-communism”, Mobutu
could count on significant support from the West. His reign lasted for more than thirty years, and was
characterized by violence, political repression and gross Human Rights violations (see e.g. Olsson and
Fors 2004: 323).
4The proximate reason for this attack were ethnic tensions related to the inflow of an estimated one million
Hutu refugees to Eastern Zaire after the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) seized power in
Rwanda in 1994. The group of refugees included an indefinite number of genocidaires who participated
in the Rwandan genocide against the Tutsi population, and enjoyed Mobutu’s support (see e.g. Coleman
2008d: 13). When Mobutu increased the pressure on the Banyamulenge (Zairan Tutsi), essentially
depriving them of their Congolese citizenship and essentially forcing them to escape to neighboring
Rwanda, they formed an armed rebellion, which was later joined by Kabila’s ADFL (Olsson and Fors
2004: 324–325).
5Next to supporting attempts for unseating Kabila, these foreign forces were also highly involved in the
exploitation of the DRC’s vast natural resources, of which the most precious ones – including gold,
timber, diamonds and coltan – are conveniently located near the eastern border (Grignon 2003; Miskel
and Norton 2003: 2).
6The greatest shortcoming of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement can be seen in the fact that it was exclusively
signed by the various governments participating in the conflict or attempting to mediate it (Angola, DRC,
Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe), but not by the various Congolese rebel factions. For an overview
of other shortcomings see Koko (2007).
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The main goal set for the ICD was to negotiate a provisional constitution for the DRC
(see e.g. Koko 2007: 36–37; Swart 2003: 38). Of particular importance – in fact even
“the most contentious issue” during the negotiations – was the question how governmental
power was to be divided between the belligerents (Apuuli 2007: 72; see also Anstey 2007:
47). Due to Laurent-Desiré Kabila’s stubbornness the ICD stagnated during the first year,
but the talks were resumed after he was assassinated on 16 January 2001. His son and
successor, Joseph Kabila, was widely credited for speaking a “far more peaceful language
than that of his bellicose father” (International Crisis Group 2001a: i), and he soon brought
the Lusaka peace process back on track (see Rogier 2004: 9; Tshiyoyo 2006: 25). After a
lengthy phase of negotiations, a power-sharing agreement was reached according to which
Kabila would remain president, and the leaders of the various factions would participate
in the government as vice presidents (see e.g. Tshiyoyo 2006: 25–27). The transitional
government was inaugurated on 24 July 2003 and lasted until national elections in 2006
confirmed Joseph Kabila in office (see Coleman 2008d: 26).
4.2.1 The DRC as a ‘Doomed to Share’ Polity
Treating the DRC between 2003 and 2006 as a post-conflict country may be considered
misguided because violence remained widespread during the transitional period, in partic-
ular at the local level (see Autesserre 2007; 2009). During the official transitional period,
fighting broke out in north and south Kivu and in the Ituri region in the east, on the border
to Rwanda and Burundi. This was effectively “a proxy war between the government in
Kinshasa and its eastern neighbours” (Tull 2009: 225–226), but it was also propelled by the
blatant opportunism of self-seeking political elites (see below). The International Rescue
Committee estimated in 2004 that more than 30,000 people were dying in the country each
month from the direct and indirect consequences of the conflict (quoted in International
Crisis Group 2005e: 1). Overall, the ‘baseline conditions’ for peace in the DRC were
rather discouraging, suffering from “the high number of warring parties, combatants and
spoilers, weak state institutions, the absence of a genuine peace to keep, notably in Ituri
and the Kivu provinces, the availability of disposable natural resources which allowed
warring factions to finance their war, and hostile neighbouring states (Rwanda, Uganda)
that continuously and covertly intervened in the DRC” (Tull 2009: 223). However, the
power-sharing arrangement that was implemented in this period prepared the country
for the national elections held in 2006 and can therefore be seen as the first moment
during the DRC’s turbulent post-conflict history in which the parties exhibited at least a
modest inclination to cooperate. According to the UCDP/Prio Armed Conflict Dataset, the
anti-Kabila war on which this chapter focused already ended in 2001 (see A.7). Out of
these reasons, it is fair to treat this period as a post-conflict polity case. As argued below,
this situation fulfills the requirements of a ‘Doomed to Share’ polity because an effective
power-sharing arrangement was in place, the parties maintained obstructive relations and
external actors were engaged in a mediative manner.
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Effective Power-Sharing. The basis for power-sharing in the DRC stems from the
‘Global and Inclusive Agreement on the Transition in the DRC’ (Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo 2002a, also known as ‘Pretoria II’), signed in Pretoria
on 16 December 2002, and the so-called ‘Final Act’ (Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo 2003) signed in April 2003, in which the participants of the
Inter-Congolese Dialogue finally accepted “as binding” a number of key documents and
agreements of the Lusaka peace process (Art. 1).7 It led to the creation of a transitional
government in which Joseph Kabila remained president, but had to share power with four
vice presidents: Jean-Pierre Bemba (MLC), Abdoulaye Yerodia Ndombasi (‘People’s Party
for Reconstruction and Democracy’; PPRD), Azarias Ruberwa (RCD-Goma) and Zahidi
Ngoma, representing the unarmed opposition (the so-called 1+4 formula, see Lemarchand
2007: 13; Tshiyoyo 2006: 25–27; Tull 2009: 216).8 Next to the executive, other transitional
institutions were set up, including a transitional parliament in which seats were allocated
to all signatories of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue based on a quota system (Tshiyoyo 2006:
25–27). The Inter-Congolese Dialogue also set in motion the drafting of a new constitution,
which was put to public scrutiny in a referendum on 18 December 2005, and provided for
popular elections held in 2006 (Lemarchand 2007: 14).
Although far from perfect, the agreement effectively constrained the power of the
president and put clear limits to his authority. In the International Crisis Group’s assessment,
it “dramatically changed the country’s power structure” (2006b: 1) and “[i]ts success in
uniting the former belligerents in a government is not insignificant” (2005e: 27). However,
the arrangement also suffered from a number of serious flaws. First, rather than being an
inclusive arrangement uniting all relevant stakeholders it exclusively focused on the warring
factions. René Lemarchand described the underlying power-sharing formula as “a more
or less improvised form of co-optation that left out of the accounting some key political
actors” and remarked that “the DRC is where power sharing departs most conspicuously
from Lijphart’s consociational model” (2007: 12–13). Second, the obstructive relations
(see below) and the political impasse in the capital led to parallel command structures in
the military as well as in the public administration, allowing many state officials to “operate
outside the legal framework of the transitional administration to cultivate their financial
networks” (International Crisis Group 2005e: 17). Third, with four vice presidents, 36
ministers in the cabinet and 500 deputies and 120 senators in the transitional parliament,
7These were, in particular: “The 36 Resolutions duly adopted by the Inter-Congolese Dialogue” listed in
the Appendix to the Final Act (par. 1); “The Global and Inclusive Agreement signed in Pretoria on 17
December 2002, together with the Additional Memorandum on the Army and Security, signed in Pretoria
on 6 March 2003” (par. 2); “The Constitution of the Transition adopted at Sun City on 1 April 2003”
(par. 3).
8The final settlement was ultimately facilitated by a partial agreement signed outside of the Inter-Congolese
Dialogue after talks held in Sun City, South Africa, in April 2002 – the Political Agreement on Consensual
Management of the Transition in the DRC (PACMT) (Government of the Democratic Republic of the
Congo 2002b) – in which Jean-Pierre Bemba and Joseph Kabila agreed to cooperate, and based on which
the post of Prime Minister was awarded to Bemba. This “heralded the end of the anti-Kabila coalition
and confirmed the isolation of the RCD and its ally Rwanda” (Swart 2003: 38).
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the transitional institutions led to the sprawling of bureaucracy (International Crisis Group
2005e: 15). As Filip Reyntjens remarks, “in a country where no competitive elections
had been held since 1965, this plethora of political personnel was totally unrepresentative
[. . . ]” (2007: 310). This sharply reduced the effectiveness of the transitional institutions
and clearly impeded their ability to decide on political reforms – not to speak of the ability
for implementing them. In its first seven months of existence, the transitional parliament
passed not more than one major law, which led to the establishment of the Independent
Electoral Commission (International Crisis Group 2005e: 15). This has animated observers
to argue that “the TNG was often more part of the problem than of the solution [. . . ]” (Aust
and Jaspers 2006: 13). Despite these shortcomings, it cannot be denied that the situation in
the DRC forced Kabila to give away a portion of his governmental power, in particular
to his main rivals Jean-Pierre Bemba (MLC) and Azarias Ruberwa (RCD-Goma). In this
light, the transitional government can be regarded as a case of effective power-sharing.
Obstructive Relations. Although the establishment of the transitional government was
regarded as a step forward in the stalled peace process that had been ongoing for several
years by all external observers, no one was so naïve as to believe that the warring parties
were genuinely committed to peace. In fact, the relations between the warring factions in
the DRC were even more overtly obstructive than in the other ‘Doomed to Share’ cases.
Few countries experienced such a large and heterogeneous group of warring factions as
the DRC. The internal cohesion of these groups was very low, which contributed to the
rise of various splinter-groups competing for power and resources. Already shortly after
the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement had been signed, the various anti-Kabila rebels began
to disintegrate and engage in inter-factional battles. The RCD split into two camps: the
original RCD under the leadership of Emile Ilunga and Bizima Karaha based in Goma
called ‘RCD-Goma’ (RCD-G), and a splinter faction formed under the leadership of
Ernest Wamba called ‘RCD-Kisangani’ (RCD-K), later renamed into Congolese Rally
for Democracy-Kisangani/ Movement of Liberation (RCD-K/ML) (see Coleman 2008d:
14–15; Koko 2007: 36–37). Though initially united in their objective to overthrow Kabila,
the different factions engaged more and more in factional battles, often aiming at gaining
or extending access to the DRC’s natural resources. The fractionalization of the rebel
groups and the rise of new insurgencies in the eastern DRC also prevented the notoriously
weak MONUC mission to fulfill its mandate effectively (Roessler and Prendergast 2006:
255).
The same atmosphere of mistrust and obstruction accompanied the negotiations held
in Sun-City (South Africa) in April 2002, in which the parties adopted the ‘Political
Agreement on Consensual Management of the Transition in the DRC’ (PACMT) (see
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2002b). During the talks, the most
contentious issue revolved around the future composition of the transitional government.
The participants arrived with largely incompatible positions: while Kabila insisted that his
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own presidency was non-negotiable but otherwise appeared ready to make a number of
concessions, the RCD-Goma “wanted to seize the opportunity offered by the Dialogue
to unseat Kabila” (Rogier 2004: 11).9 However, the other main rebel group – Jean
Pierre Bemba’s MLC – gave up its initial reservations and began to cooperate with the
government. In a partial agreement10 struck with Kabila, the two parties agreed on a
transitional arrangement according to which Kabila could remain president and Bemba
received the post of a Prime Minister (see International Crisis Group 2002e; Swart 2003:
38). On the surface, this can be taken as an indicator that the relations between the
government and the main rebel group were becoming more constructive, but in light of
the subsequent developments (see below) it appears more plausible to argue that Bemba
simply sniffed an opportunity to outmaneuver the RCD and to successfully advance its
own position in the future transitional government. Kabila and Bemba were the main
beneficiaries on this partial agreement, since it “heralded the end of the anti-Kabila coalition
and confirmed the isolation of the RCD and its ally Rwanda” (Swart 2003: 38).
There is widespread evidence that virtually all parties involved in the transitional gov-
ernment undermined the peace process or obstructed the power-sharing deal whenever it
proved beneficial for them. This contributed to the impression that the agreement “has
been marked by intense political infighting, lack of accountability and corruption” (In-
ternational Crisis Group 2006b: 1). Observers viewed the transitional government as an
arrangement in which “[e]ach member [. . . ] seems to be wary of what amount of the
cake will go his way” (Alusala 2004: 96). The belligerents’ interest in the arrangement
was, at best, purely instrumental. Though Joseph Kabila was initially hailed for his more
constructive attitude, he showed little enthusiasm for the arrangement. He was not present
in person when the accord was signed, which many interpreted as a strong indicator for
Kabila’s “blatant disregard for the peace process” (Swart 2003: 42). The greatest rupture
in the transitional government involved Kabila and RCD-Goma leader Ruberwa, who were
“barely on speaking terms” and were later involved in various military battles in Bukavu
and Goma in the east (International Crisis Group 2005e: 13). The other parties involved
were in no way more constructive and ruthlessly exploited the opportunities offered by the
power-sharing arrangement in their own favor. According to the International Crisis Group,
the “defining characteristic of the transitional government has been its weakness and the
opportunism of its key members, who have little appetite for the approaching elections”
(2005e: i). These are all clear indicators for the absence of truly cooperative relations.
9Rogier mentions two reasons for the RCD’s refusal to accept the renewal of Kabila’s presidency: The
first reason was Kabila’s continuing support for Rwandan Hutu extremists based in the DRC; and the
second reason was that “RCD-Goma was probably prevented from concluding a deal by the Rwandan
government” (2004: 13).
10‘Political Agreement on Consensual Management of the Transition in the DRC’ (Government of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo 2002b)
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Mediative Engagement. Assessing external actors’ engagement in the case of the DRC
is difficult because of the highly heterogeneous character of external influence in the Congo.
The term ‘external actor’ necessarily creates confusion, since a large part of the warring
factions were effectively foreign and maintained close links to neighboring countries. Their
governments’ support of the Congo war was highly strategic, since they “calculated that the
benefits of war [. . . ] outweighed the domestic and international consequences of flouting
formal peace committments” (Roessler and Prendergast 2006: 231). But even when
concentrating on those external actors who supported the peace process, the list remains
very long. The DRC witnessed not only a UN mission (MONUC) with four distinct phases
of deployment, but also the French-led ‘Operation Artemis’ – an EU Interim Emergency
Multinational Force (IEMF) authorized by the UN Security Council in Resolution 1484 and
equipped with a Chapter VII mandate – and a number of civilian components, including a
European Police Mission (EUPOL), a EU Security Sector Reform Mission (EUSEC), and
a military operation in support of the UN’s MONUC mission (EUFOR) (see International
Crisis Group 2004d; Morsut 2009: 262; Tull 2009: 218). In addition to that, there were
various bilateral initiatives on the regional level, most notably the engagement of South
Africa (first under Nelson Mandela and later under Tabo Mbeki), Botswana, the African
Union, and the South African Development Community (SADC).
As highlighted below in further detail, these different peace initiatives suffered from
many flaws and ambiguities. However, it is undeniable that external actors have played
a crucial role in the DRC and that they took over many responsibilities throughout the
settlement and post-settlement phase. At its height, MONUC was the most expensive of all
UN peacekeeping missions and among the largest of all times. Although the mission had
great difficulties in protecting civilians, observers agree that without MONUC’s presence
the security situation in the DRC would be “significantly worse” (Mobekk 2009: 274).
This induced Dennis Tull to a rather sober assessment about the mission’s performance:
“MONUC will not enter history as a remarkable success story. But there is also little
evidence that MONUC has performed much worse than peacekeeping missions elsewhere,
especially in the light of the DRC’s difficult political environment and the scarce resources
the mission had at its disposal” (2009: 226). With hindsight, its greatest single achievement
certainly was the organization and logistical support of the 2005 constitutional referendum
and the 2006 elections (Tull 2009: 221). In effect, the elections greatly benefited the
incumbent, Joseph Kabila, who received a majority of votes in the runoff elections to the
presidency and clearly beat his closest opponent Jean-Pierre Bemba (see Weiss 2007).
Though external actors had an outspoken preference for Kabila to win the elections, there
is little evidence for an intentional and systematic (hence: partisan) support for him. For
this, external support for peace has been far too modest and international resolve far too
weak (see below). Therefore, external support as a whole can be regarded as mediative in
the case of the DRC.
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4.2.2 Polity Dynamics in the DRC
The case of DRC confirms the plausibility of many of the assumptions made about ‘Doomed
to Share’ polities above. This is illustrated below with regard to the four overarching
themes: dealing with commitment problems, competition for power, threats from within,
and external engagement for good governance.
a) Overcoming Commitment Problems
The widespread mistrust and suspicion that characterized the relations between the partici-
pants of the transitional government turned out as a major obstacle in the transition process
(Autesserre 2007: 9). As noted above (2.2) mutual mistrust can impede the successful con-
clusion or implementation of peace agreements even under favorable circumstances. With
the highly obstructive environment prevailing in the DRC, it became virtually impossible
to implement even the most basic goals of the peace process. This became most apparent
with regard to two aspects: the disarmament of the belligerents, and the formation of an
inclusive army. In Article VI of the ‘Global and Inclusive Agreement’, the parties gave
their consent to the establishment of a defense council whose tasks included giving advice
on “the setting up of a restructured and integrated national army” and “the disarming of
armed groups” (Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2002a: Art. VI).
Both issues turned out as conflict-ridden from the beginning on.
Disarmament in the DRC was difficult because of the large number of warring factions
in conjunction with the fact that not all of the belligerents were Congolese. A particularly
obstructive element were the ‘Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda’ (FDLR),
an insurgent group comprising some 10,000 Rwandan Hutu rebels who fled to the DRC
after the 1994 genocide.11 Directed mainly against the Tutsi government in Rwanda, its
strategy was to “destabilise the region in hopes of provoking another war between Rwanda
and the Congo” (International Crisis Group 2005e). The group was “closely allied with
the Congolese government [and] took a hard-line stance against DDR [. . . ]” (Roessler and
Prendergast 2006: 272). Indeed, the presence of these forces in the DRC gave the Rwandan
president Kagame a perfect pretext for maintaining his own troops in the country, and
his willingness to repatriate them was therefore very small.12 MONUC was specifically
mandated to disarm these foreign forces, albeit on a voluntary basis (Tull 2009: 217). The
UN Security Council refrained from authorizing the forceful repatriation of the FDLR,
which “left the mission with few other means than seeking to persuade foreign fighters
to return to their countries” (Tull 2009: 219). This process was more than erroneous.
Given its low numbers of military personnel, MONUC simply “lacked the capacity to
11For a detailed assessment of the FDLR’s strategies, see in particular: International Crisis Group (2005d).
12See in particular the assessment by Séverine Autesserre: “Keeping the FDLR out of Rwanda ensured that
the movement could not become an official, recognized opposition to the Rwandan ruling party. Keeping
the FDLR in the Congo also allowed Kagame to maintain a permanent quasi-state of war in Rwanda and
therefore to restrict civil rights and clamp down on opposition parties” (2007: 7).
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undertake the enormous task of disarming and repatriating these armed groups” (Roessler
and Prendergast 2006: 273). As a result, DDR efforts stalled and the FDLR continued to
pose a great security risk throughout most of the DRC’s official ‘transition’ period.
The disarmament of the domestic belligerents proceeded in an equally obstructive envi-
ronment. The institutional set-up in which the efforts for disarmament and demobilization
were carried out was relatively unusual. The main responsibility lay in the hands of a
national agency, the ‘Comité National de Démobilisation et Réinsertion’ (CONADER),
which was supervised by the transitional government (Mobekk 2009: 276). Formally, the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) had the final authority for coordinating
and supervising the DDR efforts. MONUC’s role was limited to providing security at the
demobilization sites (see Tull 2009: 220; Wolters 2005: 6). This particular institutional
set-up clearly limited the effectiveness of the DDR efforts and, unlike in other cases,
implied that the main tensions about disarmament were not to be found at the interface
between the warring factions and external actors, but inside the transitional government.
Two years after its establishment, nearly nothing was achieved with regard to disarming the
combatants. As the International Crisis Group remarked in 2005, “[m]ost of the 300,000
combatants in the country are deployed in the same positions and are controlled by the
same military hierarchies as before the transition” (2005e: 1). Charging the national
disarmament commission for its mismanagement, donors even suspended funding for the
disarmament program in 2006. This further distanced the DRC from the goal of a quick
disarmament of its factions (Tull 2009: 220). The reasons for this poor track record can
certainly be attributed to the lack of trust among the warring factions, in conjunction with
the fact that external actors did provide too little effective security guarantees. MONUC
was a very weak force in its initial years of deployment, comprising as little as 3.500 troops
(see Tull 2009: 217). Suffering, additionally, from a lack of a strong mandate (see below),
it is naïve to assume that the mission could disperse the combatants’ fears to any significant
degree.
The poor track record with regard to the disarmament of the factions also impeded
the formation of an inclusive army. Formally, with the adoption of the peace agreement,
all warring factions subordinated their forces to the newly established ‘Armed Forces of
the Democratic Republic of the Congo’ (FARDC). However, most of them ignored their
commitments from day one of the transition phase (International Crisis Group 2006c: i;
Mobekk 2009: 277). While this may have been a deliberate strategy adopted by some
groups, others were obviously simply incapable of enforcing the necessary discipline
among their base. The International Crisis Group believed that none of the participants
of the transitional government had “strong control of either its military or political wing”,
and has pointed to the existence of parallel command structures in the new national army
(2005e: i; see also Autesserre 2007: 8). In their assessment, “the resistance of many
belligerents to demobilise their armies and integrate them into one reformed national
army [. . . ]” was one of the major obstacles to a successful security sector reform in the
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DRC (2006c: 1). Tellingly, not even the president had trust in the new national army
and instead reinforced the presidential guard to a strength of 12,000 to 15,000 troops and
established parallel command structures in order to bypass the regular military command
(see International Crisis Group 2006c: 3). This clearly impeded the formation of an
inclusive army. As the International Crisis Group remarked, somewhat frustrated, in 2005:
“It is unacceptable that, almost two years on, little has been done to unify the armies and
the administrations of the former belligerents” (2005e: 27).
In sum, this confirms the assumption that ‘Doomed to Share’ polities pose a difficult
environment for overcoming commitment problems between the belligerents. The previous
chapter has shown that issues such as disarmament and the formation of an inclusive army
can be relatively successful even in a difficult environment such as Burundi. The DRC
illustrates the difficulties involved in overcoming commitment problems in an environment
of severe mistrust and hostility. The main problems here arise from the fact that the parties
are typically obliged to integrate their forces into a joint army, which – in an environment
of deep-rooted mistrust – may create more tensions than it is supposed to solve.
b) Manner of Political Competition
The overall dynamics of ‘Doomed to Share’ polities are also reflected in the manner by
which the former warring factions compete for power and influence. Unlike in ‘Let’s
Share’ polities, where the general consensus about the distribution of current power
initially directs competition for power into formal-constitutional channels, the lack of
such a consensus in ‘Doomed to Share’ polities induces the parties to adopt informal
and unconstitutional means by which they try to deceive and outmaneuver each other.
The DRC gives a vivid illustration of this phenomenon. Not surprisingly, there was little
genuine cooperation taking place between the warring factions throughout the period of
the transitional government and nearly every cooperative gesture was accompanied by a
more or less obvious attempt to undermine these very efforts.
As noted above, the conclusion of the Lusaka Ceasefire agreement in 1999, the initiation
of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue in 2001 and the adoption of the various peace agreements
can, on the surface, be interpreted as signs for an emerging cooperative behavior. In
immediate response to these positive signs, the international community did not refrain
from applauding Joseph Kabila for his pragmatic approach. His “willingness to share
power with the rebels had made a positive, lasting impression among the donor countries
[. . . ]” (Dizolele 2010: 150). However, upon closer investigation it quickly becomes
clear that these were merely superficial gestures of cooperation that could hardly mask the
belligerents’ hidden agendas and vested interests. Whenever the warring parties cooperated,
it happened in an atmosphere of mistrust, ongoing hostilities and sizable external pressure.
As Rogier remarks, the belligerents’ support of the peace process “was much more the
result of opportunistic moves by each party than a reflection of a general commitment
to reaching a political settlement of the conflict” (2004: 3). The transitional government
128
4.2 Democratic Republic of the Congo
ultimately established was in the best tradition of this obstructive spirit. In the assessment
of Dizolele, it “bestowed on the DRC its worst government yet” (2010: 147). Observers
characterized it as a “deeply dysfunctional” arrangement in which “political elites focused
on the upcoming elections and appropriating public resource” (Tull 2009: 220). As a result,
the participants of the transitional government mainly concentrated on extending their
relative share of de facto power rather than exercising authority within the legal confines
of the power-sharing agreement. As Autesserre remarked, “[t]he government did not work
as a team to manage the transition and lead the country, but rather as enemy factions bent
on overtaking one another and on enhancing the political, military, symbolic, and financial
position of their own parties” (2007: 9).
This became most clearly apparent with respect to the RCG-Goma, clearly the party
with the least chances for a good showing in the elections (see below) and hence the lowest
inclination to exert authority through formal-constitutional instruments. Due to its close
affiliations with Rwanda, the RCD-Goma enjoyed very little legitimacy inside the Congo.
From the beginning on, exploiting anti-Rwandan and in particular anti-Tutsi sentiments
provided the main platform for Kabila’s party, the PPRD. As a UN analyst remarked:
“In the absence of a solid popular base and public services, anti-Tutsi propaganda is
one of the only things that can rouse the rabble in Kinshasa” (quoted in International
Crisis Group 2005e: 12). However, this “Rwandophone-bashing” (Autesserre 2007: 11)
significantly fueled the tensions with the RCD-Goma and contributed to the spiral of
violence in the eastern DRC. The relations between Kabila and the RCD-Goma were
therefore the most troublesome ones. Kabila tried to keep Ruberwa and the RCD-Goma
from retaining genuine power in Kinshasa, which “resulted in the effective exclusion of
Goma and its surrounding territories from the transitional administration” (International
Crisis Group 2005e: 7). This gave rise to frequent tensions between the government
and the rebel group and induced the RCD-Goma to fall back to a pattern of ‘genuine
confrontation’ since the early stages of the transitional government. Already in May
2003, RCD-Goma representatives withdrew from talks about the implementation of the
transitional government after “accusing the government of trying to keep the post of head
of army for itself and seeking to control the majority of the military regions” (Swart 2003:
42; see also Alusala 2004: 94). Another source of hostility were Kabila’s attempts to
restore central government authority in the entire Congolese territory. Kabila possessed a
large portion of de facto power in about 60 percent of the country’s territory and tried to
restore central government authority in to the eastern DRC, where it was still under the
effective control of the rebel factions (International Crisis Group 2005e: 1). This gave rise
to the “highly volatile situation in those territories that continued to be controlled by troops
affiliated with different factions, and led to both small scale battles and several bouts of
large-scale fighting” (Autesserre 2007: 9). In addition, the confrontation undermined the
already fragile cohesion of the RCD-Goma, ultimately leading to a rift between Ruberwa
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and a number of hardliners from his own party. This has further reduced the RCD-Goma’s
ability to play a more constructive role in the transition process:
“The RCD’s failure to influence the transition in a constructive way can be explained
by two main phenomena: An increasingly ‘desperate’ RCD, weakened by internal
divisions and power struggles, and the successful attempts of the presidential camp to
‘capture’ the transition process in an effort to realize its own aspirations for power”
(Aust and Jaspers 2006: 89).
But the relations between Kabila and Jean-Pierre Bemba were not significantly different,
despite the veil of cooperation that initially accompanied them. Bemba, too, used the
transitional government as a means to increase his de facto share of power. Just a few
months after the partial deal with Kabila in Sun City, he threw his peaceful aspirations
overboard by striking an offensive against the city of Mambasa in the Ituri province:
“Eager to regain territory lost [. . . ] and to seize the gold and diamond mines of Ituri”, he
tried to use the confusion revolving around the acknowledged withdrawal of Ugandan
forces from this region (International Crisis Group 2003b: 8).13 He was pushed back by
the armed wing of the RCD-ML, an Ituri-based and Ugandan-backed faction that had
split from the Rwandan-backed RCD-Goma in 1998 (van Woudenberg 2003: 198–199).
Realizing that he was unable to re-establish its influence in Ituri, the MLC withdrew and
almost immediately switched back to its constructive modus operandi by supporting a
ceasefire between the RCD-ML and the RCD-National – another RCD splinter-group with
few soldiers that until then relied on the MLC’s military force (International Crisis Group
2003b: 8). All in all, Bemba’s strategy can therefore more adequately be described as a
‘virtual cooperation’ strategy than a ‘genuine confrontation’ strategy.
The sharp competition for de facto power can also be attributed to the lack of future
perspectives available for most of the rebel factions. Aside from Kabila, most of the parties
had little hope for being represented in a future (post-transitional) government. Since no
post-election power-sharing was agreed anywhere in the peace agreement, the elections
meant that “only the allies of the winning party [. . . ] would be able to retain their positions
of authority” – and the odds stood most favorably for the incumbent Kabila (Autesserre
2007: 10). This shifted their priorities away from managing the country’s transition process
to prolonging the transitional period as long as possible and accounted for the extensive
use of ‘foot dragging’ gestures. The rebel factions were, as the International Crisis Group
puts it, “set on prolonging or disrupting the transition” by all means (2005e: i). They
persistently “ignored the elections timeline and would have continued on indefinitely [. . . ]”
13Ugandan forces had been present in Ituri for various years, but were forced to withdraw after an Angolan
brokered bilateral agreement between Uganda and the Congolese government (‘Luanda Agreement’). The
agreement was facilitated after Rwanda had signed a similar agreement a few weeks earlier (‘Pretoria’)
due to rising international pressure for its support for the RCD-Goma (see International Crisis Group
2003b: 7). Bemba was already in control of the region for a short period in 2001 as the leader of a
short-lived coalition with other Ugandan-backed factions, but lost this foothold in Ituri already a few
months afterwards (see van Woudenberg 2003: 198 and International Crisis Group 2003b: 5).
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had they not committed to a clear end-date in the Sun City Accords (Dizolele 2010: 148).
This holds particularly true for the RCD-Goma, a party that has been “deeply unpopular
beyond its narrow base among the Kinyarwanda speakers of North Kivu” and that “[m]ost
Congolese regard [. . . ] as a puppet of Rwanda” (International Crisis Group 2005e: 2). As
a result, the rebels primarily used the transitional government as a protected space allowing
them to gain both time and money and prepare for their next offensive against Kabila. As a
result, they “exploited [. . . ] [Kabila’s] deficiency whenever they could [. . . ] [and] would
often push him to the limit of his power until he had no recourse” (Dizolele 2010: 150).
Jean-Pierre Bemba was in a slightly better position, since he had a relatively large
power-base in the western part of the country (including Kinshasa) and was the only
candidate with enough money and organizational support to compete with Kabila (see
Dizolele 2010: 151).14 However, since his chances for a victory were highly uncertain
and he faced charges for war crimes from the International Criminal Court, prolonging
the transitional period was the safest bet also for him since “a longer transition meant
continued immunity from prosecution” (Autesserre 2007: 10).15 Thus, virtually all of
the rebel groups concentrated their efforts on prolonging the transitional period in order
to retain their status as official members of the government and all privileges associated
with it. For Séverine Autesserre, “the interests that most representatives had in stalling the
transition process” were among the main reasons for the lack of success in the transitional
process (2007: 9). The only exception was Kabila, who was the only one to gain from the
transition. For him, who had never been formally elected prior to 2006, the transitional
government offered an opportunity to finally legitimize his rule (Dizolele 2010: 150).
Kabila was therefore willing to sit out the transitional phase, counting on his democratic
legitimation in the post-transition elections. As a result, he mainly engaged in ‘virtual
cooperation’ strategies in order to preserve his image as a comparatively constructive
element in the peace process and not lose international support, but at the same time he
engaged in questionable military endeavors in order to keep the upper hand against his
opponents.
The inclination to fall back to ‘foot dragging’ gestures rather than trying to engage
constructively in the country’s transitional process was also fostered by the potential for
14“Besides Bemba and Kabila, the main contender in the upcoming elections will be Etienne Tshisekedi,
the veteran leader of the Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social (UDPS), who led the political
opposition against Mobutu. [. . . ] He has the advantage of not being a member of the corruption-ridden
transitional government and is still able to mobilise large numbers of supporters in Kinshasa and his
home province of Kasai Oriental” (International Crisis Group 2005e).
15This may also explain why, when Bemba failed to win the absolute majority in the first round of the
elections, his camp was reportedly “shocked” about this fact (Human Rights Watch 2008: 16–17). When,
ultimately, he lost against Kabila in the run-off elections – gaining an official 42 percent of the votes,
as compared to 58 percent for Kabila (Booysen 2007: 13; see also Weiss 2007) – he had a tough time
accepting this result. Shortly after the elections, Bemba announced that he “cannot accept these results
which are far from reflecting the truth of the ballot box”, and that he would use “all legal means to
ensure the will of our people is respected” (Gettleman and Mwassi 2006), but later accepted the Supreme
Court’s rejection of his appeal (Booysen 2007: 13).
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self-enrichment offered by the participation in the transitional government. In order for
‘foot dragging’ strategies to be attractive for the warring parties, the status quo must
offer better opportunities than all of its realistic alternatives. This condition was clearly
fulfilled in the DRC. As Kodi remarks, “[t]he power-sharing arrangement created new
opportunities for corrupt activities and guaranteed immunity to all the office-holders as
long as they maintained good client relations with their leaders” (2008: 26).16 Government
clerks on all levels of the hierarchy engaged in corrupt activities and made use of the
opportunity for ‘extraversion’ (see International Crisis Group 2006b: 4). In 2005, aid made
up approximately 25 percent of the country’s GDP, and aid inflows between 2002 and 2006
equaled US$10 billion (Matti 2010: 52). More than 50 percent of the Congolese state
budget were financed by external actors during that year (Aust and Jaspers 2006: 32). This
offered a large potential for funds being embezzled by corrupt political leaders (Matti 2010:
53). The faction leaders were not only bestowed with government posts, but also with
lucrative jobs in state enterprises (see Dizolele 2010: 147). This potential for enrichment
clearly contributed to the parties’ inclination to engage in extended foot dragging:
“For the many government workers (at the top and at the bottom of the hierarchy) who
were utterly incompetent and owed their nominations to their affiliation with one of
the components, a long transition meant more time to enrich their coffers” (Autesserre
2007: 10).
This momentum for self-enrichment is not surprising in a country where corruption and
patronage have been deeply entrenched in the political culture for half a century (see e.g.
Matti 2010: 50), but it contributed to eliminate what little was left of the transitional
government’s legitimacy. The illicit exploitation of natural resources also was a crucial
source of self-enrichment in the DRC. Minerals account for an estimated 60 percent of the
DRC’s exports (International Crisis Group 2006b: 7). Their illegal exploitation assumed
such alarming proportions that the United Nations appointed a panel of experts in order to
shed light on the extent of this phenomenon (United Nations 2003a), and numerous UN
Security Council Resolutions explicitly dealt with this problem (see e.g. U.N. Security
Council 2003a; 2003f).
In sum, the transitional government in the DRC was certainly not an adequate mechanism
for managing the conflict between the belligerents. Perceiving the transitional government
more as a continuation of war by other means, the former warring factions mainly used it
as a vehicle to extend their own share of power at the expense of their opponents. This was
accompanied by various ‘virtual cooperation’ as well as ‘foot dragging’ strategies.
c) Threats from Within
The informal and confrontational manner of political competition accompanying ‘Doomed
to Share’ polities almost certainly contributes to the emergence of threats to the stability
16For an overview of corruption in the DRC, see International Crisis Group (2006b: 4–13).
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of the polity as a whole. Unlike in ‘Let’s Share’ polities – where incentives to engage
in political mobilization ‘on the cheap’ causes politics to slide down a slippery slope –
‘Doomed to Share’ polities by definition face much more imminent threats by spoilers
or political hardliners who oppose the settlement by recourse to armed force. Much
more than in ‘Let’s Share’ polities, where a broader societal consensus about the fact of
power-sharing exists, ‘Doomed to Share’ polities are focused on elite accommodation and
co-optation. The DRC illustrates that this may erode the factions’ internal cohesion and
provide an enabling environment for spoilers and hardliners to derail the peace process.
As shown below, all of the warring parties had hardliners or dissidents in their ranks who
were diametrically opposed to their leaders’ participation in the transitional government
and instead sought a military solution. This highly conflictual environment requires
external actors to intervene in a very resolute manner. However, given the costs and
dangers associated with these forms of intervention, there is every indication to assume
that external actors will shy away from engaging in ‘genuine enforcement’ strategies and
will rather fall back to a pattern of ‘virtual enforcement’.
Since the very beginnings of the transitional period in the DRC, hardliners and spoilers
represented a major potential for derailing the peace process. The main spoilers were
dissident factions emerging as a result of internal divisions within some of the rebel groups.
The three main rebel groups “were split between two sides: the legitimists, who wanted to
play the game of the transition, and the warmongers, who either had everything to lose
with the peace or had too much to gain from war to accept a settlement of the conflict”
(Autesserre 2007: 10). According to the International Crisis Group, “the real obstacle to
the transition is the reluctance of the spoilers to give up the power and assets they derive
from the persistence of parallel chains of command in the military, the financial institutions
and the administration and the corruption these have engendered” (2005e: 15). Some
of them engaged in ‘calculated escalation’ strategies, which aimed at breaking up the
transitional government in order to make room for a military ‘solution’.
The internal divisions were most pronounced in the case of the RCD-Goma. The rebel
group was divided into a faction of hardliners located in Goma, which feared to lose
its local power base if it supported central governing authority, and a more moderate
faction centering around Ruberwa, which supported the transitional government and
was “more preoccupied with securing their new privileges and [. . . ] establishing new
political alliances” (Aust and Jaspers 2006: 89). As a result, the attempt by the transitional
government to extend central authority to the rebel-held areas in the eastern DRC triggered
a number of very serious military confrontations, most notably the 2004 Bukavu crisis. It
was rooted in an armed skirmish between a commander from the Congolese army (Colonel
Jules Mutebutsi) and the regional commander for South Kivu (Brigadier-General Prosper
Nabyolwa) about the enforcement of central authority in the eastern DRC.17 What began
17 Following his mandate, Nabyolwa took decisive actions against a group of 300 RCD-Goma dissidents
who had – allegedly with the help from Rwanda – secretly re-armed. Nabyolwa’s raids were condemned
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as a “contest for control of the province between the transitional government and the
elements of RCD-Goma supported by Rwanda” (International Crisis Group 2004e: 4)
soon escalated into a major confrontation in the course of which the city of Bukavu was
controlled for one week by a faction of RCD-Goma dissidents led by Laurent Nkunda.
This caused the death of several hundred civilians and induced tens of thousands to flee to
Burundi and Rwanda (see Beswick 2009: 340; Wolters 2007: 1). In the end, after signs
for the deployment of a rapid intervention force substantiated, both withdrew their forces,
which enabled the government to re-establish its control of the city (International Crisis
Group 2004e: 4; Tull 2009: 218; Wolters 2007: 1). The crisis deprived the RCD-Goma
of what little remained from its internal cohesion. After its end, most Congolese Hutu
and Tutsi in the rebel faction sympathized with the dissidents and finally withdrew their
support from the transitional government in Kinshasa. In July 2004, eight members of
the transitional parliament belonging to the RCD-Goma suspended their cooperation with
the government and pulled out of Kinshasa (International Crisis Group 2005e: 5–10).
This put major pressure on the ‘legitimists’ within the RCD-Goma, who increasingly
found themselves with their “back against the wall” and who were, as a result, even more
unwilling to implement political reforms decided by the center (Aust and Jaspers 2006:
89). The Kabila camp used this as an opportunity to further marginalize the movement,
arguing that its lack of leadership was a threat to the transition process (Aust and Jaspers
2006: 89).
As this shows, hardliners and spoilers have posed a significant threat to the transition
process in the DRC. These incidents can therefore be seen as a litmus test for determining
external actors’ willingness and capability to respond to threats from within. Already
for ‘Let’s Share’ polities it was shown that the centrifugal tendencies associated with the
competition for future power may require external actors to remain engaged in these polities
for sustained periods. This holds all the more true for ‘Doomed to Share’ cases, where the
adverse potential of spoilers is significantly higher – most notably since the disarmament
of the ‘former’ warring factions in this polity type is often not effective (as shown above).
However, this more challenging environment calls for robust peace-enforcement missions,
which are expensive, dangerous and more difficult to push through politically. Therefore,
it is reasonable to assume that external actors’ capability and willingness to engage in
‘genuine enforcement’ is severely compromised.
The DRC strongly supports these assumptions. The International Crisis Group believed
that “[n]either MONUC nor the wider international community has shown the ability
or the will to address the Congo’s crises”, and that international donors have missed to
take “serious action against the spoilers in the transitional government, who work against
unification of the army and administration” (2005e: ii). International response to the crisis
by the RCD-Goma leadership as an attempt to undermine the party’s command structure in the Kivus,
and Deputy Colonel Mutebutsi – a former RCD-Goma soldiers – intervened on behalf of his party by
preventing Mutebutsi from continuing with his raids (see International Crisis Group 2005e: 5, for more
details see also United Nations 2004g, par. 34 – 46).
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in the DRC was from the beginning on struck by ambiguities and indecisiveness, with the
main tension being that “[t]he war in the Congo was too gruesome and devastating for the
West to ignore, but too difficult and too low a priority to address seriously” (Roessler and
Prendergast 2006: 253). The Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement initially called for a decisive
role to be played by the United Nations, explicitly requesting them (in partnership with
the OAU) to “constitute, facilitate and deploy an appropriate force in the DRC to ensure
implementation of the agreement” (Government of the Republic of Angola 1999, Annex
A, Ch. 8). Next to more classical peacekeepig tasks, it called for peace-enforcement
mechanisms. However, from the beginning on the international community had strong
reservations against a decisive engagement in the DRC, and the initial phases of MONUC
engagement were marred by a lack of resolve and political will. Ostensibly, deploying a
strong peace-enforcement mission appeared “too risky and too costly” to UN Secretary
General Kofi Annan (Rogier 2004: 5). This led to an approach to peacekeeping in which
virtually all efforts for a more decisive engagement were contingent upon the warring
parties’ demonstrated willingness to cooperate, who were, in turn, “content to defy the
United Nations because they faced almost no consequences for continuing to prosecute the
war and loot the Congo of its riches” (Roessler and Prendergast 2006: 249). This accounts
for MONUC’s small size of some 3,000 troops in the initial phase of engagement (see Tull
2009: 217).
External support was only significantly increased after the establishment of the tran-
sitional government and in light of the blatant human rights violations occurring in the
eastern DRC, in the city of Bunia, in mid-2003. Acting, for the first time during the Congo
crisis, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the UN Security Council authorized the
deployment of an Interim Emergency Multinational Force in the town of Bunia, where
some of the most serious incidents took place (U.N. Security Council 2003d). Realizing
that this was only a temporary measure, the UN Security Council significantly increased
MONUC’s strength to 10,800 military personnel in July 2003 (U.N. Security Council
2003e). At its height, shortly before the elections, the mission reached a troop ceiling of
19,000 military personnel – seven years after its establishment (Tull 2009: 223). Although
this was decisively more than before, it was still far too little in order to successfully
tackle the challenges posed by the vast country hosting some 300,000 combatants: “In
absolute terms, MONUC is one of the biggest missions ever deployed by the UN, but in
relative terms it has been one of the smallest, be it in relation to the size of the DRC (one
peacekeeper per 139 sq km), or its population (one soldier per 3,500 Congolese)” (Tull
2009: 223).
During the Bukavu crisis, this low-key peacekeeping profile severely backfired. Due
to its lack of appropriate resources, the mission failed to prevent civilian suffering and
was criticized for its inability to support the transitional government (Tull 2009: 218).
According to the International Crisis Group, MONUC “could have done far more to prevent
Nkunda’s advance on Bukavu, with the consequent looting, killing, and rape or wounding
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of over 100 civilians” (2005e: 24). Its main shortcoming was that, instead of giving
military backing to the government troops, “it negotiated with insurgents, who broke the
deal and then proceeded to kill, rape, and loot without serious opposition” (International
Crisis Group 2004e: 6). In this regard, the Bukavu crisis “was a major blow to MONUC’s
credibility” (Tull 2009: 218). This was all the more true in light of the blatant failure to
keep peace in Bunia one year earlier, where “700 blue helmets [. . . ] were bystanders to
the massacres of 400 civilians” (Tull 2009: 217). However, the Bukavu crisis was also a
focal event that elevated external actors’ awareness about the destabilizing potential of
hardliners and spoilers, as a statement made by the UN Secretary General shortly after the
events in Bukavu illustrates:
“Hardliners and spoilers who want to see the transitional process fail can be found in
all the major components and will continue to disturb the process. [. . . ] Without the
marginalization of such spoilers through effective disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration and military integration, timely political agreements on nationality and
amnesty and legitimization of the economic sector, the country will remain unstable
and incidents such as those seen in Bukavu and Kinshasa in May-June 2004 are likely
to recur” (United Nations 2004g, par. 51 and 57).
Despite these insights, external actors’ willingness to engage more decisively has remained
low. As Dennis Tull noted, the “Security Council’s resolutions revealed the limited interests
of its five permanent members in solving the conflict [. . . ]”, which clearly limited the
mission’s effectiveness (Tull 2009: 223). There is some indication that this unwillingness
is directly related to external actors’ mediative stance. As the International Crisis Group
noted: “MONUC is often caught in the dilemma of not wanting to alienate the very parties
it is trying to get to collaborate in the peace process. [. . . ] By not acting decisively,
however, MONUC has further damaged its reputation and increased the likelihood that it
will be targeted” (2005e: 24). This has specifically reduced its determination to decisively
act against spoilers and hardliners who were keen on derailing the peace process. As the
UN Secretary General carefully noted, “[t]he efforts of the international community could
have more impact if its political goals and financial and material assistance were to be
carefully calibrated and used as additional leverage to support the transitional process”
(United Nations 2004g, par. 57). However, the existing leverage – external actors financed
more than fifty percent of the Congolese state budget in 2005 – was largely left unused, and
recommendations to use the financial assets in a more strategic manner were systematically
ignored (see International Crisis Group 2005e: 25). All this contributed to the assessment
that the UN has “adopted an overly cautious approach to peacekeeping, forcing MONUC
to react hastily to contingencies rather than prevent them” (International Crisis Group
2005e: 24). Hence, external actors’ manner of engagement in the Congo crisis mainly
136
4.2 Democratic Republic of the Congo
suffered from sufficient political will, giving rise to a specific form of intervention by
which external actors merely try to sit out the transitional phase until after the elections.18
In sum, spoilers and hardliners who were opposed to the transitional government posed
an imminent threat to its stability. The strong focus on elite accommodation at the center
provoked dissent from those who did not benefit from the power-sharing government
and caused the split of some of the rebel groups. This posed an additional threat to
the transitional government and to the integrity of the country as a whole. Countering
these threats effectively would have required external actors to commit significantly more
resources to the DRC than they were willing to provide. Instead, external actors mainly
reacted to those threats in a ‘virtual enforcement’ manner, i.e. by effectively ‘muddling
through’ the transitional phase and risking that significant human rights violations and
large-scale atrocities occur.
d) Promoting Good Governance
The engagement for good governance also was in line with the general expectations of
‘Doomed to Share’ polities. It was expected above that the obstructive environment of
this polity type poses a severe challenge to the promotion of good governance principles.
The faulty disarmament, the prevalence of spoilers and hardliners who gain from derailing
the peace process, as well as the fierce competition for de facto power that characterize
this polity type make the violation of basic principles very likely. This implies that strong
external resolve is needed in order to counter these developments and in order to prevent
at least the most blatant violations of good governance principles. Whether or not the
capability and will for fulfilling this role is present certainly depends on the idiosyncrasies
of the particular case, but as a general tendency it is plausible to assume that external
actors will lack the necessary resolve in many cases. This stipulation can, by and large, be
confirmed in the case of the DRC. External actors have played an ambiguous role here:
Facing the twin challenge of enforcing the provisions of the peace agreement and not
disrupting the fabric of the fragile post-conflict order, they often reacted in a halfhearted
and contradictory manner. This has led to a specific form of engagement in which external
18Some even believe that through their eagerness to establish a power-sharing deal in the DRC, external
actors have set perverse incentives and have thereby contributed to the emergence of splinter-groups and
peace spoilers. Tull and Mehler used the case of the DRC for illustrating that the institutionalization of
power-sharing practices “demonstrates Western willingness to provide political pay-offs for insurgent
violence and thereby creates incentive structures which turn the rebel path into an appealing option in
the pursuit of otherwise blocked political aspirations” (Tull and Mehler 2005: 376). René Lemarchand,
however, contests the applicability of their argument to this case. He contends that “[t]o detect a ‘Western
willingness to provide political pay-offs’ behind the 2002 Agreement makes little sense” and underlines
that “ethnic rivalries fuelled by greed, rather than strategic positioning through instrumentalization of
violence, were largely responsible for the break-up of the original RCD into rival factions” (2007: 18).
Hence, “contrary to what Tull and Mehler argue, greed has had a powerful multiplier effect on intra-ethnic
as well as inter-ethnic enmities, and so, also, the intervention of external patrons – Uganda and Rwanda –
on behalf of their preferred clients” (2007: 19).
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actors focus primarily on the standard ingredients of statebuilding while hardly ever
cross-checking whether these formal achievements are actually matched by substantive
achievements on the ground. This became apparent in two areas: external actors’ one-
sided focus on the elections (accompanied by a pronounced reluctance to engage into
daily politics), and their strong hesitation to counter blatant violations conducted by the
transitional government with regard to corruption and human rights.
The DRC is a case in which external actors’ focus on elections as the panacea was
particularly pronounced. Since the establishment of the transitional government in 2003,
the international community has focused almost exclusively on the polls as the immediate
goal of its engagement in the DRC. The UN Security Council considered them to be the
“foundation for the longer term restoration of peace and stability, national reconciliation
and establishment of the rule of law in the Democratic Republic of the Congo” (U.N.
Security Council 2003h). This came at the expense of other important aspects of the
external statebuilding endeavor, most importantly in that external actors have paid “scant
attention to promoting viable state institutions” (International Crisis Group 2006b: 1).
This one-sided focus is one of the main factors emphasized by Sévérine Autesserre in her
critical analysis of peacebuilding dynamics in the Congo:
“Reconstructing a state entails many measures, including the (re)building of a bureau-
cracy, a justice system, effective and disciplined coercion forces, and the selection of
appropriate leaders. In the Congo, the international peacebuilders focused dispropor-
tionately on one of these tasks: the selection of leaders, through elections. Apart from
ad hoc action aimed at stemming crises or at ensuring that elections would proceed
smoothly, the other tasks were postponed to the postelectoral period” (2009: 269).
This strong focus on the polls implied that external actors were unwilling to recognize the
dysfunctional manner of the transitional government and scrutinized whether it provided
an adequate basis for the elections. As Dennis Tull puts it, “[i]n the DRC the narrow focus
on an elite-based transition process ignored the dynamics of war” (2009: 227). But the
strong focus on the elections also hampered attempts for building strong – not to speak of
democratic – institutions (Matti 2010: 53). Such important aspects as a thorough reform
of the security sector were not viewed as long term statebuilding challenges, but rather
as “means to other ends, notably the organization of elections, the key objective of the
transitional process” (Tull 2009: 220).
All in all, this strong focus on accommodating the warlords has implied that external
actors have “shied away from the more political aspects, such as strengthening parliament,
courts and anti-corruption and auditing bodies” (International Crisis Group 2006b: i). This
has greatly hampered the promotion of good governance in the Congo and contributed
to the excessive violations that could be observed with respect to corruption or human
rights. Unlike in Macedonia, where external actors exerted continuous pressure on the
government in order to ensure that it complied with a broad range of good governance
principles, a similar engagement was lacking in the DRC. Between 2000 and 2005, the
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World Bank Group disbursed US $ 2.3 billion in loans and grants to the DRC but “[d]ue
to the limits of its mandate [. . . ] it has refrained from involvement in the political arena,
which has significantly hampered the impact of reform” (International Crisis Group 2006b:
18; see also International Crisis Group 2005e: 25). Though there are good reasons for an
unconditional disbursement of aid money in an environment where about 1,000 people
starve to death each day, it is also clear that by confining themselves to the role of a
passive bystander, external actors contributed to the very outcomes they wanted to prevent.
As the International Crisis Group noted, “[i]f the international community wants the
transition to work, it must be more proactive in denouncing the blatant corruption and
illegal manoeuvres of some of the main players and providing the resources for change”
(2005e: 3). That this was not the case clearly had counterproductive effects in the realm of
good governance, for two reasons: First, it meant that external actors’ hands were tied when
it come to decisively countering violations of good governance principles, since they lacked
the leverage necessary for levying pressure on the domestic parties. This eroded external
actors’ capability to work against the complete undermining of the transitional phase
by obstructive political elites. Second, it also implied that external actors were actively
contributing to the self-enrichment efforts made by the participants of the transitional
government. External actors not only failed to curtail corrupt activities, but they provided
an enabling environment in which corruption may spread (see the paragraph on political
competition above).
However, external actors’ apparent conviction that they could simply postpone their
wider statebuilding efforts and deal with these shortcomings in the ‘postelectoral phase’
(as suggested by Autesserre) was misguided. After the polls in 2006, external leverage
was even lower than before and external actors were even more reluctant to decisively
tackle violations of good governance principles. This became apparent immediately after
the polls. When the election results were announced, Kabila immediately began to harass
his major opponent Jean-Pierre Bemba and subsequently became notorious for blatant
human rights violations.19 Instead of doing something against these developments, the
international community kept silent: “no foreign government criticized this interference
with a fair electoral process” (Human Rights Watch 2008: 21). A MONUC official even
admitted that “[n]o one was willing to say anything to Kabila about what had happened or
about the threats to security” (quoted in Human Rights Watch 2008: 18).
19Election-related violence between Bemba and Kabila erupted on two occasions: On August 20, 2006 –
the day when the official election results were announced – a skirmish between Kabila’s Republican
Guard and Bemba’s personal guard emerged in which Kabila “struck a major blow against Bemba”
(Human Rights Watch 2008: 16–17). A more serious incident happened in 2007, when Bemba – stating
his unwillingness to rely on the state for his security – missed a deadline to disarm his personal guard
(Deutsche Presse Agentur 2007). In the course of the event Bemba’s troops were defeated and Kabila
issued an arrest warrant against him, charging him with ‘high treason’ and causing him to take refuge in
the South African embassy and later flee out of the country. The International Crisis Group assessed this
incident as the “most blatant example of democratic failure in the peace process” (2007c: 11).
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In sum, the above episodes illustrate that external actors have greatly overestimated the
therapeutic effect of the elections on a fragile political environment like the one existing in
the DRC. Kabila’s later conduct pulls the success of the elections even more into question,
as he more and more tried to get rid of those very external actors who had facilitated his
democratic legitimation. In 2009, he requested the UN to wind down MONUC, which
caused “considerable irritation” in the international community. External actors did not
fully comply with his demands – MONUC was renamed but its mandate remained largely
in place (Tull 2010: 2–3). This shows that external leverage greatly depends on the
goodwill of the host government once post-conflict elections have legitimized a new ruler
– a factor that is discussed in more detail in chapter 6. Not surprisingly, external actors’
attempts to foster democratic rule and good governance in the post-electoral phase were
doomed to failure. As Mvemba Dizolele noted in 2010, “four years after the country’s first
multiparty elections since 1965, this nation [. . . ] still teeters on the brink of dictatorship”
(2010: 148). This illustrates that the claim to postpone statebuilding to the post-electoral
phase is self-deceptive and counterproductive when it comes to promoting good governance
principles.
4.3 Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone experienced more than a decade of civil war between 1991 and 2003.20
It was initiated with an attack of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) against the All
People’s Congress (APC) government of Joseph Momoh, who had ruled the country for
the preceding twenty years (Wyrod 2008: 72–73). The RUF was heavily sponsored by
Muammar al-Gaddafi of Libya and Charles Taylor of Liberia and was characterized by
the nearly complete lack of a political program (Abraham 2001: 206–207).21 Instead, it
clung to a vague rhetoric of the liberation of the masses compiled from “disarticulated and
undigested ideological droppings drawn mainly from Gaddafi’s populist formulations about
a ‘people’s revolution”’ (Abraham 2001: 207), and its main constituency was constituted
by an “unholy alliance of marginals, criminals, and social misfits – the lumpen proletariat”
(Abdullah and Rashid 2004: 186).22 The rebel group was initially relatively weak and
contributed little to Momoh’s downfall. Due to his abuse of power and his reluctance
to introduce a multi-party system, he was overthrown by a group of military officers
in 1992, who established a temporary government called ‘National Provincial Ruling
Council’ (NPRC). Its leader Valentin Strasser became the country’s de facto president for
20This presentation confines itself to a few core characteristics and events of Sierra Leone’s armed conflict.
More detailed background information on Sierra Leone is contained in various other sources. A concise
overview of Sierra Leone’s conflict history can be found for instance in Bøås (2001: 704–709).
21As Berman and Labonte point out, Taylor’s support for the RUF was “an effort to distract and undermine
ECOMOG, as Sierra Leone was a troop contributor and served as a logistical base for the mission” (2006:
144).
22For an analysis of the origins and character of the RUF, see also Abdullah (1998).
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the upcoming four years (Abdullah and Rashid 2004: 187; Berman and Labonte 2006:
145).
However, over the years the RUF’s military strength had grown significantly, mainly
thanks to its control and systematic exploitation of the country’s diamond mines23 and its
forceful recruitment of civilians – among them preferably children (see e.g. Wyrod 2008:
70). Lacking broader popular support, the RUF relied almost entirely on violence as its
strategy, since “[t]rying to obtain the confidence and favour of the local population would
have been irksome and prolonged” (Abraham 2001: 208). Just as it fought the Momoh
government, the rebel group carried on with its attacks against the government after the
NPRC had taken over. The latter could only counter its attacks by hiring the notorious
company ‘Executive Outcomes’ – a Private Military Company (PMC) composed of former
South African soldiers – which successfully prevented the rebels from capturing the capital
Freetown (Berman and Labonte 2006: 145; Francis 1999: 326–327). The RUF were again
not involved when the NPRC was overthrown in 1996 by a group of reform-minded officers,
who wanted to clear the way for elections to be held. However, knowing that overthrowing
a democratically elected government would further undermine its popular support, the
RUF was strongly opposed to the elections and triggered an unprecedented campaign of
violence against the civilian population in an attempt to blackmail the government. It
systematically hacked off villagers’ hands – “both to terrorise them and to symbolically
deprive them of the means of voting” (John 2007: 41).24 As the movement explained itself:
“RUF fighters [. . . ] proceeded on a campaign to cut off the hands of innocent villagers as a
message that no voting should occur” (RUF press release, quoted in Abraham 2001: 211).
From this moment on, amputation became the main “hallmark” of the RUF (International
Crisis Group 2001d: 15).
Despite this terror campaign, the elections took place in February 1996 and a new
president, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah was elected. Unable to defeat the government, the RUF
entered into peace negotiations with the government and signed the Abidjan peace accord
on 30 November 1996. It not only included a blanket amnesty granted to the RUF, but was
only signed by the rebel movement on the condition that Executive Outcomes – the only
effective deterrent against RUF atrocities – left the country (see International Crisis Group
2001d: 2). However, this merely served the purpose of distracting from its true aspirations.
Soon thereafter, the RUF allied with a dissident army faction led by general Johnny Paul
Koroma and overthrew the Kabbah government in May 1997. The factions formed a
new de facto government called ‘Armed Forces Revolutionary Council’ (AFRC) (Berman
23The trade with diamonds provided the financial backbone of the RUF and was a stimulating factor in – if
not the main reason for – the conflict (see e.g. Maconachie 2009; Maconachie and Binns 2007; Olsson
2007, Reno 1999). As Berman and Labonte put it: “The people of Sierra Leone have had the great
misfortune to reside in a country rich in diamonds that others needed to bankroll a war. The quickest path
to those diamonds was large-scale armed robbery, fronted by an insurgency best known for its atrocities”
(2006: 141).
24For a detailed account of the RUF’s human rights violations, see in particular Human Rights Watch
(1999b).
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and Labonte 2006: 148–149; Francis 2000: 359). This triggered a peace-enforcement
mission led by the Economic Community of West African States, which ousted the rebel
government and reinstated Kabbah. In September 1998, RUF leader Foday Sankoh was
arrested, charged with high treason and sentenced to death a few weeks later (see Abraham
2001: 218).
Despite that, the RUF continued to be a potent force, thanks to the backing it received
from the Liberian ex-warlord Charles Taylor. In January 1999, it launched a new offensive
against the capital that could be regarded “the most merciless offensive ever mustered in the
war, taking the external peacekeepers from ECOMOG (‘ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring
Group’) and government soldiers completely by surprise” (Abraham 2001: 219). This
put it in a comfortable position to dictate the terms for a new peace agreement with
the government. The rebels insisted that they would not enter any agreement with the
government until Sankoh was released (Abraham 2001: 219; Binningsbø and Dupuy 2009:
94; John 2007: 43). The government had no choice but to fulfill the RUF’s demands, and
Sankoh was released from prison and participated in peace talks with the government
held in Lomé, Togo. In July 1999, they adopted a peace agreement (Government of the
Republic of Sierra Leone 1999), based on which the government would share power with
the RUF. It was the first peace agreement between the RUF and the government that
was actually implemented. However, most observers considered the agreement a “deeply
flawed platform” on which to base peace operations in Sierra Leone (Berman and Labonte
2006: 200). With hindsight, they were right, because it collapsed not even one year after
its implementation.25
4.3.1 Sierra Leone as a ‘Doomed to Share’ Polity
The power-sharing arrangement that was established on the basis of the Lomé Agreement
is classified as an instance of a ‘Doomed to Share’ polity. Although the conflict officially
continued until 2003, a lot speaks for including this case. The Lomé Agreement constituted
an important turning point after nearly a decade of war and contributed decisively to the
actual settlement of the conflict in 2002 (Binningsbø and Dupuy 2009: 88). As shown
below, the following conditions were fulfilled: an effective sharing of government authority,
obstructive relations between the former warring factions, and a mediative engagement by
external actors.
Effective Power-Sharing. The Lomé Agreement in Sierra Leone endowed the RUF
and its leader Foday Sankoh with a large range of privileges. Given its comfortable
negotiating position, the rebels made bold requests from the government, demanding the
25The agreement ultimately collapsed when the RUF took 500 UNAMSIL peacekeepers hostage, and RUF
rebels shot a number of protesters in front of Foday Sankoh’s home in Freetown shortly thereafter.
This led to the removal and arrest of leading RUF personnel, including Sankoh, and paved the way for
presidential and parliamentary elections in 2002 (Binningsbø and Dupuy 2009: 90–92).
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vice-presidency along with 10 ministers (in a cabinet of 20). All in all, their demands
looked “like a total surrender of the government to the RUF [. . . ]” (Abraham 2001: 220).
In the end, they received four ministries, but Sankoh was granted the vice presidency along
with the chairmanship over the ‘Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources,
National Reconstruction and Development’ (CMRRD) (see Berman and Labonte 2006:
200; Kandeh 1999). This gave him significant control of Sierra Leone’s resource-rich areas
and, according to Binningsbø and Dupuy, was “probably the single most important element
in convincing the RUF to sign the peace agreement” (2009: 96). By allowing a rebel
group notorious for gross human rights violations to participate in a democratically elected
government, the Lomé accord “shocked the conscience of the world [. . . ]” (Abraham
2001: 221). Most critique came from western human rights organizations, who were
highly opposed to the granting of an amnesty to the perpetrators as well as to the fact that
the agreement “rewarded the RUF aggression and intransigence” (Berman and Labonte
2006: 200). However, it were western powers – most notably the US and the UK – who
pressured Kabbah to agree to the deal (see International Crisis Group 2001d: 2). Obviously,
these external actors were acting on the assumption that this generous accommodation
would transform the RUF into a more constructive partner and would “ipso facto behave
like a civilised movement [. . . ]” (Abraham 2001: 221; emphasis in original). Given the
RUF’s track record, this hope appears rather naïve. Yet, it cannot be denied that the Lomé
Agreement, despite its numerous flaws and failures, was an attempt to buy off the rebel
movement and thereby create, once more, the conditions for a peaceful settlement of the
conflict. Since the range of power and privileges allotted to the RUF were significant, it
must be regarded as a power-sharing case.
Obstructive Relations. The relations between the warring parties at the moment when
the Lomé Agreement was signed were unequivocally obstructive. They were characterized
by deep animosities, an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion, and a lacking willingness
to compromise and make concessions. The Lomé Agreement was signed amidst ongoing
warfare between the two parties. The key event behind the power-sharing agreement
were the impervious AFRC/RUF attacks on Freetown carried out in January 1999. In the
attack, the rebel forces “killed an estimated 5,000 – 6,000 and injured, maimed, raped and
abducted thousands more” (Francis 2000: 361). This clearly changed the power relations
between the two parties as it only put the RUF into the position to demand a share of
governmental power. As Binningsbø and Dupuy point out: “The RUF’s superior position
by 1999 gave Kabbah little choice but to negotiate a peace agreement [. . . ]. [R]ejecting
negotiations would have led to losing international and regional sympathy” (2009: 94).
However, from the beginning on it should have been obvious to Kabbah as well as to
external actors that the RUF was not genuinely interested in peace. Already in the past, the
rebel group
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“has blatantly used negotiations for the purpose of rearming. It has consistently shown
bad faith in the string of agreements it has signed in Abidjan, Conakry, Lomé and
Abuja. [. . . ] And, of course, the RUF has committed heinous atrocities qualifying as
war crimes” (International Crisis Group 2001d: ii).
In the case of the Lomé Agreement, this behavior was particularly pronounced. Despite
the RUF’s affirmation of goodwill, fighting continued and the rebel group repeatedly acted
as the major spoiler to the peace process (see Binningsbø and Dupuy 2009: 90–91). The
rationale that “in return for a share of power and other concessions [the RUF] would be
willing to end the fighting and reinvent itself as a legitimate political movement ready to
vie for power in a democratic context” (Abraham 2001: 221) was obviously misguided.
The popular assessment that Sankoh was simply “a psychopath” (International Crisis
Group 2001d: 2) seems to match the reality closer. However, he was also rather gifted in
deceiving his negotiating partners and repeatedly evoking the illusion that he was this time
interested in peace in earnest. Obviously, “Kabbah did not have sufficient appreciation
of the chameleon-like character he was dealing with” (Abraham 2001: 213). All this
unequivocally illustrates the obstructive relations that prevailed during the short-lived
transitional government in Sierra Leone. With hindsight, there is little doubt that the RUF
was never truly willing to cooperate with Kabbah. The privileges and material benefits
associated with the participation in the government, and in particular with Sankoh’s position
as vice president, constituted the true motivation for the RUF to participate in the deal.
Mediative Engagement. Aptly assessing the nature of external engagement in Sierra
Leone requires some justification. At times during the history of the conflict, external
actors intervened on behalf of the government in a highly partisan manner. This becomes
best apparent with regard to ECOMOG’s role, on which the major peace-enforcement
responsibility rested in the initial years of the conflict (see Berman and Labonte 2006:
150). Nigeria, the main driving force behind ECOMOG, was known for its affiliation
with Kabbah, and by overthrowing the self-proclaimed government of the ‘Armed Forces
Revolutionary Council’ in early 1999 – in which the RUF participated – it “took a lead
role in restoring the Kabbah government to office” (Hirsch 2001: 151). In the International
Crisis Group’s assessment, ECOMOG “effectively became Sierra Leone’s military” (2001d:
7).26 Thus external engagement before the Lomé Agreement must be considered partisan.
The focal point that triggered a wider international attention with respect to the case
of Sierra Leone were the RUF attacks on Freetown in January 1999. “It was this awful
event – coinciding with the Kosovo crisis – that finally compelled the broader international
community to act” (International Crisis Group 2001d: 2). Roughly at the same time,
26In addition to that, there was the ‘external’ engagement by Executive Outcomes. However, these merce-
naries acted by order of the government. Thus, it would be misleading to treat them as external actors.
Note that the involvement of Executive Outcome in Sierra Leone triggered a lively debate about the
morality of modern mercenaries. For a recent pragmatic assessment about the role of mercenaries, see
Chesterman and Lenhardt (2007).
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ECOMOG support was crumbling due to General Obasanjo’s victory in the presidential
elections in Nigeria in February 1999, who immediately scaled down Nigerian support for
ECOMOG (Berman and Labonte 2006: 151–153). The last ECOMOG troops departed
about one year later, and the UN Security Council meanwhile decided to replace the small
observer mission (UNOMSIL) with a significantly larger peacekeeping mission – the UN
Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in October 1999. The mission had an initial ceiling
of 6,000 military personnel and was endowed with a Chapter VII mandate, authorizing
it to “take the necessary action to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its
personnel and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to
civilians under imminent threat of physical violence” (U.N. Security Council 1999b, par. 9
& 14). Also, as discussed below in more detail, external actors heavily pressured Kabbah
into signing the Lomé Agreement. The international community obviously had great hopes
in the treaty. As the UN Secretary General noted in July 1999: “The signing of the Lomé
Peace Agreement [. . . ] is a great step forward for Sierra Leone. [. . . ] Both sides are to be
congratulated for showing the flexibility that has made this agreement possible” (United
Nations 1996b, par. 52). Thus, at the latest since mid-1999 external engagement must be
considered mediative.
4.3.2 Polity Dynamics in Sierra Leone
The case of Sierra Leone confirms the plausibility of many of the assumptions made
about ‘Doomed to Share’ polities above. This is illustrated below with regard to the four
overarching themes: dealing with commitment problems, competition for power, threats
from within, and external engagement for good governance.
a) Overcoming Commitment Problems
In Sierra Leone, overcoming the commitment problems prevailing between the signatories
of the Lomé Agreement was a tremendous challenge. The parties mistrusted each other
and regarded themselves with suspicion and hostility. In particular, the RUF’s motivation
to actually follow up on its disarmament commitments was never trustworthy. All in
all, the case confirms the stipulation that ‘Doomed to Share’ polities provide a difficult
environment for commitment problems to be overcome. Although all parties share a
fraction of governmental power (and hence also a certain control of the means of coer-
cion), the parties were neither willing nor capable to comply with their disarmament and
demobilization requirements. Most importantly, the case of Sierra Leone illustrates the
difficulties involved in inducing reluctant parties to disarm. None of the guarantees spelled
out in the Lomé Agreement could convince the RUF leadership to actually follow up on its
disarmament commitments. In order to evade them, it initially employed a combination of
‘foot dragging’ and ‘virtual cooperation’ strategies by which it could stall the disarmament
process for several months. However, when external actors’ patience came to an end by
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early 2000, the rebel group increasingly turned to ‘saber rattling’ and ‘calculated escalation’
strategies that ultimately led to complete breakdown of the disarmament process.
As it was already the case in the DRC, external actors were crucial for the establishment
of a power-sharing arrangement in Sierra Leone in the first place. The agreement was
brokered by the UN in conjunction with the UK, the US and a number of regional states.
As already noted, external actors heavily pressured Kabbah to sign the agreement. The
humanitarian crisis that was triggered by the RUF seizure of Freetown in January 1999
“prompted concerted action from the United Nations and ECOWAS to bring the RUF
and the Government of Sierra Leone to yet another round of peace negotiations” (John
2007: 43). Kabbah was reluctant to share governmental power with those people that had
removed him violently from office and that he had desperately been trying to defeat for
various years (see e.g. Kandeh 1999: 349). Still, he ultimately “buckled under international
(particularly U.S.) pressure” (International Crisis Group 2001d: 12).
However, the “international desperation to reach an agreement” clearly played in the
hands of the RUF, who could negotiate very favorable terms for itself (International Crisis
Group 2001d: 12). The Lomé Agreement contains several concessions and security
guarantees to the RUF. The most important aspect was the question of a general amnesty
for the RUF leadership irrespective of the massive war crimes it committed. The Lomé
Agreement granted that “no official or judicial action is taken against any member of
the opposition and rebel groups in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their
objectives as a member of those organisations, since March 1991, up to the time of
the signing of the present agreement” (Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone
1999, Art. IX, par. 3). This included Sankoh, who was guaranteed “absolute and free
pardon” (Art. IX, par. 1) despite the fact that he had been arrested a few months after the
attack on Freetown and charged with the death penalty (see also Francis 2000: 361–362).
For the RUF leadership, this amnesty was the sine qua non condition for signing the
agreement. The rebel movement was not unconscious of the atrocities and human rights
violations it committed. At several occasions before, Sankoh was forced to apologize to
the nation for the RUF’s merciless campaign of violence (see Abraham 2001: 207). It
was obvious that, in the absence of a general amnesty, the RUF leadership would not get
away unpunished. However, despite its generosity, the amnesty alone was not a sufficient
measure for dispelling the RUF’s concerns. Reportedly, Sankoh only returned to Freetown
three months after signing the Lomé Agreement. As Abraham comments, “[i]ronically,
the self-proclaimed champion of the masses was afraid to be present in Freetown without
sufficient security” (2001: 221–222).
The Lomé Agreement also contained provisions about the disarmament of the warring
factions, determining that “[a] neutral peace keeping force comprising UNOMSIL and
ECOMOG shall disarm all combatants of the RUF/SL, CDF, SLA and paramilitary groups”
(Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone 1999, Art. XVI par. 1). Furthermore, it was
agreed that ex-combatants of the warring factions “who wish to be integrated into the new
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restructured national armed forces may do so provided they meet established criteria” (Art.
XVII, par. 2). The effective disarmament of the rebel groups as well as the government
militias can be regarded as the “real pillar for ensuring peace and the success of the whole
agreement” (Abraham 2001: 222). Not surprisingly, however, it turned out as the most
troublesome aspect of the peace agreement, for two reasons.
First, a lot of time was wasted in the initial weeks after the agreement had been signed.
Although originally scheduled to begin six weeks after the adoption of the treaty, the
start-date of the disarmament process had been delayed by two months – a result that
Berman attributed to “tepid donor support, administrative shortcomings, delays in the
deployment of peacekeepers, and the RUF’s disinterest in abiding by the terms of the
agreement” (Berman 2000: 24). When it finally began, the disarmament process was
“painfully slow”, and by December 1999 only slightly more than 10 percent of the total
of 45,000 estimated combatants was disarmed (Abraham 2001: 222). In light of these
developments, the UN Security Council decided to significantly strengthen UNAMSIL in
order to enable it to better fulfill its core tasks. On 7 February 2000, it decided “that the
military component of UNAMSIL shall be expanded to a maximum of 11,100 military
personnel [. . . ]” and it slightly extended its mandate (U.N. Security Council 2000a, par.
9–10). After that, the effectiveness of disarmament improved, but the process nonetheless
collapsed a few weeks later (see below).
Second – and more importantly – the disarmament efforts were forestalled by the contin-
ued reluctance on behalf of the RUF to abide by the terms of the agreement. As Abraham
noted, “the RUF became caught in a vicious circle that has made it impossible to abandon
terror and violence, and hence, one may add, to disarm” (2001: 208). Two patterns could be
observed here: a) strategies of ‘virtual cooperation’ and ‘foot dragging’ by which the rebel
movement tried to superficially meet its obligations without committing in any substantial
sense, and b) more direct denials of its disarmament obligations, culminating in various
‘calculated escalation’ strategies. The first pattern of behavior became apparent during
the initial phase of the disarmament operations. One week after his arrival in Freetown
in October 1999, Sankoh declared that there should be “no rush” in the disarmament
process and later began to question the legitimacy of UNAMSIL’s deployment, pointing
out that the Lomé Agreement did not call for UN peacekeeping troops (see Abraham
2001: 222). In general, the Lomé Agreement contained relatively generous provision
regarding the disarmament of the RUF, who “could withdraw from the process at any
time without penalty and effectively stall or derail it” (Berman and Labonte 2006: 185).
Aware of that, the rebel movement then went on to tacitly undermine the disarmament
process by forestalling the disarmament process whenever possible. Although the national
commission in charge of disarmament complained at many occasions about the lack of
cooperation from the RUF, who “always found reasons for refusing to order his men to
disarm” (Bright 2000: 39), the rebel group could successfully apply this ‘foot dragging’
strategy for various months. Apparently, Sankoh believed that “[a]s long as he kept making
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political digressions and falsely assuring everybody that he was committed to peace, no
sanction seemed possible against him” (Abraham 2001: 223).
When, in May 2000, the disarmament process came to a sudden end (see below),
UNAMSIL had collected some 12,500 weapons and about 250,000 rounds of ammunition.
The majority of them, however, were of rather poor quality or, as an observer of the
disarmament process noted “absolute crap” (quoted in Berman 2000: 26). Reportedly,
many rebels used the disarmament program as an opportunity to make money. All weapons
handed in – regardless of their quality – were rewarded with an allowance of US$ 300,
although many of them were worth much less. This has set perverse incentives, since it has
promoted a ‘demand’ for inoperable weapons, of which many were reportedly imported
from neighboring countries in order to ‘sell’ them to UNAMSIL with a comfortable
margin (Berman 2000: 26). For the RUF, this ‘virtual cooperation’ strategy was an
opportunity to demonstrate its willingness to cooperate with the disarmament program
without suffering any significant reduction of its combat-readiness. The second pattern
for avoiding to comply with the disarmament provisions relied on outright resistance.
Already in November 1999, one of the RUF’s commanders told the press that “we will not
disarm until total revolution is achieved in Sierra Leone” (quoted in Abraham 2001: 222).
That this was meant literally, however, only became apparent during the second phase of
UNAMSIL deployment, after the mission’s strength was significantly increased. Since the
heightened international involvement made it more difficult for the RUF to simply simulate
its compliance, they sought a strategy of outright resistance to the disarmament program –
very much in vain of a ‘calculated escalation’ strategy. As this had effects going beyond
the disarmament process as such, it is discussed in the paragraph on threats from within
below.
In sum, the above paragraph illustrates that ‘Doomed to Share’ polities provide a very
difficult environment for overcoming commitment problems. Arguably, in the case of the
RUF it were both malevolent intentions and the aspects of the overall structural environment
that prevented the rebels from complying with their disarmament and demobilization
requirements. The international community could do little to change this fact. Every effort
to pressure the RUF into cooperating was met by a ‘saber rattling’ or ‘calculated escalation’
strategy. Since this posed an imminent threat to the stability of the polity, these aspects are
discussed in more detail in the paragraph on ‘threats from within’ below.
b) Manner of Political Competition
The competition for power during the transitional government was also in line with the
assumptions made above about ‘Doomed to Share’ polities. As in the DRC, the parties
were not involved in managing the country’s process of transition and never attempted to
exert their powers in accordance with the principles set out in the Lomé Agreement. There
was little genuine cooperation taking place between former belligerents. Instead, both
Kabbah and the RUF used the transitional government as an instrument for outmaneuvering
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its opponents and clear the way for dominating the political system in the future. The lack
of future perspectives for the RUF in the post-transitional phase and the vast opportunities
for self-enrichment that came with the participation in the government were critical factors
accounting for this behavior. Since the prospects to attain power through popular elections
were rather dull for the RUF, they attempted to use the transitional government as a
protected space to prepare its next attack against the government. Kabbah’s prospects for
winning the elections were much better. He mainly attempted to unmask the RUF as an
irresponsible partner in front of the international community and the domestic population
alike and wait for the elections to come. As a result, the rationale of the parties in Sierra
Leone was virtually identical with the constellation as it emerged some four years later
in the DRC: Whereas Kabbah wanted to ‘sit out’ the transitional phase in order to renew
his legitimation as the democratically elected head of state, it was in the RUF’s interest
to prevent the elections from taking place, use the transitional government as a protected
space for re-arming and, ultimately, overthrow the president once again. However, for both
parties it was occasionally necessary to demonstrate their goodwill, which resulted in a
number of ‘virtual cooperation’ gestures adopted by both parties.
Participating in the power-sharing government endowed the RUF with exclusive priv-
ileges and benefits that may explain its cooperative facade in the initial phase of the
power-sharing arrangement. There is plenty of evidence that Sankoh (mis)used the agree-
ment in order to “protect RUF’s diamond deals with Taylor and other outsiders” (Reno
2003: n.p.). The ‘Commission for Strategic Mineral Resources, National Reconciliation
and Development’ (CMRRD) which Sankoh officially headed was effectively created in
order to accommodate his demands for power and material benefits. Ignoring the duties
and responsibilities associated with his appointment, Sankoh interpreted the arrangement
as an exclusive privilege allowing him the unaltered exploitation of the diamond mines in
the Kono district for the sake of funding his military activities (see Bright 2000: 39). For a
short period, this gave Sankoh’s exploitation of the diamond mines a veil of legitimacy and
allowed him to re-arm and prepare for the next large insurgency against the government.
This strategy would well be in line with the RUF’s past conduct. As the International
Crisis Group noticed, “[f]or the most part the RUF has agreed to negotiations when it
faces military disadvantage and has then broken the resulting agreements after rearming”
(2001d: 13).
This behavior has also become apparent in the context of the Lomé Agreement. As the
power-sharing agreement in the DRC, the Lomé Agreement was meant as a temporary
arrangement to bridge the time until national elections took place. In the rationale of those
external actors who persuaded Kabbah to sign the agreement, there was at least a glimmer
of hope that the RUF could be transformed into an ordinary political party – sufficient
sticks and carrots provided. In Article III, the Lomé Agreement determined that “[t]he
Government of Sierra Leone shall accord every facility to the RUF/SL to transform itself
into a political party and enter the mainstream of the democratic process” (Government
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of the Republic of Sierra Leone 1999; par. 1), and required that “[i]mmediately upon
the signing of the present Agreement, the RUF/SL shall commence to organize itself to
function as a political movement, with the rights, privileges and duties accorded to all
political parties in Sierra Leone [. . . ]” (Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone 1999;
par. 2). In this sense, the Lomé Agreement, for all intends and purposes, aimed at providing
the conditions for future electoral competition between the antagonistic parties. Initially,
Sankoh still relied on ‘virtual cooperation’ strategies by trying to raise the impression
that he was devoted to his new role as the leader of a political party. Together with his
then-ally Johnny Paul Koroma from the AFRC, he made a rhetorical commitment to peace
and offered halfhearted excuses for the atrocities the RUF and other parties committed
during the war, for instance during a speech held in July 1999:
“We are asking for forgiveness for all those who have committed these atrocities, be it
RUF, Kamajors, ECOMOG, Sierra Leone army. As a leader of a political organisation
I say we are sorry. We are ready to give peace a chance” (Reuters 1999).
However, even for naïve observers this flimsy confirmation of faithfulness must have
appeared dubious and suspicious. It is obvious that his commitment to peace never
significantly went beyond an all-too-obvious lip-service, and it was an illusion to believe
that the RUF would transform itself into a political party in earnest. As the International
Crisis Group noted, “[t]he RUF plays a long game and uses peace agreements as stepping
stones towards its ultimate goal of power” (2001d: 3). Already after the Abidjan Agreement
(Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone 1996) – struck between the RUF and the
government in 1996 – “evidence surfaced that the RUF leader never intended to abide
by the agreement and had decided to continue the armed struggle, using the accord to
gain tactical advantage” (Berman and Labonte 2006: 148). Against this background, it
was from the beginning on precluded that the transitional government could effectively
facilitate the rebel group’s transition into a political party. At no time, the RUF was devoted
to a fair electoral competition for gaining future power.
A major factor that accounts for the RUF reluctance to seek its chances through fair
electoral competition was its lack of future perspectives as a political party. Just as the RCD-
Goma in the DRC, the RUF leadership was aware that the party had little chances to win
any significant share of power through public elections. Already its barbarous mutilation
campaign before the 1996 elections was driven by the fear of being marginalized by a
democratically elected government.27 The International Crisis Group noticed that the RUF
had “no meaningful political constituency” (2001d: ii), and observed that “while there
was some initial sympathy for the RUF’s aims[,] [. . . ] that has long since evaporated”
(2001d: 14). In fact, the party was so unpopular among the population due to the atrocities
it committed that it faced a high risk for retaliation in case it really laid down its arms. As
27The International Crisis Group noted that “[t]he 1996 elections were essentially a protest vote against the
RUF and the Sierra Leone government of the day” (2001d: 14).
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Abraham comments: “No amount of legal guarantees in any number of peace agreements
will obliterate this fate. Sankoh knows this better than anybody else” (2001: 225). As
a result, facing democratic competition was clearly not an option for the RUF, as it
would have entailed the party’s political marginalization and, very likely, the physical
annihilation of its entire leadership. This becomes apparent by the elections in 2002
(after the transitional period under investigation here), in which the remnants of the RUF
campaigned as the RUFP (Revolutionary United Front Party). As Kandeh notes, “the RUF
faced an uphill task convincing the public to vote for the very elements that had laid waste
to the country” (2003: 199). This is reflected in its electoral performance: it gained a
mere 1.7 percent of the votes and was not represented in the parliament (Coleman 2008m:
14–16). With hindsight, “[t]he RUF’s atrocious track record, lumpen character and lack
of resources [. . . ] combined to account for its party’s dismal showing in the elections”
(Kandeh 2003: 212). The AFRC, the other remaining rebel group, met the same fate.
Although the group behaved much more cooperative than the RUF and ultimately even
contributed to Sankoh’s capture in mid-2000 (see Abraham 2001), the party had little
chances in the 2002 elections. Trying a similar strategy as Charles Taylor in Liberia (see
6.2), the party’s leader Johnny Paul Koroma tried to intimidate the electorate by threatening
to make Sierra Leone ‘ungovernable’ in case he did not win in the elections. However,
this “only succeeded in solidifying opposition to his candidacy and party among popular
sectors”, and the party gained a meager three percent of the popular vote (Kandeh 2003:
198).
Kabbah was in a very different position. As the incumbent president, he had much less
to fear from the elections than any of his competitors and it was in his best interest to
sit out the period of the transitional government and wait for his re-election. Though he
agreed to share power with the RUF only after external actors exerted significant pressure
on him, the Lomé Agreement turned out as an effective instrument to secure a rising level
of international attention, which significantly constrained the RUF’s room for maneuver.
There is some indication that Kabbah may have used the Lomé Agreement from the
beginning on as an instrument for “ending the war at the expense of the RUF” – as recently
argued by Binningsbø and Dupuy (2009: 88). They argue that Kabbah had no choice
but to over-compensate the RUF during the negotiation phase of the Lomé Agreement
because it was at that time in a comparatively weak position, but that it subsequently
under-compensated the rebel group in the implementation phase. In their eyes, this was at
least partly a deliberate strategy: “even though excluding the RUF during implementation
of the agreement was probably not a main purpose [. . . ] it was not completely accidental
either” (Binningsbø and Dupuy 2009: 103). For supporting their argument, they underline
that Kabbah included AFRC leader Johnny Paul Koroma – who had been left out of the
Lomé Agreement – informally in the government28 in an attempt to force the two rebel
28Koroma was offered the chair of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CPP) – an institution
set up by the Lomé Agreement and charged with the authority to monitor the implementation of the
agreement (Bright 2000: 38).
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groups to engage in battles over government positions and other benefits and provoke a
split between them (Binningsbø and Dupuy 2009: 96–97). Another strategy was to tie
the Lomé Agreement to the country’s constitution, which provided for the elections to be
held within two years after the signing of the peace deal. This stood in stark contrast to
the RUF’s demands for a four-year transitional period before elections were organized,
and limited the RUF’s participation in the government from the outset (Binningsbø and
Dupuy 2009: 101). In conjunction, this greatly enhanced Kabbah’s chances for sitting
out the transitional phase and re-legitimize his rule through the ballot-box. In addition,
including the RUF in a formal power-sharing government ensured that the rebel group
was under much higher international scrutiny than ever before, which enabled Kabbah
to blame the RUF for the failure of the peace process and underline his own qualities as
a responsible leader who tried everything to pacify the war-torn country. Accordingly,
during the electoral campaign in 2002 he “never lost an opportunity to remind voters that
they had delivered on their promise to end the war” (Kandeh 2003: 209).
In sum, the above paragraph illustrates that ‘Doomed to Share’ polities constitute an
environment in which the political competition unfolds in a highly informal and unconsti-
tutional manner. A basic consensus about the status quo is lacking, and both parties would
prefer to rule alone. In Sierra Leone, the RUF initially adopted a veil of cooperation, but
soon the same divergence of interests as in the DRC became apparent: whereas Kabbah had
an interest in sitting out the transitional phase in order to renew his democratic legitimation,
the RUF knew that they faced dull electoral prospects and therefore tried to extend their
lucrative participation in the transitional government or evoke an escalation of the situation
in case these efforts failed.
c) Threats from Within.
In Sierra Leone, spoilers posed an imminent threat to the stability of the polity. The RUF
must be considered the prototype of a spoiler and, when the Lomé Agreement was signed,
there was little reason to believe that this might change anytime soon. Nonetheless, the
entire peace agreement was based on the presumption that an effective spoiler management
is possible, i.e. that external actors have enough leverage in order to pressure the RUF to
comply with the peace agreement. For two reasons, this strategy was doomed to failure:
First, the RUF’s lack of genuine interest in the peace process (as noted above, it was even
a threat to its own existence) left little scope for either sticks or carrots to really have an
effect of its behavior. Second, as in the DRC external actors failed to respond to the RUF’s
attempts to spoil the peace process in a decisive manner, which further reduced the chances
for peace. It was only thanks to a last minute intervention by British Special Forces that
external actors could prevent the RUF from capturing the capital and ousting Kabbah, but
this at the same time entailed the end of the power-sharing experiment in Sierra Leone.
The RUF’s inclination to act as a spoiler to the Lomé Agreement became most clearly
apparent with respect to the issue of disarmament of the rebels, since this was directly
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threatening the rebels’ existence. Above, it was already shown that the rebels initially
engaged in ‘foot dragging’ and ‘virtual cooperation’ strategies in order to forestall the
effective disarmament of its troops. However, it was obvious that the RUF could not
eternally postpone its disarmament obligations. Due to mounting external pressure, defying
disarmament through a combination of ‘foot dragging’ and ‘virtual cooperation’ strategies
increasingly became untenable. As a result, the RUF soon uncovered its true face to the
world. Initially, the rebel group confined itself to a few ‘saber rattling’ gestures by which it
wanted to underline its own strength and demonstrate the impotence of the external forces.
As Abraham puts it, “Sankoh decided to test the nerve of the UN troops who, under no
orders to fight and hampered by bureaucracy and insufficient logistical and other support,
were in no position to resist force” (2001: 223). In early 2000 for instance, the rebels
created illegal roadblocks in order to deny the peacekeepers access to their territory and
looted large portions of weaponry from an UNAMSIL reconnaissance unit (see Mutwol
2009: 309–310). This clearly amounted to disarmament in reverse:
“The unit was relieved of its weapons, which consisted of three armoured vehicles
(each fitted with a 14.5mm and a 12.7mm machine gun), one 75mm self-propelled
gun, one anti-tank gun, one anti-tank weapon, 485 AK-47 rifles, ten 82mm mortars,
24 light machine guns, 20 rocket-propelled grenades and 30 pistols. At least two tons
of ammunition were also taken” (Berman 2000: 19).
Obviously, from this moment on it was hard to convince even staunch optimists that the
RUF had a genuine interest in peace. However, Sankoh continued to deny his involvement
in these incidents – “in contradiction with every evidence in possession of UNAMSIL”,
as the UN Secretary General noted (see United Nations 2000b, par. 12). This behavior
was very much in line with Sankoh’s past record of “distorting reality by a combination of
half-truths and manipulation of facts including concealment, wild allegations, outright lies,
exaggerations, and deception” (Abraham 2001: 222). Incidents similar to the one above
recurred in the ensuing weeks. In February, for instance, “a large number of well-armed
RUF fighters” stopped an UNAMSIL convoy and refused to let it proceed, despite earlier
promises that the rebel group would respect the mission’s freedom of movement (United
Nations 2000b, par. 13). For realistic observers it should have been evident at this point
that hopes the RUF could still be convinced to cooperate were baseless. A straightforward
assessment should have led to the conclusion that “the RUF will not willingly disarm
especially as it has backers who provide weapons in return for diamonds” (Abraham 2001:
225). However, the international community still stuck to its ‘wait and see’ approach, which
counted on the RUF to finally become constructive. Though the UN Secretary General
noted that he was “very concerned about the often negative and confusing approach taken
by Mr. Sankoh to key elements of the peace process [. . . ]”, he still called upon the rebel
leader to “dispel these doubts in a tangible and unequivocal manner” (United Nations
2000b, par. 60). However, by failing to realize that these hopes were illusionary, the
international community contributed to the RUF’s obstructive stance:
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“It has been the refusal to accept this reality that has enabled Sankoh and his RUF to
pose a challenge and turn a small country like Sierra Leone into a serious problem for
the world, humiliating the UN, embarrassing the West, and making a fool of regional
and national leaders” (Abraham 2001: 225).
Shortly after these events, the tensions between the RUF and UNAMSIL escalated, and the
peace process collapsed entirely. Trying to prevent the deployment of UN peacekeepers
to its core areas, the RUF switched from a ‘saber rattling’ to a ‘calculated escalation’
strategy, and henceforth aimed at disrupting the peace process by force. This became
apparent after UNAMSIL had finally begun to enforce the disarmament efforts in a
number of RUF strongholds. In mid-2000, DDR centers were opened in Makeni and
Magburaka and a number of RUF fighters began to hand in their weapons. However, their
commanders requested the immediate closure of the sites and called on the UN to return
their soldiers. Fighting between the RUF and UNAMSIL peacekeepers broke out when the
UN, expectantly, refused to meet these demands. A Kenyan peacekeeper was shot, and
the RUF abducted about 500 members from the Zambian UNAMSIL battalion (see e.g.
Berman 2000: 12). This incident was a shock to the international community and “marked
the culmination of RUF treachery” (Hirsch 2001: 146). Moreover, it vividly proved how
far Sankoh was willing to go in order to demonstrate his own strength and independence.
There is plenty of evidence that “[t]his RUF action was no random event but a carefully
orchestrated plan [. . . ]” (Abraham 2001: 224).
It appears that the RUF used it as the first step for attempting to overthrow Kabbah a
second time by running another attack on the capital. After the events in May 2000, the
rebel army moved dangerously close to Freetown before they were stopped by a British
emergency intervention team deployed to Sierra Leone in immediate response to the
abduction of the peacekeepers (see Kandeh 2003: 193). This was critical for preventing
the RUF from seizing the capital and ousting the president again:
“Britain’s military intervention saved Kabba’s presidency, rescued the UN from
impending disaster, and forced the RUF and its allies to abandon the idea of taking
power by force. Without the intervention of the British alongside the UN, it is doubtful
whether elections would have taken place in 2002 or whether the country would be at
peace today” (Kandeh 2003: 193).
After this event, there was no doubt that the “RUF was chiefly to blame” for the subsequent
collapse of the Lomé Agreement (International Crisis Group 2001d: 3). Apparently, the
motivation behind this show of force was to remind the international community of its
own weakness and to signal that the RUF was not willing to subordinate to international
pressure, in particular since its earlier attacks did not create strong opposition. However,
with hindsight this move was clearly counterproductive for the RUF and facilitated its
fragmentation and total marginalization. Immediately after the incident, Kabbah issued an
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arrest warrant against Sankoh. He was caught and re-arrested on May 17, 2000 (Berman
2000: 12).29
This escalation of the crisis was facilitated in part by the enduring good-will external
actors had demonstrated to the RUF in the initial phase of engagement. During this stage,
the international community had mainly relied on ECOMOG to do the job, apparently
“trying to keep peace on the cheap” (Berman and Labonte 2006: 200; see also Bøås
2001: 715 and Mutwol 2009: 284–289). Though formally mandated under Chapter
VII of the UN Charter, UNAMSIL’s mandate had been confined to “cooperate with
the Government of Sierra Leone and the other parties to the Peace Agreement in the
implementation of the Agreement”, to “assist the Government of Sierra Leone in the
implementation of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration plan”, and (most
notably) to “establish a presence at key locations throughout the territory of Sierra Leone,
including at disarmament/reception centres and demobilization centres” (U.N. Security
Council 1999b, par. 8). Its initial troop ceiling of 6,000 had not been not sufficient for
countering the rebels’ continued attempts to spoil the peace process. In addition to that, a
large part of the UNAMSIL troops had been “[p]oorly briefed, ill-equipped and unable
to operate cohesively”, which contributed to the ease by which the RUF could abduct the
peacekeepers in May 2000 (International Crisis Group 2001d: 20). Overall, UNAMSIL
engagement was described by the International Group as a “softly, softly” approach (2001c:
ii).30 However, the subsequent collapse of the power-sharing arrangement indicates that
“the UN underestimated Sankoh and did not treat him as seriously as they should have
done” (Abraham 2001: 223). As Julius Mutwol remarks, the “lack of any serious response
from UNAMSIL encouraged the RUF to plan further attacks” (2009: 310).
This “[a]ll carrots and no stick” approach (Abraham 2001) came to a sudden end after
the incident in May 2000. This crisis served as a focal event that made the escalation of
the conflict impossible to ignore and that served as a catalyst for a more decisive external
engagement. The UN Security Council immediately began to condemn this attempt to
blackmail the international community and clearly signaled that the limits of its tolerance
were reached. As a first response, it gave its consent to the deployment of an intervention
force led by the United Kingdom – Sierra Leone’s former colonial power – within days of
the attack. Its mandate was initially confined to protecting British citizens, but it was later
expanded to include the defense of Freetown (Mutwol 2009: 311; see also Hirsch 2001:
153). Only about a week after the attack, the UN Security Council, “[c]onvinced that the
deterioration in security conditions on the ground necessitates the rapid reinforcement of
the military component of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to
29Void of its leader, the RUF continued with its armed struggle for another few months and split into
two factions – a dangerous development that could have forestalled efforts to revive the peace process
(Coleman 2008m: 13). However, over time fighting lost in intensity, and a new ceasefire agreement could
already be struck by November (see below).
30Note that this statement was made in October 2001, roughly two years after the period under investigation
here. However, since a significant stepping-up of UNAMSIL took place in the meantime, the quote fits
all the better for the post-Lomé period.
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provide the mission with additional resources to fulfil its mandate”, raised the troop ceiling
for UNAMSIL to 13,000 (U.N. Security Council 2000b). In July, the UN Security Council
adopted measures to stop the trade of so called ‘blood diamonds’, thereby effectively
undermining the RUF’s primary source of income (U.N. Security Council 2000c). In
August, the mission was given a more robust mandate explicitly directed against the RUF,
which included the right to “deter and, where necessary, decisively counter the threat
of RUF attack by responding robustly to any hostile action or threat of imminent and
direct use of force” (U.N. Security Council 2000d; see also Berman and Labonte 2006:
164–165). Finally, in March 2000 the troop ceiling was, once again, raised to 17,500,
which transformed UNAMSIL into the largest UN peacekeeping mission of its time (U.N.
Security Council 2000f).
Although the International Crisis Group believed that the “Chapter Six and a Half”
mandate on which the mission was ultimately based was not sufficient in order to prevent
the RUF from spoiling the peace process further (2001d: 19), these steps were nonetheless
a large improvement to the overly passive manner of intervention of the past and clearly
demonstrated to the RUF where its limits were. With a larger presence of peacekeepers in
the country the intensity of fighting slowly decreased, and by the end of the year the terms
for a ceasefire improved. This led to the adoption of the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement in
November 2000 (Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone 2000), which reaffirmed the
government’s authority under the terms of the Lusaka agreement and provided for a more
effective disarmament and demobilization process. (The emerging polity is discussed as
an instance of mediated, obstructive domination in the appendix.)
In sum, the above paragraph illustrates that the RUF’s conduct during the power-sharing
government in Sierra Leone posed the greatest risk to its stability. Its ongoing refusal to
comply with its disarmament obligations caused the rebel group to switch from ‘saber
rattling’ to a ‘calculated escalation’ strategy, which effectively led to the collapse of the
polity. External actors turned out as unable to deal with the RUF’s ‘chameleon-like’
character effectively, which induced the latter to test external actors’ nerves more and more.
This fits to the overall assumption that external actors in ‘Doomed to Share’ polities are
unwilling to engage in a decisive manner because they do not want to disrupt the fragile
foundations for peace. However, with the abduction of UNAMSIL peacekeepers, the rebel
group clearly went one step too far, because it effectively provoked external actors to
switch from a ‘virtual’ to a ‘genuine enforcement’ manner.
d) Promoting Good Governance.
When it comes to the promotion of good governance, Sierra Leone in the post-Lomé
phase does not offer a particularly encouraging example. On the one hand, it was clear
to the international community that “[i]mproving governance in Sierra Leone is the most
difficult problem of all but it is essential if there is to be a lasting peace” (International
Crisis Group 2001d: 27). On the other hand, it was obvious that the Lomé Agreement
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constituted an adverse environment for promoting values such as human rights, democracy
and justice, since the degree of obstruction was extraordinarily high and because the peace
agreement set perverse incentives that rewarded rather than punished gross human rights
violations. This ambiguity led to a manner of external engagement that is typical for
‘Doomed to Share’ polities. It was argued above that the obstructive environment of this
polity type leads to a form of intervention in which external actors, while concentrating on
the ‘milestones’ of their statebuilding agenda, often ignore the political developments on
the ground. Elections often build the first element of the statebuilding agenda. In the DRC,
this has effectively led to a postponement of good governance principles until the elections
were over, although, after that, their ability for exerting influence on domestic governance
was severely reduced. A similar result can be observed for the case of Sierra Leone.
To begin with, it is certain that the Lomé Agreement itself did not provide very favor-
able conditions for the promotion of good governance. The general impression is that
“governance issues in the Accord were treated superficially and fundamental structural
problems that had persisted in the country for more than two decades were barely ad-
dressed” (John 2007: 48). This has become apparent most notably with respect to the
dismal human rights situation. Human Rights Watch prompted UN Secretary General
“to disassociate the U.N. from any peace deal that compromises respect for fundamental
standards of human rights and humanitarian law” (Human Rights Watch 1999a). Also,
many members of the international community supported punitive justice for the RUF
leadership (see Berman and Labonte 2006: 194). In addition to that, the Lomé Agreement
ran counter to democratic principles, since it invited the rebels to join a democratically
elected government and “attempted to elevate those responsible for the deaths of thousands
of innocent civilians into statesmen” (International Crisis Group 2001d: 3 and Abraham
2001: 221). This clearly distinguishes the situation from the DRC because Joseph Kabila
lacked the democratic legitimacy Kabbah possessed. As John remarks: “This could be
interpreted to mean that power sought by warlords by every means could be granted in the
name of peace at whatever cost. This was a challenge to democracy and set precedents for
political developments in the country” (2007: 48). This explains why the adoption of the
Lomé Agreement “ran contrary to the general mood in Sierra Leone [. . . ]” and triggered
mass protests in the capital (Abraham 2001: 220).
However, external actors took these shortcomings into account in order to save their
peace deal. This was accompanied by the refusal to realistically assess the prospects for
successful statebuilding in Sierra Leone. While external actors were the primary forces
behind the power-sharing arrangement, they willingly turned a blind eye to the realities on
the ground once the agreement was in place. Above, it was argued that this has prevented
external actors from cracking down on the RUF and counter its attempts to jeopardize
the peace process. But it has also led to a highly ambiguous approach with regard to
the promotion of good governance. Sankoh contributed to this outcome by adopting a
rhetoric that charmed external actors: he “kept giving assurances that he was committed
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to democracy and the Lome agreement (sic!) [. . . ]” (Abraham 2001: 223). Apparently,
external actors took such statements literally, while they deliberately ignored the many
signals that the RUF was not interested in power-sharing in earnest. Obviously, the rebel
group “confused the signing of agreements with achieving peace” (International Crisis
Group 2001d: 10). Yet, the ultimate collapse of the power-sharing arrangement in May
2000 was not an unforeseeable accident, but quite predictable under the loose conditions
external actors imposed on Sankoh. As John notes, “power-sharing in any governance
system presupposes trust and cooperation between those who will be sharing the power.
In the case of the RUF and the government of Sierra Leone, trust was absolutely lacking”
(2007: 48).
This ambiguous strategy was also reflected in the blanket amnesty granted to the RUF.
Rather than sending a clear signal that the international community would not permit
human rights violations like the ones committed by the RUF, the United Nations pursued
an ambiguous strategy. As the UN Secretary General later explained:
“At the time of the signature of the Lomé Peace Agreement, the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General for Sierra Leone was instructed to append to his signature
on behalf of the United Nations a disclaimer to the effect that the amnesty provision
contained in article IX of the Agreement (“absolute and free pardon”) shall not apply
to international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other
serious violations of international humanitarian law” (United Nations 2000a; par. 23).
Hence, the United Nations sought a secret loophole in order to be able to indict the RUF
leadership in case its atrocities are publicly marked as crimes against humanity. This can
be interpreted as a ‘virtual accommodation’ strategy, according to which external actors
make symbolic concessions without actually following up on their side of the agreement.
However, since the international community still believed in the success of the Lomé
Agreement, little was done in order to press the issue ahead. On the contrary: the amnesty
undermined the credibility of all genuine efforts to contribute to a better human rights
record and caused an outcry within the human rights community. Amnesty International,
for instance, stated that “by granting sweeping amnesties to perpetrators of gross human
rights abuses [the peace agreement] fundamentally undermines efforts to prevent further
human rights abuses and to bring those responsible to justice” (Amnesty International
1999, also quoted in Omotola 2007: 41).
The culture of impunity came to an end after May 2000, when it became undeniably
clear that the power-sharing efforts had collapsed. In August 2000, the UN Security
Council requested the UN Secretary General to “negotiate an agreement with the Gov-
ernment of Sierra Leone to create an independent special court” (U.N. Security Council
2000e, par. 1). This ultimately led to the creation of an international tribunal for the
atrocities committed in Sierra Leone, which was mandated to “prosecute persons who
bear the greatest responsibility for the commission of serious violations of international
humanitarian law and crimes committed under Sierra Leonean law” (see The Special Court
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for Sierra Leone 2001). By breaking with the culture of impunity had that characterized
the Lomé Agreement, this certainly constituted a great step forward in the promotion of
good governance. However, it came relatively late, and the long period of inaction had cost
external efforts to promote good governance a lot of credibility. In the end, this sacrifice
of good governance principles was not even effective, as “[n]either the amnesty offered
to all combatants by the Lomé accord nor the deployment of what is already the UN’s
largest current peacekeeping force has been sufficient to keep the peace process on track”
(International Crisis Group 2001d: 3).
With the collapse of the Lomé Agreement, external actors’ attempt to simply muddle
through the transitional phase until reaching the ‘anchor’ of the 2002 elections had ob-
viously failed. Due to the daunting security situation in Sierra Leone, the prerequisites
for addressing governance issues in earnest were only present after the 2002 elections.
Throughout 2001, the RUF was finally disarmed and demobilized, and after its transforma-
tion into a political party it was nothing but a “pale shadow of the rebel outfit that terrorised
the country for over a decade” (Kandeh 2003: 212). However, Kabbah’s sweeping victory
in the elections – which led to the emergence of a ‘The Winner Took it All’ polity (see
A.17) – made the promotion of good governance principles not necessarily easier. Kabbah
was re-elected with 70 percent of the votes, and his party – the SLPP – won 83 parlia-
mentary seats, followed by 22 seats for his closest competitor. As noted above, the RUFP
was crushed in the elections and not even represented in the parliament (see e.g. Kandeh
2003).31 President Kabbah himself did little to foster more constructive relations with
his former enemies. Once in power, he was soon criticized for the exclusionary system
of rule he established. The elections essentially created a “one-party, dominant type of
parliament” in which the opposition became largely marginalized (John 2007: 46). Also,
Kabbah delegated the most important ministries to south-easteners, his traditional con-
stituency (John 2007: 49).32 The International Crisis Group noted that Kabbah’s cabinet
was “neither broad-based nor designed to promote reconciliation”, and it was furthermore
charged with corruption allegations (2002d: 3). In this regard, Sierra Leone after the 2002
elections resembled the situation in after the 2006 national elections in the DRC very
closely. However, the crucial difference is that the Sierra Leonean people expressed their
contempt for the continued violation of good governance principles. Kabbah’s ignorance
of good governance principles led to a quick alienation of the electorate with the SLPP.
This accounted tor its ultimate defeat in the 2007 presidential elections (Ohman 2008),
31Nonetheless, the RUF still constituted a potential threat to security, in particular since there was the
constant possibility that RUF hard-liners would ally with those RUF fighters who went into exile to
Liberia (see International Crisis Group 2002d: 9).
32Sierra Leonean politics suffers from a north-south divide, which reflects not only a political but also
an ethnic split. The north is predominantly populated by Temne and the south mostly by Mende
(International Crisis Group 2002d: 2). Temne and Mende are the two largest ethnic groups in Sierra
Leone, each comprising about 30 percent of the population. They are followed by Krio (10 percent),
“other African” ethnicities (10 percent), “Lebanese and Asian” (10 percent), Yimba (8 percent) and
Maninka (2 percent) (see Coleman 2008m).
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making it known as “the first post-conflict elections in Africa in which an incumbent party
was defeated” (Kandeh 2008: 607).33
In sum, the above paragraph suggests an outcome that was already observed in the DRC:
promoting good governance is virtually impossible in ‘Doomed to Share’ polities because
the intricacies of daily politics preclude a systematic focus on good governance principles.
It is questionable whether external actors were aware of this phenomenon (which would
explain their careless engagement for good governance principles), or whether they were
really so naïve as to believe that promoting good governance in an environment as adverse
as the one present in Sierra Leone is possible. In both the DRC and Sierra Leone, external
actors effectively postponed their engagement for good governance until the time after the
elections, when the conditions were at least equally adverse and the legitimacy of external
engagement had drastically declined.
4.4 ‘Doomed to Share’ Polities: Conclusions
The overall dynamics of ‘Doomed to Share’ polities are well captured by a quote from
the International Crisis Group: ‘How can you force people to make peace who want
war?’ (2005e: 25).34 The two cases discussed as examples for ‘Doomed to Share’ polities
illustrate the tremendous difficulties involved in inducing reluctant parties to cooperate, but
also the ambiguities revolving around power-sharing as an instrument of post-conflict order.
Overall, the cases illustrate that power-sharing agreements can be a crucial instrument
for putting an end to acute fighting even among adverse and largely obstructive elites.
However, to expect that peace is self-sustaining once a power-sharing government is in
place is highly naïve. Power-sharing itself resolves little of the ‘root causes’ of the war,
in particular if it is not more than a transitional arrangement to bridge the time until
competitive elections. On the contrary, it creates new tensions with the potential to derail
the peace process entirely. This has become most clearly apparent in Sierra Leone, where
“[t]he notion of bringing rebel groups into government [. . . ] has proved utterly misguided
[. . . ]” (International Crisis Group 2001d: 3). Overall, the cases suggest the following
conclusions with respect to the four analytical dimensions of analysis (for a short summary,
see 4.1 on page 162):
First, both cases illustrate that it is virtually impossible to evoke an effective disarmament
and demobilization of warring parties if they have no motivation to behave constructively.
External pressure or security guarantees only have the chance to work in environments
where the former warring parties depict at least a minimal degree of pragmatism and are
33As the constitution only allows for two presidential terms in a row, Kabbah was not allowed to run again
as a candidate. He chose Solomon Berewa as his hand-picked successor. In the elections, the SPLL lost
nearly half of its parliamentary seats. The All People’s Congress (APC) turned out as the main winner
of the elections, more than doubling the number of parliamentary seats, and their leader Earnest Bai
Koroma beat Berewa in the second round of the presidential elections (Ohman 2008: 766–767).
34The original quotation is in capital letters, therefore single quotation marks were used in the above quote.
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ready to give peace a chance. Not even the prospect of participating in the government
(and holding a certain control of the means of coercion) is likely to obliterate the parties’
obstructive stance. In the DRC, external actors were crucial driving forces behind the
ultimate adoption of the power-sharing government, but in the implementation phase they
turned out as both unwilling and incapable of providing the security guarantees necessary
for overcoming the commitment problems. In addition, disarmament attempts were
impeded by the large number of warring factions (of which some were considered to be
proxy forces associated with the Rwandan Ugandan government) and the comparatively low
level of international resolve. As a result, the progress achieved with regard to disarmament
was cosmetic at best. Tellingly, not even President Kabila trusted the newly formed national
army and instead relied on his presidential guard and other armed groups. The outcome was
similar in Sierra Leone, where the RUF failed to meet any of the disarmament provisions
contained in the Lomé Peace Agreement. Instead, the rebel group relied on extensive ‘foot
dragging’ and ‘virtual cooperation’ gestures by which it tried to circumvent its disarmament
obligations. However, over time its behavior became increasingly confrontational, which
contributed to ‘saber rattling’ and ‘calculated escalation’ gestures and culminated in the
abduction of 500 UNAMSIL peacekeepers in May 2000.
Second, the overall constellation of ‘Doomed to Share’ polities has repercussions
for the manner in which the parties compete for power. In both the DRC and Sierra
Leone, the parties were highly reluctant to sincerely manage the countries’ transition
processes and confine themselves to the division of power and authority laid out in the
peace agreements that brought forward the power-sharing arrangement. Instead, they
were in both cases attracted by the vast opportunities for self-enrichment offered by the
participation in the transitional government. In addition, virtually all of the parties used the
power-sharing arrangement as an instrument for increasing their relative share of power
vis-à-vis their opponents through informal and unconstitutional means. This behavior was
greatly propelled by the lack of future perspectives available to most of the rebel groups,
which accounted for attempts to prolong the transitional process (‘foot dragging’) or evoke
a total escalation that effectively impeded the timely organization of elections (‘calculated
escalation’). In the DRC, the lack of post-elections perspectives for all candidates except
Kabila led to a clash of interest among the participants of the transitional government:
While Kabila’s goal was to ‘sit out’ the transitional phase in order to legitimize his reign,
the other factions engaged in pronounced ‘foot dragging’ gestures and aimed at extending
the transitional phase as long as possible. The potential for self-enrichment available
to the warring factions in the DRC – to which external actors contributed through the
disbursement of aid – contributed to this phenomenon. The same clash of interest has
become apparent in Sierra Leone, where the RUF’s lack of future perspectives as a political
party greatly propelled its obstructive stance. This added to its inclination to view the
power-sharing arrangement as a temporary ‘safe haven’ for re-arming and gaining time for
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Aspect DRC Sierra Leone
Commit-
ment Prob-
lems
Highly challenging environment; mistrust
and suspicion impeded both the disarma-
ment of the factions and the formation of
an inclusive army; external actors were far
too weak to provide security guarantees or
enforce compliance from the parties.
Highly challenging environment; the RUF
tried to evade its disarmament obligations
despite security guarantees and a general
amnesty; after initial reliance on ‘foot drag-
ging’ gestures it increasingly reverted to
‘saber rattling’ and ‘calculated escalation’
strategies.
Political
Com-
petition
Lacking consensus about the distribution of
power; parties were mainly concerned with
increasing their de facto share of power; un-
equal electoral perspectives led to different
goals: Kabila wanted to sit out the transi-
tional phase whereas the rebels wanted to
prolong the transitional phase by all means
(‘foot dragging’) or unseat Kabila by force.
Benefits of power-sharing induced the RUF
to adopt a veil of cooperation; same di-
vergence of interests as in the DRC: Kab-
bah wanted to sit out the transitional
phase and legitimize his rule through elec-
tions, whereas the RUF faced dull elec-
toral prospects and aimed at prolonging
(‘foot dragging’) or disrupting the transi-
tional government.
Threats
from
Within
Imminent threat to stability by spoilers will-
ing to use force; elite accommodation at the
center led to the emergence of dissident fac-
tions in the periphery; external actors could
not mobilize sufficient willingness and abil-
ity to contain the spoilers effectively (‘vir-
tual enforcement’).
Main threat arose from the RUF itself; ex-
ternal actors failed to contain the RUF effec-
tively and ipso facto counted on the rebel
group to become more cooperative (‘wait
and see’ approach); abduction of UNAM-
SIL peacekeepers provoked intervention by
British Special Forces to protect the govern-
ment.
Good
Gover-
nance
Difficult environment for promoting good
governance; external actors could do little
against pervasive human righs violations;
external actors postponed the promotion of
good governance to the post-election era.
Difficult environment for promoting good
governance; human rights violations re-
mained pervasive; blanket amnesty for the
RUF legitimized a culture of impunity; ex-
ternal actors focused one-sidedly on the
elections.
Table 4.1: Dynamics of ‘Doomed to Share’ polities
its final siege on Freetown. Kabbah, in turn, had great hopes in the 2002 elections, which
contributed to his inclination to ‘sit out’ the transitional phase.
Third, the obstructive relations prevailing in ‘Doomed to Share’ polities imply that the
polity is exposed to numerous threats from spoilers who have an interest in disrupting
the peace process and torpedoing the power-sharing arrangement. In contrast to ‘Let’s
Share’ polities, where such threats predominantly arise as a result of the ‘slippery slope’ of
political competition, ‘Doomed to Share’ polities witness spoilers who have an interest in
getting rid of the power-sharing arrangement and are willing to use armed force in order to
achieve their goal. In the DRC, the RCD-Goma was the prototype of such a spoiler, mainly
because it was the party with the least chances for being represented in a post-transition
government. In addition, the strong focus on accommodating elites induced a split between
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the rebel group’s leadership at the center and the Goma-based dissident faction led by
Laurent Nkunda. This faction posed an imminent threat to the stability of the Congolese
polity. In general, external actors were poorly equipped for responding to the destabilizing
potential posed by spoilers and hardliners of all kinds. Lacking sufficient resolve and
political will, they repeatedly failed to prevent severe political crises and gross human
rights violations associated with it. In Sierra Leone, the RUF embodied the main threat to
the transitional government, most notably after its ‘foot dragging’ and ‘virtual cooperation’
attempts became increasingly ineffective. In response to mounting external pressure, the
RUF turned to ‘saber rattling’ and ‘calculated escalation’ strategies, trying to blackmail
both external actors and Kabbah. In the end, this strategy was counter-productive, as it
facilitated the complete isolation of the RUF and destroyed the last glimmers of hope that
it would still stick to the Lomé Agreement. As Abraham noted: “Achieving peace in Sierra
Leone has proved so elusive because of the elementary, yet difficult to perceive, reason
that the RUF has never been interested in peace in the first place” (2001: 225).
Finally, the two cases illustrate that attempts to promote good governance in ‘Doomed to
Share’ polities are marked by tremendous difficulties. By definition, this polity type is char-
acterized by tensions which may include recourse to armed force. This greatly increases the
likelihood for severe violations of good governance principles, most notably with respect
to the aspect of human rights standards. In the DRC, external actors’ record in promoting
good governance was highly ambiguous. Shying away from a direct involvement in the
polity, they concentrated unilaterally on the elections as a panacea for their statebuilding
project. One corollary of this strategy was that the international community turned a blind
eye to gross human rights violations and widespread corruption during the transitional
phase, mainly because they lacked the willingness and ability to exert significant pressure
on the domestic parties. Their potential to counter these developments was even more
eroded in the post-election phase. As this suggests, the plan to postpone the realization of
wider statebuilding goals until after the elections turned out as self-deceptive. This attitude
also hampered the promotion of good governance principles in Sierra Leone. Through
pressuring the government into making far-reaching concessions to the RUF, external
actors have contributed to an environment in which the promotion of good governance
principles was particularly difficult. Reluctant to provide sufficient pressure on the parties,
external actors have – just as in the DRC – postponed the promotion of good governance
to the post-electoral phase – with minimal success.
All in all, the cases illustrate that unlike ‘domination’ polities, power-sharing polities
rely to a greater degree on at least a minimal level of cooperation between the former
warring parties. External actors are often afraid of disrupting the fragile foundations
for cooperation through a decisive engagement and therefore shy away from engaging
in genuine enforcement instruments. However, in environments where spoilers pose an
imminent threat to the stability of the polity this ‘wait and see’ approach risks to undermine
the entire peace process, as it happened in both the DRC and Sierra Leone. This suggests
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that meditative engagement may come to its limits in such obstructive environments. It
is virtually impossible to accommodate spoilers such as the RUF who have no genuine
interest in peace and who react to nothing beyond the level of significant force. It is for
this reason that the International Crisis Group, when remnants of the RUF in Sierra Leone
still refused to disarm in 2001, at some point came to the conclusion that “stark, but we
believe unavoidable [. . . ] [that] the international community must help Sierra Leone take
decisive military action against the RUF” (2001d: ii).
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‘Let the Winner Take it All’ Polities
The two polity cases discussed in chapters three and four involved power-sharing. The
remaining chapters deal with cases in which one of the conflict parties – either the pre-war
government or a rebel group – has exclusive access to formal governmental authority and
hence plays a dominant role in the post-conflict polity. The first of these types comprises
cases of political domination in which the relations between the former warring parties are
constructive and in which external actors are involved in a mediative manner – so called
‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities. This polity type usually comes into being after one of
the parties comes forth as the clear winner of national elections held in the post-conflict
phase. As a result of the comparatively constructive relations prevailing between the former
belligerents, the party that is excluded from participation in the government accepts its role
as an opposition party. Four cases in the sample fall under this category: Mozambique,
El Salvador, Guatemala and Sierra Leone after the 2007 elections (see table A.1 on page
327). Of those, the former two cases were selected as the empirical basis for this chapter.
The goal of basing the empirical discussions on a broad geographical variety requires to
select not only cases from the same region. It was therefore obvious to select one case
from African and one case from Latin America. Mozambique was chosen instead of Sierra
Leone because the case it is a more typical ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polity (see sections
A.15.3 and A.17.3). In addition, the post-Lomé constellation in Sierra Leone was already
discussed in the previous chapter, and I tried to avoid selecting the same country twice
if there are alternative cases. By the same token, El Salvador was chosen from the Latin
American cases because it provides a better fit to the overall characteristics of ‘Let the
Winner Take it All’ polities than Guatemala (see also sections A.9.3 and A.10.3).
Both Mozambique and El Salvador are cases in which the civil war started at the height
of the Cold War and was terminated directly after the end of the superpower confrontation.
This has a number of implications. First, in both cases the armed conflicts were driven
by a classical ‘Cold War’ logic, i.e. characterized by ideological differences that roughly
coincided with the ideological blocks of the Cold War. Second, these cases are the first
examples for what is called the ‘second generation’ of UN-led post-conflict intervention
efforts – i.e. peace operations that go beyond traditional (first generation) peacekeeping
efforts merely aiming at securing ceasefire agreements (see Doyle and Sambanis 2006:
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14–15). When compared to more recent (third generation) peace-enforcement missions,
these operations had more limited goals and implied a lower degree of ‘intrusion’ into
domestic affairs.
5.1 A basic model of ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ Polities
The generic model of post-conflict interactions presented above (2.1.2) spelled out a
number of assumptions about the interactions between the various post-conflict actors.
In addition, section 2.4 presented a set of possible ‘patterns of interaction’ which can
potentially be observed in the different polity types. Now, the aim is to refine this model
to the specific context of ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities. The basic features of ‘Let
the Winner Take it All’ polities are schematically sketched in figure 5.1 on page 167.
The figure illustrates that only one party (‘Side A’) controls the government while the
other is effectively excluded from access to government authority. Yet, both of them
maintain constructive relations (illustrated by the two black arrows connecting them),
which indicates that the excluded party accepts to remain outside of the formal government.
At the same time, external actors have a mediative and non-discriminatory influence on the
dynamics unfolding between the warring parties (as illustrated by the arrow connecting
external actors and the dashed line surrounding the former belligerents).
Based on that, a number of assumptions can be made with respect to the internal
dynamics unfolding in this polity type. In general, the constructive relations prevailing
between the former belligerents suggest that they engage in genuine rather than merely
‘virtual cooperation’. Yet, the fact that one party is thoroughly excluded from access
to governmental power may lead to new tensions if this form of political domination
perpetuates itself and if the excluded party is deprived from political participation in the
long run. How can we expect external actors to behave in this context? Their involvement
generally aims at assisting the ‘transition process’ and settling conflicts that may, despite
constructive relations, occur between the belligerents at any time. However, it can be
expected that the presence of a stable government – which is considered legitimate even
by the excluded side – leads to a different form of interaction than it is the case in ‘Let’s
Share’ polities. The situation requires a less direct engagement because it is not necessary
to closely monitor whether the parties maintain the distribution of power provided for in
the peace agreement or constitution. This can potentially lead to an even more indirect
and tacit engagement than it is the case for the other polity types. In the following, these
assumptions are specified further with respect to the four polity dimensions.
Overcoming Commitment Problems. ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities are neces-
sarily asymmetrical. The parties standing outside of the government are not only excluded
from executing governmental authority, but also from the privileges and material benefits
that are associated with official government positions. Since the government in most
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Figure 5.1: ’Let the Winner Take it All’ Polities (simplified illustration)
cases also controls the security forces, the excluded parties’ physical security effectively
depends on the government’s goodwill. Therefore, in all cases in which one of the former
warring parties enjoys exclusive access to governmental power, the excluded parties are in
a delicate position and are at least potentially exposed to one-sided violence committed
by the government. These structural problems potentially pose a difficult environment
for overcoming commitment problems and require more far-reaching security guarantees
granted by external actors. Making the conflict parties agree to a peace-agreement in the
absence of power-sharing provisions may be a difficult endeavor. Specific measures that
address the asymmetry between the parties are necessary by which the weaker party can be
convinced that it will not be crushed. By monitoring (or enforcing) ceasefire agreements,
supervising or conducting elections or disarming and demobilizing the different factions,
external actors can help to overcome the self-reinforcing cycle of mistrust that stems from
the commitment problem (see e.g. Brown and Zahar 2008). This, in turn, implies that
external actors’ role in the initiation phase of ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities is a
crucial condition for the successful establishment of this polity type.
Manner of Political Competition. ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities by definition
imply the exclusion of one of the former conflict parties from political participation.
Because the former belligerents maintain constructive relations, the current distribution of
power between them does not lead to imminent political tensions. Both of them accept
the status quo. However, just as in ‘Let’s Share’ polities it can be expected that the parties
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engage in political competition in order to increase their share of power in the future. The
excluded party will almost always try to gain access to formal governmental power in the
future, for instance during the next round of elections. By the same token, the dominating
party is generally reluctant to give power out of hand since this would imply its own
exclusion. This can be directly derived from assumption two above, which maintains that
parties constantly strive for enhancing both formal and de facto authority. However, in
order to compete against the government the excluded party needs realistic prospects for
being able to improve its future position through the ballot-box – in other words, a realistic
chance of winning future elections. Rather than seeking to overthrow the incumbent
government immediately, the excluded parties’ rationale is that ‘patience pays off’, i.e.
that they are able to acquire power through free and fair elections at some point in the
future. This requires the excluded party to possess sufficient resources for running an
electoral campaign and to appeal to the broader population and not only a certain minority
segment in society – no matter whether it is ethnically, religiously or ideologically defined.1
Whether or not this is the case depends not only on the party itself, but also on the actual
characteristics of the political system – most notably its level of ‘inclusiveness’ and the
general room for maneuver available to the opposition parties.
Threats from Within. Just as in ‘Let’s Share’ polities, we cannot assume that the
presence of constructive relations at the time of the termination of the conflict automatically
implies the end of political tensions for all times. This also holds true for ‘Let the Winner
Take it All’ polities, which may experience a deterioration of the former belligerents’
relations over time. This can stem from two directions. First, the excluded parties may
become increasingly disillusioned about the prospect of gaining power through competitive
elections. They could realize that patience sometimes does not pay off, which induces them
to seek ‘shortcuts’ to power by falling back to informal means of political competition.
Second, the government may deny the opposition’s legitimate requests for participation
and try to strengthen its own hold on power. As the clear winners of the conflict – either
on the battlefield or the ballot-box – the incumbent government has a lot to lose if elected
out of office – ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities have little to offer for the ‘second
winner’. Fearing to be excluded, the ruling party therefore has an incentive to abuse the
state apparatus in order to curtail the opposition’s sphere of influence – for instance by
establishing tighter controls of the media or by forging elections in order to make sure
that it remains in power. This can potentially contribute to tensions between the former
belligerents, including occasional outbursts of violence. However, the danger for the
resurgence or civil war between the parties is low, most notably because the belligerents
1In these cases, the parties associated with the minority group will almost always be excluded from
participation in the government, since its share in the national parliament will simply be too small. They
lack not only a realistic but even a theoretical chance for being represented in the government at some
point in the future. We can therefore assume that disappointment of the minority group may translate
into renewed tensions between the ethnic groups.
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are in most cases thoroughly disarmed and because the organization of a new rebellion after
several years is likely to pose tremendous problems of collective action. External actors
cannot be expected to act as a safeguard of the excluded party’s interests. Since this polity
type depicts many quasi-ideal features of post-conflict order like the successful holding of
elections, external actors are likely to overlook many of the creeping developments taking
place below the cooperative facade which characterizes this polity type.
Promoting Good Governance. External attempts to influence local dynamics and to
promote good governance are likely to be somewhat ambiguous in ‘Let the Winner Take
it All’ polities. The presence of a stable government that enjoys the legitimacy of even
the excluded parties may induce external actors to conclude that ‘Let the Winner Take it
All’ polities are more self-reliant than other polity types. Instead of directly engaging into
politics – for instance by closely monitoring the manner of political competition – external
actors are likely to focus more on influencing the policies adopted by the government
and concentrate more on technical issues necessary for implementing their statebuilding
vision (e.g. engaging in capacity-building or triggering economic growth etc.). However,
the strong interference on the level of policies may trigger resistance from the ruling
party, which is likely to amount to specific ‘virtual cooperation’ strategies with which
the government attempts to soften external actors’ influence. In addition, the problem
of ‘euphemistic blindness’ potentially prevents external actors from sharply recognizing
detrimental developments and shortcomings in the realm of governance. The successful
holding of elections and the constructive stance of the parties are factors that tend to be
interpreted as significant achievements. This could contribute to external actors’ inclination
to overlook developments in the realm of politics, for instance attempts by the ruling party
to outmaneuver the opposition and perpetuate its own hold on power.
5.2 Mozambique
Mozambique is a pronounced example for a ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polity. The
country experienced more than sixteen years of armed conflict between two armed factions:
FRELIMO (‘Frente de Libertação de Moçambique’), initially a Marxist-Leninist group that
held the government since 1975, and RENAMO (‘Resistência Nacional Moçambicana’),
an anti-communist rebel group sponsored from abroad (see Manning 2002: 38; Pitcher
2006: 92). A typical feature of the conflict in Mozambique was the high level of external
support the parties enjoyed. FRELIMO received ideological and material backing from
the Soviet Union and immediately began to implement a range of socialist policies after
independence. RENAMO was systematically propped up by the two apartheid regimes in
South Africa and Rhodesia as a counterweight to the communist influence in the region,
which enabled it to transform into a tightly organized and (at times) well equipped military
organization (see Costy 2004: 148–149; Morgan 1990: 610). Despite a furious sixteen
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years of warfare, RENAMO never managed to overthrow the FRELIMO government. The
civil war formally came to a close in October 1992, when the government and the rebel
movement signed the General Peace Agreement (GPA) (Alden 1995: 107). Until today,
Mozambique has not experienced any larger-scale recurrence of armed violence and the
country is frequently cited as one of the prime examples for successful peacebuilding in
Africa (see e.g. Costy 2004; Weinstein 2002). The elections that followed two years after
the adoption of the GPA confirmed FRELIMO in office and led, due to Mozambique’s
largely decentralized political system, to RENAMO’s far-reaching exclusion from political
participation. This situation is most adequately described as a ‘Let the Winner Take it All’
polity, as the following section underlines.
5.2.1 Mozambique as a ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ Polity
Classifying post-conflict Mozambique as an instance of a ‘Let the Winner Take it All’
polity, Mozambique combines a number of characteristics. It implies that one of the former
conflict parties has exclusive control of the government, that the former conflict parties
maintain constructive relations, and that external actors are involved in a mediative manner
in the polity. That this is the case is illustrated in the following paragraphs:
Political Domination. In the General Peace Agreement that put an end to more than
sixteen years of armed conflict in Mozambique, FRELIMO and RENAMO agreed to hold
both parliamentary and presidential elections within one year after the conclusion of the
agreement (Government of the Republic of Mozambique 1992; Protocol III). Elections
were originally scheduled to take place in fall 1993, but they were ultimately postponed
by one year since the process of demilitarization and demobilization took longer than
originally projected (see Alden 1995: 107). In the meantime, FRELIMO leader Joaquim
Alberto Chissano – the ‘unelected president’ since 1986 – remained interim president. One
particularity of Mozambique is the strong ‘the winner takes it all’ logic that accompanied
the elections. Unlike in many other peace-agreements, the GPA did not contain any pre-
election power-sharing provisions which would guarantee both parties a certain fraction
of governmental power. Instead, the Mozambican constitution made it very likely for the
winner of the elections to take exclusive control of the government. This was a result of the
strongly centralized characteristics of the Mozambican constitution. Influenced by nearly
400 years of colonial rule, Mozambique inherited a strongly centralized political system
that devotes much power to the leading political party (see Alexander 1997: 2–4; Manning
2002: 24–26; West and Kloeck-Jenson 1999: 461).
The elections had a close outcome, but nonetheless facilitated FRELIMO’s near-
complete leadership role on all levels of the political system. The party won 129 out
of 250 seats in the parliament – a surprisingly small margin – and confirmed Chissano’s
role as president (see Hatton et al. 2001: 20). Although RENAMO performed surprisingly
well in the elections, the polls manifested the wide-spread exclusion of the former rebel
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group from political participation for a period of at least five years, until the next national
elections were scheduled. Due to the highly centralist features of Mozambique’s political
system, RENAMO did not even have the right to nominate its own governors in those
provinces where it had gained the majority (Turner et al. 1998: 164). Thus, post-conflict
Mozambique can safely be considered a case of political domination.
Constructive Relations. The distinguishing feature of ‘Let the Winner Take it All’
polities lies in the constructive relations maintained by the warring parties. The presence
of such constructive relations can easily be confirmed in Mozambique. Since the adoption
of the General Peace Agreement, the country has not experienced any recurrence of armed
conflict on a larger scale. Observers of the Mozambican case have therefore frequently
cited it as an example for successful post-conflict peacebuilding (see e.g. Costy 2004).
However, getting to this point was difficult and required significant external brokerage.
Peace became conceivable for the first time after Joaquim Chissano had replaced Samora
Machel as FRELIMO leader in 1984 and introduced far-reaching reforms of the party
ideology, including a “formal retreat from Marxism” (Rupiya 1998: 14). Although this
provided for a more constructive environment, RENAMO remained reluctant to engage in
talks. The rebel group had some marked military successes, and some hardliners in its ranks
“believed that victory lay within their grasp, if they just fought a little longer” (Weinstein
2002: 149). RENAMO carried on with fighting, which only changed fundamentally at
the beginning of the 1990s when it became clear that South Africa would definitely end
its support. This coincided with a severe drought, which significantly hampered the rebel
group’s ability to feed its soldiers (see e.g. Zartman 2000a: 262). In conjunction with
an effective third-party mediation (see below), the parties developed a more and more
constructive stance over time, culminating in the adoption of the GPA in 1992.
The parties’ relations remained constructive also in the implementation phase of the
agreement. Most observers agree that RENAMO’s transition from a rebel group to a
political party was relatively unproblematic (see e.g. Weinstein 2002: 150). The party
remained cooperative and refrained from recourse to armed force although its exclusion
from political power turned out as far-reaching and permanent. FRELIMO has won
all presidential and parliamentary elections since 1994, which has clearly marginalized
RENAMO’s influence on the national level (African Elections Database 2007). As Brown
and Zahar remarked: “RENAMO has not gained much from the peace. The party has few
resources, it has no part in formal power sharing and has little say in managing state-owned
enterprises” (2008: 82). Nonetheless, leaving momentary clashes aside, RENAMO has
shown a genuine and deep-rooted preference for peace since the adoption of the GPA in
the past years. Barbara Walter believes that this mainly stems from the settling of the
main grievances underlying the conflict, most notably FRELIMO’s rejection of Marxism-
Leninism that coincided with the end of the Cold War: “Since 1989, RENAMO had insisted
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that its goal was ‘constitutional reform’, and its demands were fairly straightforward” (1999:
147).
Mediative Intervention. External actors have played a key role at various stages of
the peace process in Mozambique. Most notably, they had a decisive influence on the
adoption of the GPA in 1992. One particularity of the Mozambican case is the strong
influence of civil society organizations – most notably religious organizations – in the
negotiation process leading to the GPA. In the eyes of Richard Jackson, Mozambique
is “one of the very few cases where Track II or unofficial diplomacy supplanted official
Track I diplomatic efforts as the primary site for negotiations” (R. Jackson 2006: 161).2
Religious organizations in Mozambique transcend existing societal cleavages and therefore
have the potential to bridge differences between the conflict parties. In addition to that,
some religious groups – in particular the Catholic church of Sofala – have maintained
relatively good relations to the RENAMO leadership throughout the civil war and could
therefore exert significant influence on the rebel group to seek a settlement with FRELIMO
(see Costy 2004: 150–151).3 It was not least thanks to their influence that the agreement
was ultimately signed by all parties in Rome on 4 October 1992.4
In the implementation phase of the agreement, external engagement remained mediative
and became more and more institutionalized. Within one week after the GPA was signed,
the UN Security Council authorized ONUMOZ (Rupiya 1998: 15). Its mandate was con-
fined to monitoring the ceasefire agreement and engaging in DDR efforts (Department of
Peacekeeping Operations 2010; United Nations 2001b; Vines 1998a); therefore ONUMOZ
was still much closer to traditional peacekeeping missions than the more intrusive Chapter
VII missions that became popular a few years later. External engagement in Mozambique
can therefore be considered mediative in both its intentions and its effects.
2‘Track II diplomacy’ refers to diplomatic efforts that take place below the level of inter-governmental
negotiations. They may involve lower-level bureaucratic contacts as well as attempts for conflict
resolution facilitated by NGOs and other civil society organizations (see e.g. Miall et al. 1999).
3Among the religious organizations, most credit goes to the ‘Community of Sant’Egidio’, which Richard
Jackson describes as a “voluntary charitable Catholic organization based in Rome, but with 15,000 mem-
bers world-wide and 300 local groups in Europe, Latin America, and Africa.” Engaged in Mozambique
since the 1970s, it developed important relations with both FRELIMO and RENAMO and was therefore
considered an honest broker by both sides (2006: 161). For a more detailed background about the role
of Christian leaders for facilitating a settlement to the Mozambican conflict, see also Sengulane and
Goncalves (1998).
4According to Alex Vines, a similarly important role was played by a British businessman, ‘Tiny Rowland’,
then CEO of the London-based company Lonrho. He had previously negotiated with RENAMO in
order to protect his company’s assets in northern Mozambique. However, during the peace negotiations
he turned out to be one of the few people that RENAMO leader Dhlakama trusted, and he invested
significant private funds – including the repeated use of his company’s private airplane for flying the
RENAMO leadership to the negotiations – in order to evoke a settlement between the parties. Vines
believes that “[w]hile Rowland’s initial involvement in the peace process undoubtedly stemmed from
commercial self-interest, it appears that Rowland quickly became personally engaged in the search for a
settlement. By 1992, the time and resources he was spending far exceeded anything he could hope to
recoup commercially” (1998b: 72–73).
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5.2.2 Polity Dynamics in Mozambique
With the settlement of its conflict in 1992 and the successful elections held two years later,
Mozambique has made a great leap away from conflict towards multi-party democracy.
However, as this sections aims to demonstrate, the country has continued to be dominated
by specific post-conflict dynamics for many more years. As Giovanni Carbone describes
it, “[t]he deep social and historical rootedness of Mozambique’s new party system is
apparent from the fact that the main political cleavage – and thus electoral competition –
is heavily shaped by past patterns of conflict” (Carbone 2005: 424). All in all, the case
of Mozambique confirms the plausibility of many of the assumptions made about ‘Let
the Winner Take it All’ polities above. This is illustrated below with regard to the four
overarching themes: dealing with commitment problems, competition for power, threats
from within, and external engagement for good governance.
a) Overcoming Commitment Problems
Above, I assumed that commitment problems can effectively be overcome in ‘Let the
Winner take it All’ polities, sufficient external assistance and security guarantees provided.
However, this polity type requires that the parties’ concerns about being marginalized in
the future polity need to be specifically addressed by external actors. In Mozambique, this
manifested itself in the strong role played by external actors in the initiation phase of the
Mozambican post-conflict polity. Two aspects stood out with regard to the challenge of
overcoming the commitment problems between the former belligerents: the disarmament
and demobilization of the rebels, and the necessity to mitigate the strong asymmetry
between the parties in the pre-election phase.
Disarmament and demobilization posed a significant challenge in Mozambique. On
the one hand, the competitive nature of the elections required a thorough disarmament of
the rebels in order to avoid replicating the disturbing outcome of the Angolan elections
in 1992.5 On the other hand, the poor prospects available for the loser of the elections
reduced the rebels’ willingness to engage in disarmament in earnest out of fear that this
would leave them unprotected against retaliations by the government. As elsewhere, the
Mozambican power-elites were highly skeptical about the prospect of demobilizing their
forces, and both of the parties retained a “reserve military force” despite making gestures
to comply with their disarmament obligations (Rupiya 1998: 16). Hence, external actors’
role mainly centered around “finding ways to reassure the rebels that they would not be
attacked during demobilization [. . . ]” (Walter 1999: 144).6 In order to achieve this, the
UN prioritized the quick demobilization of the fighters and their integration into a joint
5In Angola, the UNITA rebels – still heavily armed – rejected their electoral defeat and continued their
armed struggle (see Manning and Malbrough 2010: 149; see also 9.2).
6Walter provides an insightful analysis of the background behind the Mozambican peace negotiations. In
particular, she highlights how RENAMO’s sense of insecurity (and FRELIMO’s reluctance to address it)
stalled the negotiations at various points in time.
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army while at the same time providing for the security of all parties through its physical
force. The provision of these security guarantees was a necessary step for the beginning
of the disarmament process (see e.g. Walter 1999: 149; see also Brown and Zahar 2008:
78). The whole process nonetheless took longer than originally projected in the unrealistic
one-year plan provided for in the peace agreement, mainly because both parties initially
mistrusted each other and “neither side wished to give strategic advantage to the other”
(Rupiya 1998: 16).
Ultimately, however, the demobilization process went surprisingly smooth. By August
1994 – two months before the elections – nearly 90 percent of the registered voters were
demobilized (Costy 2004: 153–155). This can primarily be contributed to the security
guarantees that external actors could raise for both parties, but it was also facilitated by a
certain ‘war fatigue’ of rank and file soldiers, which rendered the demobilization program
relatively attractive in the eyes of many combatants (see Turner et al. 1998: 154–155). As
this indicates, the international community played a strong role in the initiation phase of
the Mozambican post-conflict polity. Its involvement was “key to clinching the deal and
ushering in the transition from war to peace” (Brown and Zahar 2008: 78).
Next to disarmament, the second aspect external actors needed to address was the strong
asymmetry that divided FRELIMO and RENAMO at the time of the peace agreement.
During the entire duration of the war, the relations between the two parties could be
characterized by a marked power asymmetry. FRELIMO had controlled the government
since 1975, had access to external funds, controlled the army and possessed the capacity
to use the state apparatus – including the media – to its own advantage. RENAMO, in
contrast, had no experience as a political party when it entered the peace negotiations and
lacked both the resources and legitimacy that its opponent naturally possessed. Therefore,
“[a]fter years of guerrilla warfare, Renamo was poorly equipped for civilian life and for the
transition to parliamentary politics” (Rupiya 1998: 14; see also Carbone 2005: 425–426).
This asymmetry was a persistent source of mistrust on the side of RENAMO. As the
inherently weaker side, RENAMO “needed guarantees of security and financial assistance
before it would give up fighting” (Rupiya 1998: 14).
FRELIMO was reluctant to provide these guarantees, as any strengthening of its oppo-
nent might have caused a weakening of its own position. It neither provided RENAMO
with funds for running an adequate electoral campaign, nor took steps to “reassure its
leaders that they would remain politically relevant if they lost the elections” (Brown and
Zahar 2008: 78). External actors were therefore the only forces who could potentially
reduce the asymmetry between the parties. Due to the painful lessons learned during the
failed peace accords in Angola, they were highly dedicated to fulfill this role successfully
(Manning and Malbrough 2010: 149). Through establishing the so called ‘RENAMO Trust
Fund’, international donors contributed $ 18 million in order to “help Renamo transform
into a political party and to balance Frelimo’s access to public resources for elections” (see
Turner et al. 1998: 157). This was instrumental for convincing the RENAMO leadership
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that it could effectively compete with FRELIMO in the elections, which in turn was a
critical factor for making RENAMO agree to the terms of the General Peace Agreement
(see Turner et al. 1998: 157). Also, the international community almost entirely funded the
elections, which were seen as the “capstone of a successful peace process in Mozambique”
(Manning and Malbrough 2010: 158). All in all, the attempts to bridge the asymmetry
between the parties and provide RENAMO with a solid platform on which to run for
the elections can be considered successful. RENAMO had a relatively broad base of
popular support and could be optimistic about its performance in the elections (see Turner
et al. 1998: 154). Although FRELIMO, expectantly, won the elections, RENAMO’s good
showing surprised many observers and gave rise to hopes for winning the next round of
elections in 1999.
In sum, through their mediative efforts in the pre-election phase external actors can
chiefly be held responsible for establishing a basic level of trust between the parties that
was necessary for a settlement to the conflict (see e.g. Moran and Pitcher 2004: 511;
Weinstein 2002).
b) Manner of Political Competition
Just as in ‘Let’s Share’ polities, competition for political power in ‘Let the Winner Take
it All’ polities is directed at gaining or maintaining political power in the future. Above,
it was stipulated that ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities require that all parties need to
feel at least a theoretical chance for winning the elections in order for this polity type to
be initiated successfully. Arguably, this was one of the main reasons for RENAMO to
retain its constructive stance after the elections in 1994. However, amidst accusations that
FRELIMO engaged in electoral fraud the party became increasingly frustrated about its
own exclusion.
The international community effectively contributed to such a sense by supporting
RENAMO’s transition from a rebel group to a political party. This “gave the Renamo
leadership a realistic chance of competing in the multiparty elections and provided its
former military commanders with salaries, houses, offices, and vehicles to sweeten the
deal” (Weinstein 2002). According to Barbara Walter, the concessions and security
guarantees that were made available to RENAMO through the peace agreement and the
international involvement meant that the party retained its constructive stance. She is
convinced that “RENAMO accepted Chissano’s refusal to set up a coalition government
and did not return to war because the Rome accord had allowed RENAMO to retain
sufficient political power to challenge FRELIMO in the next elections” (1999: 149).7 This
7However, it seems that Walter overestimates RENAMO’s political power in the post-election period. She
argues that the GPA allowed RENAMO to remain the strongest authority in the provinces it controlled,
which effectively gave rise to some sort of ‘dual administration’. This contradicts the assessment by
other observers. In fact, Mozambique’s highly centralized political system has had the strange side-effect
that the winner of the national elections may also appoint members of his own party as administrators of
every locality. As a result, “[c]ontrol is excessively centralized and top-down everywhere, and even in
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clearly had the purpose of accommodating the RENAMO leadership in order to ‘buy’
peace, but it also effectively boosted its chances for competing against FRELIMO during
the elections in 1994. RENAMO’s good showing raised hopes that a victory was attainable
in the next round of elections in 1999. Although, in effect, the 1994 elections facilitated
FRELIMO’s undisputed position of dominance in the Mozambican post-conflict polity,
they also signaled that attaining a victory was not altogether impossible for RENAMO.
Though certainly frustrated about its electoral defeat, this contributed to RENAMO’s
constructive attitude. The party tried to make the best out of the situation and “claimed
credit for forcing the first democratic multiparty elections and for bringing democracy to
Mozambique” (Turner et al. 1998: 162).
However, the 1994 elections can be considered the turning point for the manner of
external influence in Mozambique. They were generally considered free and fair by the
international community and, more importantly, endowed FRELIMO with a solid basis for
executing authority on the national level. External engagement in the post-election phase
was firmly based on the principle of accepting the elected government’s sphere of authority
instead of continuing to mitigate the power asymmetry between FRELIMO and RENAMO
and thriving to provide a level-playing field. FRELIMO clearly made use of this freedom
in order to ensure its continued domination of the polity in the future. Without much
interference from external actors, the party has established an increasingly tight grip on
power in recent years, in part undermining democratic principles. There is some indication
that FRELIMO’s ‘razor-thin’ victory in the 1999 elections was the result of electoral fraud,
as some RENAMO supporters claim until today (see Weinstein 2002: 153). International
observers confirmed that there were flaws in the elections. The Carter Center, for instance,
criticized the lack of transparency in the tabulation of the final results, FRELIMO’s abuse
of its exclusive access to state-run media, and the intimidation of RENAMO participants
in a number of electoral districts. As their final report states, although the elections were
based on a “successful registration exercise supported by both parties, and a generally
satisfactory campaign period”, these flaws have “undermined the credibility of the process,
fueling political suspicions and doubts about the final results” (The Carter Center 2000: 2).
The 2004 elections, in which FRELIMO again gained a comfortable majority, were
accompanied by similar irregularities: the tabulation of the results was as flawed as in
1999, and despite a very low voter turnout (36 percent) there were provinces depicting 100
percent turnout (of which more than 90 percent voted in favor of FRELIMO), suggesting
that blunt attempts for ballot-box stuffing took place (see Ostheimer 2005; Ruigrok 2005).
The low turnout can also be taken as an indicator that Mozambicans have developed a
strong sense of political apathy over time, apparently out of recognition that there is no real
alternative to FRELIMO (see Ostheimer 2005: 125–126). All this indicates that FRELIMO,
step by step, hollows out those very principles on which RENAMO’s constructive stance
Renamo strongholds it is exerted by Frelimo, which can hardly make the yoke seem lighter” (Weinstein
2002: 152).
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was based – the perception of having a fair chance of gaining power through the ballot-box
in the future. However, the international community does not appear particularly eager to
address these challenges. As Brown and Zahar remarked, “the international community
fails to recognise the capture of that state by the governing party, and aid donors actually
provide FRELIMO with resources to strengthen its hold on the system. [. . . ] [They] do
not raise governance problems forcefully even if they are aware of them” (2008: 80–82).
As a result of these developments, RENAMO’s sense of being a realistic alternative to
centralized FRELIMO rule has eroded over time. In addition, after decades in power it
has become questionable whether FRELIMO would accept a RENAMO victory given that
this would imply its sudden and complete exclusion from power. According to Jeremy
Weinstein “[t]he idea that Renamo might gain control of districts, provinces, and the
national government – all at once, with unlimited control – makes Frelimo shudder” (2002:
154). This suggests that FRELIMO is simply not prepared for losing the elections, and
some even believe that it might be willing to abuse the state’s security apparatus in order
to secure its power in case it happened (see e.g. Brown and Zahar 2008). Allegedly,
FRELIMO has already implemented measures aiming at perpetuating its hold on power
in the past. It seems that Mozambique’s political system has quasi become a one-party
system over time in which the boundaries between the party and the state have become
increasingly blurry (Brown and Zahar 2008: 81), and the government “is said to pursue its
policy of exclusion against Renamo on all political levels” (Linder 2010: 14). This further
diminished RENAMO’s electoral opportunities and has given rise to renewed tensions
between the former belligerents. Asked about their evaluation of Mozambique’s future
prospects for peace, a number of RENAMO fighters underline that they have “forgiven but
not forgotten the past”, and that they expect a deterioration of social peace between the
parties (quoted in Linder 2010: 15).
In sum, the case of Mozambique shows that FRELIMO has used its position of domi-
nance in the initial phase of the polity in order to secure its exclusive political influence in
the long run. RENAMO had little choice but to accept this result. However, as the next
section indicates, its calls for political reforms became increasingly louder, and it backed
these demands with occasional ‘saber rattling’ gestures and appealed to the international
community in order to exert more pressure on the government.
c) Threats from Within
The stipulations made above about attempts to deal with threats from within can also
by and large be confirmed in the case of Mozambique. Despite the constructive attitude
that initially characterized the relations between the former warring parties RENAMO’s
sense of being marginalized has repeatedly given rise to tensions and political crises. With
FRELIMO hollowing out democratic principles in Mozambique, RENAMO’s claim for
attaining political power has become more and more unrealistic over time. This has eroded
the main principle on which ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities rely. Brown and Zahar
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even believe that “the prospect that RENAMO will ever win an election, coupled with
the increased alienation of RENAMO supporters, make a reversion to civil conflict more
probable” (2008: 80). If this should become true, Mozambique’s political system provides
little safeguards and “possesses none of the levers that it would need to forestall a possible
relapse into civil strife after the 2004 presidential and parliamentary elections” (Weinstein
2002: 150).
Imagining that nearly two decades after the end of the war RENAMO will transform
back into a rebel group appears unrealistic. However, it can be observed that RENAMO
has increasingly sought more informal channels of influence in the future in order to
compensate for its wavering chances to win more formal power. One of them were ‘saber
rattling’ gestures by which the rebel group tried to remind both the government and
the international community of its own power. For instance, RENAMO has repeatedly
threatened to boycott elections or withdraw from the parliament. This frequently happened
after local and national elections, for instance in 1998, 1999 and 2004 (see Ruigrok 2005:
46). The earliest example is RENAMO’s announcement to withdraw from the 1994
elections just one day before they were scheduled, thereby threatening to derail the entire
peace process. Knowing that the support from opposition parties is key to the legitimacy
of the elections, RENAMO tried to improve its own bargaining position by threatening to
withdraw. This strategy worked. The international community raised its financial support
for Renam and “[a]lmost at once RENAMO announced that it was back in and the crisis
was averted” (R. Jackson 2006: 169; see also Turner et al. 1998: 161; United Nations
2001b). The elections in 1999 can be considered a litmus test for RENAMO’s willingness
to remain a constructive force. This time, RENAMO came even closer to victory than
in 1994, as FRELIMO only won by a “razor-thin margin” (Weinstein 2002: 150). Many
RENAMO supporters were convinced that FRELIMO engaged in electoral fraud in order
to facilitate the election results (Weinstein 2002: 150) and RENAMO made use of what
can be called rhetorical ‘saber rattling’. In an attempt to demonstrate its discontent about
the elections, RENAMO “threatened to proclaim a separate government to preside over the
six northern provinces where RENAMO obtained the majority of its votes”, and its leader
Dhlakama began to set up offices in Beira, the country’s second largest city (Coleman
2008k: 12). This gave rise to fears that RENAMO MPs would refuse to take up their
seats in the parliament which, ultimately, turned out as unfounded. Still, “RENAMO and
Dhlakama [. . . ] continued to agitate against the government, and the country was rife with
rumors of a return to armed conflict” (Coleman 2008k). However, these ‘saber rattling’
gestures came to a sudden end when Mozambique was hit by a serious flood in early
2000, which significantly increased international attention paid to Mozambique. Dhlakama
realized that amidst “the presence of so many foreign humanitarian workers and military
personnel, it was not the time for a show of political squabbling” (Coleman 2008k). After
this, the party came back to its constructive stance, hoping that its patience would pay off
at some point in the future. However, realizing that its chances for gaining power through
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competitive elections were diminishing, RENAMO’s call for a constitutional reform grew
louder.
After the elections in 2004 – in which FRELIMO’s candidate Armando Guebuza could
acquire an absolute majority of 63.7 percent of the votes – RENAMO rejected the elec-
tion results and filed an official complaint with the National Electoral Commission for
accusations of fraud. It only withdrew its boycott after international observers declared
the elections “free and fair” (see e.g. Freedomhouse 2006; Ostheimer 2005). In addition,
RENAMO has repeatedly called for a greater degree of decentralization in the political
system and it has on various occasions – typically after elections – requested FRELIMO to
form coalition governments. This happened for the first time during the run-off elections
for the presidency in 1994, when RENAMO leader Dhlakama requested the formation of a
government of national unity. Afraid that RENAMO might spoil the peace process if its
demands were rejected, the international community was initially still supportive of this
idea and organized meetings between Chissano and Dhlakama with the aim of brokering
a ‘pre-election deal’ between the two parties. Despite international pressure, Chissano
rejected such a deal and instead offered his rival the status of ‘Leader of the Opposition’
– “complete with salary and benefits, including a diplomatic passport” (Rupiya 1998: 16;
see also Brown and Zahar 2008: 78). In the end, Dhlakama had no choice but to give in
and accept FRELIMO’s leadership role. After the dubious elections in 1999, RENAMO
again called for power-sharing, but this time the international community clearly rejected
its demands and called on RENAMO to accept the elections results (Weinstein 2002: 153).
The only issue-area in which RENAMO was able to record at least a partial success was
in the realm of decentralization. Between 1994 and 1997, the government implemented
a series of decentralization measures that led to the formation of so called ‘Autarquias’ –
districts or cities in which a considerable degree of political autonomy is granted. Officially,
there are 33 Autarquias in Mozambique, established between 1994 and 1997 (Linder 2010:
3–4). Due to its boycott of the local elections, RENAMO initially did not profit from the
establishment of these provinces. It was only in 2003 that the party gained control of five
of these districts (Linder 2010: 3–4). Given that RENAMO is otherwise nearly completely
excluded from political participation on both the national and local level, this is obviously
not more than a drop in the ocean. The accusations of fraud accompanying the elections in
1999 and 2004 illustrate that FRELIMO, too, may have made use of more informal and
unconstitutional instruments in order to remain in power.
In sum, the above paragraph illustrates how important it is for the stability of ‘Let the
Winner Take it All’ polities that the excluded party continues to have realistic prospects
for gaining power in future elections. After accusations of fraud regarding FRELIMO’s
victory in the 1999 elections became louder, RENAMO made increasing use of ‘saber
rattling’ gestures in order to demonstrate its discontent with the election results. However,
five years after the end of the conflict, recourse to armed force was an unrealistic option
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for the former rebel group, which is one reason to explain why it by and large maintained
its constructive stance.
d) Promoting Good Governance
Attempts to promote good governance have been the primary concern of external actors in
post-conflict Mozambique, but their efforts to do so have been highly selective and ambigu-
ous. Above, it was stipulated that external actors in ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities
tend to prefer more tacit and ‘technical’ forms of intervention over those which require
direct interference with the interactions between the former warring parties. Since there is
a legitimately elected government whose authority is accepted by all relevant domestic
parties, external actors can be expected to refrain from getting involved into daily politics.
Unlike in power-sharing situations, which require external actors to closely monitor the
distribution of power between the belligerents and/ or to continuously provide incentives
or security guarantees, such direct forms of intervention are considered unnecessary or
even counterproductive in ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities. Instead, external actors
are highly concerned with ensuring that the ruling party adopts the ‘right’ policies – those
which are in accordance with external policy preferences.
In line with these stipulations, the case of Mozambique confirms that external influence
was by and large disguised as a seemingly ‘technical’ and apolitical form of intervention.
Observers have noted in the context of Mozambique that “the international community
prefers to avoid overtly political issues” (Brown and Zahar 2008: 82). External actors
have concentrated their efforts on two issue-areas: on providing an enabling environment
for growth and a self-sustained economic development and on reconstructing the state
“along lines more familiar and congenial to the agencies themselves” (Plank 1993: 424).
This has become apparent with respect to the liberalization policies that external actors
levied on the government through aid conditionality in the 1980s and 1990s. Inspired
by the ‘Washington Consensus’ the World Bank had discovered Mozambique as a target
for its structural adjustment program already before the termination of the conflict (see
e.g. Juergensen 1998: 8; Pitcher 1996: 49; 2006: 93: Pfeiffer 2004: 362). The program
aimed at inducing a far-reaching liberalization of the Mozambican society – Harry G. West
(2008) even speaks of a “neoliberal revolution” – that included privatizing state-owned
companies on a broad scale, fighting corruption, and transforming Mozambique into a
competitive economy. According to Plank, the aim of these efforts was to build “a new
kind of state – technically competent, economically rational, and politically dispassionate
[. . . ]” (1993: 426). In accordance with this goal, external actors put a strong emphasis on
capacity building. For instance, they undertook various parliamentary training programs
“in an effort to build the skill base of Mozambican parliamentarians to manage and pass
legislation in the national assembly” (Weinstein 2002: 154). Conveniently, external actors
have, at the same occasion, also provided them with the polities to adopt. In an effort to
‘rationalize’ Mozambican politics, they have exerted a strong influence on the government
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in order to adopt certain policies that were considered ‘appropriate’ (see e.g. Plank 1993;
de Renzio and Hanlon 2007).
Overall, Mozambique has neatly complied with donors’ demands, contributing to its
reputation as a ‘donor darling’ (see de Renzio and Hanlon 2007: 15). However, the
government had little choice to do otherwise. In those few occasions in which it tried to
resist external actors’ policy preferences, it faced tremendous pressure from international
donors, who have repeatedly brought the issue to the negotiation table. For Renzio
and Hanlon, this illustrates that “donors have been very inflexible in their imposition
of specific policy prescriptions, creating an environment where the questioning of the
predominant development paradigm is seen as a losing strategy for an aid-dependent
country which needs to keep aid resources flowing into the economy” (2007: 20). The
Mozambican case shows that what external actors subsume under technical assistance
has in fact given them a tremendous influence on the content and direction of the policies
adopted. Mozambique’s dependence on external funds has given external actors sizable
leverage on the domestic political process (see e.g. Batley 2005; Manning and Malbrough
2010; Pitcher 2006; de Renzio and Hanlon 2007).8 In this environment, the government is
unlikely to “engage in debates about policy alternatives which could call into question the
predominant development paradigm” (de Renzio and Hanlon 2007: 10).
However, the seemingly apolitical manner of intervention favored by external actors
had strongly political effects which often stood in stark contrast to the government’s
own political goals. This form of external influence placed the Mozambican government
under double-pressure because the FRELIMO leadership needed to meet external actors’
demands while at the same time ensuring the support from its various constituencies from
both within and outside of the party. As Plank remarks, “the West’s policy prescriptions
imply dramatic social and political consequences, including the exacerbation of social
inequalities, the aggrandisement of local and expatriate elites, and the subversion of pre-
vailing political arrangements” (Plank 1993: 428). As a result, “[t]he political survival of
the Government requires a complex and perilous balancing act, which depends on ensuring
the continued flow of aid while simultaneously maintaining the support of key domestic
constituencies. These objectives are often in conflict” (1993: 418).9 As a way out of this
dilemma, the government made use of typical ‘virtual cooperation’ strategies. Realizing
8In the past, most of the aid flowing into Mozambique bypassed the official government budget and went
directly to specific donor-funded projects. In recent years – mostly in response to the general trend for
increasing ‘ownership’ – donors have more and more tried to endow the Mozambican government with
more responsibility regarding the disbursement of aid. However, as Richard Batley highlights, this has
also invited donors “into the heart of the governmental process”, thereby increasing rather than reducing
donors’ influence on the domestic policy process (Batley 2005: 415).
9Plank gives the following example to illustrate this dilemma in the case of Mozambique: “[R]educing
subsidies on food and other goods is one of the conditionalities commonly imposed by the I.M.F. in its
structural adjustment lending, and compliance is frequently required by other donors as a precondition to
their own disbursements of aid. At the same time, maintaining subsidies on food and other ‘essential’
goods is often required in order to gain or keep the political backing of soldiers and urban consumers,
whose support is crucial to the survival of those in power” (1993: 418).
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that it makes little sense to directly resist external policy prescriptions, the FRELIMO
government made use of ‘foot dragging’ strategies in order to mitigate external influence
on domestic policies. Agreements struck with external actors are “commonly accompanied
by delays in or failures of implementation, variously attributable to legislative obstruction,
bureaucratic inertia, or popular resistance” – a strategy which he calls “grudging compli-
ance with conditionality” (Plank 1993: 418). In addition to engaging in ‘foot dragging’
strategies, the government also tried to avert some of the pressure by turning a blind
eye to bureaucratic indiscipline and corruption. This allowed the government to “enter
into formal compliance with awkward conditions while informally pursuing other ends”
(1993: 418–419). Corruption has indeed been wide-spread in Mozambique ever since the
settlement of the conflict (see e.g. Harrison 1999).
Though external actors could successfully enforce liberalization pressure on the Mozam-
bican government, many other aspects of the good governance agenda remained unad-
dressed. For the main part, this becomes apparent with regard to external actors’ tacit
acceptance of FRELIMO’s attempts to perpetuate its domination of the government and
to undermine democratic principles. According to Brown and Zahar, external actors in
Mozambique “prioritise economic reform over political reform and [. . . ] concentrate their
resources on the strengthening of the state and its institutions without sufficiently empower-
ing opposition parties or civil society” (2008: 82). This suggests a strong ambiguity about
the seemingly ‘technocratic’ intervention of outside actors. It implies that external actors
maintain a certain level of trust in the government’s goodwill and commitment to peace.
Although they scrutinize the government’s actions, the degree of surveillance and control
regarding its democratic performance is less direct than in other polity forms. Since they
believe the government to be a legitimate, stable and largely uncontested domestic author-
ity, democratic rule is simply assumed, but not actually enforced. As a consequence, the
government has relatively large freedom in areas such as human rights, minority politics,
freedom of the press, and their relations with the political opposition.
This outcome was reinforced by the phenomenon of ‘euphemistic blindness’, which also
plays an important role in ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities. After the sobering attempts
to create the conditions for peace in Somalia and Angola, the international community was
keen on presenting a success-case to the world and it is still convinced that Mozambique
is an example for statebuilding success like few other cases (see Batley 2005: 417). This
is in part justified. The Mozambican economy grew by high rates in the post-conflict
period, with some years experiencing as much as 11 percent growth. GDP per capita
roughly doubled between 1990 and 2005 and aid dependence decreased from a peak of
above 80 percent in 1992 to below 20 percent in 1999.10 In conjunction with the relatively
stable and constructive political conditions (see above), there was a certain ground for
optimism throughout the 1990s. However, as Jeremy Weinstein warns us, “success breeds
complacency” – a danger that he believes to be most pronounced “in cases where progress
10Figures taken from World Development Indicators Online (2007).
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is evaluated mechanically, as if one is checking off items on a simple list of indicators:
‘Economic growth, check; democratic elections, check; a functioning opposition, check;
and a military out of politics, check!”’ (2002: 150). He highlights that “a deeper look at
Mozambique’s political and economic situation suggests a bleaker interpretation” (2002:
142). Nearly two decades after the end of the civil war, Mozambique is still one of the
poorest countries in the world. Of all 169 countries ranked in the 2010 Human Development
Index, Mozambique occupies the fifth-lowest rank – only three ranks above the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, which continues to be struck by armed conflict until today (UNDP
2010; see also Fauvet 2000; Reisinger 2009a: 488–491). The international community,
though, has focused one-sidedly on the achievements of the Mozambican statebuilding
process, which it has interpreted as an indicator that Mozambique yielded a self-sustaining
peace. This gave rise to the myth of Mozambique as representing an unprecedented success
story or ‘poster child’ of post-conflict reconstruction (Moran and Pitcher 2004; see also
Costy 2004).
In fact, one can argue that external actors have deliberately turned a blind eye to aspects
like corruption or the hollowing-out of democratic principles in order to safeguard Mozam-
bique’s political stability and its characteristics as a success case. Renzio and Hanlon
describe this process as a ‘pathological equilibrium’ that has emerged between external
actors and the government, resulting in “an environment where high aid dependence is
coupled with limited pressure for accountability from civil society, parliament or the media,
who lack political clout and technical capacity, and with substantial rewards for going
along with donor demands” (2007: 10). This suggests that external actors are not only
ignorant of reversals in Mozambique’s democratic performance, but that they effectively
playing in the hands of FRELIMO. As Brown and Zahar argues: “[t]he close international
involvement [. . . ] is contributing to the institutional decay of RENAMO” (2008: 82).
In sum, the above paragraph illustrates that external actors used the presence of a stable
and democratically legitimized government as a reason for limiting their engagement to
the realm of policies, but that they refrained from directly engaging in political issues. The
phenomenon of ‘euphemistic blindness’ accounted for the fact that democratic governance
was simply assumed, but not actually enforced. This prevented external actors from
recognizing some of the dangers that crept in by the backdoor, including FRELIMO’s
gradual attempts to hollow out democratic principles.
5.3 El Salvador
El Salvador experienced an armed conflict that is, in various regards, comparable to
Mozambique‘s civil war. The country has historically been ruled by authoritarian regimes
with close affiliation to rich landowners. Opposition to their rule grew over time and
culminated in a guerrilla war. In its course, the right-wing government was ousted in
1979, making room for a reform-minded revolutionary junta led by exiled opposition
183
Chapter 5 ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ Polities
leader José Napoleón Duarte (Christian Democratic Party, PDC). However, parts of the
guerrilla movement demanded more radical changes and formed the left-wing rebel group
‘Farrabundo Morti National Liberation Front’ (FMLN) in 1980, which enjoyed support
from Cuba and the Soviet Union. This gave rise to a decade-long civil war between the
government and the FMLN in the course of which more than 70,000 people were killed
(see e.g. Allison 2010; Call 2003; Karl 1992; Reiber 2009; Wantchekon 1999; Zinecker
2004: 9–10).
Just as in Mozambique, the Salvadorian civil war was highly ideological and clearly
driven by a typical Cold War logic (see also Heupel and Zangl 2004: 350). The United
States were concerned about a left-wing government emerging in its backyard and therefore
heavily supported the PDC government. Throughout the 1980s, El Salvador – a small
country with not even seven million inhabitants – was the fifth-largest recipient of US
aid (see Reiber 2009: 199; see also Boyce 1995). Between 1980 and 1991, the United
States provided the government with more than $ 4 billion of aid (one billion alone for the
military), which made a victory of the left-wing rebels nearly impossible (see Call 2003:
831). However, neither side was able to yield a decisive victory and “[a]s early as 1984
observers had been keenly aware that the civil war had reached stalemate” (Munck 1993:
80; see also Karl 1992; Walter and Williams 1993). With the Cold War ending, it became
increasingly clear to all participants (including the United States) that there was no military
solution to the war (see Munck 1993: 89; Orr 2001). In April 1990, the conflict parties met
in Geneva and decided to open formal peace negotiations under the auspices of the United
Nations. The first substantive agreement in the peace accords was on human rights and
gave rise to UN peacekeeping mission (ONUSAL) that was deployed even before a formal
cease fire agreement was in place (Burgerman 2000: 68; Montgomery 1995: 142). In what
became known as the ‘negotiated revolution’ (Karl 1992), the final peace agreement was
adopted in Chapultepec, Mexico, between the FMLN and Salvadoran President Alfredo
Cristiani on 16 January 1992 (see e.g. Hampson 1996b: 77).
In accordance with the country’s pre-war constitution, national elections were held in
March 1994, enthusiastically called “elections of the century” by many observers (see e.g.
O’Shaughnessy and Dodson 1999: 99). In the absence of any pre-election power-sharing
deal between the belligerents, the elections were held in a ‘the winner takes it all’ spirit.
ARENA, which had gained power by beating the PDC in the 1989 elections (see Stanley
2006: 104), won most seats in the national Assembly in 1994 (although falling short of an
absolute majority), followed by the FMLN, which emerged as the second strongest force
in the parliament. ARENA’s candidate Armando Calderón Sol outperformed the candidate
nominated by a coalition of opposition parties (led by the FMLN), Rubén Zamora, in the
runoff-elections to the presidency (see Lehoucq 1995; Seligson and Macías 1995).
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5.3.1 El Salvador as a ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ Polity
Post-conflict El Salvador fulfills all requirements for a ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polity.
The elections in 1994 gave rise to a situation in which one of the former warring parties
(ARENA) dominates the executive and effectively excludes the FMLN from participation
in the government. Despite that, the FMLN has accepted its electoral defeat and yet
has remained a relatively constructive party throughout the duration of the Salvadoran
post-conflict polity. Finally, external actors were engaged in El Salvador in a mediative
manner. In conjunction, this allows classifying El Salvador as an instance of a ‘Let the
Winner Take it All’ polity type, as justified in more detail below:
Political Domination. In the 1994 elections, ARENA emerged as the clear winner in
both the presidential and parliamentary elections. The party gained 39 out of 84 seats in the
National Assembly, and their candidate Calderón Sol won more than two thirds of the votes
in the runoff elections for the presidency (see Lehoucq 1995: 179–180). This outcome
manifested ARENA’s position of dominance in the Salvadoran post-conflict polity and
led to the effective exclusion of its former enemy, the FMLN, from governmental power.
Since ARENA lacked an absolute majority in the National Assembly, the party frequently
needed to collaborate with the opposition in order to pass new laws. There is plenty of
evidence for how ARENA deliberately kept the FMLN away from virtually all kinds
of decision-making power and rather engaged in deal-making with smaller opposition
parties, thereby “ignoring or bypassing consultation or compromise” with the FMLN
(Holiday 2005: 80). At the same time, the outcome of the elections confirmed the FMLN
as the second-strongest party in Salvadoran politics. In its first elections, the rebel-group-
turned-party emerged as the second strongest force in the Salvadoran political system,
even outperforming the PDC (see Lehoucq 1995). This gave rise to a strongly polarized
party system, in which there is a deep ideological divide between the government and the
largest opposition party, with the former strongly supporting neoliberal policies and the
latter being largely opposed to the government’s radical pro-market stance (Azpuru 2010:
112; see also Reiber 2009: 205). For the most of El Salvador’s post-conflict history, the
incumbent party has contributed to a deepening of this divide by trying to marginalize the
FMLN (Colburn 2009: 143). ARENA’s position of dominance has “enabled it to thwart
the FMLN’s desire for more rapid and complete fulfilment of the remaining provisions
of the Peace Accords” (O’Shaughnessy and Dodson 1999: 127). Therefore, the period
between 1994 and 2009 can safely be considered a case of domination by one of the former
belligerents.
Constructive Relations. Despite the bloody civil war fought by the parties in El Sal-
vador, there is widespread evidence that they maintained comparatively constructive
relations since it became clear that neither of them was able to win the war. According
to Tommie Sue Montgomery, “the convergence of interests among all the major actors,
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which combined to push the peace process along despite serious problems and setbacks, is
distinctive” (1995: 160). Since his election in 1989, the Salvadoran president Cristiani has
made clear that his first priority was to end the civil war and he immediately made steps in
that direction (see Burgerman 2000: 68). Initially, these attempts were hardly successful.
The FMLN did not trust the government and instead of opening negotiations launched
the largest military offensive of the entire war in November 1989. The offensive gave a
good impression of the army’s incapability to contain the rebels, but it at the same time
indicated that the FMLN was unable to “spark a popular insurrection” (Montgomery 1995:
141). In effect, it manifested the military stalemate between the parties and brought “both
sides back to the negotiating table with a new resolution” (Montgomery 1995: 141; see
also Colburn 2009: 145).
From that moment one, it quickly became clear that both sides had a true interest
in finding a settlement to the conflict. According to Reiber, once the parties initiated
negotiations there were little veto-powers left who were opposed to the peace process
(2009: 226). The only exception is the military, who previously possessed a strong role
in the Salvadoran polity and was consequently the party that had most to lose from the
democratization process. Hence, the armed forces were “far from willing to give up
their autonomy vis-a-vis the civilian authorities” (Munck 1993: 85). Nonetheless, due to
significant pressure from external actors, the military’s resistance could be softened over
time. According to Susan Burgerman, one of the success factors in El Salvador was the
existence of “a pragmatic elite seriously concerned with international prestige and with the
economic detriments of continued civil war and capable of exerting its influence over the
military high command” (2000: 64).
The peace negotiations were opened with an agreement on human rights, leaving aside
issues such as demilitarization, the division of powers in a future cabinet or other ‘hard’
issues that usually tend to characterize peace negotiations from the beginning on (see
Reiber 2009: 198). This was clearly a novelty, as it was “the first instance in which human
rights was made the focus of a conflict resolution process, and the UN for the first time
approached the idea of including institutional reforms aimed at long term human rights
protection in an accords package” (Burgerman 2000: 69). This can be interpreted as
a further sign that the two sides began to develop constructive relations. The ceasefire
agreement, adopted in 1992, was never violated, and both parties accepted the United
Nations’ role as a mediator in the conflict (Montgomery 1995: 158; see also Call 2003:
832). Thus, at the time of the elections it was already evident that “all key political
actors accepted the legitimacy of the elections and the constitutionality of the regime”
(O’Shaughnessy and Dodson 1999: 99). As Montgomery writes, “[b]oth the agreements,
as well as their implementation, could not have happened without the good will of the
parties involved [. . . ]” (1995: 146). What matters most is that the FMLN accepted its
defeat in the elections without hesitation (see Zinecker 2004: 134). Thus, we can generally
consider the relations between the belligerents to be unusually constructive. The only
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notable exceptions – the somewhat bumpy demobilization process and ARENA’s polemic
electoral campaign – are discussed in more detail below.
Mediative Engagement. External actors in El Salvador have generally played an am-
biguous role. This becomes most drastically clear in the case of the United States. It is
beyond doubt that their support of the right-wing government during the conflict is one
of the primary reasons for the long-lasting and bloody civil war (see also Munck 1993:
77). At the same time, they have contributed heavily to the settlement struck between the
parties in 1992 and have generally supported El Salvador’s transition process. Whether or
not their engagement in the post-settlement period was mediative or partisan is a matter
of interpretation, but it appears reasonable to suggest that the ideological proximity with
ARENA – a party that has been “a loyal ally of the United States on almost all relevant for-
eign policy issues” (Holiday 2005: 79) – did not vanish instantly. Nonetheless, the United
States were key for facilitating a settlement between the parties and pressured ARENA to
comply with a number of key provisions contained in the peace agreement (Holiday 2005:
79). In November 1990 for instance, the United States cut military assistance by half and
tied the disbursement of the remaining funds to the condition that the military accepted
UN mediation and showed good faith in the peace negotiations. Therefore, “[c]ontinued
U.S. military support, which the armed forces had been able to take for granted for more
than a decade, was suddenly insecure” (Burgerman 2000: 67). Thus, though the United
States clearly were no neutral third party (if that exists at all), the engagement cannot be
considered partisan either. The most appropriate interpretation seems to be that the United
States simply needed to find a coherent stance towards the FMLN – a rebel group against
which they supported a massive fight just a few years before.
The truly mediative force in El Salvador’s post-settlement history were the United
Nations. As O’Shaughnessy and Dodson put it, “ONUSAL played an aggressive role, not
only in facilitating negotiations but in working to assure compliance by all parties” (1999:
126). The United Nations have enjoyed a very good reputation among all major parties in
El Salvador and their engagement is “now considered among the most successful instances
of implementation of a negotiated peace agreement in the post-Cold War period” (Call
2003: 830; see also Reiber 2009: 230). Unlike in other cases of third-party mediation,
all conflict parties generally perceived the UN as an impartial and trustworthy authority
(Reiber 2009: 241). In their first meeting in Geneva in 1990 – which took place before
a ceasefire was in place – the conflict parties already requested the United Nations to
mediate the peace negotiations and to send human rights observers to El Salvador. This
was the starting point for ONUSAL (Misión de Observación de las Naciones Unidas en El
Salvador), whose mandate was initially limited to verifying the human rights agreement
and which was deployed to El Salvador amidst ongoing fighting (see Burgerman 2000:
70).11
11For a detailed background on the United Nations’ role in El Salvador, see Fen Osler Hampson (1996b).
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ONUSAL was a small mission that remained below the level of a fully-fledged peace-
keeping force. At no point (except for a temporary step-up during the elections), more than
380 military observers and some 600 police observers were deployed (see Department of
Peacekeeping Operations 2010). Despite its small size and low level of physical resolve,
the mission could exert effective pressure on the domestic parties to proceed along the
lines of the peace agreement:
“As a mediator, the UN helped energize the negotiations by being a source of proposals,
by reframing the meaning of concessions, and by creating a sense of urgency, imposing
deadlines, and offering side-payments assurances [. . . ]” (Hampson 1996b: 95-95).
For instance, ONUSAL “successfully pressured the parties into backing away from a side
agreement that threatened to corrupt the new civilian police force” (Burgerman 2000: 71).
The authority stemmed in large part from the high reputation of two diplomats who were
not formally part of ONUSAL, but who were mandated to mediate the peace process:
Alvaro de Soto, mediator on behalf of the UN Secretary General, and Undersecretary-
General Marrack Goulding. Though probably not anticipated, the two individuals “proved
crucial to unblocking the implementation process when it was stagnant” and assisted
the peace process until long after their official mandates ran out (Call 2002: 393). The
successful organization of the elections in 1994 can in large part be contributed to external
actors and the resources they invested (see Reiber 2009: 236). It is against this background
that Boyce remarks: “External assistance unquestionably has contributed greatly to postwar
reconstruction and to the consolidation of peace” (1995: 2101). Out of the above reasons,
it is beyond doubt external actors as a whole played a mediative role in El Salvador.
5.3.2 Polity Dynamics in El Salvador
Together with Mozambique, the peace process in El Salvador is widely considered to
be one of the most successful cases of post-conflict peacebuilding of all times (see e.g.
Call 2003: 830). El Salvador has remained peaceful since the adoption of the ceasefire
agreement in 1992 and the country has since then become profoundly de-militarized. Since
the beginning of the peace negotiations in 1991, it has made huge progress on the way
to becoming a consolidated state. El Salvador must today be considered a multi-party
democracy in which different parties can effectively compete against each other, as it has
been most impressively confirmed by the FMLN’s victory in the 2009 elections. This
distinguishes El Salvador from Mozambique, where RENAMO’s influence has become
more and more marginalized over time. Although the outcome in both cases was different –
Mozambique’s political domination was self-reinforcing, whereas El Salvador’s was not –
the political dynamics in the two cases have many things in common. Some of the general
characteristics of ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities that were confirmed for Mozambique
in the previous section can also be found in El Salvador.
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a) Overcoming Commitment Problems
As in Mozambique, overcoming the commitment problems in the initiation phase of the
polity has been a central aspect of El Salvador’s route to peace. As stipulated above, ‘Let the
Winner Take it All’ polities provide an environment where overcoming the commitment
problems between the parties is possible as long as external actors provide sufficient
security guarantees. In El Salvador, two aspects turned out as the most important ones
in this regard: providing security guarantees in order to facilitate the disarmament of the
warring factions, and providing a level playing field for both parties to compete in the
upcoming elections.
In El Salvador, attempts to disarm the factions were characterized by the typical dilemma
as it occurs in most settlement situations: “The guerrillas took the position that they could
not agree to a ceasefire unless they were guaranteed a political role; the government said
the FMLN could not have a political role so long as it remained armed” (Montgomery
1995: 144). Both sides feared that their opponents could fail to fulfill their part of the
agreement, which nearly prevented a settlement to the conflict. As a result, the path to
the negotiation table became a “long and checkered one” (Munck 1993: 80; see also
Hampson 1996b: 91–92). But even after a ceasefire agreement was signed by the parties,
the FMLN remained skeptical towards the prospect of disarming and demobilizing its
forces. Knowing that this would have implied to give away its main source of bargaining
power vis-à-vis the government, the FMLN was highly reluctant to comply with the
disarmament provisions contained in the agreement: “Demobilization secured cooperation
from the government, but drastically reduced the ability of the FMLN and other domestic
groups to force the government to treat them seriously, reform its practices, and stick to
the agreement” (Hampson 1996b: 97).12 In what can best be described as a ‘foot dragging’
strategy, the party tried to postpone the demobilization of its forces as long as possible
(see Zinecker 2004: 66–67; see also Munck 1993: 84). It was only after the United States
provided the rebel group with the necessary security guarantees that the FMLN gave up
its resistance (Munck 1993: 86). But even then, it retained a sizable number of weapons
in secret arms caches, apparently as another safeguard in case the peace process derailed.
This was only discovered after one of these secret storage spaces exploded in May 1993.
After this incident, the former rebel group fully complied with the disarmament program:
“An embarrassed FMLN [. . . ]” dissolved more than 100 arms caches in El Salvador and
abroad and turned in tons of arms and ammunition (Call 2002: 394; see also Reiber 2009:
196). This behavior vividly illustrates how fears for giving away one’s only means of
coercion can prevent even constructive parties from complying with their disarmament
12In her book about the ambivalence of peace in El Salvador (in German), Heidrun Zinecker sheds further
light on the FMLN’s fears: “[D]er FMLN besaß ein eigenes Druck- bzw. Sanktionsmitel nur so lange,
wie er noch nicht demobilisiert war und seine Waffen nicht abgegeben hatte. [. . . ] Die Regierung
vermochte hingegen, zumindest nach der Demobilisierung der FMLN, die Erfüllung der sich für sie aus
dem Friedensabkommen ergebenden Forderungen ohne eine größere Furcht vor dessen Sanktionen zu
stornieren.” (2004: 66).
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obligations. In ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities, where one party has exclusive control
of the security apparatus, this behavior is likely to be more pronounced than in ‘Let’s
Share’ polities, where both have at least theoretically a certain control of the means of
coercion.
The government-side was initially equally reluctant to comply with the disarmament
and demobilization provisions. For instance, it was unwilling to dissolve the National
Guard and the Treasury Police (Munck 1993: 84). However, in the end it gave in and the
disarmament process could be finished two months behind schedule. On 17 December
1992, “the FMLN demobilized the last of its 12,362 combatants, officially bringing to
a close the armed conflict” (Call 2002: 394). The actor most resistant to any sort of
change were the armed forces, who potentially were to lose most from the adoption of
the peace accords. High-ranking military officers involved in human rights violations
during the civil war were the greatest obstacle to peace. A report published by the UN-led
Truth Commission13 investigated 34 cases of severe human rights violations, and came
to the conclusion that more than 90 percent of them could be ascribed to the military.
The report “called for immediate removal of those implicated, together with a genuine
assertion of civilian control over the military, including promotions and the military’s
budget” (O’Shaughnessy and Dodson 1999: 105). ARENA and right-wing political parties
were reluctant to comply with the recommendations, but after significant pressure from
the United States and other external actors, “a purge of the military was carried out, the
security forces were disbanded, and thus a major obstacle to democratic transition was
reduced if not eliminated” – although those responsible for the crimes were never held
accountable (O’Shaughnessy and Dodson 1999: 106–107).14
The second crucial role external actors played in the initiation phase of the Salvadoran
polity was bridging the asymmetry between the belligerents and ensuring that the FMLN
could gain a realistic perspective for successfully competing against ARENA in the
elections. As in Mozambique, the power relations between the former belligerents in El
Salvador were highly asymmetric at the time of the peace negotiations. ARENA had formed
the government since the elections in 1989 and therefore enjoyed all the benefits typically
associated with holding office. In contrast, the FMLN was “a rebel army organized to
fight a military, not an electoral, campaign” (Allison 2010: 110). The role of the United
Nations was to provide a level playing field for both parties, and it “had to address [the]
inequality in power between the two parties throughout its mission” (Hampson 1996b: 97;
see also Munck 1993: 89). In this regard, one of the most crucial challenges was to design
the FMLN’s transition from a rebel group to a political party. External actors generally
13The Accords provided for the establishment of a Truth Commission, whose mandate was to investigate
human rights violations committed by all parties. For a further background analysis of the Truth
Commission in El Salvador, see in particular Margaret Popkin (2004).
14Against the recommendations of the Truth Commission (but with the approval of the United States), a
general amnesty was adopted by the Salvadoran parliament in March 1992. The government transferred
many of the purged military officers to lucrative jobs in state-run companies and civil society (see
Hampson 1996b: 87–88; Zinecker 2004: 70–71).
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fulfilled this role successfully, as discussed in more detail in the next section on political
competition.
In sum, the above paragraph illustrates that the Salvadoran elites were highly reluctant
to comply with their disarmament obligations and that the army offered significant resis-
tance against the reform of the security sector. Despite the constructive stance that had
characterized the parties’ relations from the beginning on, the FMLN maintained secret
arms caches as an insurance in case peace fell apart. This illustrates that the absence of
power-sharing agreements may make it more difficult to induce an effective disarmament
of the rebel groups even if they have benevolent intentions. The asymmetry between the
FMLN and ARENA also turned out as a crucial factor that needed to be addressed in the
initiation phase of the polity. Although external actors played a less vital role in this regard
as in Mozambique, they greatly assisted the rebel group’s transition into a political party.
b) Manner of Political Competition
Regarding the manner of political competition in ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities, it
was stipulated above that, in this polity type, both parties accept the status quo but at the
same time strive for increasing their share of power in the future. Since only one of them
can be represented in the government, the excluded party strives for gaining power in the
next round of elections, which the incumbent government wants to prevent. The perception
held by the excluded party of having a realistic chance to successfully compete against
the government can be seen as an important factor for the maintenance of constructive
relations (5.1).
This last aspect was a crucial factor in the case of El Salvador. As RENAMO in Mozam-
bique, the FMLN needed to be propped up significantly in order to be able to compete in
the elections against ARENA. Several problems existed that made this process difficult. For
example, the FMLN consisted of different and largely incompatible ideological currents
that made its registration as a single political party difficult (see Zinecker 2004: 124–125).
In addition to that, the FMLN was, at the time of the 1994 elections, still in a much more
precarious position than RENAMO in Mozambique because ARENA received by far the
greatest share of campaign funds: 54 percent, compared to only seven percent received
by the FMLN (see Wantchekon 1999: 815). A specific agreement with the international
community to compensate this disadvantage (along the lines of the RENAMO Trust Fund
in Mozambique) was lacking. Thus, it is not surprising that “ARENA’s campaign had
better quality and more financial resources” (Azpuru 2010: 111).
Nonetheless, the FMLN could develop a sense of having a realistic chance of winning
the elections at some point in the future. Despite the little campaign funding it could rely
upon, public opinion polls conducted before the elections suggested that a large number of
voters was still undecided and that ARENA’s presidential candidate Calderón Sol, though
being the most popular candidate, would be unable to collect enough votes for an outright
victory (see Lehoucq 1995: 181; see Allison 2010: 114). As a result of this, the FMLN
191
Chapter 5 ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ Polities
could be relatively confident that it would survive the elections without losing face. Its
confidence was further raised when external actors – most notably the United States –
signaled to take the rebel group seriously and engage in negotiations at eye level (see
Thale 1997: 192). In addition to that, the United States were strong supporters of the
land-reallocation program, which aimed at allocating land to ex-combatants (both from the
government and the FMNL) in order to support the demobilization process: “The United
States, through USAID, provided about 85 percent of the funding for the transfer of land
to FMLN ex-combatants and their supporters, making the program relatively costfree to
the Salvadoran government” (Thale 1997: 194). Though this cannot be compared to the
millions of dollars handed over to RENAMO in Mozambique, the prospects offered for
the FMLN were ostensibly encouraging enough in order to motivate it to overcome its
internal cleavages and become a constructive political force. Partly as a result of these
factors, the FMLN’s transition to a political party worked smoothly even in the absence
of sizable financial compensations. Michael Allison calls the FMLN’s transition into a
political party one of the “most enduring legacies” of the Chapultepec Accords (2006:
145). As a result, the elections took place in an environment of effective competition and
endowed the FMLN with a real perspective for continuing as a political party and defeat
the incumbent government at the ballot-box in the near future.
Overall, the FMLN’s exclusion from power was less pronounced than it was the case for
RENAMO in Mozambique. The former rebel group maintained a strong base of popular
support from left-wing and center-left voters (Azpuru 2010: 129) and could therefore hope
to influence a number of core policies in its own favor. In the short run, it tried to use
ARENA’s lack of an absolute majority in the parliament for engaging in political deals
with the ruling party, but ARENA found ways to marginalize the FMLN’s influence in the
parliament (see Holiday 2005: 79). However, in the long run the FMLN counted on the
ballot-box as the vehicle to power (see e.g. Wantchekon 1999: 819). Unlike RENAMO in
Mozambique, the FMLN could steadily improve its performance in the national and local
elections in the years following the 1994 elections and therefore gained more influence in
the polity over time (Azpuru 2010: 129). This strengthened its conviction of being able to
gain power through formal-constitutional means at some point in the future. Already in the
elections to the legislative assembly 2000, the FMLN gained a majority of votes although it
failed to win the presidential race. This was a shock to ARENA, which subsequently tried
to engage in “perverse political trade-offs” with the smaller opposition parties in order
to reduce the FMLN’s influence to a minimum (Holiday 2005: 79). However, ARENA’s
strategy of discrediting the FMLN and portraying it as a party that “simply cannot be
reasoned with” (Holiday 2005: 80) has not worked out in the long run. Though ARENA
could once again win the presidential elections in 2004, the FMLN’s candidate Salvador
Sánchez Cerén won the 2009 presidential race (Azpuru 2010; Colburn 2009; Greene and
Keogh 2009). This successful completion of what Samuel Huntington called the “two-
turnover test” (1991) was widely considered a remarkable achievement whose “greatest
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significance is likely to be that they mark the country’s first peaceful turnover of power
since the nation-state became independent in 1821” (Colburn 2009: 144).
In sum, the case of El Salvador therefore confirms that patience in ‘Let the Winner Take
it All’ polities may pay off in the long run. Arguably, the FMLN’s constructive stance
can be explained in great part by its improving electoral prospects. Though fifteen years
have passed between the end of the civil war and the FMLN’s capture of power, its steady
improvement of election results has certainly prevented the party from relying on more
informal and unconstitutional means of political competition.
c) Threats from Within
Due to the parties’ constructive stance in El Salvador, the country was not exposed to
direct political threats and has not faced severe political crises in the post-conflict phase.
However, there have been a number of potentially destabilizing developments with the
potential to threaten the stability of the polity as a whole, most notably the alarming crime
rates and the rising political apathy associated with it.
In post-conflict El Salvador, ordinary (i.e. non-political) crime has become a major
threat to the continued democratic consolidation. El Salvador is the country of origin for
youth gangs like the ‘Mara Salvatrucha’, which are characterized by an extremely high
level of violence and have spread over all large parts of Latin America in the past years
(Zinecker 2004: 163).15 These gangs have contributed to an environment in which the
use of deadly force has become ubiquitous over time. In the mid-nineties, the number of
homicides was three times as high as during the civil war. El Salvador today still counts
as the second most violent country in Latin America after Colombia (Reiber 2009: 256).
Zinecker makes the argument that the threat of being shot is today much more present in
the life’s of Salvadorans than it was during the civil war (2004: 163–165). This has turned
out as a severe threat to democratic consolidation and, according to Reiber, has caused a
retreat into private affairs that tends to hamper the ability for political interest articulation
(2009: 206).
External actors have largely ignored this aspect or were at least unaware of its potentially
dangerous effects on democratic consolidation. As Charles T. Call highlights, “[t]he
crime wave underlies the most provocative aspect of El Salvador’s police and justice
reforms: international observers consider them a success story, but Salvadoreans are far
less enthusiastic.” For him, this is a clear indicator for the “divergent interests between
international actors and citizens of post-conflict societies” (2003: 829). The long term
effects of this crime wave on democratic consolidation may be detrimental. In a public
opinion survey conducted in 1999, more than half of the respondents considered the high
crime rates a reason for abolishing democracy and introducing a more rigid system of rule
– more than twice as many as for any other reason mentioned (see Call 2003: 828). This
15For a detailed characterization of youth gangs in Latin America, see in particular Huhn, Oettler, and Peetz
(2010).
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gave rise to a growing political apathy among Salvadorans. Since the ‘elections of the
century’ in 1994, voter abstention has frequently reached levels of 60 percent and more.
This can be seen as an indicator for a low inclusiveness of the political regime, but also
generally pulls the legitimacy of the election results into question (see Zinecker 2004:
132).
In sum, despite the constructive relations prevailing in El Salvador, the country faces a
number of challenges with the potential to become threats to the process of democratic
consolidation – most notably the pervasive crime rates. Already now, this has undermined
both the meaning of democracy in the eyes of Salvadorans and its substantive importance.
A closing of political space and a move towards more authoritarian politics – as favored
by many Salvadorans – would certainly be the wrong signal to deal with this problem.
Ultimately, the presence of electoral competition in which both of the former conflict
parties face a realistic chance of winning future elections has been a major source for
political stability in El Salvador in the past (see above). Gradually doing away with these
opportunities would certainly create new political tensions as it would imply the effective
diminishing of electoral opportunities for either of the two factions.
d) Promoting Good Governance
With respect to external attempts for promoting good governance in ‘Let the Winner
Take it All’ polities I assumed above that external actors are more likely to focus on the
realm of policies rather than politics (‘apolitical intervention’) and that their obsession
with the achievements in the realm of formal democracy prevents them from recognizing
potential threats and dangers to democratic consolidation (‘euphemistic blindness’). The
case of El Salvador generally confirms these two stipulations. By placing an overly
strong focus on political stability and the adoption of the ‘right’ policies, external actors
have overlooked a number of shortcomings in El Salvador’s democratization process. In
addition, by concentrating exclusively on the positive aspects of El Salvador’s post-conflict
reconstruction process, they were in part unable to recognize dangerous or detrimental
developments and react accordingly.
The first aspect – the apolitical engagement by external actors – was as pronounced in
El Salvador as in Mozambique. Broadly speaking, it can be argued that external actors
(and, among them, the United States in particular) were less concerned about fostering a
thorough democratization of Salvadoran politics than about ensuring that the government
neatly complied with external actors’ policy agendas. As James K. Boyce suggests,
international donors have “for the most part limited their purview to more conventional
macroeconomic concerns [. . . ]” and have “not extended their conditionalities to the peace
process, for example, by setting targets for greater reallocation of government spending
to programs mandated by the Peace Accords” (1995: 2109). This has mainly expressed
itself in the imposition of pro-market policies. The United States have invested billions
of dollars throughout the 1980s in order to prevent El Salvador from being ruled by a
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Socialist government, and even after the end of the Cold War the they have exhibited little
enthusiasm for the perspective of a left-wing government being in place that rejected its
policy prescriptions. As David Holiday puts it, “[w]hat really seems to matter for US
officials is less the redemptive idea of free elections than the electoral dominance of a
conservative political project keenly attuned to America’s global priorities” (2005: 77).
With ARENA, such a ‘political project’ was in place. As Boyce writes, there has
been “a close correspondence between the macroeconomic policy preferences of the
Government of El Salvador and those of the donors [. . . ]” at least since ARENA took
power in 1989: “Both parties favored government budget deficit reduction, low inflation,
privatization of the financial sector and of agricultural exports, trade liberalization, and
streamlining of the state” (1995: 2108). ARENA was extremely loyal to the United States
and supported the country in key foreign policy issues, not least by deploying troops to
Iraq (see Holiday 2005: 79). International Financial Institutions needed to apply little
‘strong-arm diplomacy’ (Holiday 2005: 78) (i.e. tying the disbursement of loans to tight
conditions) in order to see its liberalization agenda implemented in El Salvador. For
instance, the country was the first of the six signatory nations to both ratify and implement
the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) (see
Madrid 2009: 189).16 This fostered El Salvador’s reputation as “the clear leader in Central
America in pushing for free trade initiatives” (Holiday 2005: 79). Hence, external actors
could be highly satisfied with ARENA’s governance performance. Its neat compliance
with the external policy prescriptions naturally induced the United States to develop a
certain bias for the incumbent government, which undermined the democratization agenda.
At times, it even proved questionable whether the US would “tolerate a leftist, or even a
moderate, social democratic government that pursued policies somewhat more independent
of Washington [. . . ]” (Holiday 2005: 81). The US themselves fueled such doubts when
US officials, concerned about a possible victory of the FMLN, warned Salvadorians of the
negative consequences for the bilateral relations with the United States. Roger Noriega,
then Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs under president George
W. Bush, addressed the Salvadoran people and underlined that the United States “[. . . ]
know the history of this political movement, and for this reason it is fair that the Salvadoran
people consider what type of relations a new government could have with us” (quoted
in Reiber 2009: 234). As Reiber comments, these threats stood in stark contrast to the
16DR-CAFTA is a free-trade agreement modeled according to the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), which aims at fostering the free flow of goods and services between the signatory countries.
According to Cori Madrid, the benefits for El Salvador, which has enjoyed a privileged access to the US
market already before the agreement, are dubious. She shows that the agreement is likely to harm El
Salvador’s agricultural sector and further increase its trade deficit with the United States, thereby risking
to deepen rather than diminish poverty in El Salvador. She explains El Salvador’s strong support for the
agreement because of the potential benefits to be expected for a small but influential fraction of society:
the Transnational Capital Class (TCC): “Because of their interest in productive processes that take place
on a global level, they serve to benefit from this agreement despite the fact that CAFTA-DR will likely
destroy what little remains of a Salvadoran productive structure” (2009: 208).
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democratic spirit of the peace agreement and the rhetoric of democratization put forward
by external actors (2009: 235).17
Another example can be seen in the fact that the United States strongly argued in favor of
channeling the vast majority of aid through the government (instead of NGOs), dispersing
fears that this may lead to a neglect of the population in formerly rebel-held territories
(see Boyce 1995: 2107). It is questionable whether, in the case of an FMLN-controlled
government, their preference would have been the same. However, it must also be noted
that external actors’ ability for imposing ‘strong-arm diplomacy’ has eroded over time.
Observers agree that since the 1994 elections, “[t]he international community’s ability
to exercise influence and offer incentives has [. . . ] diminished” (Thale 1997: 199; see
also Boyce 1995; Reiber 2009). This had the effect that external actors not only ignored
shortcomings regarding the implementation of the peace agreement or El Salvador’s
general democratization process, but that they were at times unable to induce change in
the Salvadoran polity even if they wanted to (see Reiber 2009: 222). One blatant example
is ARENA’s unwillingness to implement a series of electoral reforms that were suggested
in order to prevent the occurrence of electoral irregularities in future elections. Although it
would have been easy for ARENA to pass the required laws – it lacked only three votes
in the National Assembly for an absolute majority – it refused to do so (see Thale 1997:
199).18
As in Mozambique, the problem of ‘euphemistic blindness’ has additionally hampered
the promotion of good governance principles also in El Salvador. Soon after the 1994
elections, international attention quickly moved elsewhere “although some important
elements of the peace process were still unfinished [. . . ]” (Thale 1997: 198). External
actors hailed the country as a clear success case of post-conflict peacebuilding. This
enthusiasm does not come as a surprise when taking El Salvador’s encouraging post-
conflict development into account. There is no doubt that El Salvador today is “far more
democratic” than ever before (Stanley 2006: 112). However, external actors’ overly positive
assessment of El Salvador’s achievements was sometimes exaggerated. For instance, the
Bush administration hailed El Salvador as a role model for the democratization of Iraq
and Afghanistan (Holiday 2005: 77). Aside from the fact that these cases are absolutely
not comparable,19 this anecdote illustrates that external actors were unable or unwilling
17In the German original: “Diese Drohungen standen in völligem Widerspruch zu jahrelangen interna-
tionalen Bemühungen um eine Demokratisierung der salvadorianischen Politik, um eine Verbreitung
demokratischer Praktiken und eine Förderung demokratischer Werte.”
18In this context, Boyce speaks of a “reverse leverage” that ARENA could exert on external actors because
the United States were keen on preventing a Socialist government by all means during the war (1995:
2112). All in all, ARENA’s neat compliance with external policy preferences speaks against generally
stipulating that the government possessed strong reverse leverage vis-à-vis external actors in the post-
conflict period. As argued in chapter 7, reverse leverage plays a much stronger role in cases of partisan
engagement, which was not the case in post-conflict El Salvador.
19As Holiday comments: “That the Bush administration has consistently relied on El Salvador – an otherwise
insignificant country in the United States’ ‘backyard’ – as a singular case of success might be interpreted
as a sign of weakness for the administration’s argument” (2005: 77).
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to recognize the dangers and potential threats that became apparent in El Salvador’s post-
conflict development. Their inclination to conceive success in a rather one-dimensional
manner (that is, focusing exclusively on elections and the subsequent implementation of
liberal policies) caused them to overlook the deficits existing in other dimensions, for
instance justice, poverty reduction, public security, inclusiveness of the regime, and the like.
Critical observers maintain strong doubts about the success of the liberalization policies
and the quality of Salvadoran democracy as a whole. As in Mozambique, the presence of
high growth rates has had little effects with regard to alleviating mass poverty. As Holiday
explicates:
“One of the lowest tax rates in the hemisphere and a growing fiscal and trade deficit,
combined with the state’ s overall underinvestment in public needs, have resulted in
negligible gains on many social and economic fronts and leave formidable challenges
for the near future” (Holiday 2005: 81).
A complete collapse of the Salvadoran economy is only prevented due to the vast volume
of money transferred by emigrated Salvadorans to their families in the form of remittances,
which by far overshadows the importance of foreign investment or official aid (see Reiber
2009: 223). Therefore, it is fair to say that “[m]igration and remittances have arguably
done more to ensure El Salvador’ s economic stability than any measure taken by the state”
(Holiday 2005: 82). In conjunction, these factors have the potential to erode some of the
achievements reached since the adoption of the peace agreement in El Salvador. Already
two years after the ‘elections of the century’ a majority of Salvadorans expressed the need
for a ‘strongman’ to solve the country’s problems (see Call 2002).
Other problems arise as a result of the incomplete separation of powers, which becomes
most evident with regard to the weak standing of the rule of law. During most of El
Salvador’s history, courts have been highly politicized and have systematically played the
role as the right hand of the incumbent regime. In the peace agreement, not more than
half a page was dedicated to the reform of this sector, containing only vague provisions
(see Zinecker 2004: 149–150). According to Charles T. Call, “[t]he judicial reforms in the
accords were agreed upon in a hurried fashion during the final stales of negotiations [. . . ]”
(2002: 407). Although, since the peace agreement, the members of the national court of
justice are no longer elected by a simple majority but by a two-thirds qualified majority of
the votes in the national assembly (and hence, in most cases, the approval of the opposition),
ARENA could circumvent the effectiveness of this provision by effectively buying the
support from the Christian Democrats (PDC) in return for positions in the government
(Zinecker 2004: 150–151). This eroded Salvadorans’ confidence in this institution, which
had ranked “near the bottom of public regard for state institutions” in public opinion polls
conducted in 1996 and 1997 (see Call 2002: 408).
In sum, external actors’ hailing of achievements in the realm of formal democracy and
their low priority for a deep-rooted democratization process have led to a blossoming of new
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problems and challenges – among them the rising socio-economic exclusion of large parts
of the population and the weak standing of the judiciary vis-à-vis the other powers. This
has helped to create an environment that may turn out as a threat to democracy as a whole in
the long run. Though this aspect is much less pronounced than in Mozambique, observers
of the Salvadoran case frequently warn us that challenges such as the blatant deficits in
public security may erode the basis on which democracy rests. Call, for instance, reminds
us that “justice and security are tremendously important for the survival of democracy and
its relevance for everyday life” (2003: 828). Currently, democracy is certainly not very
much at risk in El Salvador. The FMLN’s recent victory in the elections is an important
turning point with the potential to break political apathy and renew Salvadorans’ belief in
democracy as a whole. However, whether or not these effects are short-term, temporary
measures or may have a long term effect will mainly depend on the FMLN’s ability to
address many of the country’s most blatant problems.
5.4 ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ Polities: Conclusions
The two cases discussed as examples for ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities illustrate that
the optimistic attitude external observers often have with respect to this polity type is not
unfounded. Both Mozambique and El Salvador have remained peaceful for a period of
more than fifteen years by now. In both cases, recourse to large-scale organized violence
appears highly unrealistic. However, the case studies have also demonstrated that even this
polity type may become subject to ‘threats from within’ with the potential to lead to more
confrontational relations over time. Overall, the cases suggest the following conclusions
with respect to the four analytical dimensions of analysis (for a short summary, see 5.1 on
page 199):
First, both cases support the theoretical argument that ‘Let the Winner Take it All’
polities provide an environment in which overcoming commitment problems is possible
as long as external actors provide sufficient security guarantees and effectively bridge
the asymmetry that naturally prevails between the parties in this polity type. Unlike in
‘Let’s Share’ polities, where both parties have a certain control over the means of coercion,
complying with disarmament implies that one party entirely loses its means of coercion
and hence its bargaining power vis-à-vis its opponents. In Mozambique, this induced
the parties to retain ‘reserve military forces’ and caused the disarmament process to take
slightly longer than expected. However, the parties soon gave up these ‘virtual cooperation’
gestures. After the international community had taken decisive measures to bridge the
asymmetry by enabling RENAMO to successfully compete against FRELIMO in the
elections, the former rebel group became fully constructive. A similar outcome could be
observed in El Salvador. Although both parties had entered peace negotiations and agreed
to the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force even before signing a formal ceasefire
agreement, they were reluctant to comply with their disarmament obligations and the
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Aspect Mozambique El Salvador
Commit-
ment Prob-
lems
Asymmetry between the parties caused
problems in the disarmament process; se-
curity guarantees and ‘war fatigue’ induced
the parties to comply with their obligations;
external actors were key for bridging the
political asymmetries by propping up RE-
NAMO and giving it a realistic perspective
in the upcoming elections.
Elites were highly reluctant to comply with
disarmament obligations and the reform of
the security sector; despite its constructive
stance the FMLN maintained secret arms
caches as a life insurance in case the peace
falls apart; large public support for the rebel
group reduced the necessity for external ac-
tors to bridge the asymmetry between the
parties.
Political
Com-
petition
External actors were key for supporting
RENAMO’s transition from a rebel group
to a political party; close outcome of the
elections encouraged RENAMO to seek its
chances in subsequent elections; accusa-
tions about electoral fraud caused increas-
ing tensions among the former belligerents
and induced RENAMO to call for political
reforms and closer external scrutiny; so far
patience has not paid off for RENAMO.
Strong public support encouraged the
FMLN to seek its chances in subsequent
elections; ARENA tried to strengthen its
position by keeping the FMLN out of all
decision-making processes; FMLN won
presidential elections after fifteen years in
opposition, illustrating that patience may
pay off in ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ poli-
ties.
Threats
from
Within
Relations between the former belligerents
become tenser with RENAMO’s diminish-
ing prospects of gaining power; occasional
outbursts of election related violence; REN-
AMO makes use of rhetorical saber rattling
gestures (‘virtual confrontation’) but always
comes back to constructive stance.
No imminent threat to stability; FMLN has
no reason to seek informal channels of po-
litical competition; creeping developments
(youth violence and rising political apathy)
have the potential to undermine the success
of democratic consolidation.
Good
Gover-
nance
External actors maintain trust in popularly
elected government; bias for seemingly
apolitical forms of intervention (capacity
building and liberalization policies); prob-
lem of ‘euphemistic blindness’ prevents ex-
ternal actors from reacting to the gradual
hollowing-out of democratic principles.
ARENA was a ‘donor darling’ government
that neatly complied with external policy
prescriptions; external actors (especially
US) had a tacit preference for ARENA and
favored stability at the expense of democ-
racy; problem of ‘euphemistic blindness’
induces external actors to overlook press-
ing problems in the realm of economics and
justice.
Table 5.1: Dynamics of ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities
provisions regarding the reform of the security sector contained in the peace agreement. In
addition, the FMLN maintained secret arms caches, ostensibly as a life-insurance in case
peace falls apart. However, after these were discovered the party became fully cooperative
and committed to the disarmament program. External actors played an important role as
facilitators of the agreement but there was less necessity for hard security guarantees (as
embodied by a strong peacekeeping force) as in Mozambique.
Second, the cases support the argument that both sides need to have realistic chances for
winning the elections in the initiation phase of ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities. The
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central feature of this polity type is that the excluded party accept the status quo although
it does not participate in the government itself. In order to maintain its constructive
stance, it is necessary that the excluded party continues to have realistic chances of
gaining power through the ballot box at some point in the future. The rationale of the
excluded parties in ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities is that ‘patience pays off’. It is
therefore crucial for the establishment of ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities that political
competition is initially carried out on a level playing field. Ensuring this level playing
field required a significant engagement of external actors in both cases. In Mozambique,
they were key for endowing RENAMO with the ability to successfully compete against
FRELIMO in the elections by supporting its transition from a rebel group to a political
party. These efforts were generally successful, which is illustrated by the close outcome of
the 1994 elections. Due to Mozambique’s centralized system of rule, FRELIMO’s victory
manifested RENAMO’s total exclusion from governmental power. Yet, the former rebel
group fared better than expected and faced realistic chances of gaining power in subsequent
elections. However, throughout the ensuing years it became increasingly questionable
whether political competition really took place on a level playing field. The 1999 elections
took place amidst signs for electoral fraud, which clearly pulled FRELIMO’s close victory
into question. The situation was similar in El Salvador, where the FMLN could compete
against the government-side at eye level. Thanks to a less centralized political system,
the former rebel group’s exclusion from governmental power was much less pronounced
than in the case of Mozambique. Due to its strong degree of popular support and its good
showing in the elections, the FMLN could be confident about its future perspectives as
a political party. Though ARENA used all legal means in order to curtail the FMLN’s
political influence and keep the party out of decision-making processes on all levels, it
could not prevent the party from gradually gaining political influence. The former rebel
group won a majority of seats in the parliament in 2000 and the presidential race in 2009.
Hence, for the FMLN patience has really paid off in the end.
Third, the cases confirm that ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities may experience
a worsening of political tensions if it turns out that patience may not pay off for the
excluded party in the end. This has mainly become apparent in Mozambique, where
RENAMO experienced a painful loss in the elections in 1999 and 2004 and accused
the government of having forged the election results. For short periods, the party fell
back to informal and unconstitutional means of political competition, which became most
clearly apparent by RENAMO’s claim to establish a parallel government in the RENAMO-
controlled areas. Ostensibly, these measures served the purpose of underlining its own
power vis-à-vis the government, and possibly also of wielding concessions from the ruling
party. However, the party never went beyond these ‘saber rattling’ gestures and generally
remained a constructive force. In El Salvador, there was no need to engage in informal and
unconstitutional means of political competition since the FMLN could steadily improve
its electoral performance. Threats there have arisen mainly as a result of ordinary (non-
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political) crime, which has reached alarming proportions. This has entailed the risk of
gradually undermining the constructive foundations of this polity-type as more and more
citizens appear willing to accept a more authoritarian system as long as it is capable to
improve the situation. The next elections will show in how far a post-conflict country like
El Salvador is able to deal with this problem.
Finally, the cases illustrate that ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities offer a good
pretext for external actors to confine their engagement to apolitical aspects and to refrain
from direct confrontations with the government. Although, overall, ‘Let the Winner
Take it All’ polities offer a favorable environment for promoting good governance, this
can potentially hamper actual attempts to push for stricter good governance standards.
In Mozambique, external actors hailed the peaceful conduct of the 1994 elections as
a show-case of successful post-conflict reconstruction and withdrew from the country
within a few months after the elections. However, unlike in power-sharing polities, the
presence of an elected government that was even accepted by its former enemies ostensibly
induced external actors to conclude that the polity was instantly self-sustaining. As a
consequence, external actors mainly concentrated on imposing liberalization policies
and capacity building programs while at the same time overlooking some of the more
fundamental developments taking place below the facade of the ‘poster child’ case. Most
notably, they have done little to counter the gradual hollowing-out of democratic principles
or the pressing poverty problems the country faces despite its tremendous growth figures.
El Salvador offers a similar picture. More than in Mozambique, external actors (most
notably the United States) maintained a clear preference for ARENA in the post-conflict
phase, although this was clearly below the level of a partisan engagement. Their preference
was fostered by the latter’s willful compliance with external policy preferences in the realm
of economic liberalization. This seemingly ‘apolitical’ intervention often had tremendous
political effects and put tremendous pressure on the government. At the same time, external
actors have avoided to become involved in more political issues or call for a fair manner of
political competition.
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Chapter 6
‘The Winner Took it All’ Polities
‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities, discussed in the previous chapter, are characterized
by comparatively constructive relations maintained by former warring parties, despite
the fact that only one of them is part of the government. This is a relatively uncommon
constellation. Far more frequent are cases in which political domination by one of the
warring parties occurs in an environment of mistrust, suspicion and sometimes even open
hostility. Two different kinds of this constellation can be distinguished: Situations of
obstructive domination in which external parties intervene in a mediative manner, and
situations of obstructive domination in which external actors intervene in a partisan manner.
The former type, called ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities, is discussed in this chapter, the
latter type (‘You Stay Out’ polities) is discussed in the subsequent chapter.
The by far greatest share of all post-conflict polity cases in the sample (in total nine
cases) fall under the ‘The Winner Took it All’ type: Cambodia (after the 1993 elections),
Côte D‘Ivoire (the period between the adoption of the ‘Linas-Marcoussis Agreement’ of
January 2003 and the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement of March 2007), Sierra Leone (the
period starting with the election of May 2002), the DRC (the period following Joseph
Kabila’s election for president in 2006), Haiti (the period between Aristide’s downfall
and the elections in 2006), Angola (since 2002), Tajikistan (between 1996 and 2001) and
two Liberian cases (the period of Charles Taylor’s presidency and the situation after the
elections in 2006) (see table A.1 on page 327). The reign of Charles Taylor in Liberia, and
the case of Côte d’Ivoire are discussed in detail in this chapter because, in combination,
they provide the best fit to the case selection criteria formulated in section 1.4.2. Sierra
Leone, the DRC, Tajikistan and the second Liberian case were dismissed from the outset
because other post-conflict periods of these countries were already used for illustrating
the dynamics of other polity types. Angola after the assassination of Jonas Savimbi is not
a typical case because the opposition much weaker than in the other cases (see A.2.3).
As two non-African cases, Haiti or Cambodia could have been used in order to fulfill the
criterion of ensuring geographical variety, but in comparison in turned out that Liberia and
Côte d’Ivoire were more representative of the ‘The Winner Took it All’ polity type.1 Hence,
1Although Cambodia is classified as an instance of the ‘The Winner Took it All’ polity type, certain doubts
remained about the classification of external engagement as mediative; therefore the case cannot be used
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in this case, the ‘typical case’ criterion took precedence over the principle of ensuring
geographic variety.
6.1 A basic model of ‘The Winner Took it All’ Polities
The basic features of ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities are schematically sketched in
figure 6.1 on page 205. The figure illustrates that only one party (‘Side A’) controls the
government while the other is effectively excluded from access to government authority.
However, unlike in the case of ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities discussed in the previous
chapter, the former warring parties maintain obstructive relations, which indicates that a
basic consensus among the parties about the distribution of formal authority is lacking
and that the Side B contests the legitimacy of Side A governing alone. This is illustrated
by the thick black line dividing the warring parties. External actors have a mediative and
non-discriminatory influence on the dynamics unfolding between the warring parties (as
illustrated by the arrow connecting external actors and the dashed line around the former
belligerents).
Based on that, a number of assumptions can be made with respect to the internal
dynamics of this polity type. In principle, the obstructive relations between the former
belligerents suggest that the parties are unlikely to engage in genuine cooperation. We can
expect the relations between the former warring parties to range from ‘virtual cooperation’
to outright hostility. The government-side is most likely eager to defend its position of
dominance by all means, while the excluded parties usually conceive the government’s
rule as illegitimate and therefore try to overcome their marginalization in the polity by all
means. In this obstructive environment, external actors can be expected to face a similar
dilemma as in ‘Doomed to Share’ polities. There, it was argued that this polity type
requires significant external efforts for securing the post-conflict order, but it was also
demonstrated that external actors are often unwilling or incapable of engaging in genuine
enforcement efforts. Instead, their engagement is more adequately described as a ‘virtual
enforcement’ effort, indicating that external actors concentrate on a few visible milestones
of their statebuilding agenda without cross checking what occurs behind this seemingly
democratic facade. In ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities we can expect a similar pattern of
external engagement. The obstructive relations prevailing between the former belligerents
in conjunction with the thorough exclusion of one of the former conflict parties from access
to governmental power potentially leads to tensions which require a decisive intervention
by external actors in order to prevent a relapse into violence or large-scale human rights
abuses. Given the constraints external actors are exposed to themselves, it may often be
as an unequivocal ‘The Winner Took it All’ case (see A.5.3). The second post-conflict period in Haiti
cannot be considered a typical ‘Doomed to Share’ case either because it was triggered by a political
crisis rather than a large-scale armed conflict. Although there were riots which qualified the case as an
instance of a minor armed conflict, this is not a typical constellation for ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities
(see A.11.1).
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Figure 6.1: ’The Winner Took it All’ Polities (simplified illustration)
the case that they lack both the willingness and the ability to successfully perform this role.
Two reasons may account for this. First, the existence of a formal settlement between the
parties and the existence of a formal government that, at least formally, enjoys international
legitimacy and recognition gives external actors a pretext to reduce their support. Second,
the ruling party puts additional pressure on external actors to withdraw or to refrain from
infringing with domestic affairs. As a result, there is a strong impetus for winding down
external support at a relatively early stage. These mechanisms are now illustrated in more
detail for the four analytical dimensions.
Overcoming Commitment Problems. Just as ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities, ‘The
Winner Took it All’ polities are necessarily asymmetrical. The parties standing outside of
the government are excluded from all benefits and privileges associated with the control
of the state apparatus. More importantly even, they have no control of the formal means
of coercion, including the security forces and the army. Due to the obstructive relations
prevailing between the former warring parties, this is likely to hamper attempts to overcome
commitment problems entirely. Though external actors can potentially provide security
guarantees for the excluded parties and hence can help to overcome some of the structural
problems that tend to hamper a full cooperation between the belligerents, a thorough
disarmament process is most likely doomed to failure because the excluded parties have no
motivation to disarm. Knowing that external actors cannot remain engaged in the country
eternally, the opposition must fear being exposed to one-sided acts of violence by the
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ruling party. In addition, realistic prospects for gaining power through peaceful means (as
it is the case in ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities) are lacking. As a result, there is hardly
any real perspective for commitment problems to be overcome in ‘The Winner Took it All’
polities. The parties are highly unlikely to fulfill their obligations with regard to aspects
such as disarmament, demobilization or the formation of a joined army. More than it is the
case in ‘Doomed to Share’ polities, the parties – in particular those excluded from formal
authority – are likely to openly resist their disarmament obligations because they do not
even have to maintain a veil of cooperation. This may give rise to a pattern of ‘genuine
confrontation’ to external disarmament efforts. However, it is also conceivable that the
parties make use of ‘foot dragging’ and ‘virtual cooperation’ strategies, in particular if
they count on mobilizing greater external support for their cause. This may give rise to
attempts by which the parties try to meet part of their disarmament requirements without
giving away any real share of power. For instance, the former rebel groups may decide to
hand in spare weapons of poor quality and use the money of the disarmament program in
order to acquire newer weapons elsewhere.
Manner of Political Competition. As noted above, the manner of political competition
in ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities is characterized by the perceived lack of a real
perspective for the excluded party to gain power through democratic means and/ or the
impatience to attempt to do so. Unlike in ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities, where both
parties accept the status quo and engage in competition for future political power out of
the conviction that ‘patience pays off’, a basic consensus about who governs is lacking in
‘The Winner Took it All’ polities. The excluded party perceives the government’s rule as
illegitimate and its own exclusion from power as unfair. As a result, it strives for changing
the distribution of power in its own favor as soon as possible. This almost necessarily
amounts to the use of informal instruments of political competition, for instance attempts
to mobilize public opinion against the government with which the excluded parties try to
unmask the government’s authoritarian tendencies and by which they aim at underlining
the government’s lack of legitimacy. These attempts ultimately address external actors in
the hope that they decide to support the opposition’s cause. The government, in turn, can
be expected to use its control of the state apparatus in order to constrain the opposition’s
room for maneuver. However, although the government is in a strong position and does
not necessarily need external actors’ ongoing support, it has to prevent external actors
from identifying with the goals of the opposition and, most importantly, prevent them
from switching to a partisan manner of engagement in favor of the opposition parties.
Instead of openly devoting itself to an authoritarian mode of governance, the ruling party
is therefore likely to symbolically adopt a number of democratic gestures with which it
masks its exclusive hold on power. This may include farce elections or symbolic attempts
to include opposition members into the government, but also ‘foot dragging’ strategies
with which the government tries to appease external actors without complying with their
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democratization requests. At the same time, the government can be expected to likewise
make use of ‘blaming and shaming’ strategies with the aim of portraying the opposition as
a source of instability and as a potential spoiler to the peace process. This ultimately serves
as a pretext for justifying its strong hold on power and, in some cases, even to legitimize
repressions or measures of one-sided violence against the political opposition.
Threats from Within. Since, for the opposition, the route to power through formal
elections is a distant and uncertain perspective, we can expect them to fall back to other
means for gaining power. This may range from peaceful means, for instance attempts to
mobilize popular opinion against the government, to violent means, including preparations
for another armed insurgency. For the government, the excluded opposition may easily
become a threat to its hold on power. Its attempts to mobilize domestic and international
opinion against the ruling regime could theoretically deprive it of its public support and
spur resistance against its rule. Hence, from the perspective of the regime, a free press and
an independent sphere of civil society may become a dangerous instrument of political
mobilization with the potential to weaken its power. As a result, the government is likely to
apply various measures to restrict the opposition’s sphere of influence and establish a tight
control of the political space. However, with the frustration about its own exclusion rising
over time, it cannot be ruled out that the excluded parties attempt to secretly re-arm and
start another insurgency against the government. This gives rise to even more questionable
and informal attempts to contain or even destroy the opposition and may generally lead to
a (re-)militarization of politics.
Promoting Good Governance. With respect to promoting good governance principles,
‘The Winner Took it All’ polities pose a particularly difficult environment. Most impor-
tantly, the ambiguity between external actors’ claims and their achievements is likely to
be significant. The following considerations can be expected to play a role. In general,
given their mediative stance, we can expect external actors to have a genuine interest in the
promotion of good governance and democracy. This distinguishes this polity type from
‘You Stay Out’ polities discussed in the next chapter, where external actors’ interest in
stability overrides their preference for democracy. However, the far-reaching exclusion
of the opposition parties in conjunction with the prevailing obstructive relations poses an
imminent threat to stability and bears the potential for tensions to become violent. This
requires significant stabilization efforts by external actors and potentially even a long-
lasting military engagement. Based on the assumption that external actors shy away from
costly and long-lasting engagements, it is questionable whether they are able and willing to
commit the necessary resources that a thorough stabilization of the situation would require.
In addition, we can expect the incumbent government to underline its sovereignty and to
exert pressure on external actors to withdraw in order to avoid a too strong involvement into
external affairs. This can facilitate many different outcomes, but as a general rule it seems
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fair to assume that genuine successes in the realm of democratization are highly unlikely.
In cases where external actors are reluctant to commit the necessary resources or where
they give in to pressure to withdraw, the most likely result is a serious deterioration of
domestic governance, possibly masked by thin veil of democratic politics. Where external
willingness to remain involved is higher, a halfhearted peacebuilding approach may emerge
in which external actors remain physically present but fail to address the main challenges
in an adequate manner.
6.2 Liberia
Liberia is a country with an unusual history, because it is one of the few African countries
that has never been formally colonized. It was founded by former slaves returning from
the Unites States to the African continent and gained the status of an independent republic
in 1847. Descendents of the initial American settlers formed a specific class, the so-called
Americo-Liberians, which dominated the country’s political life for more than a century.
Although being a small minority – today they comprise not more than four percent of
the population – these settlers regarded themselves as a superior and more ‘civilized’
class, which found its expression in the establishment of an autocratic system that greatly
benefited members of the Americo-Liberian elite and systematically excluded indigenous
Liberians from political and economic participation (see e.g. Adeleke 1995: 572; Ellis
1995; [1999] 2007; Huband 1998; Outram 1999: 164). Their reign lasted until 1980, when
a young army officer called Samuel Doe overthrew the last Americo-Liberian president,
William Tolbert, in a violent coup and established an autocratic system that lasted for
roughly one decade. Doe, who could neither read nor write, built a regime that benefited
his own ethnic tribe, the Krahn, and violently suppressed dissent or opposition (see e.g.
Ellis [1999] 2007; Huband 1998: 27–44; Reno 1999: 86; Sawyer 2004). His rule was
“bathed in blood from the day it started” (Huband 1998: xvii).2
Doe’s rule constitutes the immediate context for the civil war that broke out in Liberia
in 1989.3 Its main protagonist was Charles Taylor, a former member of Doe’s cabinet, who
was exiled from Liberia after having allegedly diverted $ 900,000 of Liberian government
funds in 1983 (Ellis 1999: 52–53).4 He returned to the region in the late 1980s and
2Doe and his cronies immediately executed incumbent President William Tolbert and most of his ministers
on Monrovia’s ‘golden beach’, broadcasting the massacre live on television (Huband 1998: xvii).
3Liberia has experienced two civil wars since the end of the Cold War. The transitional government (NTGL)
established after the termination of the second civil war is discussed as an example for a ‘Doomed to
Share’ polity in the appendix.
4As a consequence of his alleged diversion of government funds, Taylor was detained in the United States
(where he had also studied), but was able to escape to Ghana and, later, Burkina Faso, where he joined
a group of exiled Liberians and nationals of other West African countries formed around veterans of
the failed coup attempt against Doe led by Thomas Quiwonkpa in 1985 (see Ellis 1999: 67–69). This
multinational group formed the basis of the NPFL, kept together by the determination to finally defeat
Doe (Ellis 1999: 67–69; see also Sesay 1996b: 395–396).
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formed a rebel group, the ‘National Patriotic Front for Liberia’ (NPFL), which launched
an attack against Doe’s government forces on Christmas Eve 1989 (see e.g. Abdullah
and Rashid 2004: 180; Gershoni 1997: 55). Doe was overthrown and killed by a NPFL
splinter-group in 1990,5 and Taylor was, from this moment on, celebrated as a liberator
who freed Liberia from Doe’s illicit system of rule (Ellis 1995: 167; see also Harris 1999;
Sesay 1996a: 36). However, since the NPFL failed to gain control of the capital, the civil
war lasted for another six years. A decisive intervention by the Economic Community of
West African States (ECOWAS), led by Nigeria, prevented Taylor from seizing Monrovia
(see e.g. Adeleke 1995; Berman and Labonte 2006). Nonetheless, he managed to establish
control over large portions of Liberian territory in the following five years – an area
that was popularly referred to as ‘Taylorland’ or ‘Greater Liberia’ (Reno 1999: 92). To
counterbalance the fact that he was not head of state (and hence did not have access to
official state resources), Taylor imposed a tight political and administrative system in the
areas he controlled and engaged in various illicit activities in order to finance his war
activities (see Reno 1999: 92–93; 2004).
There were numerous attempts to solve this war through power-sharing arrangements.
Various transitional governments6 were established between 1990 and 1996, but none of
them contributed to a settlement of the conflict (see Sesay et al. 2009: 39). Peace became
for the first time conceivable with the adoption of the ‘Abuja Accords’ (see Government of
the Republic of Liberia 1995) and the ‘Supplement to the Abuja Accords’ (see Government
of the Republic of Liberia 1996) in 1995 and 1996, respectively. They cleared the way for
national elections to be held in 1997.7 Surprisingly, the warlord Charles Taylor yielded
a sweeping victory in the polls and became Liberia’s official head of state (see Harris
1999). However, he created an exclusive regime that soon raised resistance from opposition
groups and, ultimately, triggered another armed insurgency in the country. Not more than
two years after Taylor took office, Liberia found itself in the middle of its second civil war,
driven by a newly formed rebel group called LURD (‘Liberians United for Reconciliation
and Democracy’), which was later joined by a group called MODEL (‘Movement for
5Doe was abducted by a group called INPFL (Independent NPFL) shortly after his arrival at the ECOMOG
headquarters in Monrovia. A video tape of the later events shows how Doe, nearly naked and tied at
his wrists, sits amidst numerous INPFL rebels on the floor, being interrogated by INPFL leader Prince
Johnson. Johnson then gives order to torture his ‘prisoner’, which begins by his ears being cut off. He
supposedly died from a loss of blood a few hours later (Ellis [1999] 2007: 9–11).
6These were the Interim Government of National Unity of Liberia (IGNU), founded in August 1990
and led by Prof. Amos Sawyer as the country’s transitional president (Howe 1996: 154); the Liberia
National Transitional Government (LNTG), established in the ‘Cotonou Peace Agreement of 25 July
1993 (S/26272), the Liberia National Transitional Government II (LNTG II), established by the ‘Abuja
Accords’ of 19 August 1995 (S/1995/742); and the Liberia National Transitional Government III (LNTG
III), established in the Supplement to the Abuja Accords, signed on 17 August 1996 (see International
Crisis Group 2002a: 36–43 for a chronology of the events in Liberia between 1989 and 2002; see also
Korte (1997) for a more detailed description).
7The latter led to the implementation of a power-sharing government (Liberia National Transitional
Government III) that was, compared to earlier agreements, relatively effective (see Outram 1999: 167–
169).
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Democracy in Liberia’).8 Taylor’s six years of rule as the Liberian president are discussed
here as an instance for a ‘The Winner Took it All’ polity.
6.2.1 Liberia as a ‘The Winner Took it All’ Polity
The polity that emerged with Taylor’s election for president fulfills all characteristics of a
‘The Winner Took it All’ Polity. There is no doubt that his rule was autocratic, repressive
and hardly inclusive. Resistance against his rule was pronounced, which accounts for
clearly obstructive relations between the former belligerents. External actors’ engagement
in this situation was rather ambiguous, since it was – with ECOMOG’s support for the
government – highly partisan during the war, but has increasingly leaned towards a
mediative manner in the post-conflict period. These features of Liberia’s post-conflict
polity are now highlighted in further detail:
Political Domination. With his victory in the 1997 presidential elections, Charles Taylor
was able to gain exclusive control of Liberia’s executive and administrative structures.
His excellent showing during the polls came as a surprise to many observers, but many
explained it retrospectively by his strong position and the relative weakness of all other
candidates: A “destitute, starved, and traumatized population recognized that in these
conditions it was preferable to vote for the strongman who could defeat the other factions,
and perhaps leave Liberians to their own devices to survive” (Reno 2004: 125). This gave
him a comparative advantage over other former warring parties, whom he systematically
excluded from power. Already during the election campaign, he ran on the cynical slogan
“He killed my Ma, he killed my Pa, but I will vote for him” (Outram 1999: 169), leaving
no doubt that he was willing to act as a spoiler to the peace process in case Liberians
voted for any other candidate (see also Smith and Wiesmann 2003: 2). Members of the
Krahn and Mandingo tribes9 previously aligned with Samuel Doe were the first victims
of his repressive policies (see e.g. Mehler 2010: 11; Outram 1999: 170). Taylor’s flimsy
attempts to mask his strong hold on power, like his move to include opposition politicians
in the government, were interpreted by critics “not as a gesture of reconciliation but as a
device to incorporate and stifle the political opposition” (Outram 1999: 169). All in all,
‘Taylor-the-president’ was hardly different from ‘Taylor-the-warlord’ (see e.g. Reno 2002:
8For a detailed discussion of the origins and background of the LURD insurgency, see in particular:
International Crisis Group (2002a: 4–13). For MODEL, see International Crisis Group (2003e).
9The terms Krahn and Mandingo are used to refer to two out of Liberia’s official sixteen ‘tribes’. As the
smallest tribe, the Krahn comprise about 5 percent of the population and there are “few political and
cultural institutions that unite the various Krahn lineages [. . . ] other than the tendency of successive
governments to lump them together for administrative convenience” (Ellis [1999] 2007: 33). The
Mandingo tribe comprises predominantly Muslims who consider themselves “descendants from an
ancient aristocracy of traders and warriors who migrated from the Savannah to the forest area, for whom
their possession of Islam is a badge of high status” (Ellis [1999] 2007: 38). In present-day Liberia, “many
Liberians persist in regarding Mandingo as outsiders, people who do not belong to Liberia, even when
they have lived their for generations” (Ellis [1999] 2007: 39).
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842). His rule was accompanied by marked human rights violations, targeted killings
of opposition politicians, and systematic attempts for self-enrichment (see Gberie 2005:
61–62; Outram 1999: 169). As the International Crisis Group remarked:
“From 1997 to 1999 Liberian opposition figures were murdered or threatened into
leaving the country, freedom of expression was restricted, the army was not reformed
as promised and efforts at genuine reconciliation were half-hearted. Taylor has run
the country as a personal fiefdom, and continues to take a cut from the operation of
most major businesses” (2002a: 21).
The result was a quickly progressing centralization of the political system, as more and
more opposition politicians were forced into exile. This also led to a radicalization of the
opposition and gradually set the stage for the resurgence of violence (Tawiah and Aboagye
2005: 76). As former interim president Amons Sawyer noted, “[w]ithin a year of targeting
those who had fought against him, Taylor had created the conditions for the formation of
an armed resistance group, LURD, that operated from bases in the south-eastern forest
region of Guinea” (Sawyer 2004: 450). Therefore, Taylor’s six years of rule as Liberia’s
official president can be regarded as a blatant case of political domination.
Obstructive Relations. Since the outbreak of the civil war in 1989, the relations between
the warring factions had been highly complex and fluid. Unlike in many other armed
conflicts where the number of armed factions was small and stable (e.g. Mozambique),
the Liberian civil war was characterized by a large and heterogeneous group of factions of
which some even changed sides during the war (see Reisinger 2009b). The main factions
were Taylor’s NPFL, which initially comprised fighters from the Gio and Mano tribes, a
splinter-group called Independent NPFL (INPFL) affiliated primarily with the Gio tribe and
later turning against Taylor, and a group called ULIMO (United Liberation Movement of
Liberia for Democracy), which mainly comprised fighters from the Krahn and Mandingo
tribes, among them many fighters from the disbanded ‘Armed Forces of Liberia’ (see
Gershoni 1997: 59–62; Reno 1999: 105). ULIMO later split along ethnic lines, with
most Mandingos joining the ULIMO-K (led by Alhaji Kromah) and most Krahn joining
ULIMO-J (led by General Roosevelt Johnson) (see Howe 1996: 156; Korte 1997: 69). As
the different factions were joined together less by ideological orientation or political goals
than by a loose affiliation with certain tribes, it was extremely difficult to create a basic
level of trust among the different groups. Moreover, all of them profited economically
from participating in the civil war; therefore the incentive to defect constantly remained
present. Most of the early peace agreements failed because they were “blatantly repudiated
at one time or another by the different armed factions, but almost consistently by Taylor’s
NPFL” (Sesay et al. 2009: 39). Also, none of the factions had been thoroughly disarmed
at the time of the settlement (see Bøås 2001: 711; Tanner 1998: 138).
Against this background, it is no surprise that the warring parties continued to maintain
highly conflictual relations at the time of the settlement. Taylor’s election as president
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further fueled the mistrust and suspicion among the various factions and members of the
Krahn and Mandingo tribes (who were the main beneficiaries of Samuel Doe’s patronage
networks) rightly feared to become thoroughly excluded from political participation. The
anti-Taylor factions had a hard time to accept that they had been defeated at the ballot-box,
which is most clearly illustrated by their recourse to armed force within a period of only
one year. The formation of LURD and MODEL, the two anti-Taylor insurgencies, is
directly linked to Taylor’s oppressive style of government. LURD, until its emergence
in July 2000 a largely unknown actor, can be described as “essentially a loose coalition
of anti-Taylor forces, drawing upon a variety of militia factions and refugee groups [. . . ]”
(International Crisis Group 2002a: 4). It has its roots in Guinea, from where it launched its
first invasion against Liberia. MODEL was founded in March 2003 in Côte d’Ivoire, and,
just as LURD, appears to be mainly a coalition of convenience. For both groups, it “has
been difficult knowing where they stand ideologically and many of their documents are
vague along these lines” (Jaye 2003: 645). At the latest from this moment on, the relations
have transformed from (passive) obstruction to (active) hostility. All in all, the relations
between the warring parties can therefore safely be considered obstructive.
Mediative Engagement. A large number of external parties was engaged in Liberia’s
first civil war and the ensuing post-conflict phase. Some francophone west African
countries supported Taylor’s insurgency, including Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso (Jaye
2003: 646). ECOWAS played a key role during Liberia’s civil war since its very beginnings
and certainly was the only factor that prevented Taylor from yielding an outright military
victory. Upon its creation on 7 August 1990, ECOMOG (‘ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring
Group’) was, in various regards, a novelty: It was the first regional peace enforcement
mission deployed in any third world country and at the same time the first regional mission
to which the United Nations were a secondary partner (see Howe 1996: 146). During the
civil war, ECOMOG made extensive use of its peace enforcement authority – arguably to
such an extent that it became a conflict party itself. Though their involvement effectively
prevented Taylor from seizing the capital in 1990, some see this as the primary reason that
the conflict continued for another six years:
“Had victory been obtained at this point, one would not be writing of a CPE [Complex
Political Emergency, CR] but merely of one of the many military takeovers that have
occurred in sub-Saharan Africa. What transformed the situation into a CPE was the
intervention of the Economic Organisation of West African States (ECOWAS). The
ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) [. . . ] stalemated the military
position and preserved the remnants of the collapsed Liberian state” (Outram 1999:
167).
Thus, in the early phase of its engagement, ECOMOG clearly was a partisan force. In
order to achieve its goal, it even collaborated with different anti-Taylor factions and
provided them with logistical, material and financial support (Howe 1996: 156). However,
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there is reason to argue that after more than five years of engagement and 12 failed
peace agreements, ECOWAS changed its strategy in 1995. Before, some of the crucial
warlords had always been excluded from participating in peace talks and none of the
crucial factions had been represented in the transitional government (Interim Government
of National Unity, IGNU) that existed between 1990 and 1994. The factions, including
Taylor, therefore rejected the legitimacy of the transitional body (see Korte 1997: 60–63).
Matters began to change in August 1994, when the Ghanian president Jerry Rawlings was
elected as ECOWAS chairman. He clearly put a new momentum to the peace process
and “warned the warlords that unless they ‘talked peace’ quite seriously, the monitoring
group would be pulled out of Liberia” (Sesay 1996b: 399). This change in leadership
was of paramount importance for the ultimate adoption of the Abuja peace agreements.
The UN Security Council viewed “with appreciation the diplomatic achievement of [. . . ]
president Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, in bringing together the factions (sic!) leaders of
Liberia to sign the Accra Agreement [. . . ]” (U.N. Security Council 1995). Already in
December 1994, the Accra Peace Agreement was adopted, which included the formation
of a five member governing committee, the so called “Council of State”, consisting of
representatives from four major factions (NPFL, ULIMO, AFL, LNC) and one traditional
chief leader (see Government of the Republic of Liberia 1994, part II). This was the first
time in Liberia’s turbulent conflict history that warlords were accepted as participants of
an official government body (Korte 1997: 62; see also Abdullah and Rashid 2004: 180).
After the elections in 1997, ECOMOG’s role was reduced to training the new national
army and, due to quarrels with Taylor, ECOMOC was forced to leave the country entirely
by December 1998 (see International Crisis Group 2002a: 40; Tawiah and Aboagye 2005:
73). Meanwhile, the greater part of the international community, including the European
Union and the United Nations, was initially willing to “give Taylor a chance” (International
Crisis Group 2002a: 21; see the discussion below for further detail). All this suggests that
external engagement in the early phase of the Taylor regime must be regarded as mediative.
6.2.2 Polity Dynamics in Liberia
The case of Liberia confirms the plausibility of many of the assumptions made about
‘The Winner Took it All’ polities above. This is illustrated below with regard to the four
overarching themes: dealing with commitment problems, competition for power, threats
from within, and external engagement for good governance.
a) Overcoming Commitment Problems
In the basic model of ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities presented above (6.1), it was
argued that this polity type provides a particularly difficult environment for overcoming
commitment problems. The exclusion of parts of the former belligerents from access to
formal authority in conjunction with the prevalence of obstructive relations accounts for
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the most difficult structural environment of all polity types discussed so far. At the same
time, it is fair to assume that the excluded opposition is unlikely to disarm even when
external actors provide sufficient security guarantees – in part out of fear that they might be
exposed to one-sided acts of violence by the government once external actors withdraw and
in part because recourse to armed violence represents a measure of last resort to contain
the government.
With respect to disarmament, Liberia is not an ideal case for illustrating the dynamics
of ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities because the main efforts for disarming the warring
factions took place before the elections in 1997 – i.e. before this polity-type was formally
established. Most of the peace agreements adopted throughout Liberia’s checkered conflict
history contained provisions for the disarmament and demobilization of the factions.
Already the Cotonou Agreement of 1993 provided for a disarmament process conducted
by ECOMOG and monitored by the United Nations (see Government of the Republic of
Liberia 1993, Art. 6). Though it was never implemented, this agreement provided the
blueprint for all subsequent peace agreements, including the Abuja peace agreement of
1995, which cleared the way for the 1997 elections. Efforts for disarmament began in early
1996 but needed to be postponed to November due to the worsening security conditions on
the ground (see United Nations 2001a). However, as Victor Tanner remarks, “Liberia, with
its multiple factions, numerous ‘casual’ fighters, absence of regular armies and lack of
peacetime opportunities for ex-fighters, was a difficult candidate for demobilization” (1998:
136). Although, upon the conclusion of the program in January 1997, the UN observed that
it was initially met with “remarkable enthusiasm” by combatants of the various factions,
a closer look reveals that the process was characterized by significant flaws and that the
parties’ compliance with the disarmament provisions was mainly symbolical.
In total, UNOMIL reported that some 20,000 fighters had been disarmed and about
10,000 weapons (of which one fifth was unserviceable) and more than one million rounds
of ammunition surrendered by the end of the disarmament period on 9 February 1997
(see United Nations 2001a: n.p.). These are not insignificant numbers. The total number
of combatants from all factions was initially estimated at about 50,000 to 60,000, but
this figure was later revised by ECOMOG to 33,000 fighters (see Tanner 1998: 137).
This enabled UNOMIL to announce that more than sixty percent of all combatants had
been disarmed (see United Nations 2001a: n.p.). However, the total number of weapons
collected by UNOMIL did “not coincide with the expected figures before disarmament”
(Creative Associates International 1997: 20), and there is evidence that a considerable
number of those who pretended to be fighters were in fact civilians who got hold of a
weapon or sufficient rounds of ammunition (see Creative Associates International 1997:
16). Or, if they were real fighters, they certainly did not belong to the avant-garde: “As in
many demobilization operations, the weaker elements gravitate toward the demobilization
centres in order to secure access to the benefits, encouraged and often ‘sponsored’ by the
real fighting troops” (Tanner 1998: 137). In addition, roughly one fifth of the weapons
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surrendered were unworkable, and the overall quality of the weapons handed in was poor
(see Tanner 1998: 137). Reportedly, on one occasion ECOMOG troops accepted an
“ornamental cannon, a tear gas canister, a bayonet and a grenade held together by duct
tape as ‘warlike materials”’ (Creative Associates International 1997: 16). UNOMIL took
this as the reason to introduce a stricter definition of what counts an eligible weapon, but
this immediately led to a slowing-down of the disarmament process (Creative Associates
International 1997: 16). Despite that, witnesses reported that at the end of the disarmament
process “would-be fighters were being processed regardless of whether they presented a
weapon or not” (Tanner 1998: 137). All this raises significant doubts with respect to the
seriousness by which the parties engaged in the disarmament process and the effectiveness
of the program as a whole. Most importantly, it can be ruled out that the roughly 8,000
serviceable weapons ultimately surrendered significantly constrained the factions’ ability
to fight in any significant sense. It is more likely that different factions “retained substantial
caches as ‘life insurance’ in case the peace process fell apart” – as Wolf-Christian Paes
observed during the disarmament period in 2004 (2005: 257). There is every reason to
believe that it was not the effectiveness of the disarmament program as such but rather “the
faction leaders’ desire to ‘behave’ until elections [. . . ] that kept the guns off the streets”
(1998: 137). All this suggests that the parties engaged in extensive ‘virtual cooperation’
gestures in an attempt to circumvent their disarmament obligations.
The reluctance to comply with the provisions of the Abuja Accords was squarely
confirmed with regard to the reform of the security sector, which was supposed to take
place after Taylor’s election as president. The Abuja Accords contained provisions for
the reform of the national army on the basis of an equal representation of the country’s
different ethnic groups. Obviously, for Taylor this would have implied a limited influence
on the armed forces and a potential threat to his rule in case disloyal officers staged a
coup against him. Out of this reason, one of the first things he did after being elected as
president was to announce that “as a democratic leader he was not bound by the Abuja
Peace Accords [. . . ]” (International Crisis Group 2002a: 13). Taylor maintained deep
mistrust against the national army, which mainly comprised Krahns and was still strongly
affiliated with some of his main opponents in the civil war. In his eyes, a much more secure
strategy was to abolish the army as it existed at the time and replace it by a loose network
of armed units loyal to him (see International Crisis Group 2002a: 13). Instead of pursuing
a sincere reform of the country’s security forces, Taylor simply multiplied their number in
order to make sure that no single unit or faction could threaten his power-base (Tawiah
and Aboagye 2005: 78).10 This stood in stark contrast to the provisions of the Abuja
Accords: “Rather than attempt to eliminate partisanship among state security forces, he
promoted it by retaining his wartime militia and slowly peeling away the army’s strength”
10Among the security forces controlled by Taylor were, next to the Armed Forces of Liberia and the police,
an ‘elite’ Anti-Terrorist Unit, a Special Operations Division (SOD), a Special Security Services (SSS),
special security or paramilitary units controlled by specific ministries, and “an array of militia groups
including the ‘Marines’, the ‘Wild Geese’ and a host of others” (Tawiah and Aboagye 2005: 78).
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(International Crisis Group 2002a: 13). The Anti-terrorist Unit played the lead role among
these factions and “embodies Taylor’s hunger for complete control over security [. . . ]”
(International Crisis Group 2002a: 13). These measures certainly did not help to raise
the level of trust among the former belligerents. Roosevelt Johnson, the former leader of
the ULIMO-J faction and one of Taylor’s main adversaries during the civil war, criticized
these developments and expressed concerns for his own security. More specifically, he
accused Taylor of “recruiting and stuffing the army, national security agency, police force
and other paramilitary agencies with former fighters of his defunct National Patriotic Front
of Liberia militia”, as a press report pointed out (see Pan African News Agency 1998).
In sum, the above paragraph illustrates how the asymmetrical division of power among
the former belligerents and the prevalence of obstructive relations may forestall the over-
coming of commitment problems in ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities. Neither Taylor
nor the rebels had a real interest in complying with the provisions of the accords. The
result was a halfhearted and incomplete disarmament process and security sector reform
that was mainly symbolic and had hardly any substantive effects.
b) Manner of Political Competition
The manner of political competition in ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities can be expected
to differ significantly from ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities. In section 6.1 I argued
that the obstructive relations of the belligerents are likely to lead to a highly conflictual
pattern of political competition in which the excluded parties are disillusioned by formal
routes to power. The party in power can be expected to make full use of its sovereign rights
for controlling the political space and to tacitly tighten its hold on power by autocratic
means. However, it stands under the watching eye of the international community, which is
engaged in a mediative manner and will possibly not tolerate all autocratic excesses of the
government. This is likely to result in a pattern of ‘virtual cooperation’ according to which
the ruling party makes some symbolic concessions and pretends to cling to a democratic
posture. The excluded opposition, in turn, will not be satisfied by trying its chances in a
subsequent electoral contest because it is unwilling to wait until the term of the incumbent
government is over and because the government’s privileged access to state resources and
the media entails a high probability that the electoral contest would be unfair. As a result,
it has little choice other than falling back to informal means of gaining power, which may
include the use of violence as a measure of last resort.
These dynamics are by and large confirmed by the case of Liberia. In general, Charles
Taylor’s legacy as a warlord left severe doubts regarding his capabilities as a civilian ruler.
During his time as the de facto ruler of ‘Greater Liberia’, he was not only accountable
for gross human rights violations, but he also engaged in illicit economic activities. He
collaborated closely with some commercial firms operating in the NPFL areas, including
the Firestone Tire and Rubber company, which allegedly provided logistical support for
Taylor’s 1992 attack on Monrovia (Reno 1999: 100). The trade with illegally logged
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Liberian timber played a particularly important role in these arrangements. By cooperating
with a “clandestine network of predatory foreign firms” (Johnston 2004: 441), Taylor
granted timber concessions to foreign companies in exchange for money or large shipments
of small arms (Johnston 2004: 446). Originally, this was a strategy for sustaining warfare,
but over time the exploitation of Liberia’s resources became an end in itself (see Reno 1995:
112–117; Sesay 1996b: 398). Taylor was also engaged in a number of regional conflicts,
most notably by supporting the notorious RUF rebels in Sierra Leone and engaging in the
unlawful trade with conflict diamonds originating from the RUF (see e.g. Chojnacki 2009:
187; Heupel 2006: 154–155; Reno 2003). All in all, Taylor is estimated to have gained as
much as US $ 450 million through his illicit economic activities (see Adebajo 2004: 14).
Because his past records left doubts regarding his virtues as a civilian ruler, Taylor was
keen on presenting himself as a responsible statesman who was truly interested in recon-
ciling his war-ridden country. Already with the conclusion of the Abuja Accord in 1995,
he began to orchestrate his public appearances by producing himself as a wholehearted
politician with a genuine interest in peace. As Steven Ellis highlights:
“The way was now clear for Taylor to take part personally in Monrovian politics, and
on 31 August 1995 he arrived back in the city for the first time since he had fled in
1983. He was greeted by cheering crowds who believed that his entry into the city
meant peace at last. Dressed all in white and driving his own car, he made every effort
to appear as a Messiah, like Christ arriving in Jerusalem on Palm Sunday” (2007:
105).
Since then, the white dress became Taylor’s trademark and he did everything to keep up
the facade of being a responsible ruler after he was elected as president. However, his
rule suffered from one central flaw: although he was now endowed with formal authority,
there remained significant parts of the population who continued to question his legitimacy
and who deeply mistrusted him. As the International Crisis Group remarked: “At the
centre of Taylor’s problem with his political rivals is a desire for them to recognise his
presidency. He seeks legitimacy, especially from political sponsors who were openly or
quietly supportive of his war [. . . ] [b]ut some of these feel betrayed by Taylor’s conduct
both during the war and afterwards” (2002a: 15). In an attempt to remedy this fact, he made
efforts to boost his public image by adopting a conciliating language and by appointing
some members from the opposition to his cabinet. Among them was Roosevelt Johnson,
the former leader of the Ulimo-J faction, who became Minister of Rural Development (see
International Crisis Group 2002a: 14). At his inauguration address on 2 August 1997,
Taylor underlined that there would be no “witch hunts” against civilians or former enemies,
promised to establish a human rights and reconciliation commission and stressed the need
to forgive (see IRIN 1997).
Taylor’s careful orchestration served the purpose of creating the impression of him being
a responsible ruler. Initially, this was not without effect. Despite this dull record as a
warlord, the international community seriously seemed to believe that attaining peace and
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reconciliation would be possible with Taylor as president. In a letter to the President of
the UN Security Council, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan welcomed the successful
completion of the elections and underlined that the polls were “certified as having been free
and fair” (United Nations 1997a). In a statement published a few days later, the president
of the UN Security Council emphasized “the goodwill and cooperation demonstrated by
the parties in the electoral process [. . . ]” and expressed his hopes that it “provides a strong
foundation for the people of Liberia to achieve a durable peace, the re-establishment of
constitutional government, and a return to the rule of law” (United Nations 1997c). Finally,
at the occasion of a special conference on Liberia held a few months later, Kofi Annan again
commended Taylor “for the constructive and statesmanlike manner in which he has begun
to lay the foundations for long-term peace, reconciliation and development in Liberia” and
praised the formation of an inclusive government and the “expressed commitment of the
new President to promoting the protection of human rights and respect for the rule of law”
(United Nations 1997b).
Such bloomy statements indicate that the international community was initially highly
wiling to “give Taylor a chance” (International Crisis Group 2002a: 23). However, they
could hardly obscure the fact that Liberia’s new president was the same warlord who had
taken the country hostage for more than six years for his personal aspirations to power. It
did not take long until Taylor’s statesmanlike facade exhibited the first cracks. The first
tensions arose with ECOMOG at the occasion of Taylor’s denial to restructure the army, as
provided for in the Abuja Accord (see above). Underlining his constitutional rights, Taylor
argued that the peace agreement ceased to exist in August 1997, when he was inaugurated
as president (see Pan African News Agency 1997). Hence, “[b]y the end of 1997, the
honeymoon was over” (Tanner 1998: 140). Taylor’s stronger grip to power also led to a
worsening of Liberia’s internal security situation. It did not take long until human rights
violations became pervasive (see e.g. International Crisis Group 2002a: 21). His regime
was perceived by outside observers as a “one-man show” (Aboagye and Bah 2005b: 99),
and the general impression prevailed that he executed his powers “without the national
consensus that was requisite for national cohesion” rather than truly cooperating with the
opposition (Tawiah and Aboagye 2005: 80).
As president, Taylor also continued to engage in systematic efforts to loot the country’s
natural resources and augment his personal fortune. As Amos Sawyer puts it, his “ascent
to the Liberian presidency [. . . ] formalised the relationship between the underworld
economy and the state” (2004: 449). This control of wealth was his most crucial source of
authority, which was from the beginning on based on the conditional distribution of state
revenues to patronage networks and “underwent little change, despite his shift from faction
leader to president of the Republic of Liberia” (Reno 2004: 126; see also Reno 1999: 85–
126). After his inauguration, Taylor’s first executive order provided for ten percent of the
income from Liberia’s maritime registry – one of the country’s largest sources of income
– to be put in a special account supervised by him personally (see Sawyer 2004: 447).
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Also, the government formed a holding company, the ‘Liberian Resources Corporation’
(LIBRESCO), which collected the entire mineral resources of the country. It was put under
presidential control, too (Outram 1999: 169). By far the largest share of the state budget
was channeled into the armed forces and used for buying new government equipment,
but hardly anything was invested into the country’s physical or social infrastructure (see
Reno 2004: 128). Thus, there is every reason to suggest that Taylor “melded his official
and personal interests almost perfectly” (Reno 2008: 389). These developments make
clear that “Liberia is a democracy in name only” and that Taylor has “effectively used
intimidation, patronage and corruption to hold power” (International Crisis Group 2002a:
13). All in all, Taylor’s ambiguous conduct confirmed his “highly mercurial personality,
at times saying all the right things about good governance and economic reform, and at
others carrying forth with unreasonable statements and brutally lashing out at opponents,
real and perceived” (Tanner 1998: 142).
For the opposition, these were clear signals that hoping for an opening of the political
space or a significant improvement of Taylor’s governance record was illusionary, which is
reflected in the rise of armed insurgency groups discussed in the next section. However,
Taylor’s exclusive hold on power was not the only factor that accounted for the opposition’s
poor electoral prospects. The opposition as a whole was generally considered to be
heterogeneous, poorly organized and occupied with turf wars and mutual accusations. As
the International Crisis Group pointed out, “distrust and suspicion among key figures” was
a significant problem, as “[m]any leaders discount one another as tainted by some past
association or action, such as having been an early supporter of the National Patriotic
Front of Liberia” (2002a: 18). In addition, the members of the former warring factions
suffered from the fact that they predominantly belonged to the Krahn and Mandingo tribes,
both of which were likely to enjoy little public support. As Steven Ellis highlights, “many
Liberians persist in regarding Mandingo as outsiders, people who do not belong to Liberia,
even when they have lived their for generations” (2007: 39). Krahns, in contrast, were
mainly associated with Samuel Doe’s rule and hence “stereotyped as poorly educated and
thuggish” (Itano 2003: 7). As a result, their prospects of faring well in future elections
was dull, which explains that the Krahn and Mandingo based insurgency movements
which facilitated Taylor’s downfall were unable to develop any political program other
than unseating Taylor (see below). Though leaders of these warring factions were later
represented in the transitional government that was established after Taylor’s removal from
office, none of them “survived into the electoral arena” during the national elections that
took place in 2006 (Harris 2005: 375).
In sum, the lack of a level playing field was a striking feature of political competition
in Liberia. Charles Taylor adopted a few flimsy ‘virtual cooperation’ gestures in order
to present himself as a democratic and responsible ruler, but at the same time thoroughly
excluded the opposition parties from political participation. Most of the former anti-
Taylor factions faced poor prospects for winning future elections, which reduced their
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inclination to stick to formal-constitutional means of gaining power. The result was a
highly confrontational manner as it is characteristics for ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities.
c) Threats from Within
As argued above, we can expect the leaders of ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities to face
a considerable dilemma with regard to the manner in which they deal with threats from
within. Since their rule is per se perceived as illegitimate by parts of the population, they
are likely to take measures for controlling the political space and curtailing civil society
and the free press. However, these efforts are marked by the attempt to still maintain a
veil of democratic rule, because the leaders of ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities must
be concerned about external actors giving up their mediative stance and supporting the
opposition’s cause. This leads to a highly contradictory exercise of power in which brutal
attempts to contain the opposition go alongside a symbolic endorsement of democratic
principles.
In the case of Charles Taylor, such concerns clearly played a role. As an elected
president who came to office under the promise to reconcile the country, depicting an
overtly authoritarian stance entailed the risk of losing international support, which could
undermine the president’s hold on power in the long run. For this reason, he has “avoided
some excesses that usually characterise brutal authoritarian regimes” – for instance by
refraining from systematically oppressing civilians (International Crisis Group 2002a: 16).
Taylor still tried to maintain the illusion of heading a democratic and accountable regime.
Most importantly, he tried to dispel the impression that he had anything to do with ongoing
warfare in Sierra Leone because this was one of external actors’ main sources of criticism.
For example, in a policy statement issued in December 1998, the Liberian government
distanced itself from external actors’ allegations and tried to reinforce its reputation as a
responsible regime:
“The Government of Liberia views with disappointment and indignation suggestions
and allegations by the Government of Sierra Leone that Liberia is supporting former
Junta/RUF forces in Sierra Leone. The government of Liberia reiterates unequivocally
that it is not supporting in any form the forces of the AFRC or RUF in Sierra Leone. It
is the policy of the Liberian government to welcome the restoration of constitutional
rule in Sierra Leone under the leadership of the democratically elected government of
president Tejan Kabbah” (Government of the Republic of Liberia 1998).
However, there is widespread evidence that the reality had little to do with these euphemistic
statements. Observers overwhelmingly agree that Taylor had continued to play a key role
for supporting the RUF after his election for president (see e.g. Global Witness 2005;
International Crisis Group 2002a).11 Domestically, Taylor’s rule had equally little to do
11Note that Taylor’s involvement in the war in Sierra Leone was the reason for his indictment to the Special
Court for Sierra Leone in 2003 (see e.g. Coleman 2008i).
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with the standards of democratic and accountable regimes. Truly opening the political
space to political opponents had never been an option for Taylor because he had deeply
mistrusted many of the former warlords against whom he was engaged militarily throughout
the war and because he had been unwilling to share the benefits associated with the access
to governmental power with his former enemies. Immediately after taking office he made
attempts to curtail civil society and the media and to harass political opponents. In October
1998, the Minister of Information stopped the independent radio station ‘Star Radio’ on
accusations that it was operating without an adequate license. In 2001, the Catholic Station
Radio Veritas suffered the same fate. However, reflecting Taylor’s inconsistent use of
oppressive measures – the International Crisis Group pointed out that he “operates with
changing rules, sometimes democratic, other times repressive” – both stations later regained
the permission to reopen (see 2002a: 16). Civil society organizations were also targeted
from the beginning on as part of Taylor’s attempts to curtail the public space. In October
1998, members of the local human rights organization ‘Justice and Peace Commission
of Liberia’ (JPC) were intimidated and harassed after issuing a statement demanding
more transparency and accountability (see Amnesty International 1998). According to the
International Crisis Group, “[p]opular perception outside Liberia is that the independence
and effectiveness of civil society has been virtually destroyed by Taylor” (2002a: 20).12
Members of the political opposition – in particular those associated with one of the
former warring parties – were suffering most from Taylor’s attempt to yield total control.
They were systematically targeted by Taylor’s security forces and numerous opposition
figures were murdered or forced into exile during the first two years of his presidency (see
International Crisis Group 2002a: 21). Among the opposition politicians allegedly killed
by the Taylor regime was Samuel Dokie, a co-founder of the NPFL who became opposed
to Taylor already during the civil war. He was detained by Taylor’s “Special Security
Forces” together with his wife, sister and cousin on 29 November 1997; their dead bodies
were found a few days later, strongly suggesting that Taylor ordered their assassinations.
Taylor denied any involvement in these killings, but this could not prevent public opinion
from gradually turning against him (see e.g. Outram 1999: 169; Tanner 1998: 142). As
the International Crisis Group remarked, “this episode sent a powerful message to foes
that political inclusion was off the agenda” (2002a: 15). However, it should be noted that
some of Taylor’s security forces acted autonomously, most notably because Taylor had
increasingly been “struggling to keep order in his ranks” (Tanner 1998: 142). Arguably,
this played in Taylor’s hands. Ultimately, the lack of clear command-and-control structures
enabled him to deny his responsibility for acts of violence committed by his security forces.
12However, given the country’s American heritage, the concept of civil society is less alien to Liberia
than it might be to other African countries and more rooted in the country’s history. Liberia can
look back to a vibrant civil society which has been active for several decades. In 2002, more than
ten percent of all Liberians were members of some civil society organization (National Democratic
Institute for International Affairs 2004: 10). Despite Taylor’s tight control of civil society, it is generally
acknowledged that it has played a “critical role” for fostering democratic consolidation (Toure 2002:
1–2).
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It was precisely this unpredictability of the security apparatus that provided a “constant
source of intimidation to ordinary Liberians and political foes” (International Crisis Group
2002a: 14).
Over the next months, tensions between Taylor and his former opponents had risen
steadily. They culminated in a gun-battle between government forces and fighters loyal
to Roosevelt Johnson in September 1998, which left between 50 and 200 people dead. A
group of fighters, including Johnson, later took refuge in the US embassy (see e.g. Pan
African News Agency 1999). This incident was the result of rising mistrust between the
government and the former Ulimo-J leader Johnson. Over the preceding months, Johnson
had gathered a large number of former fighters around his headquarters in the Liberian
capital, claiming, as the International Crisis Group remarks, that “violence and intimidation
by government forces had forced them together for protection” (2002a: 8). Taylor used
this incident as an occasion to finally get rid of his opponents by accusing them of a coup
plot and claiming that Johnson headed a group of about thirty people which had planned to
overthrow the government. Thirteen suspects – all of them Krahn – were imprisoned, while
19 others fled the country before they could be arrested. A Liberian Jury found thirteen of
the 32 suspects guilty, including Johnson, who was convicted in absentia while on exile in
Nigeria (see e.g. Pan African News Agency 1999). This contributed to a climate in which
most remaining opposition figures with serious ambitions were driven out of the country
(see International Crisis Group 2002a: 15).
Rising frustration about Taylor’s abuse of governmental authority gave the impetus for
the recourse to violence as a means to unseat Taylor. The opposition groups increasingly
came to the recognition that “in the absence of military pressure from the rebel groups, no
amount of dialogue would have caused a significant change in the style and governance of
Taylor to accommodate Liberia’s political opposition and civil society organisations, so
that they could pursue their political objectives without intimidation or fear of persecution”
(Tawiah and Aboagye 2005: 75). These considerations gave rise to the re-formation of
an armed opposition against Taylor. The first attempts for an armed resistance against
the president became apparent already in August 1998, roughly one year after had taken
office, when a Guinean-based group called ‘Justice Coalition of Liberia’ launched an
attack against government troops. Though the group was quickly pushed back to Guinea,
this attack can be seen as the starting point for a whole series of armed engagements
against Taylor. Similar attacks were launched by another Guinean-based rebel group, the
‘Organisation of Displaced Liberians’, which had become active since April 1999 (see
International Crisis Group 2002a: 8–9).
In February 2000, the different anti-Taylor factions united and formed LURD, which
was ultimately responsible for Taylor’s downfall (see International Crisis Group 2003e:
9). As the anti-Taylor factions during the war, LURD mainly comprised fighters from the
Krahn and Mandingo tribes, who “[did] not trust one another but have formed pragmatic
alliances against the common enemy” (International Crisis Group 2003e: 4). The group
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was at no time more than a coalition of convenience, united in the objective to “seize power
by deposing Charles Taylor” (Tawiah and Aboagye 2005: 79; see also Harris 2005: 376).
After having been defeated already at the polls in 1997, the rebels this time sought a final
solution to the Liberian conflict. Consequently, they ignored all attempts for yielding a
negotiated settlement and concentrated exclusively on the battlefield (see International
Crisis Group 2003e: i). Despite their small number, both LURD and MODEL had the
advantage of their fighters being highly motivated. Many of the Krahn and Mandingo
fighters who made up the bulk of the rebel movement were well-trained and disciplined
former members of Doe’s national army (Tawiah and Aboagye 2005: 79). This gave them
a significant advantage over Taylor’s soldiers, many of whom were “badly trained, badly
paid and sometimes forcibly recruited” (International Crisis Group 2003e: 6–7). The
conflict soon stalemated and fighting continued for some two years. As the presidential
elections – scheduled for October 2003 – moved closer, it became the immediate priority
of the rebel groups (LURD and MODEL) to forestall the polls and prevent Taylor from
being confirmed for a second term (International Crisis Group 2003e: 6).
By mid-2003, Taylor was increasingly weakened by international sanctions (see below)
and suffered a number of painful rebel advances (Tawiah and Aboagye 2005: 74). He was
forced to sign a ceasefire agreement (Agreement on Ceasefire and Cessation of Hostilities,
ACCH) on 17 June, and his fate was sealed with the deployment of a new regional
intervention force (‘ECOWAS Mission in Liberia’, ECOMIL) in August 2003. ECOMIL
was a humanitarian intervention mission comprising about 5,000 troops. Its deployment
was based on a strong political consensus from West African heads of states – “a situation
that starkly contrasts with the bickering that dogged earlier ECOWAS deployments in
the 1990s” (Aboagye and Bah 2005a: 284). One month after its deployment, ECOMIL
transferred its authority to the ‘United Nations Mission in Liberia’ (UNMIL), which was
mandated by the UN Security Council in resolution 1509 (2003) (U.N. Security Council
2003g; see also Tawiah and Aboagye 2005: 94). In conjunction with the mounting pressure
from within, this ultimately facilitated Taylor’s resignation. As argued in more detail
below, this situation can be interpreted as a switch from mediative to partisan external
engagement.
In sum, the confrontational manner of political competition gave rise to numerous
threats to the stability of the polity and the incumbent regime. Taylor tried to counter these
threats by exerting an increasingly tight control on the political space and by systematically
targeting opposition politicians who could turn out as a threat to his rule. However,
the outcome was counterproductive, because this has increased rather than reduced the
opposition’s willingness to unseat Taylor militarily before he could legitimize his rule
through popular elections.
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d) Promoting Good Governance
External attempts for promoting good governance in ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities
are likely to be marred by significant challenges and profound difficulties. Above, it was
argued that the conflictual nature of this polity requires a particularly intensive engagement
by external actors but at the same time constitutes a profound obstacle for external actors
to provide the necessary resources. In addition, external actors are likely to face pressure
by the incumbent regime to withdraw. This may result either in a hasty withdrawal
amidst an incomplete statebuilding agenda or a long-enduring engagement in which exit
options are hard to conceive and in which the promotion of good governance principles
remains external actors’ long run responsibility. The case of Liberia partly confirms these
stipulations because external actors gave in to pressures from the Taylor regime for a quick
withdrawal. However, Taylor’s subsequent abuse of power and his continued support for
the RUF rebels made external actors reconsider over time and impose sanctions against
the regime. In the end, it is no exaggeration to say that they openly aligned with the
armed opposition against Taylor and at least indirectly supported its attempts to oust Taylor
militarily.
Taylor’s sweeping victory in the 1997 elections put the international community in a
significant dilemma. On the one hand, it implied that Liberia had a new and democratically
legitimized head of state – a fact that is generally portrayed as a great achievement of
post-conflict reconstruction processes. On the other hand, Liberia’s new leader was a
former rebel leader known as a notoriously greedy and brutal ruler who hardly possessed
any of the characteristics typically associated with democratic leadership. In other words,
the democratic principle (accepting the outcome of democratic elections) clashed with the
good-governance principle (ensuring that the new administration meets at least a minimal
degree of accountability) in a particularly spicy way. Ignoring the former principle would
have implied to ignore the will of the people and would have completely jeopardized
external actors’ own rhetoric, while ignoring the latter principle was associated with a
high risk of authoritarian rule and, ultimately, even the recurrence of armed conflict. As
already argued above, external actors gave priority to the former principle by embracing
the fact that a democratically legitimized government was in place in Liberia. Ultimately,
no one could ignore the fact that he was elected with a large majority of votes and that,
despite voter intimidation, the elections proceeded according to international standards
(see Harris 1999: 437–438). Hence, external actors levied at best moderate pressure on
the new regime to become more cooperative and accountable. They simply hoped that
Taylor would “become more statesmanlike as he was forced to grapple with the demands
of governance” (Reno 2004: 134).
This soft stance was to Taylor’s great benefit. His declaration made shortly after the
elections that he was not bound by the Abuja Accords any longer clearly served the purpose
of backing up his sovereignty and demonstrating his claim to power. Though considerations
of sovereignty are also said to stand behind his refusal to allow ECOMOG to restructure
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the army, it may just as well have been based on fear that a representative army would not
be loyal to him (see also International Crisis Group 2002a: 13). Whatever the reasons, in
the end ECOMOG was “forced to leave Liberia after [an] embarrassing showdown with
president Taylor over his rejection of the Abuja accord provision [. . . ]” (International
Crisis Group 2002a: 40). After the last peacekeepers left by late 1998, Taylor “had the
whole political-military theatre to himself [. . . ]” (Tawiah and Aboagye 2005: 80). The
wider international community remained remarkably silent about the withdrawal of the
peacekeepers. Overall, external engagement in the initial years of Taylor’s rule depicts a
lacking willingness to pose any significant constraints on Taylor. Despite the fact that a UN
arms embargo levied against all parties to the civil war in 1992 was never lifted (see Itano
2003: 4), external actors did little in order to take influence on Liberia’s internal situation
in the years between 1998 and 2000. Not a single report of the UN Secretary General to
the UN Security Council was drafted in this period, not even to speak of Security Council
resolutions which would condemn the deterioration of human rights standards and the
spread of corruption in Liberia.13 This can certainly not be accounted for on the grounds of
an improving security situation, because Taylor had faced armed skirmishes with dissidents
at the latest since August 1998 and had essentially been at war with LURD since early
2000 (see above). In sum, Taylor’s insistence on his sovereignty as an elected president
left external actors little scope of action, but they also demonstrated little willingness to
make use of what was left of their leverage in the first three years of Taylor’s rule.
External actors might have left Taylor alone if his destabilizing rule would have been
limited to his own country. However, Taylor’s ongoing refusal to end his support for the
RUF in Sierra Leone and to stop the illicit trade with conflict diamonds led to significant
discord with the international community (see e.g. McDonough 2008: 365–366). After
several unsuccessful attempts for inducing Taylor to give up his support for the RUF, the
UN Security Council imposed various measures against the Liberian government in its
Resolution 1343 (2001), including a travel ban and ban on the trade with rough diamonds
from Liberia (U.N. Security Council 2001; par. 5-7). It also called upon the Liberian
government to establish a Certificate of Origin regime for the trade in rough diamonds
(par. 15). In subsequent resolutions, the UN Security Council decided that the Liberian
government “has not complied fully with the demands in resolution 1343 (2001)” and
imposed further sanctions, including an embargo on the trade with Liberian timber (see
U.N. Security Council 2003c; par. 1 and 17). The sanctions did not take immediate effect,
but there is reason to argue that they “helped immensely to deprive Taylor’s forces of
weapons that would have enabled him to perpetuate or prolong his retention of power”
(Aboagye and Bah 2005a: 288). As such, the imposition of sanctions may still be in
accordance with a mediative manner of engagement, as long as they aim at supporting the
peace process (and not primarily at hurting the regime against which they were imposed).
13This can be confirmed on the UN website at http://www.un.org/documents/repsc.htm (visited at 15 October
2010).
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This condition was clearly fulfilled in the case of the sanctions levied against the Liberian
government. However, there is reason to argue that Taylor’s ongoing reluctance to comply
with international demands led to an increasing recognition among external actors that
he needed to be removed from office in order to secure lasting peace in Liberia and West
Africa as a whole. The humanitarian crisis that came with the offensive against Taylor
created a sense of urgency that had been lacking before, inducing external actors to become
increasingly impatient with Taylor (Aboagye and Bah 2005a: 282). This clearly marked a
turn in the international community’s approach towards Liberia.
LURD contributed to this change in public opinion by presenting itself as a responsible
rebel group fighting for a legitimate cause with as little civilian victims as possible. In this
vain, the rebel group repeatedly underlined that it supported a just cause and respected
human rights standards. The rebel group keenly tried to avoid human rights violations. In
order to underline these qualities, a LURD spokesman stated they deliberately avoided
to raid towns and pro-government areas in order to protect civilians (see International
Crisis Group 2002a: 10). The International Crisis Group believes that “LURD efforts
to treat enemy combatants humanely has paid off, with many combatants and prisoners
switching sides” (2002a: 11). Over time the international community increasingly sided
with the insurgents, too. Switching to a “containment strategy” in dealing with Taylor,
external actors essentially tried to isolate the regime internationally and wait for Taylor
to be removed by hostile forces (see International Crisis Group 2002a: 23). ECOMIL
was clearly more than a neutral peacekeeping force, as it allegedly cooperated with the
LURD insurgents in order to force Taylor’s resignation (Tawiah and Aboagye 2005: 79;
see also International Crisis Group 2003c: 6). Although clear evidence is lacking, there is
indication that the United States played a particularly important role in facilitating Taylor’s
downfall. As the International Crisis Group pointed out in 2003:
“[I]t is becoming increasingly clear how central a part the U.S. government, especially
the Department of Defence, took in orchestrating various aspects of Charles Taylor’s
overthrow. [. . . ] U.S. refusal to commit peacekeeping forces to Liberia in mid-2003
may have been due not only to strategic doubts and bureaucratic wrangling, but also
to a desire to give LURD sufficient time to overthrow Taylor” (2003c: 13–14).
At the latest from this moment on, one must note that external intervention had switched
from a mediative to a partisan manner of engagement. There is strong reason to argue
that Taylor “miscalculated the will and determination of other member states to enforce
their commitment to intervene when the civilian population was under threat” (Tawiah
and Aboagye 2005: 82). Had Taylor credibly signaled his willingness to comply with
international requests to stop his illicit dealings with the RUF in Sierra Leone, it is
questionable whether the UN Security Council would have imposed sanctions against him.
But as Taylor became increasingly perceived as the main obstacle to peace in an entire
region, pressure to remove him from office was rising sharply.
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In sum, the above paragraph illustrates that ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities provide a
highly difficult environment for promoting good governance standards. Because external
actors took an early exit option and withdrew from the country, they lost all leverage
through which they could have induced Taylor to adopt a more cooperative stance. However,
Taylor’s presidency also vividly illustrates that even leaders of ‘The Winner Took it All’
polities may become subject to significant external limits and constraints if they exaggerate
their hold on power, because this could encourage external actors to switch to a partisan
manner of engagement in favor of the opposition.
6.3 Côte D’Ivoire
The history of Côte d’Ivoire, once a French colony, is tightly coupled to its former president
Felix Houphouët-Boigny. After leading the country to independence in 1960, he became
Côte d’Ivoire’s president for the next thirty years. He adopted a paternalistic leadership
style that, despite privileging his own ethnic group (the Akan) effectively balanced the
different ethnic groups living in the country (see Akindès 2004). During Houphouët-
Boigny’s reign, Côte d’Ivoire achieved a high level of political stability and experienced
tremendous economic growth rates. However, when the world market price for cocoa – the
country’s primary export commodity – dropped sharply in the early 1980s, Côte d’Ivoire
went through a painful cycle of economic decline, triggering tensions between the different
ethnic groups (see Akindès 2004: 5; Dozon 1989: 136; Hofnung 2005: 8–9; Woods 2003:
641).14 The economic decline led to an increasing politicization of ethnic factors, which
was dramatically fueled as a result of the power vacuum created by Houphouët-Boigny’s
death in 1993. His successor, Henri Konan Bédié, continued with the questionable heritage
of privileging the Akan, but he also tried to capitalize on xenophobic tendencies through
introducing a highly dubious nationalistic ideology known as Ivoirité.15 The main rationale
behind these policies was to prevent the predominantly Muslim dwellers from the north
– who had felt “ostracized by the southern nexus of power” and were brand-marked as
non-Ivorians (Coleman 2008e: 10) – to formulate their own claims to power (Akindès
2004: 20; see also Kipré 2005: 263; Ogunmola 2007: 118). As Abu Bah highlights, “[t]he
tacit goal of this divisive ethnic politics was to marginalize northerners, lumping them
14Contrary to what it sounds like, the independence did not diminish the influence of France in Côte d’Ivoire.
During the reign of Houphouët Boigny, the country stayed France’s closest ally in Africa, what makes
Hofnung even speak of a ‘pseudo-independence’ (“pseudo-indépendance”). He argues that to allow
formal independence was a change that was perceived necessary by the former french leadership in order
to maintain the French influence in Africa: “Tout changer pour que rien ne change: c’est, en substance,
le chemin que va suivre le premier président ivoirien” (Hofnung 2005: 18).
15Ivoirité draws a distinction between ‘true Ivorians’, ‘intermittent Ivorians’ and ‘Ivorians of convenience’.
Though its initial purpose was to discredit the opposition candidate Alassane Dramane Ouattara, it
eventually spread much further and was used to mobilize nationalist and xenophobic feelings on a large
scale (Hofnung 2005: 9–10).
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together with the immigrants from Burkina Faso, implying that they too are foreigners or
at best Ivorians of immigrant ancestry” (2010: 602).
In accordance with the nationalist ideology of Ivoirité, Bédié passed a new electoral
code before the elections in 1995, which was specifically crafted for the sake of preventing
the promising opposition candidate Alassane Dramane Ouattara from participating in the
elections. This led to a boycott of the 1995 elections by the main opposition parties and
facilitated Bédié’s sweeping victory (see Akindès 2004: 20; Kipré 2005: 263; Toungara
2001: 67). The ensuing tensions pulled Côte d’Ivoire in a long period of political tensions,
which escalated after Ouattara was again banned from participating in the polls in 2000. A
southerner, Laurent Gbagbo, yielded a dubious victory, which triggered riots and tensions
and led to a failed coup attempt against Gbagbo. The political tensions escalated in 2002,
when a northern rebel group called ‘Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire’ (MPCI)
initiated an armed rebellion against the government.16 It soon united with some other
northern rebel groups to form the ‘Forces Nouvelles’. Headed by Guillaume Soro, its
stated goal was to overthrow Gbagbo and clear the way for elections to take place (see
Bah 2010: 604). The armed conflict between the government and the ‘Forces Nouvelles’
soon amounted to a military stalemate and an effective division of the country, with the
government troops holding the Christian south and the rebel groups the Muslim north of the
country. A peace agreement (Linas-Marcoussis Agreement) was hammered out in January
2003, providing for a buffer zone to be established between the rebel-held north and the
government-held south (see Harris 2007: 182). France and ECOWAS dispatched 10,000
troops to Côte d’Ivoire, and one year later the United Nations deployed peacekeepers as
part of the United Nations Operation in Ivory Coast (UNOCI) (Harris 2007: 182–183).
6.3.1 Côte D’Ivoire as a ‘The Winner Took it All’ Polity
The peace agreement provided for the establishment of a power-sharing government, but
the implementation of these provisions was forestalled by continued quarrels between the
different parties (see e.g. Mehler 2007: 4). Most importantly, Gbagbo was never committed
to true power-sharing, which is why this situation is treated here as a de facto case of
political domination. Matters only began to improve with the adoption of the Ouagadougou
agreement in 2007, which led to a more effective implementation of power-sharing in
Côte d’Ivoire (see International Crisis Group 2007e). As a consequence, this section
concentrates on the period between the adoption of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement in
2003 and the signing of the Ouagadougou Agreement in 2007. The following paragraphs
justify Côte d’Ivoire’s classification as a ‘The Winner Took it All’ polity in more detail.
Political Domination. Formally, the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement led to a power-sharing
arrangement – the Government of National Reconciliation – which was to be led by a
16For a short overview of Côte d’Ivoire’s conflict history (in German), see also Andreas Mehler (2004).
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“consensus Prime Minister who will remain in office until the next presidential election”
(see Government of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire 2003, Art. 3c). Seydou Diarra, a
northern Muslim, was appointed to this position, while Gbagbo was allowed to finish his
presidential term until the next round of elections scheduled for 2005 (see Rothchild 2005:
252). However, little effective power sharing materialized in the implementation phase of
the Accord. Rothchild describes it as a “shaky political and military deal from its outset”
(Rothchild 2005: 252). Prime minister Diarra’s authority was deliberately undermined
by both the president and the national assembly, depriving him of real political influence
(see International Crisis Group 2004a: 2). Disillusioned, many rebel participants soon
boycotted the government of national unity and power-sharing had effectively ceased to
exist by March 2004 (see Rothchild 2005: 253). Meanwhile, Gbagbo used every op-
portunity to increase his own hold on power and resisted all attempts for reviving the
original spirit of the power-sharing arrangement. When the UN Security Council, aware of
Diarra’s impotence, requested the government to reinstate a prime minister endowed with
real decision-making, suggesting that the former Prime Minister Charles Konan Banny
assumed this position. Gbagbo heavily rejected these requests (International Crisis Group
2007e: 2; see also Chirot 2006: 74). He also violated his promise to hold presidential
elections in due time. Originally scheduled for 2005, Gbagbo managed to postpone them
for a total of five years. When they finally took place in November 2010, he refused to
accept Ouattara’s victory.17 Thus, despite the presence of a formal power-sharing arrange-
ment the three years between March 2004 (the end of the conflict according to the ‘UCDP/
Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’) and March 2007 (the adoption of the Ouagadougou Peace
Agreement) are more adequately described as a case of political domination.
Obstructive Relations. In the case of Côte d’Ivoire, it is obvious to see that the relations
between the parties in the post-settlement phase were obstructive. The political crisis
came into being precisely because a basic consensus about who governs was lacking.
The International Crisis Group speaks of several measures of obstruction (“manœuvres
d’obstruction”) that became evident during the implementation phase of the agreement
(see 2005b: 2). The relations between Gbagbo and the rebel groups remained tense
and uncompromising and both sides tried to undermine the implementation of the Linas-
Marcoussis Agreement (Mehler 2007: 4). Three factors stand out in this regard.
First, Côte d’Ivoire has, despite the adoption of a peace agreement, effectively remained
a divided country. The UN troops, though deployed with a clear mandate to mitigate the
tensions between the different ethnic groups (see below), at the same time perpetuated the
country’s partition. Without the presence of these external troops, it is very likely that the
warring factions would have sought a military solution to the conflict, potentially leading
17This gave rise to armed tensions between Gbagbo’s and Ouattara’s supporters which lasted for more than
four months. They only ended after Ivorian forces, assisted by French Special Forces, arrested Gbagbo –
who had been hiding in a bunker below the presidential residence in Abidjan for several weeks – in early
April 2011 (see Economist 2011).
229
Chapter 6 ‘The Winner Took it All’ Polities
to a long and bloody armed conflict without any clear victor (see International Crisis
Group 2005b: i). Second, Gbagbo has never been honest in his promises to share power
and devote himself to peace. Four days after signing the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement,
he referred to the peace deal as being not more than a “proposition” and encouraged
his followers not to worry about the implications (Agence France Presse 2003a). He
jeopardized the power-sharing arrangement and dragged his feet on the promise to hold
presidential elections. Also, he repeatedly tried to defeat the rebels militarily after signing
the agreement (see e.g. Chirot 2006: 73). Third, the entire implementation period of
the peace agreement was “badly compromised by a lack of good faith and political will”
among all participants (International Crisis Group 2004a: i). As the International Crisis
Group remarked, the government of national reconciliation ‘did not reconcile anyone’
(2005a: 1).18 Mistrust and suspicion remained widespread in both camps. Rather than
taking a conciliating posture, well-placed rhetorical attacks from political hardliners – for
instance from members of Gbagbo’s FPI, who suggested that the rebels should have been
prosecuted rather than included in a civilian government (see Lamin 2005: 19) – further
poisoned the atmosphere between the parties. This contributed to an atmosphere in which
hardly any of the key provisions of the peace agreement were implemented. Hence, the
peace process was stalemated before it actually started (see Bah 2010: 607). As a result,
“violence continued, disarmament stalled, elections became elusive, and the government
remained dysfunctional” (Bah 2010: 609). Against this background, the period between
the adoption of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement of January 2003 and the Ouagadougou
Peace Agreement of March 2007 can clearly be considered obstructive.
Mediative Engagement. When classifying external actors’ involvement in Côte d’Ivoire,
a clear discrepancy between their own assessment of the situation and the impression their
engagement made on the conflict parties becomes apparent. Felix Houphouët-Boigny,
Côte d’Ivoire’s long-time president, maintained close links with France throughout his
reign; therefore the country has remained under some sort of de facto patronage from
its former colonial power during most of its post-colonial history. This has led to rising
tensions throughout the past two decades. In an environment of sharply declining national
income and painful economic reforms imposed by International Financial Institutions,
more and more Ivorians viewed France as a neo-colonial power that is primarily interested
in defending its own economic interests in the country (see e.g. Almås 2007: 53). The
International Crisis Group described the country’s special relationship with France as a
“love-hate relationship” (2004a: 3). During the coup d’etat in 2002, France immediately
dispatched some 300 troops in order to evacuate French citizens and protect French
business interests (see Mehler 2004: 7). Not surprisingly, French engagement in the
conflict led to mixed feelings among Ivorians. On the positive side, “[f]earing that a rebel
18The original quotation is in French: “Le Gouvernement de réconciliation nationale (GRN) n’a réconcilié
personne. Il a encore moins préparé le terrain pour une élection présidentielle crédible au terme du
mandat constitutionnel du Président Laurent Gbagbo” (International Crisis Group 2005a: 1).
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victory would produce another Rwanda, with hundreds of thousands killed [. . . ]”, it can
be argued that France’s quick and decisive intervention prevented an escalation of the
military confrontation (Chirot 2006: 72). France’s strong role also certainly served as a
catalyst for mobilizing additional external involvement, most notably from ECOWAS and
the United Nations (see Harris 2007: 182–183). However, on the negative side accusations
that the French government – in a neo-gaullistic spirit – was trying to go back to its
interventionist policies of colonial times were difficult to dispel, in particular as some
provisions of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement were interpreted by Gbagbo’s supporters
as privileging the rebels (see Mehler 2004: 7–8). The tension escalated after nine French
soldiers were killed in an attack by an Ivorian aircraft in November 2004. In retaliation for
the attack, France destroyed the entire Ivorian air force in a targeted attack, which triggered
countrywide riots against French institutions and buildings (see Chirot 2006: 73; Hofnung
2005: 88–91). From this moment on, both parties in the conflict declared France to be
their enemy. As Chirot comments, “[c]ombined with the deep-rooted resentment against
the former colonial power for its high-handedness decades after independence, this made
the continuing French presence as unpopular as it was necessary” (2006: 73).
The ‘special relationship’ with France makes it difficult to decide whether external
engagement as a whole was mediative or partisan. Originally, there was some indication
that France tended towards deposing Gbagbo through holding early elections, but Gbagbo
had always insisted to continue his presidential term, which officially lasted until 2005 (see
Agence France Presse 2003b). In the end, Gbagbo‘s demands were fulfilled, obviously
out of recognition that deposing an elected head of state might add instability to an
already fragile situation. Since then, external engagement as a whole can be considered
mediative. Three factors underline this point: First, although the buffer-zone, put in place
by the French intervention and later institutionalized by both ECOWAS and the United
Nations, effectively perpetuated the partition of the country, its immediate goal was to
prevent an escalation of the armed conflict (see Harris 2007: 182). This goal was achieved
quickly although the country has suffered from the consequences of its partition until
today. Second, by calling for the establishment of a government of national unity and by
deliberately avoiding a clear posture on the looming conflict over the citizenship question
(see Bah 2010), the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement was written in a conciliatory spirit and
avoided to openly take side against any of the belligerents. Third, after the difficulties
with the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement had been realized, the international community
increasingly relied on regional mediation under the auspices of the African Union (AU)
in order to find a settlement to the conflict. This greatly helped to increase the legitimacy
of the peace process and can be seen as a crucial impetus to finding a settlement. As a
2006 Report by the UN Secretary General on the progress of the peace process in Côte
d’Ivoire expressed, “[t]he encouraging developments in Côte d’Ivoire during the reporting
period would not have been possible without the untiring efforts of the regional leaders,
in particular presidents Mbeki, Obasanjo and Tandja” (United Nations 2006e: par. 83).
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Though the efforts to include regional leaders were not immediately successful – a 2005
peace agreement struck in Pretoria failed because it, too, avoided a satisfactory solution
of the citizenship problem – the successful conclusion of the Ouagadougou agreement in
2007 can be attributed in part to the sense of ownership prevailing among Ivorians (see
Bah 2010: 609–611). Out of these reasons, external engagement as a whole can, despite
the controversies revolving about France’s role, be regarded as mediative.
6.3.2 Polity Dynamics in Côte D’Ivoire
The case of Côte d’Ivoire confirms the plausibility of many of the assumptions made about
‘The Winner Took it All’ polities above. This is illustrated below with regard to the four
overarching themes: dealing with commitment problems, competition for power, threats
from within, and external engagement for good governance.
a) Overcoming Commitment Problems
As argued above, the exclusion of parts of the former belligerents from access to formal
authority in conjunction with the prevalence of obstructive relations turns ‘The Winner
Took it All’ polities into difficult environments for overcoming commitment problems.
The excluded opposition is unlikely to disarm even when external actors provide sufficient
security guarantees, which is likely to result in ‘virtual cooperation’ strategies according
to which the rebels may symbolically comply with the disarmament provisions without
giving up any substantive degree of power.
Côte d’Ivoire closely matches these stipulations. The Linas-Marcoussis Agreement
provided for a number of trust-raising measures between the parties to be adopted in the
implementation phase. The most important one was a process of disarmament, demobi-
lization and reintegration of armed combatants to be carried out by the Government of
National Reconciliation under “ECOWAS and French force supervision” (see Government
of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire 2003; Art. VII, par. 2-4). With the establishment of
UNOCI by UN Resolution 1528 on 27 February 2004, the UN was specifically mandated
to “help the Government of National Reconciliation implement the national programme
for the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of the combatants” (U.N. Security
Council 2004a, Art. 6 par. e). However, the disarmament process had be stalled from
the beginning on, reflecting the pronounced mistrust prevailing between the parties. As
Lamin highlights: “Fairly obviously, all parties, without exception, did indeed fail to live
up to their commitment to disarm, and instead chose to accuse each other of bad faith. In
such a situation, it is difficult to see what third parties could have accomplished” (2005:
20). In July 2004 – nearly one and a half years after the adoption of the Linas-Marcoussis
Agreement – a high-level meeting on the situation in Côte d’Ivoire took place in Accra,
Ghana, in which the parties agreed to a “framework and timeline for the implementation of
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the main provisions of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement” (United Nations 2004d; par. 60).
According to this plan, the disarmament process was to commence by mid-October 2004.
However, on 9 October the ‘Forces Nouvelles’ leader Guillaume Soro “declared that the
disarmament process would not commence on 15 October” (United Nations 2004f; par. 8).
According to the UN Secretary General, the reason for this refusal was that “the Forces
nouvelles were not prepared to disarm in the absence of progress in the adoption of the key
constitutional and legal reforms provided for in that Agreement” (United Nations 2004f;
par. 38). Gbagbo’s camp likewise obstructed the disarmament process. The ‘young patriots’
militias associated with the president “ransacked the offices of the National Commission
for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration as well as those of the opposition
parties, the Rally of the Republicans (RDR) and the Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire-
African Democratic Rally (PDCI-RDA)”, which led Soro to declare both the Accra III
and Linas-Marcoussis Agreement as “null and void” (United Nations 2004f; par. 15). A
new timetable for disarmament was agreed in mid-2005 at the occasion of the Pretoria
Agreement and the Yamoussoukro meeting. At the latter occasion, the parties adopted
a timetable providing for the disarmament and demobilization process to be concluded
by 3 October 2005 (United Nations 2004e; par. 9). However, the implementation of this
timetable was repeatedly obstructed by the parties to the extent that disarmament efforts
had still not commenced by March 2007 (see e.g. United Nations 2007; par. 4). Hence, as
a result of a pronounced ‘foot dragging’ behavior in which both sides engaged, virtually
nothing had been achieved in the realm of disarmament in the period under investigation.
In sum, the above paragraph illustrates the tremendous difficulties involved in imple-
menting disarmament and demobilization provisions in ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities.
This can clearly be attributed to the obstructive relations prevailing between the belliger-
ents, and it was certainly facilitated by the power asymmetry prevailing between the parties.
Security concerns constituted a constant obstacle throughout this entire period. Although
UNOCI was specifically responsible for guaranteeing the security of ministers of the
Government of National Reconciliation, of ‘Forces Nouvelles’ leader Guillaume Soro as
well as members of the opposition who had left Côte d’Ivoire out of security concerns
(see United Nations 2004e; par. 13), this engagement could not effectively dispel fears for
being harassed or excluded. Aside from physically dividing the factions, there was little
the international community could do to evoke any sort of cooperation between the parties:
“In a situation where all sides played spoilers, the international community was hamstrung”
(Lamin 2005: 20).
b) Manner of Political Competition
Because of the obstructive relations prevailing between the former belligerents in conjunc-
tion with the lack of even a basic consensus about who governs, I argued above that ‘The
Winner Took it All’ polities are characterized by a highly conflictual pattern of political
competition. Since the ruling party is likely to (ab)use its sovereign powers for controlling
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the political space and extend its hold on power, the excluded parties are disillusioned by
the prospect of gaining power through formal channels like competitive elections. As a
result, they have little choice other than falling back to informal means of gaining power,
which may include the use of violence as a measure of last resort. However, because
external actors have a watching eye on the way the dominating party exercises its authority,
the party in power is likely to engage in extended ‘virtual cooperation’ strategies in order
to mask its authoritarian grip to power.
For Laurent Gbagbo, ‘virtual cooperation’ gestures were key to his long hold on power
– arguably to a greater extent than it was the case for Charles Taylor in Liberia. For
various reasons, Gbagbo was in a much weaker position than Taylor in his initial years
after being elected president. First, although being head of state, Gbagbo did not possess
control of powerful armed forces. Côte d’Ivoire had traditionally maintained a relatively
weak military, primarily because Ivorian leaders had long trusted on the repelling effect
of French troops (see Mehler 2004: 7). Second, although Gbagbo was head of state he
only had effective control over half of the country, while the other half was occupied
by rebel forces. Together with the fact that his assumption to power was the result of
highly dubious elections (see above), his sovereignty and domestic authority was clearly
infringed. Third, although external actors decided to engage in a halfhearted manner of
intervention, Gbagbo was under much closer external surveillance than Taylor in Liberia.
Finally, unlike Taylor – who possessed full sovereign rights – Gbagbo formally headed a
power-sharing government and needed to maintain the impression of at least a minimal
level of cooperation.
Despite this more challenging situation, Gbagbo has been remarkably successful in his
attempts to stay in power. ‘Foot dragging’ and ‘virtual cooperation’ strategies became
his main instrument for achieving this. Rather than facing an electoral defeat in the
2005 polls, he managed not only to postpone the elections, but his presidential mandate
had repeatedly been extended (and hence legitimized) by both the African Union (AU)
and the UN Security Council. For instance, in October 2005, the UN Security Council
recognized the “impossibility of organizing presidential elections on the scheduled date
[. . . ]” and reaffirmed “the decision of the Peace and Security Council [. . . ] that president
Gbagbo shall remain Head of State from 31 October 2005 for a period not exceeding 12
months [. . . ]” (U.N. Security Council 2005a: par. 3). The ‘Forces Nouvelles’ openly
rejected this decision and suspended their participation in the council of ministers. This
created further tensions between the groups, as “[b]oth the opposition and the ruling party
organized rallies in Abidjan to underscore their respective positions on the expiry of the
president’s mandate” (United Nations 2006d: par. 8). However, in order to strengthen
the transitional government and contain Gbagbo’s authority, the UN Security Council
also supported the African Union’s attempts to install a new Prime Minister “endowed
with real decision-making powers until presidential elections could be organised” (Chirot
2006: 74; International Crisis Group 2007e: 2). After several meetings of regional leaders,
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they appointed Charles Konan Banny to assume that role, who was officially inaugurated
on 7 December 2005. Gbagbo immediately rejected this decision and did everything
to effectively “neutralize” Banny (International Crisis Group 2007d: 2). Hence, the
international community’s strategy to ‘tame’ Gbagbo by assigning a strong Prime Minister
blatantly failed.
However, there were various occasions in which ‘foot dragging’ strategies reached their
limit. In January 2006, for instance, an international working group mandated by the
United Nations officially suggested to dissolve the parliament in order to clear the way for
presidential elections. The parliament’s official mandate had ended in December 2005, but
the assembly remained in power upon Gbagbo’s personal request (see Voice of America
2006). Keen to avoid the dissolution of the parliament by all means, Gbagbo made use of a
‘saber rattling’ strategy with which he underlined his potential to act as a spoiler if necessary.
He orchestrated anti-UN riots and militias loyal to the president even tried to seize the
UNOCI headquarters (see Voice of America 2006). This bold move was a success: almost
immediately the UN gave up their demands. However, Gbagbo’s confrontational stance
required to quickly switch back from a ‘virtual confrontation’ to a ‘virtual cooperation’
strategy. In February 2006, he therefore accepted an invitation by the new Prime Minister
for a meeting with main political leaders, including ‘Forces Nouvelles’ leader Guillaume
Soro, which constituted their first personal meeting since 2002 (see United Nations 2006b:
par. 11). This gave rise to hopes that the parties had, finally, switched to a more cooperative
modus operandi and met the international community’s immediate approval. In July 2006,
the UN Secretary General hailed the “working relationship between the tandem formed
by president Gbagbo and Prime Minister Banny [. . . ]” and underlined that “[s]ince the
beginning of the conflict, Côte d’Ivoire has never been as close to resolving the key issues
that lie at the heart of the crisis [. . . ]” (United Nations 2006c: par. 51). In this environment
of goodwill, it became easier for Gbagbo to obstruct once more the most important goal
of the transitional government: preparing the country for the elections in October. As a
frustrated UN Secretary General stated in October 2006:
“The manifest lack of political will by the main Ivorian political leaders, in particular
their inability to transcend narrow personal and political interests [. . . ] have created
yet another major stalemate. At every critical turn of the peace process, some of the
main political leaders have resorted to calculated obstruction of the peace process,
exploiting loopholes in the peace agreements, using legal technicalities and often
inciting violent acts by their followers. Consequently, the second transition period,
like the first, is coming to a close without elections” (United Nations 2006g: par. 70).
However, the international community’s willingness to learn from this episode was ex-
tremely limited. Rather than seeking more effective ways of dealing with Gbagbo, the
international community essentially repeated the decision made one year earlier: extending
both Gbagbo’s and Banny’s mandates, each for a period of twelve months, and postponing
the elections by another year. These decisions were made at the African Union’s ‘Peace
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and Security Council’ and later endorsed by the UN Security Council in resolution 1721
of 1 November 2006 (U.N. Security Council 2005b). For Gbagbo, this outcome was ideal:
it again legitimized his de facto presidency and gave him another twelve months time
for seeking a way out of his electoral dilemma. As it soon turned out, he did not even
need so much time, as he swiftly pulled out a plan B for rescuing his presidency – to the
surprise of the international community and his political opponents alike. On 19 December
2006, Gbagbo officially announced to open a direct dialogue with the ‘Forces Nouvelles’,
mediated by the rebels’ main supporter, president Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso. The
meeting took place in Ouagadougou in Burkina Faso in March 2007 and resulted in a new
power-sharing deal, according to which Gbagbo would remain president and Guillaume
Soro assumed the post of a Prime Minister (see e.g. Bah 2010: 613). The international
community lauded the deal. Observers underlined the “surprising spectacle of a visibly
cordial coexistence between the two former enemies [. . . ]” as the International Crisis
Group remarked somewhat cynically (2007d: 1). The UN Secretary General congratulated
the signatories for “mustering the necessary political will to assume full responsibility for
resolving the crisis in their country” and underlined that the “advent of the Ouagadougou
agreement [. . . ] takes the Ivorian peace process to a unique turning point” (United Nations
2007: par. 98-99). However, pleasing the international community certainly was not the
only motivation of the two leaders for striking the deal. Both of them profited politically
from the agreement:
“Gbagbo saved his presidency and gained a strong platform from which to launch
another presidential bid. As a powerful Prime Minister, Soro has a strong position to
shape the implementation of the agreement and deliver to northerners their citizenship
documents. For Soro, this could be a vindication of the rebellion and a path to
becoming a hero in the north” (Bah 2010: 613).
For Gbagbo, who was the main initiator of the dialogue, the gains clearly outweighed the
costs. Although the agreement meant that, this time, he would need to engage in more
faithful power-sharing than during earlier agreements, he bought himself time and political
credit for preparing a successful presidential campaign. As the International Crisis Group
remarked: “Everything is negotiable for the Ivorian president, except the extent of his
powers and anything that could affect his chances of remaining president” (2007d: 3).
The beginning of the new power-sharing agreement was indeed marked by a relatively
close cooperation between Gbagbo and Soro, but their relations became more and more
obstructive as the elections moved closer. In what had already been a familiar pattern by
then, Gbagbo refused to hold elections in November 2009 and dissolved the government
in February 2010 (see Bah 2010: 614; International Crisis Group 2010).19
19As mentioned above, the period beginning with the conclusion of the Ouagdougou agreement on Côte
d’Ivoire is classified as a mediated, obstructive power-sharing polity. Therefore, the events taking place
after March 2007 are not discussed here in detail.
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Gbagbo’s false promises and repeated violations of agreements increasingly frustrated
the ‘Forces Nouvelles’. After the signing of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement they could
still hope to gain power through the ballot-box within a two-year period. As it was the
case in Liberia, this had a unifying effect on an otherwise heterogeneous and fragmented
opposition. Though predominantly originating from the Muslim north of the country, the
opposition against Gbagbo was both an ethnically and religiously heterogeneous group
(Kirwin 2006: 49), which formed an electoral alliance in light of Gbagbo’s attempts for
dominating the country’s political scene. In March 2004, seven different opposition groups
coalesced against Gbagbo – the so-called G7 or ‘Coalition des Marcoussistes’.20 The
common goal of this coalition was to enforce the implementation of key provision from the
Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, suggesting to establish a transitional government without
Gbago’s leadership (see International Crisis Group 2005a: 8–14). The formation of this
coalition had tremendous effects on Gbagbo’s calculations to remain in power through
public elections. According to Chirot, it “meant that Gbagbo would have no chance of
winning a free election even if northerners were excluded, because he and his ethnic allies
had become a minority in the south itself” (2006: 74). A major point of disagreement
between Gbagbo and his opponents was over the legitimacy of the national electoral
commission, which was charged with organizing the polls in 2005. Suspecting Gbagbo
of controlling or manipulating the commission, the opposition groups called for a neutral
third party (the United Nations) to organize the elections (International Crisis Group 2005b:
21). The International Crisis Group had recommended in due time that the international
community should take the organization of elections in its own hands and guarantee their
transparency (see e.g. 2005b: i–ii), but these recommendations were obviously overheard
by the international community.
However, just as in Liberia, Gbagbo’s continued policy of effectively excluding (or:
outmaneuvering) the opposition led to increasing doubts about the prospects of being able
to compete against Gbagbo through the ballot-box. In light of Gbgabo’s extended pattern
of ‘virtual cooperation’ they have soon become aware that participating in the fake power-
sharing government would not clear the way for free and fair elections. As a result, the
‘Forces Nouvelles’ soon switched to informal means for remaining in power. Disillusioned
by the power-sharing arrangement, they repeatedly suspended their participation in the
transitional government. This happened for the first time in September 2003 after Gbagbo
announced the appointment of the defense and internal security ministers. Complaining that
the appointment procedure violated earlier agreements, the ‘Forces Nouvelles’ announced
their suspension from the transitional government on 23 September (see United Nations
20It comprised the PDCI-RDA, the Rally of the Republicans (RDR), the Union pour la démocratie et
pour la paix en Côte d’Ivoire (UDPCI), the Mouvement des forces de l’avenir (MFA), the Mouvement
patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI), the Mouvement populaire ivoirien du grand ouest (MPIGO) and the
Mouvement pour la justice et la paix (MJP) (see United Nations 2004b: par. 7). Some of them were
powerful southern groups associated with Houphouët-Boigny’s former ruling party, who were disgruntled
after Gbagbo broke with them (see Chirot 2006: 74).
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2003b; par. 6-9). For Gbagbo, this provided a pretext to blame the opposition for the
failure of the peace process and to announce that he would unite the country by force if
necessary. This led to a severe deterioration of the security situation and culminated in an
attempt by government forces to cross the ceasefire line. Government soldiers also seized a
national television station in order to broadcast an announcement prompting external actors
to withdraw from the ‘zone of confidence’ in order to allow the government forces “to fight
the Forces nouvelles and ‘reunite’ the country” (United Nations 2004c; par. 12-13; see
also United Nations 2003b; par. 8). After the tempers cooled down, the ‘Forces Nouvelles’
returned to the power-sharing government in January 2004, only to again suspend their
participation in October, after representatives of the former rebel group claimed to have
discovered a secret transport of weaponry and ammunition to the rebel stronghold Bouaké
(see United Nations 2004f; par. 12). At the latest from this moment on, power-sharing had
been defunct, giving rise to ever more obstructive relations between the factions.
In sum, Gbagbo’s success in remaining in power despite the presence of highly ob-
structive relations is remarkable. When the elections ultimately took place in November
2010 he had already been in power five years longer than originally provided for in the
Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. The use of ‘virtual cooperation’ gestures (backed by a few
‘saber rattling’ gestures where necessary) was key for achieving this goal. Blinded by a
few conciliating gestures, the international community constantly seems to have hoped
that Gbagbo would cooperate over time and make room for elections to take place.
c) Threats from Within
The dilemma faced by leaders of ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities with regard to the
manner in which they deal with threats from within also becomes apparent in the case of
Côte d’Ivoire. Facing increasing resistance from the excluded parties through informal
channels of political competition, they are likely to adopt similar measures, most notably
by controlling the political space and curtailing civil society and the free media. This
may over time amount to a pattern of genuine confrontation. However, these efforts are
marked by the attempt to still maintain a veil of democratic rule, because the leaders of
‘The Winner Took it All’ polities must be concerned about external actors giving up their
mediative stance and supporting the opposition’s cause. The case of Côte d’Ivoire gives a
good illustration of the dangerous potential that is entailed by the increasingly informal
manner of political competition. It can be shown that, over time, both parties adopted more
confrontational and coercive instruments of political competition.
Unlike Charles Taylor in Liberia, Gbagbo formally headed a power-sharing government
and was therefore exposed to greater external scrutiny. As a result, he needed to use
subtler means for extending his hold on power than Taylor, although the general logic
was very similar. Both Taylor and Gbagbo relied on informal and coercive instruments
for dealing with threats from within while maintaining a superficial veil of cooperation.
Just as Taylor, who used the existence of a myriad of security forces as a pretext to
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obscure his responsibility for attacks of opposition members, Gbagbo relied on so called
‘young patriots’ – a militia of young supporters armed with machetes and knives which
repeatedly obstructed the peace process and which was held responsible for harassment and
atrocities.21 This militia had the advantage that Gbagbo could formally distance himself
from its actions and could deny any responsibility for its atrocities. However, the ‘young
patriots’ have always acted to the president’s advantage and have torpedoed the peace
agreement since its very beginnings. Not more than one day after the Linas-Marcoussis
Agreement was signed, they started a riot in the country’s largest city Abidjan, attacking
French citizens and institutions. In an attempt to express their aversion against the power-
sharing deal, “armed gangs looted and killed as they swept up so-called rebels in Abidjan
districts inhabited by northerners” (Chirot 2006: 72). This was only the starting point for a
whole series of attacks. In November 2003, for instance ‘young patriots’ militias joined
with some 100 troops from the national army and attempted to “forcibly cross the ceasefire
line [. . . ] with the aim of launching an attack against the Forces nouvelles” (United Nations
2004c; par. 12). All in all, the impression prevails that the ‘young patriots’ were “[o]ne
of the key elements in the political-military struggle that has wracked Côte d’Ivoire since
2002 [. . . ]” (Banégas 2006: 1). Though it is hard to prove that these militias acted on
behalf of Gbagbo, the UN Secretary General was right to point out that the government
has done “little [. . . ] to check the abuses by urban militias or youth groups, such as the
Young Patriots, who have been responsible for attacks against and harassment of civilians
[. . . ]” (United Nations 2004c; par. 30). But the government also made use of more direct
means of coercion. It repeatedly tried to launch offensives against the rebel-held north in
an attempt to weaken the rebels. In November 2004, for instance,
“government forces launched a series of poorly coordinated attacks against the rebels.
They bombed northern cities, killing dozens of civilians, and attacked the Abidjan
hotel that housed the rebel delegates to the powerless coalition government set up at
Marcoussis. UN troops backed by the French blocked a government thrust toward the
rebel capital of Bouaké, and UN guards protected the rebel delegates in Abidjan, who
would otherwise have been killed” (Chirot 2006: 73).
Strategic use of the media was the other pillar on which the parties relied in their attempts
to weaken their opponents. The media has from the beginning on been a key element in
the parties’ attempts to mobilize public support for their course. As the International Crisis
Group pointed out, “[t]he political elites’ skilled use of the media has led many to believe
that the Ivorian crisis is really about deep-seated hatreds with a long history”, which has
turned out as “a useful way to disqualify opponents in order to monopolise political [. . . ]
power” (2004a). The UN Secretary General noted in 2004 that “the Ivorian media have
unleashed a considerable amount of hate propaganda, which, coupled with the widespread
lack of objectivity of most local news reports, has become a major destabilizing factor”
21For a historical background of the ‘young patriots’ militias, see in particular Banégas (2006).
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(United Nations 2004b; par. 38). This can be interpreted as the systematic use of ‘blaming
and shaming’ strategies by which both parties tried to delegitimize their opponents. In
an attempt to counter these threats, the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement dealt explicitly with
“the incitement to hatred and xenophobia propagated by certain media” and called upon the
national transitional government to “restore free broadcasting of the international radio and
television media” (Government of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire 2003; Art. V, par. 1-3).
External actors also dealt with the destabilizing potential posed by media. In resolution
1572 (2004), the UN Security Council called for the Ivorian parties to “stop all radio and
television broadcasts inciting hatred, intolerance and violence” (U.N. Security Council
2004c; par. 6). In accordance with its mandate, UNOCI set up an independent radio station,
ONUCI FM, which “provide[d] its listeners with unbiased and non-partisan information”
(United Nations 2004d; par. 45). The UN Secretary General has also regularly reported on
progress yielded with regard to attempts for combating destabilizing media reports. For
instance, in 2005 he reported that “incitements to violence, exclusion and intolerance and
calls for a resumption of the armed conflict [. . . ] continued uninterrupted by the Ivorian
media, in particular those associated with the ruling party” (United Nations 2004e; par.
41).
Overall, the role of the media in motivating militias like the ‘young patriots’ to engage
in violent activities cannot be overestimated. It effectively gave the political leaders – most
notably Gbagbo, who had enjoyed a privileged access to the media – an indirect instrument
for ‘commanding’ violent attacks while at the same time denying every responsibility
for their actions and maintaining the facade of (virtual) cooperation. This last aspect
was crucial for Gbagbo, since he had to avoid the impression of being the main spoiler
of the peace process. Standing under closer surveillance from external actors, Gbagbo
occasionally needed to demonstrate his goodwill in order to be able to save his presidency,
as demonstrated in the paragraph on political competition above. This strategy was
generally successful. As the International Crisis Group noted in 2005, ‘the protagonists
of the Ivorian crisis know how to please the international community by giving them
the impression to cooperate’ – while, in effect, they have long shown little inclination to
advance to peace in earnest (see 2005b: i).22 This strategy was particularly pronounced
between the signing of the Accra III agreement in July 2004 and the renewed rupture of
the relations between the government and the rebels in December 2004. In this period, the
parties were engaged in their ‘favorite game, consisting precisely of bypassing the rules of
the game, denying their obligations, mutually accusing each other of a lack of good will,
22In the French original: “Les protagonistes de la crise ivoirienne savent plaire aux diplomates en leur
donnant l’impression de coopérer dans le cadre d’un processus de paix. Mais ce processus s’est jusqu’à
présent réduit à effectuer deux pas en arrière pour chaque pas en avant” (International Crisis Group
2005b: i).
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and of exploiting, with an undeniable bravery, the smallest room for maneuver resulting
from the imprecision of the peace accords [. . . ]’ (International Crisis Group 2005b: 4).23
In sum, both parties relied on informal and unconstitutional instruments for increasing
their share of influence in the polity, most notably through relying on militias, which
repeatedly tried to escalate the situation; this at the same time allowed the leaders to deny
every responsibility for their attacks. This constituted a significant threat to the stability of
the polity as a whole. An additional threat arose from the parties’ systematic use of the
media as an instrument to circulate their hate rhetoric, which aimed at mobilizing public
opinion against their adversaries.
d) Promoting Good Governance
External attempts for promoting good governance in ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities are
likely to be marred by significant challenges and profound difficulties. Above, I argued
that the conflictual nature of this polity requires a particularly intensive engagement by
external actors. At the same time, it constitutes a profound obstacle for external actors
to provide the necessary resources. In addition, they are likely to face pressure by the
incumbent regime to withdraw. This may result either in a hasty withdrawal amidst an
incomplete statebuilding agenda or a long-enduring engagement in which exit options are
hard to conceive and in which the promotion of good governance principles remains a
responsibility for external actors in the long run. The case of Liberia partly confirms these
stipulations because external actors gave in to pressures from the Taylor regime for a quick
withdrawal. However, Taylor’s subsequent abuse of power and his continued support for
the RUF rebels made external actors reconsider over time and impose sanctions against the
regime.
In Côte d’Ivoire, the outcome was different. Unlike in Liberia, where Taylor’s election
had ended the civil war, Gbagbo’s dubious victory in the polls gave the impetus for the
civil war in the first place. This implied that Gbagbo’s authority was, in the eyes of
external actors, less sacrosanct than Taylor’s had initially been, and external engagement
has therefore been relatively intense from the beginning on. Although Gbagbo tried to
reduce external pressure in order to clear the way for a military solution (see above), he
had never been successful in achieving this goal. In addition, the historically strong role
played by France implied that the international community as a whole possessed a greater
willingness to remain engaged in the country. However, due to the tense Franco-Ivorian
relations, France ran a high risk of undermining its own legitimacy by intervening in their
23Own translation from the French original: “Entre ces deux dates, les acteurs du conflit ivoirien se sont
livrés à leur jeu favori consistant précisément à contourner les règles du jeu, à renier leurs engagements,
à s’accuser mutuellement de mauvaise foi et à exploiter avec un incontestable brio les moindres marges
de manœuvre résultant de l’imprécision des accords de paix, qu’il s’agisse de ceux de Linas-Marcoussis
ou de ceux d’Accra III” (International Crisis Group 2005b: 4).
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former colony (see e.g. Mehler 2004: 6–8).24 This has raised the risk for charges of
neo-colonialism to be transferred to the international community at large. In the eyes of
the International Crisis Group, the international community therefore faced a dilemma of
either forcing the Ivorian parties to comply with external engagement (which risks causing
significant resistance) or to disengage and abandon the country to its fate (2005b: i).25
In Liberia, the international community had initially chosen a soft-handed approach that
gave Taylor exclusive control of the political arena and that effectively reduced external
pressure to a minimum. This only changed after Taylor had effectively been drawn into
another civil war and when external actors had to admit that hopes he would turn into a
more statesmanlike leader turned out as illusionary. In Côte d’Ivoire, the international
community chose neither of the two extreme options but instead a halfhearted middle-
way.26 This had already been reflected in the faulty Linas-Marcoussis Agreement of 2003,
which was quickly hammered under French leadership but which failed to address the
most pressing issues of the conflict – most notably the citizenship issue that constituted
the main grievance of the conflict (see Mehler 2007: 4). As Bah comments, “[e]ven when
citizenship was addressed in the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, it was largely treated as a
legal and administrative problem” (2010: 599). Not surprisingly, the implementation of
the agreement was conflict-ridden from the start, as already illustrated above. Nonetheless,
external actors had long clung to the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement as the major point of
reference for the peace process. Instead of acknowledging that it provided an ill-suited
basis for the Ivorian peace process, additional agreements, adopted in 2004 (Accra III)
and 2005 (Pretoria Agreement), followed the spirit of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement
very closely. Using again a phrase of Bah: “Ironically, this blemished agreement became
the cornerstone of the subsequent agreements negotiated by the international community”
(2010: 606).
As shown above, Gbagbo dragged his feet in implementing the agreement. Making
extensive use of ‘virtual cooperation’ strategies, he found various ways to circumvent
the international community’s demands and break his own promises without facing any
significant punishment. This effectively provided a context in which calls for maintaining
good governance standards went unheard. As Chirot remarked in 2006, “[a] unitary and
fair democracy is impossible at this point, and every effort to broker one will end up with
the same stalemate and broken promises” (2006: 75). Human rights violations remained
24According to Andreas Mehler, the self-declared goal of French policy in Africa lies in the protection of
‘legitimate authority’. However, given that President Jacques Chirac referred to Gbagbo as heading a
‘fascist regime’, Mehler concludes that Gbagbo had apparently ceased to be viewed as a legitimate ruler
by French authorities (2004: 8).
25The original text of the International Crisis Group Report (in French) is telling in this regard: “La
communauté internationale fait face à un dilemme clair: elle peut soit contraindre les belligérants à
respecter enfin leurs engagements, ce qu’ils n’ont encore jamais fait, soit se désengager et abandonner la
Côte d’Ivoire à son triste sort” (2005b: i).
26The International Crisis Group warned in this context that choosing a middle-way is doomed to failure:
“[. . . ] une position médiane, à mi-chemin entre la coercition et l’inaction, est promise à l’échec” (2005b:
i).
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pervasive throughout the entire period under investigation here, which can in large part be
contributed to the indiscriminate killings committed by groups such as the ‘young patriots’,
but also to continued violations by state organs and the rebels. A quotation from the UN
Secretary General vividly illustrates the full extent of these human rights violations:
“Politically motivated and arbitrary detentions, extrajudicial killings, rape, confisca-
tion of private property and the intimidation of opposition leaders and their followers
were widely committed with impunity by elements of the Ivorian Defence and Se-
curity Forces and by the Forces nouvelles, and militias associated with both forces.
Of particular concern were the incidents of ethnically motivated human rights abuses
such as killings, rape and the destruction of dwellings, which were also committed by
ethnic and community-based militias” (United Nations 2004e).
The climate of impunity that prevailed in Côte d’Ivoire made it very unlikely for the
perpetrators to be held accountable. Elsewhere, the UN Secretary General noted that “the
severely compromised administration of justice allows the perpetrators [. . . ] to operate
freely” (see United Nations 2005a; par. 46). The international community could do little
in order to improve the human rights situation on the ground. Although external actors
intervened on some occasions in order to prevent large-scale human rights violations (see
above), their halfhearted manner of intervention prevented them from taking a harder
approach towards the perpetrators of human rights violations. Its actions were confined
to documenting the human rights situation and criticizing the parties for their violations,
but little was done to prevent them. According to its mandate, UNOCI documented
the human rights situation in Côte d’Ivoire and published reports on the human rights
situation in the country. In its third report, for instance, UNOCI criticized “egregious
human rights violations and the reluctance of the authorities on either side of the zone of
confidence to conduct criminal investigations into cases brought to their attention” (see
United Nations 2006d; par. 61). However, other than engaging in awareness-raising
programs and conducting investigations into those human rights violations brought to its
attention, there was little UNOCI could do in order to improve the situation. The partition
of the country additionally hampered the promotion of good governance principles and had
negative repercussions for various good governance dimensions. In the realm of justice,
for instance, the division of the country split the jurisdiction of some courts, with the effect
that some areas had “no access to any judicial process” (see United Nations 2005a; par.
40).
In sum, the above paragraph suggests that external actors were incapable of having
any significant effect on the compliance with good governance standards in Côte d’Ivoire.
Undoubtedly, the zone of confidence prevented the recurrence of large-scale organized
violence, but it contributed to an environment in which calling for good governance
standards became illusionary. Ostensibly, external actors have since the beginning of
their engagement in Côte d’Ivoire believed that elections were within reach, inducing
them to postpone the promotion of good governance standards to the post-election era.
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This outcome suggests that ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities constitute a very difficult
environment for promoting good governance standards even if external actors remain
engaged on the ground.
6.4 ‘The Winner Took it All’ Polities: Conclusions
The two cases discussed above illustrate the internal dynamics of ‘The Winner Took it All’
polities. Overall, it has become apparent that this polity type differs significantly from ‘Let
the Winner Take it All’ polities discussed in the previous chapter. The lack of constructive
relations and a pronounced dissent about the distribution of formal governmental authority
gives rise to interactions that are far more conflict-prone and confrontational. The following
conclusions can be drawn from these cases (for a short summary, see table 6.1 on page
245):
First, it has become apparent that ‘The Winner Take it All’ polities provide a particularly
difficult environment for overcoming commitment problems in the implementation phase
of the polity. In section 6.1 I stipulated that the prevalence of obstructive relations in
conjunction with the far-reaching exclusion of one of the warring parties from governmental
power (and hence from the state security apparatus) impede attempts for an effective
disarmament of the warring parties even if external actors are willing to provide significant
security guarantees. The two cases by and large confirm these stipulations. Liberia is only
partly suitable as a case for illustrating the dynamics of ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities
with regard to disarmament because the main efforts for disarming the warring parties
had taken place before the elections in 1997, i.e. before a ‘The Winner Took it All’ polity
was formally in place. At this point, it had still been unclear who would win the elections,
which is one factor to explain why the parties fulfilled their disarmament obligations at
least in part. However, the Liberian case also vividly illustrates that the belligerents tried
to make sure that the disarmament process is not too painful and does not significantly
curtail their military capacities. In what can be treated as a ‘virtual cooperation’ attempt,
they handed in weapons of poor quality or tried to register civilians for the demobilization
program. The mistrust prevailing between Taylor and his former opponents also prevented
the newly elected president to integrate his forces into the national army, which had been
dominated by members of the Krahn ethnic group. In outright violation of the Arusha
Agreement, Taylor created parallel security forces, triggering a serious confrontation with
the ECOMOG command. In Côte d’Ivoire, attempts for disarmament and demobilization
were characterized by the outright resistance of all parties from the beginning on. Despite
the presence of a zone of confidence which physically divided the former belligerents,
none of them could be induced to comply with the disarmament provisions contained in the
Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. The parties made extensive use of ‘foot dragging’ strategies
with which they managed to forestall the disarmament process for more than three years.
Militias associated with the warring parties (most notably the ‘young patriots’ associated
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Aspect Liberia Côte d’Ivoire
Commit-
ment Prob-
lems
Disarmament efforts were carried out be-
fore the 1997 elections; parties partly ful-
filled their disarmament obligations but also
engaged in significant ‘virtual cooperation’
behavior; suspicion against Krahn domi-
nated national army induced Taylor to rely
on parallel security forces for his own secu-
rity.
Disarmament process stalled from the be-
ginning on despite external security guaran-
tees; parties engaged in extensive ‘foot drag-
ging’ and ‘blaming and shaming’ strategies;
parties (in particular ‘young patriots’) made
use of ‘calculated escalation’ strategies in
an attempt to circumvent their disarmament
obligations.
Political
Com-
petition
Pronounced ‘virtual cooperation’ behav-
ior; Taylor tried to present himself as a re-
sponsible and accountable ruler in order to
boost international support; no level playing
field: opposition parties were thoroughly
excluded and the former anti-Taylor fac-
tions lacked realistic prospects for com-
peting against the president in popular
elections; opportunities for self-enrichment
strengthened Taylor’s grip to power.
Gbagbo secured his hold on power by en-
gaging in pronounced ‘foot dragging’ strate-
gies; he oscillated between ‘virtual cooper-
ation’ and ‘saber rattling’ strategies in or-
der to appease external actors; opposition
became increasingly disillusioned by the
prospect of gaining power through competi-
tive elections and sought informal channels
for gaining power.
Threats
from
Within
Both sides fell back to informal and uncon-
stitutional instruments of competition from
the beginning on; Taylor exerted tight con-
trol of the political space and systematically
targeted opposition politicians; lack of per-
spectives induced heterogeneous opposition
to unite and re-arm in order to unseat Tay-
lor militarily before he could legitimize his
rule through popular elections.
Both parties fell back to informal and un-
constitutional instruments of competition
(‘genuine confrontation’); Gbagbo relied on
militias (‘young patriots’) as an instrument
of confrontation without officially taking
responsibility; both parties made strategic
use of the media and engaged in extensive
‘blaming and shaming’ strategies in order
to mobilize public opinion against their ad-
versaries.
Good
Gover-
nance
Difficult environment for promoting good
governance; external actors took early exit
option by giving in to Taylor’s demand for
an early withdrawal, which deprived them
of every leverage to push for good gover-
nance principles; Taylor’s ongoing refusal
to end his support for the RUF in Sierra
Leone triggered increasing external pres-
sure and induced a more and more partisan
manner of external engagement.
Difficult environment for promoting good
governance; Gbagbo was under closer
external surveillance but external actors
mainly adopted ‘virtual enforcement’ mea-
sures; partition of the country has impeded
progress in the realm of good governance
in many issue areas.
Table 6.1: Dynamics of ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities
with Gbagbo) repeatedly relied on ‘calculated escalation’ strategies, contributing to an
environment in which effective disarmament became impossible.
Second, the cases illustrate that political competition in ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities
is by definition highly confrontational. Competition for power in ‘The Winner Took it All’
polities is unlikely to be carried out on a level playing field. Due to its exclusive control of
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the state apparatus, the government-side has a comparative advantage over the excluded
parties and is likely to use it in order to secure its hold on power. This deprives the excluded
parties of a realistic perspective for gaining power through elections at some point in the
near future. They are therefore likely to rely on informal means of political competition,
which may include recourse to armed force as a measure of last resort. The case of
Liberia demonstrates that Taylor was eager to gain exclusive control of the state apparatus
immediately after his election for president and that he ostensibly viewed his control of
the state apparatus as a formidable instrument of self-enrichment. However, knowing that
external observers scrutinized his qualities as a civilian ruler, he made a number of flimsy
attempts to present himself as a responsible statesman, for instance by including members
from the opposition into his cabinet. This inclusive facade was soon overshadowed by the
harassment of opposition politicians and an ever tighter control of the political space. The
lack of future perspectives for the rebel groups was particularly pronounced in the case
of Liberia because the anti-Taylor factions mainly comprised Krahns and Mandingos, i.e.
members from those two tribes with the lowest level of popular support. In Côte d’Ivoire,
the constellation was different, because Gbagbo and his opponents were formally part
of a power-sharing government and because the former rebel groups faced much better
electoral prospects. Rather than counting on a victory in future elections, Gbagbo did
everything to prevent the polls from taking place in order to extend his de facto rule as long
as possible. By oscillating between ‘virtual cooperation’ and ‘saber rattling’ strategies,
Gbagbo could successfully postpone the elections for a total of five years until he felt
ready for them. The former rebel groups became increasingly disillusioned by Gbagbo’s
deceptive maneuvers and increasingly sought informal channels of political competition,
for instance by suspending their participation in the transitional government.
Third, the parties in ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities are particularly likely to engage
in attempts to outmaneuver political opponents and exploit every opportunity to gain a
relative advantage over them. Due to the lacking consensus about the status quo, the parties
constantly try to gain more de facto power – either with the aim to inflict serious harm on
one’s opponents or out of fear about being overthrown themselves. In Liberia, this has
become apparent by Taylor’s attempts to control the political space and curtail opposition’s
room for maneuver. Making use of his heterogeneous security forces, Taylor harassed
political opponents and allegedly was responsible for targeted killings of key opposition
figures. The vast number of security forces he maintained – some of which suffered from
poor command and control structures – allowed Taylor to deny any responsibility for their
actions. This repressive style of rule forced many opposition politicians into exile and
constituted the main reason for the former rebel groups to rearm and unite against Taylor.
In Côte d’Ivoire, the parties made use of various informal and unconstitutional instruments
in order to increase their relative share of de facto power. At several occasions, Gbagbo
tried to pass through the zone of confidence in order to provoke a direct military escalation
with the rebel groups. He also called on external actors to withdraw in order to give him the
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opportunity to ‘unite’ the country. However, his most important instrument of obstruction
were not the official armed forces but the ‘young patriots’ militias who most likely acted
on his order. The reliance on this heterogeneous militia group allowed Gbagbo to launch
attacks against the rebels with officially having to take the responsibility for their actions.
In addition to that, both parties made extensive use of ‘blaming and shaming’ strategies,
i.e. deliberate attempts to delegitimize one’s opponents and manipulate public opinion
in one’s own favor. Since the very beginnings of the conflict, the media has played a key
role in this regard. Despite making use of such instruments, neither side could gain any
significant advantage in the post-conflict period under investigation.
Fourth, ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities pose a particularly challenging environment
for promoting good governance principles. Above, it was stipulated that the prevalence
of obstructive relations between the former belligerents in conjunction with the constant
possibility for resource to armed force contributes to a situation in which the prospects
for transparent and accountable rule are dismal and in which human rights violations are
likely to be pervasive. In addition, the existence of a stable (and sometimes democratically
legitimized) government gives external actors a good pretext to seek early exit options.
Some of these assumptions are confirmed by the cases, although the role played by external
actors in the polities differed significantly. In Liberia, external actors respected Taylor’s
sovereignty and were willing to give him a chance. After ECOMOG’s early withdrawal,
there was little external power left to constrain Taylor. This gave rise to a situation in
which external actors had little leverage to call upon the government to comply with good
governance standards. Aside from the fact that Taylor came to power through free and
fair elections, his manner of rule was diametrically opposed to the principles of good
governance, as corruption, human rights violations, the curtailing of the media and abuse
of public funds were widespread during his rule. However, the greatest source of concern
for external actors was Taylor’s continued support for the RUF in Sierra Leone, which
was increasingly perceived as the main obstacle to peace in this country. This induced
external actors to lean more and more to a partisan manner of engagement and impose
strict sanctions against Taylor’s regime. It also finds its expression in their tacit approval
of and indirect support for the LURD and MODEL insurgents. In Côte d’Ivoire the
constellation was different, because external actors had at no point withdrawn from the
country. Despite their stronger presence, they turned out as unwilling or incapable of
enforcing good governance standards. Buying into the parties’ ‘virtual cooperation’ and
‘foot dragging’ gestures, they had ostensibly believed that elections were within reach,
as provided for by the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, and postponed the enforcement of
good governance standards until after the elections. Meanwhile, the zone of confidence
perpetuated the country’s partition into a rebel-held north and a government-held south.
Among other things, this accounted for widespread human rights violations, propelled
by a culture of impunity. Though UNOCI regularly called upon the parties to refrain
from human rights violations, it could do little more than reporting and investigating past
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atrocities. Its abilities to prevent large-scale human rights violations were significantly
limited.
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Chapter 7
‘You Stay Out’ Polities
All cases discussed so far were cases of mediative external engagement. The last polity
type discussed here contains cases of partisan external engagement, i.e. cases in which
external actors have a systematic and intentional bias for the incumbent regime. At the
same time, all cases of partisan engagement contained in the sample depicted a strong
executive dominance by one of the former warring factions as well as obstructive relations
between the belligerents; therefore, they can all be subsumed under the ‘obstructive
partisan domination’ or ‘You Stay Out’ polity type. In total, four cases from the sample fall
under this polity type: Afghanistan since the US-led military intervention in 2001, Haiti
(after Bertrand Aristide was reinstalled in office), Post-genocide Rwanda and post-conflict
Tajikistan since 9/11 (see table A.1 on page 327). Of those, Afghanistan is undoubtedly the
clearest contemporary case of partisan intervention, and the ever increasing proliferation
of violence leaves little doubt that the relations between the government and the armed
opposition are obstructive. Yet, it is argued here that the case is exceptional and unsuitable
for demonstrating broader post-conflict dynamics, because it is strictly speaking not a
post-conflict case.1 Haiti is also not the ideal case for demonstrating post-conflict dynamics.
The country’s elected president Jean-Bertrand Aristide was ousted in a military coup in
1991, and his reinstatement three years later can be exclusively attributed to a US-led
military intervention. Thus, the case clearly fulfills the requirement for partisan external
engagement. However, the case arguably suffers from the absence of a preceding armed
conflict. The violence that accompanied the coup against Aristide in 1991 led to an
estimated 4,000 deaths in the ensuing three years but lacked the existence of an armed
opposition of any significant sort (see A.11). Since the case is contained in the ‘UCDP/ Prio
Armed Conflict Dataset’ it nonetheless forms a legitimate case of post-conflict intervention;
yet, in order to demonstrate the dynamics between the former warring factions the case
arguably offers too little for being included in this chapter.
1Although Afghanistan experienced a civil war in the post-Cold War period the invasion of the country by
a US-led coalition in 2001 was not related to the civil war as such. Rather, the present civil war can be
seen as a consequence of the external intervention. The scale and scope of external engagement by far
exceeds the average level of outside intervention in post-settlement situations. Despite that, the case of
Afghanistan tends to be subsumed under the broader literature on post-conflict engagements, and for this
reason it is discussed in the appendix in section 9.1.
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The two remaining cases, Rwanda and Tajikistan, are discussed below as examples
for ‘You Stay Out’ polities. Both are cases in which partisan external engagement falls
short from a large-scale military intervention on behalf of one of the conflict parties as it
could be observed in Afghanistan and, to a lesser extent, Haiti. In post-genocide Rwanda,
the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), which put an end to the genocide by conquering the
Rwandan capital Kigali in 1994, established a strongly autocratic regime – initially under
the veil of a broad-based power-sharing arrangement until its facade started to crumble.
Due to the moral authority it gained by ending the genocide, the RPF was able to mobilize
nearly unlimited international support for its policies and the international community
ultimately even sanctioned or ignored large-scale human rights violations committed by the
RPF. Tajikistan is an even subtler case of partisan external engagement. Although the case
has never been prominently represented on international policy-makers’ agendas, the ruling
government in post-conflict Tajikistan could successfully mobilize international concerns
against a gradual takeover of the country by an allegedly ‘radical’ Islamic opposition.
In particular after 9/11, the country possessed significant strategic importance for the
United States and other Western nations and has been considered an ally in the war against
terrorism. Despite the presence of moderate democratization pressure, this exploitation of
Western fears has led to a blossoming of external support for the Tajik government, which
has allowed the latter to further consolidate its hold on power. Before discussing these
cases in more detail, the following section sheds a brief light on the dynamics of ‘You Stay
Out’ polities in a more theoretical manner.
7.1 A basic model of ‘You Stay Out’ Polities
The basic features of ‘You Stay Out’ polities are schematically sketched in figure 7.1 on
page 251. As the figure illustrates, only Side A holds control of the formal government,
whereas Side B is excluded from access to governmental authority. As it is the case in
‘The Winner Took it All’ polities, a basic consensus about this distribution of governmental
power among the former warring parties is lacking. This is illustrated by the thick black
line dividing the former belligerents. The major difference to ‘The Winner Took it All’
polities discussed in the previous chapter is the partisan engagement of external actors,
which is illustrated in figure 7.1 by the arrow connecting external actors and Side A (and
the absence a such a link between external actors and Side B). Based on that, a number of
assumptions about the general dynamics of this polity type can be drawn. As in all other
polity types characterized by obstructive relations, we cannot expect the former warring
parties to engage in genuine cooperation. What is more, due to the fact that there is no
external pressure for the parties to adopt a mediative stance and because there is no need
for the dominating party to pretend to cooperate with the excluded party in order to secure
external funds, we cannot even expect the parties to engage in ‘virtual cooperation’. Instead,
one can expect the relations to range from unfriendly co-existence to outright hostility.
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Figure 7.1: ’You Stay Out’ Polities (simplified illustration)
Nonetheless, the ruling party can be expected to adopt a few flimsy pluralistic gestures (e.g.
ceremonial elections) in order to give its regime the semblance of democracy. External
actors take a decisively different stance in this polity type than in all other types discussed
so far. Because they either perceive the excluded party as illegitimate or develop – out of
geopolitical considerations – a strong bias for the incumbent government, external actors
are less interested in a deep-rooted democratization which might bring their opponents to
power. In this context, the phenomenon of ‘virtual enforcement’ is even more pronounced
than in other polity types. Rhetorical, external actors are likely to favor the same democratic
principles as elsewhere but they will refrain from pushing for the implementation of these
principles. In the following, these assumptions are specified further with respect to the
four polity dimensions on which this dissertation focuses.
Overcoming Commitment Problems. Given the basic characteristics of ‘You Stay Out’
polities, attempts to overcome commitment problems in the post-settlement phase are a low
priority for external actors and the prospects for convincing the excluded parties to disarm
its forces voluntarily are particularly dull. Above, it was argued that external security
guarantees are one of the main conditions for the parties to overcome their commitment
problems. In ‘You Stay Out’ polities, we can expect that external actors are reluctant to
provide significant security guarantees to parties which they consider to be illegitimate or a
potential threat to security and stability. Because the excluded parties have no formal role
to play in the polity, ‘overcoming’ the commitment problems in ‘You Stay Out’ polities
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effectively amounts to the unconditional surrender of the excluded party. This may give
rise to a situation in which external actors either enforce the disarmament of the excluded
party or induce them to turn a blind eye towards attempts by the ruling party to defeat its
opponents militarily in case it refuses to subordinate to the state’s writ.
Manner of Political Competition. Political Competition in ‘You Stay Out’ polities
suffers from one overarching tension: On the one hand, overall questions of legitimacy
require that a veil of democracy is maintained. On the other hand, this commitment to
democracy is by definition ‘virtual’ because neither the governing party itself nor external
actors have an interest in truly democratic processes which could bring the unwelcome
opposition to power. From this, a number of assumptions about the manner of political
competition in ‘You Stay Out’ polities can be derived. In general, we can expect the
governing party to establish a ‘symbolic’ democracy, i.e. a political system in which
democratic features mainly fulfill a ceremonial function. This may find its expression
in fraudulent elections or even cruder attempts to remain in power, for instance the
intimidation or disappearance of opposition politicians. Because external pressure for
democratization is mainly rhetorical, the regime’s authoritarian drift is likely to go further
than in all other polity types. For justifying its own hold on power, the ruling party will
also engage in attempts to delegitimize its political opponents and present itself as the
guarantor for stability in the country. This, in turn, implies that the excluded opposition
has hardly any realistic chances for being represented in the government by means of a
fair political competition. As a result, it will make use of informal means of competition
(potentially including violence), which provides the government with another pretext
for de-legitimizing the opposition further. Hence, we can expect ‘blaming and shaming’
strategies to be of central importance for the government’s attempts to justify its hold on
power.
Threats from Within. For the government in ‘You Stay Out’ polities, open political
space may easily turn into a threat if the opposition is able to criticize the ruling party’s
attempts for manipulating elections and maintain in power by all means. Since the route
to power through formal means is largely precluded by the government’s authoritarian
practices, the opposition has little other alternatives than using civil society or the media in
order to unmask the incumbent regime’s democratic shortcomings and abuses. In order
to prevent this from happening, the ruling party can be expected to take measures for an
almost unlimited control of the political space and to effectively silence domestic criticism.
Backed by its ‘stability credit’, the government is likely to portray political dissent as a
strategy by sectarian politicians or outside forces to destabilize the regime.
Promoting Good Governance. Finally, with regard to promoting good governance stan-
dards we can expect ‘You Stay Out’ polities to differ significantly from the other polity
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types discussed in this dissertation. In virtually all polity types discussed so far, the promo-
tion of good governance standards was marred by ambiguities. In constructive polity types
(‘Let’s Share’ polities and ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities) the problem of ‘euphemistic
blindness’ prevented external actors from recognizing shortcomings and potential threats to
the implementation of good governance principles. In the obstructive polity types discussed
so far (‘Doomed to Share’ polities and ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities), external actors
were often reluctant to commit the resources necessary for enforcing even basic good
governance standards. In ‘You Stay Out’ polities, external actors’ willingness to promote
good governance principles is relatively low because, as noted earlier, external actors
do not want to risk the stability of the incumbent regime. As a result, they are likely to
exhibit a strong tolerance towards the shortcomings and excesses of the incumbent regime.
However, this has limits. External actors cannot afford to officially support regimes that
systematically forge elections and commit severe human rights violations because this
stands in severe contrast to their own good governance rhetoric. Despite their preference
for the stability of the incumbent regime external actors can be expected to place pressure
on the ruling party to do away with the most blatant (and most visible) violations of good
governance principles. However, their ability to induce a significant change of behavior is
likely to be particularly low in ‘You Stay Out’ polities. As argued above, external influence
in post-conflict environments depends on the availability of credible sticks and carrots
and external actors’ demonstrated willingness to use them. In ‘You Stay Out’ polities,
the ruling party has an effective remedy against the imposition of external threats: the
threat that they will empower those forces which external actors want to keep out of the
government. This ‘reverse leverage’ has turned out as a crucial factor by which the ruling
parties in ‘You Stay Out’ polities can avert unfavorable external influence.
7.2 Rwanda
Rwanda shares many features with Burundi in terms of its colonial history and its ethnic
and cultural composition. Yet, the two countries took diametrically opposed paths in their
post-colonial development. Whereas Burundi became a Tutsi monarchy (see 3.3), revolting
Hutu groups in Rwanda swiftly facilitated the downfall of the ruling Tutsi elite after the
country reached independence in 1962 (see e.g. Mehler 2006: 250; Uvin 1999: 256).
“The result was a radical shift of power from Tutsi to Hutu” (Lemarchand 1995: 8). Hutu
elites then dominated the country for more than three decades. In the thirty-two years
between independence and the outbreak of the genocide in 1994, Rwanda witnessed not
more than two rulers: Gregoire Kayibanda took power immediately after independence
and remained in power until he was overthrown by General Habyarimana in an armed
coup about a decade later (see e.g. Lemarchand 1995: 9; Mehler 2006: 253–256; Newbury
1995: 12–13). Habyarimana’s regime was highly autocratic and became notorious for
the exclusion of opposition parties and human rights violations (see Traniello 2008: 37;
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Uvin 1999: 257). In farce elections, the self-declared president regularly yielded about 95
percent of the votes. This “served as a facade to legitimise the president’s authoritarian
rule, notably towards international donors” (Silva-Leander 2008: 1603). However, the
regime faced a lot of internal resistance, mostly from exiled Rwandans – predominantly
Tutsi – who had escaped to neighboring countries after the ‘social revolution’ and in the
post-independence period. By the late 1980s, an estimated 400,000 to 600,000 Rwandan
refugees were living in neighboring countries (Lemarchand 1995: 8 and Khadiagala 2002:
464). Arguing that the Rwandan livelihoods were already over-populated, Habyarimana
refused to repatriate these ‘Rwandans abroad’ (see Newbury 1995: 13). This created
tensions that, ultimately, amounted to a civil war.
On 1 October 1990, the government was attacked by the Rwandan Patrotic Front (RPF),
an insurgent group made up of exiled Rwandans residing in neighboring Uganda. This
attack constitutes the immediate background for the unprecedented genocide that unfolded
four years later, but “no one within the RPF had the slightest idea of the scale of the
cataclysm they were about to unleash” (Lemarchand 1995: 8). Though predominantly
a Tutsi movement, the insurgents also comprised Hutu (Reyntjens 2006b: 1110). Next
to promoting democratic standards, its foremost political goal was the repatriation of the
Rwandan refugees into their home country (see Khadiagala 2002: 464; Reyntjens 1996:
245). However, hardliners within Habyarimana’s regime used the insurgency as a pretext
for mobilizing mass resistance against the Tutsi minority, and “extreme right factions in the
government [. . . ] seized on the invasion to promote a significant expansion of the security
forces, and to brand all Tutsi as internal supporters of the RPF” (Newbury 1995: 14). This
was accompanied by the articulation of an “increasingly overt ideology of Hutu supremacy
[. . . ]”, based on which it was easier to mobilize resistance against the Tutsi-dominated
RPF (1998: 198). The confrontation soon escalated into an enduring civil war between
the government and the RPF, which was characterized by marked atrocities, massacres
and targeted killings. Next to the ‘Forces Armée Ruandaises’ (FAR), radical Hutu troops,
known as the ‘Interahamwe militias’, soon joined the fight against the RPF and fueled
the conflict by committing massacres among the Tutsi population (Mehler 2006: 261).
However, the RPF turned out as an effective military force, and the Habyarimana regime
could only counter the attacks due to French arms supplies and a small contingent of
troops sent by the French government in support of the regime (see Clapham 1998: 199;
Khadiagala 2002: 467).
After three years of fighting, mounting international pressure led to the adoption of a
peace-agreement between the government and the rebel groups – the Arusha Accords (see
Government of the Republic of Rwanda 1993). The agreement contained a number of
far-reaching concessions to the rebel group. The most controversial provisions were about
the establishment of a ‘broad-based transitional government’, in which the RPF would
hold five cabinet seats (out of 21) and eleven seats in a transitional parliament (out of 70),
and the restructuring of the army such that the RPF would hold 40 percent of the troops
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and 50 percent of the officer corps (see Lemarchand 1995: 9 and Khadiagala 2002: 477).
In an additional protocol2 to the Arusha Accords, the parties also agreed on the deployment
of a ‘Neutral International Force’ under the command of the United Nations, which should
assist in the implementation of the agreement, provide security and support the formation
of an inclusive army (Art. 52 & 53). This led to the establishment of the UN Assistance
Mission for Ruanda (UNAMIR), comprising about 2,000 troops (see e.g. Mehler 2006:
265).
The Arusha Accords turned out as an ill-suited basis for guaranteeing lasting peace
between the belligerents. Rather than implementing the agreement in earnest, the govern-
ment effectively impeded the proper implementation of the Arusha Agreement (Barnett
1997: 551). Hutu hardliners within and outside of the government were utterly opposed
to the compromises struck in Arusha. They rejected any compromise with the RPF and
continued to mobilize popular emotions against the Tutsi. This led to the formation of
a radical Hutu party, the ‘Coalition pour la Defense de la Republique’ (CDR) (see e.g.
Mehler 2006: 256). In particular after the assassination of the first Hutu president Melchior
Ndadaye by Tutsi elites in neighboring Burundi in 1993 (see 3.3) – which led to the
inflow of hundreds of thousands of Hutu refugees to Rwanda – these Hutu radicals became
convinced that the cooperation with the Tutsi was to be prevented by all means: “the
message conveyed by Ndadaye’s assassination came through clear and loud: ‘Never trust
the Tutsi!”’ (Lemarchand 1995: 10). They soon reverted to creating an image of the Tutsi
in the Rwandan population as “both alien and clever, not unlike the image of the Jew in
Nazi propaganda”, and to portray them as an imminent threat to the Hutu. This culminated
in the drastic conclusion that “[n]othing short of physical liquidation can properly deal
with such danger” (Lemarchand 1995: 9).
This conviction soon turned into reality. About half a year after the adoption of the
Arusha Accords, on 6 April 1994, president Habyarimana’s airplane was hit by a missile
and crashed. This was the focal event for the systematic genocide among the Tutsi and
moderate Hutu that unfolded in the following 100 days (see e.g. Mehler 2006: 256).
Although the final evidence who launched the missile that brought the plane down is still
lacking, the view supported by most observers is that Hutu radicals within the government
party MNRD were responsible, as they were also the ones who profited mostly from the
plane crash.3 The president’s death “remove[d] once and for all the specter of Arusha [. . . ]”,
and at the same time allowed Hutu radicals to point out the Tutsis as those responsible
behind the attack, which they used as a justification for the genocide (Lemarchand 1995:
10). All in all, “the shooting down of Habyarimana’s plane [. . . ] seems entirely consistent
2‘Protocol of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandese Patriotic
Front on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties’. It builds an annex to the Arusha
Agreement and is part of the same document indicated above.
3Note that others speculate that RPF leader Paul Kagame ordered the shooting down of the plane, and two
investigations by French and Spanish investigators concluded that the later president was involved (see
Robinson and Ghahraman 2008).
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with the overall strategy of MNRD extremists” (Lemarchand 1995: 10). In the three
months that followed, between 800,000 and over one million people – mostly Tutsi, but
also moderate Hutu deemed to be ‘traitors’ – were slaughtered with machetes or beaten to
death (see e.g. Hintjens 1999; Mehler 2006: 249).4 Understaffed and endowed with a weak
mandate, the UN peacekeeping force did nothing to prevent the atrocities. On the contrary,
giving up in the face of the challenges in Rwanda, the UN Security Council decided to
withdraw the larger part of UNAMIR and leave only a small observer force on the ground
(see e.g. Barnett 1997; 2002; Suhrke 1998). As Lemarchand comments: “That a carnage
of this magnitude could have been going on day after day, week after week, without
interference from the international community speaks volumes for its lack of resolve in
dealing with massive human rights violation” (1995: 11). The international community’s
failure is all the more tragic given that the genocide was neither simply a spontaneous
eruption of violence nor an unfortunate chain of events, but well-planned and precisely
orchestrated. At the latest since 1992, “members of ‘Hutu power’ militias were being
trained in techniques of hunt and destroy operations, rather than in open armed combat”
(Hintjens 1999: 247; see also Des Forges 1999: 176–199; Reyntjens 1996: 247–248).
Thus, there was clear evidence that something was going on behind the scenes.
The genocide came to an end due to a military victory of the RPF, which invaded Kigali
on 4 July 1994. This led to a mass exodus of Hutu from Rwanda. In total, about two million
Hutu fled to neighboring states, most notably to DRC, Burundi, Uganda and Tanzania, out
of fear for Tutsi retaliation (Traniello 2008: 38). The victors established a new government
in Kigali which was, at least formally, in compliance with the power-sharing formula
contained in the Arusha Accords (see e.g. Reyntjens 2006b: 1105). However, through
making unilateral amendments to the Fundamental Law, the RPF managed to undermine
the effectiveness of power-sharing to the extent that it merely became cosmetic (see the
paragraph on political domination below). Despite the formal presence of power-sharing,
post-genocide Rwanda is therefore classified as a case of political domination, as argued
below in more detail.
7.2.1 Rwanda as a ‘You Stay Out’ Polity
Post-genocide Rwanda first witnessed a transitional phase based on the Arusha Accords,
followed by popular elections in 2003, in which the RPF was confirmed in office. Although
the pre-election and the post-election phase are, technically speaking, two different periods
– the former involved cosmetic power-sharing, while the latter constitutes a clear case of
political domination – the degree of RPF domination was already so strong before the
elections that Rwanda can safely be treated as a case of political domination ever since
the RPF took power in Kigali. In addition to that, external engagement in post-genocide
Rwanda offers little ground for being regarded as mediative. Out of these reasons, the
4For comprehensive background reports on the Rwandan genocide, see in particular Alison Des Forges
(1999), Barnett (2002) and Debiel (2002: 331–433).
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case is classified as an instance of a ‘You Stay Out’ polity, as argued in more detail in the
following paragraphs.
Political Domination. Post-genocide Rwanda is a case where the formal polity char-
acteristics stand in stark contrast to the de facto distribution of power among the former
belligerents. The RPF did its best to create the illusion that its commitment to the Arusha
Accords was sincere. As provided for in Article 6 of the Accords, Faustin Twagiramungu
(a Hutu) became prime minister (see Reyntjens 2006b: 1105). The RPF then nominated a
Hutu, Pasteur Bizimungu, for the presidency, while RPF leader Paul Kagame “took a back-
ground position as minister of defence but retained the vice presidency” (Silva-Leander
2008: 1607). This gave “a semblance of multi-ethnicity to the regime” (Waugh 2004: 149).
In addition to that, all parties received the number of seats allocated to them by the accord,
with the notable exception that those held responsible for the genocide (i.e. the former
government party MRND and the Hutu extremist party CDR) were banned (Reyntjens
2004: 178). This was certainly warranted in light of the atrocities sparked by these parties,
but by excluding the main signatory of the Arusha Agreement this decision reduced the
effectiveness of power-sharing from the outset.
However, the “illusion of inclusiveness was soon shattered” (Reyntjens 2004: 180). The
RPF swiftly demonstrated that it exercised near total control of the state apparatus. Rather
than sticking to the original spirit of the Arusha Accords, the party influenced the provisions
of the accords in its own favor by making unilateral amendments to the Fundamental Law
which strongly modified the spirit of the power-sharing agreement. Most importantly, the
RPF significantly strengthened the position of the presidency at the expense of the authority
of the Prime Minister. This step can be interpreted as a “subtle piece of constitutional
engineering which attempted to mask the consolidation of the RPF’s hold on political
power” (Reyntjens 2004: 178). The RPF’s next move consisted of intimidating unwelcome
politicians and forcing them into exile. After a number of moderate Hutu politicians
accused the RPF of “monopolising power and betraying the spirit of the Arusha Accords”
(International Crisis Group 2002c: 11), a number of influential Hutu politicians – including
the prime minister – were forced to resign in 1995 (Debiel 2002: 414; Lemarchand 2007:
7). In the ensuing years, many more politicians suffered the same fate, and the RPF
increasingly unmasked its unrestrained claim to power. Most importantly, after president
Bizimungu, too, was forced to resign in 2000, the RPF’s military leader Paul Kagame
finally became president, thus formally occupying “the position he already held de facto”
(Waugh 2004: 154). At the latest from this moment on, all serious opposition against the
RPF had evaporated. As the International Crisis Group noted in 2002: “[T]he political
parties that exist today in Rwanda are only tolerated if they agree not to question the
definition of political life drawn up by the RPF. Their existence serves to maintain the
facade of compliance with the Arusha Accords on power sharing” (2002c: 2).
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Fearing popular elections and the possible undermining of its power-base, the RPF was
also able to significantly extend the transitional period. Originally, it was to last until 1999,
but the RPF argued that “time is not ripe for democracy and elections” (Uvin 2001: 180)
and unilaterally extended the transitional period to last for four more years until July 2003
(see also Reyntjens 2006b: 1106). This gave the RPF time to depose the most powerful
opposition party – the MDR – just before the elections. Due to the RPF’s tight control
of the National Electoral Commission in conjunction with the fact that the polls were
public rather than secret, Kagame yielded an unrealistic 95 percent of the votes in the
August 2003 presidential election (see Reyntjens 2006a: 1106–1108). At the latest from
this moment on, it became clear even to benign observers that “Rwanda had become for
all intents and purposes a single-party state” (Lemarchand 2007: 7). All this supports
the argument that the Rwandan post-genocide period is most adequately classified as a
case of political domination. As Uvin noted, despite the formal presence of power-sharing
institutions, “there is no doubt in anybody’s mind that politics in Rwanda is dominated by
the RPF and especially its military leader Paul Kagame [. . . ]” (Uvin 2001: 179). Reyntjens
is even more outspoken about the RPF’s reign: “Rather than liberation, inclusiveness and
democracy, the RPF has brought oppression, exclusion and dictatorship” (Reyntjens 2006b:
1103).
Obstructive Relations. The legacy of the genocide leaves little doubt that the relations
between the warring factions have remained highly obstructive in post-genocide Rwanda.
Above, it was already highlighted that the RPF seized the opportunity of its military
victory to impose a repressive and authoritarian regime, which cracked down on opposition
members and led to a further alienation between the ethnic groups. However, the greatest
obstructive potential arose from the large number of Hutu refugees – many of them
génocidaires – who escaped to the eastern DRC after the RPF had taken power in July
1994. The Congolese refugee camps in which they resided were a breeding ground for
Hutu extremists of all kinds (see Mehler 2006: 267). This turned out as a severe security
threat to the new regime in Kigali. The most notorious perpetrators of the genocide –
members from the Rwandan government forces and the Interhamwe militia – mainly took
refuge in North Kivu, and since autumn 1994 “carried out cross border raids into Rwanda,
where they killed civilians, attacked villages, hospitals and schools, and ambushed vehicles”
(International Crisis Group 1998b: 5). The RPF responded to this threat by maintaining
proxy forces on Congolese territory, which were responsible for the “slaughter of tens of
thousands of refugees in the Congo in 1998 and of thousands of Congolese civilians again
in 2000” (Silva-Leander 2008: 1607; Uvin 2001: 183; see also chapter 4.2 above). In
these two wars on Congolese soil, the RPF has committed “colossal” human rights abuses,
directed at Hutu refugees and Congolese civilians alike (see Reyntjens 2006b: 1111).
Against this background, the International Crisis Group aptly described the transitional
phase as a “situation of almost permanent war, due to the ongoing military threat from
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armed Hutu groups based in the region and the countries that backed them” (2002c: 6).
However, the government’s human rights record in its own country is little better. The RPF
was accused of having massacred “probably well over 100,000” civilians between April
and September 1994 (see Debiel 2002: 415; Reyntjens 2006b: 1111). Since 1995, violence
was increasingly targeted against Hutu elites, who became the “victims of harassment,
imprisonment and even physical elimination” (Reyntjens 2006a: 1105). All this leaves
little doubt that the relations between the former warring factions were highly obstructive
in post-genocide DRC.
Partisan Engagement. All in all, there is reason to argue that external actors’ role in
post-genocide Rwanda differs drastically from the mediative manner of engagement as it
was present in all other polity types discussed so far. Under the impression of the genocide,
the international community widely credited the new regime in Kigali for having ended the
atrocities and for having liberated the country from the hordes of ravaging Hutu extremists.
In addition to that, its disgraceful silence and inaction during the killings undermined the
basis for strong moral arguments with respect to the characteristics of the new regime. This
had the effect that external actors developed a strong bias for the incumbent regime and
that they systematically and intentionally turned a blind eye towards the RPF’s excesses.
Although large scale military support for the regime was lacking, the manner of external
intervention can clearly be considered partisan. Three factors accounted for that:
First, the international community suffered from an acute sense of guilt for not having
prevented or stopped the genocide. Instead of intervening at an early stage, a number of
western states – France, Belgium and the US – evacuated their citizens from the conflict-
ridden environment, which sent a clear signal to the génocidaires that they could proceed
without facing much outside interference. In particular the decision by the UN Security
Council to reduce the number of peacekeepers in the country from about 5,000 to a meager
270 observer troops served as a catalyst for the genocide (see Mehler 2006: 265). Thus,
for not having stopped or at least contained the outburst of violence, the international
community clearly bears part of the responsibility for what happened in Rwanda. Allison
Des Forges was one among many to have made this point. Although she highlighted that
“[t]he Rwandans who organized and executed the genocide must bear full responsibility
for it”, she also made clear that “[t]o the extent that governments and peoples elsewhere
failed to prevent and halt this killing campaign, they all share in the shame of the crime”
(1999: 19).5 The scale of the atrocities in conjunction with external actors’ “acute sense
of guilt” (Reyntjens 2006b: 1114) contributed to a pronounced pro-RPF bias among the
5In addition to that, she points out that the UN as well as the governments of Belgium, France and the
US “bear added responsibility: the U.N. staff for having failed to provide adequate information and
guidance to members of the Security Council; Belgium, for having withdrawn its troops precipitately
and for having championed total withdrawal of the U.N. force; the U.S. for having put saving money
ahead of saving lives and for slowing the sending of a relief force; and France, for having continued its
support of a government engaged in genocide” (Des Forges 1999: 19).
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greater part of the international community. After they had taken power in Kigali, “a strong
feeling prevailed in the international community that some latitude needed to be given to a
regime facing the colossal task of reconstructing the country in human and material terms”
(Reyntjens 2004: 179). Reducing the complexity of the genocide to simple terms such
as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ guys (Reyntjens 2006b: 1114), the international community swiftly
made its choice as to where the new regime stood. The RPF’s seizure of power “was seen
by many as the succession of a bloody dictatorship by a decent government” (Reyntjens
2006b: 1103).6
Second, the RPF skillfully promoted its cause among the international community and
mobilized significant external support. There is evidence that “[t[he regime understood the
moral weakness of the international community very well, and fully exploited the ‘genocide
credit’ which allowed it to acquire and maintain victim status [. . . ]” (Reyntjens 2006b:
1114). After having taken power, the government constantly criticized the international
community and has reminded it of its failure during the genocide (see Mehler 2006: 267),
which has effectively silenced all critique. As Schaller (2008) notes, the RPF has exploited
the international community’s bad conscience in order legitimize its dictatorial rule (see
Schaller 2008: 633). As a result, international goodwill towards the RPF and its charismatic
leader Kagame has from the beginning on been nearly unlimited. This has expressed itself
in a significant tolerance external actors have exhibited towards the RPF’s violations of
good governance standards. It also explains why Kagame has been viewed as a “respected
leader” in the West although he can be held accountable for crimes comparable to those
committed by Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe or Omar Hassan Al-Bashir in the Sudan (see
2008: 628). Although he fought several wars in the DRC and reportedly engaged in the
systematic exploitation of natural resources from the country’s eastern provinces,7 the
international community blatantly ignored the allegations against Kagame and continued
to view him as a “visionary, charismatic and optimistic man” (Uvin 2001: 179).
Third, the international community exhibited a systematic preference for stability as
opposed to democracy in Rwanda. When the first signs for the regime’s authoritarian
tendencies became apparent, “most thought it premature to question the good faith and
political will of the new regime” (Reyntjens 2004: 179). This gave the RPF nearly
unlimited room for maneuver, which it used in order to silence critics, undermine the
principles of power-sharing and perpetuate its rule. This became most drastically clear
6A group of western countries, most notably the US, the UK and the Netherlands, formed a group called
‘Friends of Rwanda’, which “squarely supported” the RPF. As Reyntjens notes, “[t]hese countries were
not burdened by much knowledge of Rwanda or the region [. . . ]”, but had no doubt that the RPF were
the ‘good guys’ and worth supporting (2004: 179).
7The international community’s silence was particularly pronounced in light of Rwanda’s involvement
in the Congo crisis. A 2001 report by a UN mandated panel of experts on the illegal exploitation of
natural resources in the DRC (United Nations 2003a) documented that the Rwandan government was
systematically engaged in the exploitation of valuable resources in the eastern DRC and that Kagame and
other members of the regime personally enriched themselves through these endeavors (see also Grignon
2003: 46; Schaller 2008: 628).
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with respect to the extension of the transitional phase. Whereas in most other cases external
actors pushed hard for early elections in post-conflict situations, the opposite was the case
in Rwanda. There, international observers simply concluded that “Rwanda is not ready for
democracy” (quoted in Silva-Leander 2008: 1612) and remained generously silent when
the RPF announced to extend the transitional period by another four years in 1999. Unlike
in many other post-conflict cases, external actors were also extraordinarily generous in their
assessment of the fairness and transparency of the elections. The local elections in 1999 for
instance suffered from a general lack of secrecy, as voters were “asked to line up behind
those for whom they wanted to vote” (Uvin 2001: 180). In the polarized environment
of post-genocide Rwanda, lining up in front of the wrong candidate can obviously be
a threat to life and security for voters. However, for the international community, this
was obviously not a huge problem. As Uvin notes: “[t]he UN Resident-Representative,
who had headed an informal donor monitoring group, stuck his neck out remarkably far,
publicly declaring the elections transparent and fair and, within the Rwandan context, a
significant achievement” (2001: 180). A similar picture emerges in light of the national
elections held in 2003, which confirmed the RPF in power with a highly unlikely 95 percent
of the vote (see Waugh 2004: 205) – in a country where the Tutsi make up approximately
14 percent of the population. By and large, external actors failed to criticize the results of
the elections and even endorsed them as a sign for progress (see Reyntjens 2006b: 1109).
As these examples illustrate, external actors’ behavior in the case of post-genocide Rwanda
can clearly not be regarded as mediative. As Reyntjens notes, by continuing to keep its eyes
shut to the frequent violations of the Rwandan regime, the international community has in
fact become “complicit in the consolidation of a new dictatorship” (2006b: 1114). Out of
these reasons, external engagement in post-genocide Rwanda is regarded as partisan here.
7.2.2 Polity Dynamics in Rwanda
The case of Rwanda confirms the plausibility of many of the assumptions made about
‘You Stay Out’ polities above. This is illustrated below with regard to the four overarching
themes: dealing with commitment problems, competition for power, threats from within,
and external engagement for good governance.
a) Overcoming Commitment Problems
In ‘You Stay Out’ polities, overcoming commitment problems is generally no priority
for the parties. Unlike in polities with mediative engagement there are no outside forces
trying to work towards a constructive settlement of the conflict. Instead, together with the
ruling party external actors impose their vision of a post-conflict peace and take measures
to ensure that the defiant party subordinates to this vision. These measures may involve
active combat (as in Afghanistan, discussed in the appendix), or subtler measures like
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turning a blind eye to the ruling party’s efforts to contain its opponents. This was the case
in Rwanda.
After the genocide had come to an end and the RPF had captured power in Kigali,
there was obviously little common ground between the Hutu and the Tutsi. As Prunier
comments: “Nobody was automatically innocent, and suspicion was everywhere. Worse,
there was very little solidarity between Hutu and Tutsi survivors” (2009: 3).8 The exodus of
approximately two million Hutu to neighboring countries posed additional security threats,
because the refugee camps in eastern Zaire and elsewhere were notorious breeding-grounds
for Hutu radicals, resembling “war machines built for the reconquest of power in Rwanda”
(Prunier 2009: 25). Soon after the genocide, exiled Hutu radicals had consolidated their
power and began cross-border raids in Rwanda targeting predominantly Tutsi civilians. In
one incident in 1997, for instance, about 300 Tutsi were killed with machetes by ex-FAR
soldiers and Hutu militias. The aggressors proceeded “as brutal and blatantly racist as
ever”: “Busses would be stopped at roadblocks, emptied of their passengers at gunpoint,
then Hutus separated from Tutsis. The Tutsis would be shot or hacked to death” (Waugh
2004: 122). This prompted Waugh to the conclusion that “the genocide had never really
ended, and although more localized and on a lesser scale, the génocidaires were still able
to continue in their mission to rid Rwanda of its Tutsi minority” (2004: 122). Tensions had
also arisen among the Tutsi community, in particular between those who were repatriated
after the genocide and the survivors of the genocide. The RPF has generally viewed the
latter with suspicion for being potential collaborators of the Hutu militias (see Reyntjens
2010: 13).
The international community had done relatively little to stabilize the situation or induce
the parties to engage in greater cooperation. Although UNAMIR II9 at that time comprised
some 5,500 troops, the mission contributed little to overcoming the ‘commitment problems’
between Hutu and Tutsi in the post-genocide era and certainly did not contribute to a sense
of security among the Hutu population. As Prunier remarks:
“In theory UNAMIR II could have stopped or at least detected some of the worst
human rights abuses then being committed by the RPF-led government. But just as
had been the case for UNAMIR I before the genocide, it was not supposed to engage
in intelligence gathering. It clumsily tried once or twice to find out about some of
8In a similar vain, Waugh notes that “the two communities restarted their existence together in a climate
of distrust, denial and insecurity [. . . ] and the concept of ‘reconciliation’ was really only a word to
be recited by RPF ministers and ambassadors at international meetings while at home it meant almost
nothing” (2004: 123).
9UNAMIR’s post-genocide mandate dates back to 17 May 1994, when the UN Security Council could
finally bring itself to vote for sending a second UN force to Rwanda. The UN Security Council expanded
UNAMIR’s mandate, authorizing it, among other things, to “contribute to the security and protection of
displaced persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda [. . . ]”, and increased the force level to 5,500
troops (U.N. Security Council 1994a; par. 3–5). However, “[t]he new force arrived too late to protect
Tutsi from genocide” (Des Forges 1999: 498).
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the most obvious massacres, but because it was always giving advance notice of its
movements and ‘cooperated’ with the RPA, it never found anything” (2009: 33).
As a result, UNAMIR II was not able to restore the credibility and reputation which the
UN had lost during the genocide. On the contrary, the peacekeepers were “despised by
everybody in Rwanda as the embodiment of arrogant powerlessness” (Prunier 2009: 33).
It possibly largest achievement was that it deterred an immediate attack by the radicals of
the former regime against the RPF. There is reason to argue that “[i]f UNAMIR had not
been present, it is likely that the forces of the old regime, some of which had escaped to
the refugee camps in Zaire, would have counterattacked” (Vaccaro 1996: 399).
Although the UN presence hardly constrained the RPF’s room of maneuver, the new
Rwandan government soon tried to get rid of the peacekeepers, arguing that there was no
longer a necessity for mission of this size. In a first step, the Rwandan government called
for a reduction of troops from 5,500 to 1,800. By deciding to reduce the troop level to
2,330, the UN Security Council nearly fully complied with the government’s demands (see
Prunier 2009: 33). The difference of some 500 peacekeepers hardly made any difference.
As Prunier notes: “UNAMIR II troops were, for all practical purposes, deaf, blind and
lame. Whether there were 1,800 or 2,330 of them was irrelevant” (2009: 33). The UN’s
reluctance or inability to set limits to the RPF’s room of maneuver also becomes clear with
regard to the blatant human rights violations the government committed among the Hutu
population in the post-genocide period. Aside from the killings of hundreds of thousands
of civilians during and immediately after the genocide by the RPF, a first large-scale RPF
massacre took place in April 1995 in a Hutu refugee camp in Kibeho under the watching
eyes of the UN and numerous NGOs.10 In the eyes of the RPF, the existence of such UN
administered camps on Rwandan soil was a major annoyance since it allegedly protected
predominantly génocidaires and limited the RPF’s sovereignty over Rwanda territory. Out
of these reasons, the RPA seized the camp in April, gathered the refugees on a mountain
plateau and began to shoot at the crowd with rifles and mortars. It is estimated that up
to 5,000 people had been killed, but an official investigation came to the conclusion that
casualties numbered at 388. Since then, the figure “has never been officially questioned,
although everybody knows it to be false” (Prunier 2009: 40–42). The massacre was
carried out under the watching eyes of the UN blue-helmets, who did nothing to prevent
the atrocities. When asked to stop the killings, a soldier of the Zambian UN battalion
reportedly stated: “We have been ordered to co-operate with the Rwandan authorities, but
not to shoot at them” (quoted in Prunier 2009: 40). This illustrates that external actors
were ostensibly willing to turn a blind eye to the RPF’s attempts to defeat its opponents by
force rather than giving security guarantees to those parties excluded from governmental
power.
10Kibeho hosted a large refugee camp established by the French as part of the operation turquoise, which
aimed at protecting Rwandan refugees and IDPs (mostly Hutu) in the post-genocide context. By April,
the camps approximately contained 150,000 IDPs (see Prunier 2009: 40–42).
263
Chapter 7 ‘You Stay Out’ Polities
Despite its large degree of latitude, the Rwandan government exerted continued pressure
on the peacekeepers to withdraw, and the international community swiftly complied. In
March 1996 – less than two years after the end of the genocide – UNAMIR’s mandate
came to an end, upon request of the government and against the wish of the UN Secretary
General. In his final report on UNAMIR, The UN Secretary General again underlined
“that the United Nations would still have a useful role to play in Rwanda after the expiry of
the mandate of UNAMIR on 8 March 1996”, but also pointed out that any of the options
for a post-UNAMIR engagement he sketched “would require the consent of the Rwandan
Government and that consent has not been forthcoming”. He concluded the report by
expressing his “regret [. . . ] that there appears to be no alternative [. . . ] to the complete
withdrawal of all the civilian and military components of UNAMIR after 8 March [. . . ]”
(United Nations 1996a, par. 43–46). The UN’s swift withdrawal from Rwanda is clearly
exceptional given the vast challenges. It reflects the strong leverage the RPF could exert
on the government – a topic that is discussed in more detail below.
In sum, the case of Rwanda illustrates that neither external actors nor the RPF had any
interest in seeking to accommodate the excluded parties and inducing them to cooperate.
External actors only provided marginal security guarantees to the Hutu and turned a blind
eye to the RPF’s attempts to defeat its opponents militarily. The combination of the
opposition’s widespread exclusion in conjunction with the partisan engagement by external
actors made any effort for inducing the excluded parties to willingly disarm illusionary.
Overall, this suggests that the room for accommodation is miniscule in ‘You Stay Out’
polities. ‘Overcoming’ commitment problems effectively amounts to the military defeat or
unconditional surrender of the excluded warring parties.
b) Manner of Political Competition
Political competition in Rwanda follows a pattern that is very much in line with the general
model of ‘You Stay Out’ polities. Although, as a post-genocide case, Rwanda certainly
differs a lot from ordinary post-conflict countries, some of its dynamics were clearly
facilitated by the specific combination of partisan external engagement, an obstructive
domestic environment, and the RPF’s domination of the political space. The crux about
‘You Stay Out’ polities is that access to political power – or the political space more
generally – is highly exclusive and regulated by both formal and unspoken rules and
procedures. In the case of Rwanda, it can be shown that, in order to survive politically,
the RPF’s only choice was to exert tight control on the political space. In so doing, it has
made use of both overt and covert strategies to delegitimize and marginalize the political
opposition, both in front of a domestic and an international audience. Through making
use of ‘blaming and shaming’ strategies, the RPF gained substantial leverage over both
domestic and external actors, which it used in order to incrementally put its authoritarian
agenda into reality.
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As a predominantly Tutsi movement, the RPF’s natural constituency in post-genocide
Rwanda comprises only about 12 percent of the population (see Coleman 2008l). As a
result, the party has to fear popular elections more than anything else unless it is able to
fully control their results. Any truly free and fair vote runs a high risk of replicating the
outcome of the first democratic elections held in neighboring Burundi in 1993: a sweeping
victory of a Hutu party (Frodebu) and the marginalization of the Tutsi party (Uprona)
that had ruled previously (see 3.3). Bluntly put, “the RPF would simply lose power if it
accepted a competitive political system” (Reyntjens 2010: 33). However, “[l]osing power
as a result of free and fair elections in a context of political freedom is not an option for the
military victor” (Reyntjens 2006b: 1109). It therefore has become a priority for the RPF to
make sure that political competition is not carried out on a level playing field. Elections
are rather seen as “an arena which must be intensively managed by the government to
retain its dominance of political space” (Beswick 2010: 236). Until now, the RPF has
been remarkably successful in ‘managing’ its access to power. This would not have been
attainable without external actors’ indirect complicity with the regime in Kigali. Keen to
avoid a relapse of the country into violence and driven by a sense of guilt and responsibility,
external actors have effectively become one of the most important pillars on which the
RPF’s power rests. This becomes most apparent with respect to the prolongation of the
transitional phase by four years. Given the RPF’s grim chances of winning a fair electoral
contest, this was the most secure way for the regime to remain in power. When the RPF
announced that it would prolong the transitional phase, virtually no resistance from external
actors could be observed. Instead, external actors were fully convinced by the argument
that “time is not ripe for democracy and elections, as it would be a recipe for violence and
ethnic division” (Uvin 2001: 179). Even the International Crisis Group, otherwise known
for embracing political liberalization, noted in 2002 that “[c]ontrol over the activities of
political parties was until now partly justified by the fragile security situation that Rwanda
has experienced since 1994” (2002c: i). In all other cases, the attempt by any government
to extent an already long transitional phase of five years (the constitution originally only
allowed two years, see Prunier 2009: 8) by another four years would certainly have caused
an outcry within the international community. However, in the case of Rwanda “the donor
community in Rwanda has been most wary of pressing for elections” (Uvin 2001: 179).
This illustrates that external influence in Rwanda was of a different quality than in cases of
mediative external engagement and that external actors effectively apply double-standards
in their approach towards post-conflict countries.
In addition to avoiding or manipulating elections, ‘blaming and shaming’ strategies
have become the other backbone for the RPF’s hold on power. Its military victory over
the perpetrators of the genocide endowed it with a universal degree of moral authority
and effectively gave it “the monopoly of knowledge construction on the country’s past,
present and future” (Reyntjens 2006b: 1114). The RPF skillfully used its monopoly on the
interpretation of Rwandan history as a political instrument by imposing the “boundaries
265
Chapter 7 ‘You Stay Out’ Polities
of ‘political correctness’ in modern Rwanda [. . . ]” (2002c: 1). This has become apparent
through a rhetorical commitment to ‘unity’ and a ‘consensual mode of governance’, which
have at the forefront become the main principles for political competition in Rwanda.
However, “in practice the doctrine and politics of unity directly contradict the exercise of
political freedom and pluralism” (International Crisis Group 2002c: 2), since they have
deliberately been used as an instrument for exerting tight control on the political space:11
“[r]eferences to identities other than the officially sanctioned Banyarwanda identity
are regularly met with informal public shaming campaigns, labelling the individuals
uttering these propositions as génocidaires sympathisers and even negationists” [. . . ]
(Zorbas 2004: 43).
This has culminated in the vague notion of ‘divisionism’ which the RPF introduced into
Rwandan politics and based on which references to ethnicity are not only discouraged
but declared illegal (Hintjens 2008: 10). On 18 December 2001, the Rwandan parliament
adopted a law on discrimination and sectarianism, which aimed at forbidding individuals
and political parties to poison the political climate by adopting a sectarian rhetoric (see e.g.
Zorbas 2004: 44). The law, however, is “vague and [. . . ] leaves the door open to selective
and politically motivated enforcement” (Zorbas 2004: 44). In the constitutional referendum
held two years later, the concept of ‘divisionism’ was amended to the constitution (see
Silva-Leander 2008: 1613). This turned out as the perfect tool for getting rid of political
opponents and controlling the manner of political competition and has been “exploited
by the RPF to delegitimize those who criticize them” (Beswick 2010: 236). In a similar
vain, Silva-Leander notes that “[w]hile the measure is ostensibly aimed at preventing a
resurgence of ethnically based politics of the pre-genocide period, it has been criticised for
placing excessive restrictions on the freedom of the press and on the activity of political
parties” (2008: 1613).
Constantly emphasizing the threat of divisionism to reconciliation and the consolidation
of peace has become a perfect pretext for the RPF to postpone elections and justify a
hard line against political opponents. The ruling party has repeatedly argued that “the
transformation of political mindsets is a precondition for the exercise of civil liberties”
(International Crisis Group 2002c: 1), and in an environment in which ‘divisionism’ and
‘sectarian’ politics prevail, the necessary mindset is obviously lacking. Accusations of
divisionism and ‘genocide ideology’ were also “frequently levelled against critics of the
RPF whose motives do not appear to be linked to such an offence” (Beswick 2010: 237).
11There are widely diverging discourses about the origins of Hutu and Tutsi cleavages – broadly speaking,
an essentialist discourse, which sees the origins for the ethnic tensions in unalterable socio-historic
differences between the two groups, and a social-constructivist discourse, which locates the origins of
the tensions in strategic manipulation of ethnic identities by colonial power (see Uvin 2008). Whereas
Hutu extremists have clung to the essentialist argument (which they have used as a justification for the
killing), the RPF has embraced the social-constructivist discourse quasi as an official state ideology and
has emphasized that Hutu and Tutsi are effectively one people – the ‘Banyarwanda’ (see Zorbas 2004:
42–43).
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Most importantly, they served as the main reason for banning the MDR in the 2003
elections – the only party making at least “sporadic attempts to challenge the party line
and counter the RPF’s growing power” (International Crisis Group 2002c: 10; see also
Reyntjens 2006b; Silva-Leander 2008). Based on charges of divisionism, the RPF also
got rid of president Bizimungu. Although himself a member of the RPF, he “represented
a potential political threat to the position of the RPF” and was therefore forced to resign
(see Beswick 2010: 235). The same happened to the former Prime Minister Faustin
Twagiramungu when he returned from exile in Belgium shortly before the elections in
2003 in order to run as an independent presidential candidate (see Zorbas 2004: 43). Thus,
the “Rwandan political opposition, unless directly aligned with the RPF [. . . ] faces a
non-negligible potential threat in the nebulous definition of divisionism” (Zorbas 2004:
43).
The RPF has also used such ‘blaming and shaming’ strategies as an instrument to levy
“freedom-destroying legislation” against civil society groups (International Crisis Group
2002c: 13) and confine, more generally, the boundaries of the political space (see Beswick
2010). One year after banning the MDR, the parliament “recommended the dissolution
of the last autonomous civil society organisations for their alleged ‘genocidal ideology”’
(Reyntjens 2006b: 1107). Therefore, it is fair to conclude with Beswick that the ideology
of divisionism provided the “framework through which the RPF seek to dominate Rwandan
politics and limit political space” (2010: 236). This illustrates that ‘blaming and shaming’
strategies were a key instrument for the RPF to bend the playing field in its own favor.
Unlike its opponents, the RPF possessed the monopoly on the interpretation of the truth,
or what Karl W. Deutsch called the “ability to afford not to learn” (quoted in Senghaas
2008: 180–181). The manipulation of the past was a particularly important measure to
achieve this goal. As Reyntjens comments: “In Rwanda as in some other places, history is
a highly political stake of the present and the future rather than a way of analysing and
understanding the past. Its manipulation contributes to the structural violence so prevalent,
yet apparently so invisible to outsiders” (2010: 33). Through their open or tacit acceptance
of the RPF’s attempts to monopolize political power, it is no exaggeration to claim that
external actors “may be assisting in the writing of a partial vision of the past and the
present, in which genocide crimes are the only ones that are acknowledged and the need to
combat impunity exists only for one side [. . . ]” (2001: 184).
In sum, the manner of political competition in Rwanda was shaped by a few symbolic
commitments to democracy, which masked the RPF’s tight grip to power and its near total
control of the political space. ‘Blaming and shaming’ strategies (most notably through
charges of ‘divisionism’ and ‘genocide ideology’) were the main instrument with which the
RPF exerted control on the political opposition and justified its authoritarian manner of rule.
In addition, since the RPF knew that it had no chances for winning competitive elections, it
unilaterally extended the transitional phase, which met external actors’ immediate approval.
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This illustrates that the notion of a level playing field is alien to ‘You Stay Out’ polities,
because it is neither in the interest of the ruling party nor external actors.
c) Threats from Within
Aside from delegitimizing political opponents, the RPF has also engaged in murkier strate-
gies for consolidating its hold on power, including the systematic use of violence against
political opponents. Also in this regard, external actors have become tacit accomplices
of the RPF. The international community has not only been incapable or unwilling to
denounce the RPF’s actions, but has deliberately and systematically turned a blind eye to
even the most serious violations committed by the RPF. In line with the general model of
‘You Stay Out’ polities, I argue that this is mainly a result of the ‘reverse leverage’ which
the RPF could exert on external actors and by which it could effectively limit external
actors’ influence in the domestic political arena.
In order to secure its hold on power, the RPF has made use of a number of highly
questionable techniques by which it was to exert control on its political opponents. One
of its preferred techniques was to force unpleasant individuals into exile. Instances of
violence directed against opponents of the regime had clearly been on the rise throughout
the transitional period, reflecting, in Uvin’s assessment, “the totalitarian and militaristic
nature of the current government and its president, Paul Kagame” (2001: 184). Between
1995 and 2002 alone, fourty Rwandan political leaders have taken the path of exile. The
RPF has sold these exclusions as a “necessary stage in purging the political class of
its corrupt or reactionary elements” (International Crisis Group 2002c: 12). Forcing
opposition politicians into exile became relatively easy once the RPF had created an
environment of fear and mistrust among the political class and the general population.
Through disappearances, threats and intimidation, which Beswick describes as “shadowy
affairs, difficult to attribute to the government and the subject of rife speculation among
civil society activists and observers” (2010: 241), the RPF created an environment in which
the use of actual force was often not necessary. Given the violence it was responsible for
in the past, its threats certainly have not suffered from a lack of credibility. For instance,
when, in 2004, a parliamentary commission recommended the dismantling of the last
independent human rights organization Liprodhor, it was unnecessary to actually put the
recommendations into reality: “After Parliament sent a list of a dozen Liprodhor cadres to
the government with the request that they be arrested and prosecuted, in early July most of
its leadership fled to Uganda and Burundi” (Reyntjens 2010: 12).
Short from direct intimidation and threats for arrests, the government’s strategy has also
worked in a subtler way: through creating an environment of self-censorship, it caused
Rwandans to “fear discussing sensitive political issues in general and fear challenging the
government more specifically” (2010: 244). This helped to cripple both civil society and
the media, which have been targeted by the RPF from the beginning on (see Reyntjens
2004: 185). Ostensibly, the regime views civil society as an extension of the state and not
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as a counterweight to it, with the effect that “civil society activists can operate in Rwanda
only if they are willing to forego work on politically sensitive issues” (Beswick 2010:
245). This included foreign NGOs, whose reports have regularly been picked apart by
the regime if they were not favorable to the RPF. A critical Human Rights Watch report,
for instance, was commented as “very mean-spirited, grossly prejudiced and shallowly
researched” and described as a “shameless attempt to interfere in the internal politics of
Rwanda and an immoral attempt to enhance the political agendas of certain opponents”
(quoted in Reyntjens 2010: 5). The same was true for unwelcome scholars of journalists
– whether Rwandans or from abroad. The French academic Gérard Prunier for instance,
who has written several critical analyzes of the RPF, was attacked by the director of the
Rwandan information office as a pseudo-academic who can be held “indirectly responsible
for the 1994 genocide” (quoted in Reyntjens 2010: 4). Critical journalists “have been killed
or maimed, have ‘disappeared’, or are in jail or in exile”, which has led to an environment
of fear and a profound degree of self-censorship prevailing in Rwandan media (Reyntjens
2006b: 1113; see also International Crisis Group 2002c: 14). All this has resulted in a
voluntary withdrawal from politics: “Rwanda is suffering not only from a politics of fear
[. . . ] but also from what could be considered a fear of politics, or of occupying the political
space that is, or may be, available” (Beswick 2010: 244). The international community has,
by and large, ignored these indicators for an authoritarian drift and has remained “reluctant
to challenge the RPF on its handling of political space” (2010: 246).
Aside from dealing with critics and political opponents in a dubious manner, the govern-
ment has also committed severe human rights violations, accounting for its human rights
record to have been “dismal from day one” (Reyntjens 2006b: 1111). The most disturbing
outburst of RPA violence in the post-genocide phase was a massacre taking place between
July and September 1994, documented in a report by a UNHCR team – the so-called
Gersony report. It contains “evidence of alleged systematic killings of Hutu civilians by
the RPF, totaling between 25,000 and 40,000 victims in all” (Waugh 2004: 151; see also
Prunier 2009: 15–17). However, the UN later denied the existence of this report, arguing
that it had only been given verbally. Des Forges highlights that “U.S. officials were aware
of the U.N. decision not to make the report public and agreed with it” (1999: 555). This
illustrates another striking example for the double-standards that external actors applied
with respect to the Hutu and Tutsi. As Waugh notes, this “failed UN attempt to protect the
RPF in the climate of post-war reconstruction later served only to diminish the credibility
of the government that it sought to protect” (2004: 151). In addition to that, the RPF/ RPA
committed blatant human rights violations in neighboring Congo during which thousands
of civilians lost their lives. These attacks were partly driven by the motivation to crush ex-
isting Hutu radicals which posed a threat to the stability in the country, but observers have
agreed that control of the eastern Congo’s natural resources increasingly became an end in
itself for the Rwandan government (see above). The government’s strategy was to play
down these crimes in light of the much more furious level of violence that characterized the
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Rwandan genocide (see Zorbas 2004: 32). For this end, it accused everybody criticizing
the crimes as engaging in historical ‘revisionism’ (Beswick 2010: 237). This strategy
fully worked and effectively silenced most domestic and international criticism. Buffeted
by its sense of guilt for not having prevented the genocide, the international community
did not want to expose itself to the reproach of engaging in ‘revisionist’ rhetoric itself.
Instead, it simply turned a blind eye to the targeted killing of thousands of refugees and
civilians in the Congo in 1998 and 2000. These instances of mass violence committed by
the Rwandan government were “brushed under the carpet” by the international community,
ostensibly out of a feeling “that it is very difficult to condemn a regime for murders when
it has just been the subject of an un-condemned genocide” (Uvin 2001: 183). As a result,
it was for a long time “not considered politically correct to acknowledge that the RPF
has not brought liberation, inclusiveness and democracy, but oppression, exclusion and
dictatorship” (Reyntjens 2006b: 1104). By charging external actors of a revisionist rhetoric,
the RPF was therefore able to silence “those who challenge the simplistic ‘RPF good guys,
Hutu bad guys’ vision of the genocide” (Beswick 2010: 237).
The gradual hollowing-out of civil society and the media and the frequent and systematic
violations of human rights at home and abroad leave little doubt that “Rwanda is run by
a dictatorship with little respect for human rights [and] little attention to the fate of the
vast majority of its population [. . . ]” (Reyntjens 2010: 2). In Reyntjens’s own assessment,
“Rwanda is an army with a state, rather than a state with an army” (2010: 2). Yet,
donors to Rwanda have by and large “refrained from exerting significant pressure on
the government over its failure to [. . . ] provide sufficient space for civil society, despite
frequently identifying this as key for good political governance” (Beswick 2010: 246).
The same holds true for instances of physical violence directed against opponents of the
regime. Also here, donors “have chosen to look the other way or to minimise it, treating it
as if it were the same as the other, more ‘understandable’ types of violence” (Uvin 2001:
184). As Reyntjens comments: “President Kagame, against whom there is overwhelming
evidence of responsibility for war crimes and crimes against humanity, is given red carpet
treatment on his frequent international visits [. . . ] and Rwanda is often presented as a
‘model”’ (2010: 2). The crucial question is: why has the international community passively
accepted these atrocities? The most compelling reason is the “genocide credit” (Reyntjens
2006b) or “victim’s license” (Monbiot 2004) that the RPF naturally possessed after having
stopped the genocide and which the regime skillfully exploited in the post-genocide phase.
This has “allowed the regime both to capitalize on the guilt feelings of the international
community and to present itself as the victim of genocide” (Reyntjens 2010: 33). By
repeatedly reminding the international community of its own wrongdoings, the RPF has
successfully exerted ‘reverse leverage’ on external actors. This has enabled it to “limit
donor attempts to influence its political development” (Beswick 2010: 232). External
actors subscribed to the argument that the legitimacy of the government “probably extends
beyond the natural constituency of the RPF [. . . ] because it has been able to restore order
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and initiate some sort of development” (Silva-Leander 2008: 1614). In particular in US
policy circles, the attitude has long prevailed that the transitional government was “multi-
ethnic; has respected the spirit of the Arusha agreements; is trying to improve the quality
of its governance; allows for a largely free press and broad-based civil society; and more
generally, given the reality of the genocide and continued civil war, has been remarkably
willing to try to live up to high standards of governance” (Uvin 2001: 179). The RPF could
also control external leverage by strategically selecting the donor countries potentially
most sympathetic to its rule. These were certainly not the supporters of the former Hutu
regime, most notably France and Belgium, who remained highly skeptical towards the
RPF’s rule. Therefore, the regime has “actively sought to encourage relationships with
states that had little traditional involvement in Rwanda, particularly Anglophone donors”
(Beswick 2010: 230; see also Schaller 2008). These countries were also more receptive to
the ‘good guys – bad guys’ rhetoric officially endorsed by the Rwandan government. It
was certainly no coincidence that the US, which heavily subscribed to these arguments,
became Rwanda’s largest donor (Beswick 2010: 230).
Next to the ‘genocide credit’ as such, Reyntjens (2010) points out that the RPF’s success
in monopolizing its hold on power under the watching eyes of the international community
was facilitated by two additional aspects: the incremental manner by which it monopolized
the political space, and its well-developed information management practices. With respect
to the former, he remarks that the RPF’s “piecemeal approach has allowed the regime to
avoid condemnation by the international community, which was faced by steps considered,
each on its own, to be too small to warrant a robust response” (2010: 32). The second
aspect was at least equally important. The presence of the genocide credit as such is
not sufficient for convincing the international community of one’s own merits. It needs
to be regularly communicated to the international community and used strategically for
creating the ‘reverse leverage’ with which the regime could ultimately exert control on the
international community. The RPF has been mastering this art skillfully so far. Waugh
notes that “[t]he public relations campaign waged by Kagame on the international stage
was becoming as successful as his military offensives” (2004: 148). Kagame was obviously
aware of this when he stated that the RPF “used communication and information warfare
better than anyone” (quoted in Reyntjens 2010: 26). According to Buckley-Zistel, the
RPF’s primary toolbox consisted of “re-shaping the identity of the parties to the conflict
through referring to a common past and future and it takes place, inter alia, at the level of
national commemorations, the re-writing of history and its teaching, as well as through
museums and memorials” (2008: 12; emphasis original). The overall impression therefore
is that the RPF “displays exceptional skill at converting international feelings of guilt and
ineptitude into admissions that the Front deserves to have the monopoly on knowledge
construction” (Pottier 2002: 203).
In sum, the RPF made use of a number of informal and unconstitutional mechanisms in
order to deal with perceived threats to its position of dominance. In order to discourage
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the formation of any significant opposition against its rule, the RPF deliberately created
an environment in which fear and mistrust prevailed and in which potential dissenters
knew that they would face immediate punishment. The control of civil society and the
media were crucial instruments in this regard, because they could have been used by the
opposition as a way to mobilize public opinion against the ruling party. In addition, the
RPF continued with its attempts to impose a military solution against the most dangerous
threat to its rule: the members of the former regime residing in the eastern DRC. Although
this was accompanied by large-scale human rights violations, external actors not only
remained silent but actively helped to brush evidence against the RPF under the carpet.
d) Promoting Good Governance
It was stipulated above that the promotion of good governance is even more troublesome
in ‘You Stay Out’ polities than in cases of mediative engagement because of the reverse
leverage that the ruling party may exert on external actors. Although, at the surface, external
actors endorse liberalization policies as strongly as elsewhere, both their willingness and
their ability to influence domestic dynamics is significantly reduced. Cases of partisan
engagement match more closely the argument made by Barnett and Zürcher (2009) that
external actors often enter a ‘contract’ with ruling elites in post-conflict societies according
to which they tolerate a large number of violations of good governance principles in
exchange for political stability. Although there are almost always grand cleavages between
external actors’ governance rhetoric and the implementation of actual strategies, the gap is
even wider in ‘You Stay Out’ polities. External actors’ engagement for democracy is not
only ambiguous and struck by conflicts of interests (as elsewhere), but to a large extent
even virtual.
This becomes most clearly apparent with respect to external actors’ attempts for promot-
ing post-conflict justice. Given the scale of the atrocities committed in Rwanda – about
ten percent of the population was wiped out in the genocide – justice is one of the most
important aspects of the entire post-conflict reconstruction effort in Rwanda. A number
of international donors favored an approach to justice based on a truth and reconciliation
commission, but the RPF expressed a strong preference for punishment. Ultimately, most
donors subscribed to the RPF’s viewpoint and decided to devote significant resources
into restoring Rwanda’s justice system (see Uvin 2001: 181). However, the challenges
were horrendous. The legal system in Rwanda was desperately overburdened by the sheer
number of genocide suspects and the striking lack of law processing capacities. The vast
majority of lawyers either fell victim to the genocide or were living in exile, and it is
estimated that there were only ten lawyers left in the country by mid-1994 (see Zorbas
2004: 34). Even after impressive investments in the justice system, it would take more
than a century to process all suspects. In fact, more people were dying in the prisons
each year than were convicted, and “[m]ost observers agree that the justice system is not
able to work dramatically much faster than it has done until now” (Uvin 2001: 182; see
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also Mehler 2006: 268). Therefore, the government ultimately adopted an approach to
truth and reconciliation known as the Gacaca system in 1998. It allowed for a local-level
approach to enforcing justice, combining “elements of conventional justice with mediation
and reconciliation aspects” (Silva-Leander 2008: 1611). This led to a drastic speeding-up
of the trials. However, before establishing the system the Rwandan government made
sure that crimes committed by the RPF were exempted from the Gacaca system: “The
government argues that crimes committed by the RPF should not be tried through the
Gacaca system so as to avoid creating a moral equivalence between these crimes and the
crimes of genocide” (Silva-Leander 2008: 1612). Therefore, the RPF was again able to
bypass the adoption of good governance principles in one key area of concern.
However, the by far greatest problems in the justice sector became apparent with respect
to the ICTR, which was established by the UN Security Council in November 1994
and “endowed with the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens
responsible for such violations in the territory of neighboring States, between 1 January
1994 and 31 December 1994 [. . . ]” (U.N. Security Council 1994b, par. 1). By definition,
this included crimes committed by the RPF before, during and after the genocide. However,
the regime has made all efforts for preventing the ICTR from prosecuting war crimes
committed by the Rwandan Patriotic Army in 1994, “making the full execution of the
mandate of the tribunal impossible” (Reyntjens 2006b: 1114; see also Silva-Leander
2008: 1612). Represented as a non-permanent member in the UN Security Council in
1994, the Rwandan government voted against Resolution 955 “because its Statute did not
provide for the death penalty and because its seat was not located in Kigali” (Reyntjens
2010: 18). The regime was obviously unwilling to give the control over the delicate
issue of punishing the perpetrators of the genocide out of hand. When the resolution was
nevertheless adopted, the regime did everything for making sure that the ICTR stayed
away from RPF crimes. The ICTR’s lead prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte, soon became the
main victim of the RPF’s obstructive maneuvers, in particular after she had expressed her
confidence, in April 2002, to put forward the first charges against RPF members by the end
of the year and complained about a lack of cooperation from the Rwandan government (see
Reyntjens 2010: 19). Kagame reacted furiously, and he skillfully played out the ‘genocide
credit’ once again by appealing to the moral superiority of the RPA’s crimes. In a 2003
BBC interview, Kagame asked: “How [. . . ] does the ICTR attempt to place the RPA,
who actually put an end to the genocide, at the same level as the génocidaires, the very
perpetrators of the genocide?” In another interview given to the BBC one year later, he
added to this by asking provocatively: “Shouldn’t we be trying those people for allowing
genocide to take place in Rwanda when they had full responsibility to prevent that, later
on to stop it?” (quoted in Zorbas 2004: 34). Del Ponte clearly became a nuisance to the
regime in Kigali and it therefore did its best to replace her by a prosecutor that was more
loyal to the RPF. For this end, it exercised “discreet pressures on the UN Security Council
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not to renew Del Ponte’s mandate”, which was due to expire by September 2003 (Reyntjens
2010: 20). Strikingly, the UN obeyed. In July, the UN Secretary General made a proposal
to replace Del Ponte by another prosecutor and the UN Security Council followed these
recommendations (Reyntjens 2010: 20; see also International Crisis Group 2003g: 6).
This had the effect desired by the RPF: “Her successor, Gambian judge Hassan Bubacar
Jallow, abandoned the investigations against RPF/RPA suspects” (Reyntjens 2010: 20).
This, again, illustrates the effect of the ‘reverse leverage’ which the Rwandan government
could exert on the international community, and how far the latter was willing to go in its
support of the regime. By bluntly following the ‘orders’ of the Rwandan regime, the UN
has clearly willingly thrown the last bits of leverage and authority overboard. This only
enabled the RPF to continue its questionable policies. As Reyntjens remarks: “The RPF
explored the limits of tolerance, and it realized there were none; so it crossed one Rubicon
after the other” (2010: 32). In addition to that, the obvious use of double-standard clearly
gave the already tarnished image of the ICTR – which Prunier calls a ‘justice disaster’
(2009: 12–13) – the final blow.
The promotion of democratic standards failed blatantly, too. As noted above, external
actors willingly gave their consent to the prolongation of the transitional phase by four
years. However, the regime was aware that it could not eternally postpone the holding
of elections, and, after mounting donor pressure it decided to hold presidential elections
in July 2003 – nine years after the genocide. The local elections held in 1999 had given
a flavor of what could be expected from the presidential polls. Due to a significant lack
of secrecy, ballot-box stuffing, the intimidation of voters and candidates and the ban
on political parties before the elections prompted observers to view the polls as “mere
window-dressing” (Reyntjens 2006b: 1106; Uvin 2001: 180). Signs that the 2003 elections
could be equally compromised were omnipresent. The International Crisis Group noted in
late 2002 that there were “no political signs that the July 2003 elections will take place
in a context of genuine pluralism, or even that the main RPF opponents will be allowed
to participate on an equal footing with the RPF” (2002c: 1), and recommended to the
international community to “refuse to finance the 2003 elections and the establishment
of post-transitional institutions unless they are preceded by the liberalisation of political
activities and a marked improvement in respect for basic freedoms of association and
expression” (2002c: iii). Nonetheless, the international community decided to ignore these
signs and supported the elections financially (see Reyntjens 2010: 32). Not surprisingly, the
elections suffered from numerous flaws, most notably the banning of the main opposition
party MDR on the eve of the elections (see Rohde 2003; Silva-Leander 2008: 1613). Void
of any significant degree of political competition, the elections provided the Rwandan
government with the perfect opportunity to legitimize its rule and their outcome was
predictable: Kagame was elected with a majority of 95 percent of the votes – a result
that is highly unlikely to be the result of a free and fair competition in a country in which
the RPF’s natural constituency only comprises about 12 percent of the population (see
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e.g. Waugh 2004: 205). Rather than causing an international outcry, the polls endowed
the regime with a heightened level of legitimacy. As Reyntjens remarks: “Although the
international community was of course fully aware of the cosmetic nature of the whole
exercise, it endorsed the outcome despite a few timid expressions of concern (eg from The
Netherlands, the USA and the EU)” (2006b: 1109).
This reaction gives a good impression of external actors’ inability or unwillingness to
challenge the Rwandan government reflects the international community’s “uncertainty
about where the cause of barring ethnically based politically associations ends and where
the rule by arbitrary authority begins” (2004: 205). Most scholars agree that the RPF’s
intentions were clearly reflecting the latter of the two possibilities. Given the pronounced
and far-reaching degree of manipulation, there is widespread evidence that the sole purpose
of the polls was to “confer a layer of democratic legitimacy on what was in reality
the gradual closing off of political space” (Reyntjens 2010: 32). As Beswick notes,
elections are a “necessary exercise for the Rwandan regime [. . . ]”, since it allows both
the government and its partisan supporters to maintain the veil of an ordinary process
of transition to democracy (2010: 233). Objectively, however, the polls sanctioned the
complete occupation of Rwanda’s political space by the RPF and completed the transition
“from one dictatorship to another” (Reyntjens 2006b: 1113).
Remarkably, the international community by and large sanctioned this charade. Only
one EU report voiced critique against the elections (see e.g. Zorbas 2004: 44). However,
Kagame denied these charges and called the EU report ‘ridiculous’ (Waugh 2004: 199). To
the delight of the president, most donors decided to see the matter less critically. Although
most of them acknowledged that there were “significant ‘irregularities’ during the voting”,
the vast majority at the same time praised Rwanda for having held elections and underlined
that this constituted a “key stage in transition to democracy” (see Beswick 2010: 233).
The same pattern could be observed in the 2008 parliamentary elections, which took
place in an equally fraudulent environment. Silva-Leander remarks that “[a]s before,
the donor community has effectively endorsed the outcome of the elections so as not to
upset the delicate balance that has been achieved in recent years” (2008: 1616). This
clearly illustrates the international community’s failure and ambiguity in promoting good
governance. As Reyntjens highlights:
“The so-called international community bears overwhelming responsibility in allow-
ing the RPF to deploy its skills successfully. It has been a willing hostage to Kigali’s
spin, whether it be on political governance and human rights, on massive violations
of international humanitarian law, on the aggression and plunder of the DRC, on its
dangerous social and economic engineering exercise, or on the way it has injected
structural violence across the country and the region” (2010: 33).
All in all, it can be followed from the above that the RPF as well as external actors have
had a strong favor for stability at the expense of liberalization. As Beswick carefully puts it,
there is at least the “possibility [. . . ] that there is no significant tension between the closed
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political environment in Rwanda and the priorities of key donor states in their relationships
with the country” (2010: 246). Evidence for this ‘possibility’ has become apparent since
the very early stages of the transitional period. With unusual unity, a consensus existed
between the government and the international community that “the restoration of security
would have to take priority over the instauration of democratic rule” (Silva-Leander 2008:
1614) and that “democracy has to be traded off for stability” (Uvin 2001: 179). As Beswick
notes, “given the history of genocide and subsequent destabilization of the Great Lakes
region, both donors and elites within Rwanda have an interest in maintaining stability
and security in the state” (2010: 233). Although this may bring stability in the medium
run, it may just as well create the conditions for a relapse into violence in the long run.
Observers agree that allowing the RPF to monopolize political power and suppress its
opponents may give rise to “deep-rooted feelings of frustration, anger and despair”, which
may pave the ground for the recurrence of violence on a scale similar to 1994 (Reyntjens
2006b: 1114). In a similar vein, Uvin underlines the possibility that donors are, in the
long run, “condoning, if not strengthening, new dynamics of social exclusion and violence”
(Uvin 2001: 181). Strikingly, it was exactly this “voluntary blindness” to apprehend the
tensions and injustices present in pre-genocide Rwanda that has prevented external actors
from apprehending the imminent threats and reacting accordingly (see Uvin 2001: 177).
Silva-Leander contends that the potential for violence in Rwanda is self-reinforcing, since
“the government’s survival strategies are more likely to lead it to undertake policies that
could aggravate structural tensions [. . . ] rather than policies that work for long-term peace”
(Silva-Leander 2008: 1614).
In sum, the above paragraph illustrates that ‘You Stay Out’ polities constitute an environ-
ment in which promoting good governance standards is not a priority for external actors,
because they have a clear preference for stability as opposed to democracy. Despite clear
evidence for electoral fraud, they sanctioned the outcome of the elections and generally
turned a blind eye to the RPF’s authoritarian drift. In addition, the case illustrates that
the ruling parties in ‘You Stay Out’ polities are able to exploit the partisan support they
are enjoying for exerting ‘reverse leverage’ on external actors. This became most clearly
apparent when the RPF successfully prevented the renewal of Carla Del Ponte’s mandate
as lead prosecutor of the ICTR.
7.3 Tajikistan
Tajikistan is another example for a post-conflict case in which external actors have sig-
nificantly contributed to the survival of the incumbent government. The country gained
independence from Soviet rule in 1991 and soon thereafter lapsed into a civil war that cost
an estimated 60,000 lives and led to approximately 700,000 people being displaced (see
e.g. Karagiannis 2006: 3). The outbreak of the civil war was related to the strong sense of
regionalism that has traditionally characterized the country. Tajikistan mainly consists of
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mountainous territory which divides the country into different ‘natural’ provinces. Most of
them have maintained little contact and communication in the past. In administrative terms,
the territory can be divided into four different regions: Soghd (formerly Leninabad) in the
north-west bordering Uzbekistan, the central province comprising the capital Dushanbe,
the province Khatlon in the south-east bordering Afghanistan and comprising the city
Kulob, and the autonomous province Bergbadakhshan in the west, sharing borders with
Afghanistan and China (see e.g. Schmitz 2004: 13). The region around Kulyob and the
northern province of Leninabad constituted the pillars of Soviet rule in Tajikistan (see e.g.
International Crisis Group 2009b: 2), but the power-vacuum associated with the end of
the Cold War triggered sharp rivalries for political power among representatives of the
different factions.
The civil war12 started in 1992 due to disagreement about contrasting visions of the
role of the state in the post-Cold War era. Observers mainly describe it as a “struggle
over the very definition of the new Tajik state – either as a secular and conservative
state, dominated by former Soviet elites, or as a democratic and potentially Islamic-
led new state, with wide regional representation” (Lynch 2001: 51; see also Matveeva
2009: 168). Resistance against the post-independence government under the Communist
leadership of Rakhmon Nabiev from the Leninabad Province, who was elected amidst
accusations of fraud in 1991, were the proximate reason behind the outbreak of the civil
war. Nabiev’s greatest failure was “his inability to restore and maintain consensus between
distinctive cultural regions of the country” (Nourzhanov 2005: 110). Over the course
of the ensuing year, he faced increasing pressure from an alliance of nationalist, Islamic
and democratic opposition parties, the so-called ‘United Tajik Opposition’ (UTO), whose
declared objectives were “equal representation, human and civic rights, Tajik sovereignty
and constitutional amendments to enshrine the rule of law” (Lynch 2001: 56).13 After
attempts to crush the opposition failed, Nabiev was ultimately forced to include the
opposition in a coalition cabinet in which they held eight out of 24 ministerial posts
(International Crisis Group 2001e: 2). However, the inclusion of Islamic elements into
the government triggered widespread resistance from elites originating in the Kulyobi
region, which – with the help from Russia and Uzbekistan – launched a major armed
insurgency against the de facto government (see Nichol 2009; Smith 1999: 243–244). In
December 1992, the little known Imomali Rakhmonov from Kulyob, member of a rebel
group called Popular Front, seized the capital Dushanbe in December 1992 (see Iji 2001:
360; International Crisis Group 2001e: 2).14 The ensuing year witnessed the largest number
12For a detailed overview of the conflict dynamics in Tajikistan, see e.g. John Heathershaw (2009a).
13The UTO was a coalition of ethnic groups from the Garm and Gorno-Badakhshan regions, comprised of
both liberal, democratic elements and Islamists. They were opposed to the political domination of the
country by Kulyob and Leninabad groups, which Nabiev’s presidency embodied, and hence united in
their goal of overthrowing the government (International Crisis Group 2003f: 13).
14The PTF (Popular Front of Tajikistan) emerged in the Kulyob region out of opposition against Nabiev’s
Communist government, and is seen as the “incubator of the civil war” (International Crisis Group 2009b:
2). The region had effectively seceded from the central government in 1992 and built up parallel state
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of hostilities, with approximately 50,000 people falling victim to the armed confrontation
(Matveeva 2009: 168). The civil war followed a pattern of guerrilla tactics in which “terror
in all its manifestations, rather than combat engagements, was the main modality [. . . ]”
(Nourzhanov 2005: 112). Rakhmonov mobilized public support through selling his coup
as an active resistance against the attempt to establish an Islamic state in Tajikistan, which
secured him military support from both Russia and Uzbekistan (International Crisis Group
2009b: 3).15 Uzbekistan, in particular, perceived the Islamic opposition as a threat to its
national security and “gave considerable military and political assistance to bolster the
coalition behind the secular Tajik government” (Torjesen and MacFarlane 2007: 317).
Despite the large degree of external support, the government failed to defeat the UTO
immediately and after about one year the situation became stalemated. The parties agreed
on a ceasefire and, in December 1994, the UN Security Council established the U.N.
Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT) (see e.g. Nichol 2009). Despite that,
the conflict continued on a low scale for another three years, during which Rakhmonov
managed to consolidate his hold on power (see Lynch 2001: 57). By 1996 the warring
parties as well as their external sponsors increasingly came to recognize the necessity for a
negotiated settlement. Accompanied by significant pressure from Russia, UN-administered
negotiations between President Rakhmonov and the leader of the United Tajik Opposition
(UTO), Said Abdullo Nuri, culminated in the June 1997 ‘General Agreement on the
Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan’ signed in Moscow (International
Crisis Group 2001e: 2). Formally, the agreement provided for a power-sharing arrangement
between the government and the UTO, promising a thirty percent share of government
positions to the latter (see e.g. Smith 1999: 244; Torjesen and MacFarlane 2007: 312).
Other parties were entirely left out of the agreement. Although Rakhmonov formally
adhered to the terms of the agreement, he also made sure that the UTO would not gain
any significant share of influence. For instance, he refused to grant any of the ‘power
ministries’ to the UTO although the latter had been entitled to it by the agreement (see
Lynch 2001). Since peace could by and large be maintained, UNMOT pulled out in 2000,
but Russian troops have remained on the ground (Nichol 2009: 9).
7.3.1 Tajikistan as a ‘You Stay Out’ Polity
Despite the presence of a formal power-sharing agreement and although external engage-
ment accompanying the 1997 settlement must overall be regarded as mediative, there is
structures. Its militia army later renamed itself into Popular Front, and was characterized as a “heavily
armed though poorly disciplined military force [. . . ] famous as much for their looting and atrocities as
their combat skills” (International Crisis Group 2009b: 2).
15However, it would be misleading to interpret the civil war as a conflict between Islam and securalism.
Rakhmonov was able to mobilize external (in particular Uzbek) fears against an Islamization of the
region. Despite Rakhmonov secularist and Communist stance, a number of Muslim religious leaders
stayed loyal to him, while a number of secular parties joined the opposition in its fight against the
government (see Karagiannis 2006: 4).
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reason to argue that matters had significantly changed throughout 2001 at the latest. As
argued below, the power-sharing arrangement did not prevent Rakhmonov from accumu-
lating a large portion of power and effectively establish an authoritarian state, which has
triggered increasing tensions with the opposition parties. In addition to that, Tajikistan’s
geopolitical importance was swiftly elevated after the US declared the ‘war against terror-
ism’ in September 2001, and the country was suddenly transformed from a low-priority
post-Soviet republic to an ally in the fight against radical Islam. At the latest from this
moment on, Tajikistan can be classified as a ‘You Stay Out’ polity, as argued below in
more detail:
Political Domination. The power-sharing arrangement struck as a result of the peace
agreement in 1997 was an effective mechanism to end the civil war since it co-opted
various opposition members to lucrative posts in the government and administration. The
General Agreement provided for members of the UTO to be co-opted “into the structures
of the executive branch, including the ministries, agencies, local government, judiciary
and law enforcement bodies in accordance with a quota” (Government of the Republic of
Tajikistan 1997, Art. 3). As Matveeva puts it, the agreement empowered “an elite cartel
which had agreed to end mutually harmful hostilities” (2009: 171). However, Rakhmonov
had from the beginning on been the undisputed leader of this cartel and he left little doubt
that he aspired to gain nearly exclusive control of the government. Observers generally
agree that the government’s commitment to these provisions has never been genuine and
hardly limited the power of the Rakhmon administration in any meaningful sense. Most
importantly, the president never bothered to fulfill the thirty percent share granted to the
UTO in the agreement, which has frustrated many of its members (see Schmitz 2004:
20). Ostensibly, “[t]he government and its strongmen feel they won the civil war and see
little need to make more than cosmetic concessions on the power-sharing issue” (Smith
1999: 247). Rakhmon’s exclusive hold to power is also illustrated by the fact that all
key positions in the government were controlled by his cronies, whereas “opposition
commanders have gradually been removed from their positions” (Heathershaw 2009b:
1315; see also Heathershaw 2007: 220; Lynch 2001: 63). As most of Rakhmon’s16
supporters come from the Kulyob region, analysts speak of a ‘Kulyobization’ of Tajikistan
in this context (see e.g. Heathershaw 2005; 2007).
In general, there is compelling evidence that Rakhmonov has since 1997 “steadily
increased his authoritarian rule and marginalized the opposition” (Nichol 2009: 5). Consti-
tutional amendments adopted in 1994 and 1999 greatly boosted the president’s authority,
who was then not only head of state, but also head of government, supreme commander,
guarantor of the constitution and head of the UN Security Council. In addition to that, he
“controls the judiciary by virtue of his right to propose the judges of the Constitutional
16Rakhmonov has removed the Slavic suffix to his name in order to appear more ‘western’ (see International
Crisis Group 2009b: 2).
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Court, the Supreme Economic Court, and the Supreme Court, as well as the procurator-
general and the military prosecutor” (Matveeva 2009: 164). Rakhmonov could further
consolidate his power in the 1999 presidential elections, in which he won an “unlikely
97 per cent on an even more implausible 98 per cent turnout” (International Crisis Group
2001e: 4). Rakhmonov, hence, embodies an extremely centralized and personalized system
of rule, in which “his presidential administration is the source of all power in the country,
while most ministers are little more than channels of communication to the president, or
implementers of his will” (International Crisis Group 2009b: 2). There are numerous
indicators that he intends to remain president for life. A constitutional referendum held in
2003 enabled the president to run for two more seven-year terms, implying that he “can
rule legally until 2020” (Matveeva 2009: 164). The International Crisis Group suspects
that he “will find a way to extend his rule after that date if his health permits” (2009b: 4).
Thus, it would appear wholly unfounded to treat Tajikistan as a power-sharing case. In the
eyes of Matveeva, “Tajikistan is a mimicry of democracy: it is an autocratic state which
maintains a democratic façade” (Matveeva 2009: 163). Out of these reasons, post-conflict
Tajikistan is classified as a case of political domination here.
Obstructive Relations. Despite the strong hollowing-out of power-sharing by Rakhmon
and his supporters, Tajikistan has generally remained peaceful since 1997. Observers
overwhelmingly agree that post-conflict Tajikistan is comparatively stable and that the level
of violence is generally low (see e.g. Heathershaw 2005; 2007; Torjesen and MacFarlane
2007). While this would generally speak for constructive relations between the belligerents,
there is also enough evidence for the contrary. The relations between the ruling party and
the opposition are described by observers as highly asymmetric, which allows Rakhmon to
put significant pressure on the opposition parties and effectively force them to give their
consent to whatever he decides (see Schmitz 2004: 21). The International Crisis Group
remarked with regard to the opposition that the president “has gradually limited their
powers and enforced the state’s writ [. . . ]” (2004g: 1). This sheds a different light on the
seemingly conciliating stance of the UTO, suggesting that it has had little alternatives other
than complying with the demands of the government. Many observers agree that this policy
of pressure and exclusion contains the seeds for a renewed radicalization of members of
the opposition (see e.g. Schmitz 2004: 39). In the eyes of Lynch, this widespread exclusion
raises “the possibility of new challenges to the ‘idea’ of Tajikistan as it emerged after 1997”
(Lynch 2001: 52). In this environment, it is questionable why the UTO has not chosen
the path of re-armament. Arguably, this can be contributed to the presence of Russian
troops in the country, which had for a long time been “the guarantor of the survival of the
Rakhmonov regime” (Iji 2005: 192). This served as a strong deterrent against any attempts
to take up arms again, which may explain why the exclusion has not led to a larger unrest
among the excluded population. As Matveeva notes, “Russia is the only country that can
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help the regime in case of civil disorder [. . . ] [and] it has been instrumental in pacification
of anti-regime revolts” (2005: 152).
Aside from the UTP, the government’s strong grip to power has also triggered tensions
with other members of the opposition, most notably those who have been excluded from
the power-sharing arrangement from the beginning on. The government has deliberately
excluded representatives from other provinces, most notably the elites from the former
Leninabad province in the north, where 40 percent of the population live (see Smith 1999:
249). Many regional leaders have therefore challenged the legitimacy of the government
and have sought to establish parallel structures of authority, often relying on paramilitary
forces. These ‘warlords’ have often been under intensive pressure from the government,
which has been eager to re-establish the state’s monopoly of violence (see e.g. Torjesen and
MacFarlane 2007: 326). However, some of these regional leaders have enjoyed significant
support from the population. In the eyes of Nourzhanov, a warlord in the Tajik context
is not per se a disruptive element but often “a protector and provider who is accepted
by a community under pressure from unrepresentative government as a legitimate leader”
(Nourzhanov 2005: 126). However, the government’s policy of excluding whole regions
from access to power has recently fueled concerns about a possible secession of both the
Leninabad/ Soghd province in the north and the Mountainous Badakhshan region in the
east (see e.g. Nichol 2009: 4). All this suggests that, although the relations are much
less conflict-ridden as in other cases of obstructive domination, a basic consensus as to
who governs (as it is the case in constructive cases) is lacking. Important parts of the
population challenge the government’s authority, and the government has undoubtedly
quelled potential unrest by its tight control of the state apparatus. Out of these reasons, the
environment in post-conflict Tajikistan is considered obstructive here.
Partisan Engagement. The involvement of external actors in post-conflict Tajikistan
requires a nuanced assessment before being able to classify the case. Unlike in some other
cases where external engagement is more clearly mediative or clearly partisan, external
involvement in Tajikistan has oscillated between mediative and partisan engagement since
the beginning of the civil war. As noted above, neighboring states – notably Russia and
Uzbekistan – had intervened in a highly partisan manner at the beginning of the civil
war, until they realized that a military victory was not attainable. From this moment on,
they mainly engaged in a mediative manner, and observers agree that external pressure
was vital for facilitating the peace agreement adopted in 1997.17 The United Nations
and the regional powers complemented each other in their attempt to establish peace in
Tajikistan, with the former taking on the role as a ‘good cop’ in the negotiations and the
latter playing the role of the ‘bad cop’, willing to use pressure if necessary (Iji 2005: 199).
17Russia and Iran had sizable leverage over the government and the UTO, respectively, and made use
of their scope of action by pressuring the two parties into a compromise (see e.g. Iji 2005). It is
widely acknowledged that this has contributed “significantly to the resolution of issues involved in the
negotiation” (Smith 1999: 248).
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This mediative stance also characterized the first years of Tajikistan’s post-conflict period,
which is illustrated by external actors’ early withdrawal, compounded by the low rank the
country has traditionally occupied on external actors’ agenda (see Matveeva 2009: 174
and International Crisis Group 2009b: 20).
This has changed significantly after 9/11. While Tajikistan had been a relatively re-
mote post-Soviet republic before this event in the eyes of the West, the terrorist attacks
immediately boosted Central Asia’s geopolitical importance. Tajikistan, which shares a
long border with Afghanistan and is the country through which most drug trafficking from
Afghanistan to Europe takes place, was suddenly particularly high up on the international
community’s (and in particular Washington’s) agenda (see e.g. Schmitz 2004: 52). “Tajik-
istan is no longer a remote corner of the post-Soviet zone, but a key piece in the large
jigsaw that makes up U.S. defense policy [. . . ]”, as Akbarzadeh noted (2006: 564). As
a result, Tajikistan had suddenly become “the centerpiece of a booming peacebuilding
industry”:
“Western diplomats, academics, and international nongovernment organizations (IN-
GOs) flocked to Tajikistan, NGOs emerged, and an impressive flow of money streamed
into the country, focusing on such issues as civil society and local government devel-
opment, socio-economic development, and so on” (Matveeva 2009: 175).
The Tajik government responded immediately to the new geopolitical situation. Not more
than one day after the United States had initiated ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’, the Tajik
government announced on 8 October 2001 to open its airspace to the U.S. Air Force –
with immediate effects: “Less than a week later, the United States promised to donate $3
million to Tajikistan by way of assisting the drought-stricken agricultural sector, although
U.S. authorities denied any connection between the committed funds and Tajikistan’s
decision to join the war on terror” (Akbarzadeh 2006: 566).18 From a US perspective,
the country “seemed to be willing to cooperate with the United States, but hesitated to
do so without permission from Moscow” (Nichol 2009: 2). After a while, however, the
Tajik government has learned how to use “its helplessness as a lever” (International Crisis
Group 2009b: 19) and balance the influence of Russia and the US.19 This has guaranteed
the Tajik government significant external support which, according to the International
Crisis Group, has been “crucial to his regime’s survival” (2009b: ii). In sum, there is no
doubt that both the US and Russia have had a strong interest in the stability and survival
of the incumbent government. As Schmitz notes, external actors’ activities in Tajikistan
18In January 2002, the United States went one step further by lifting the ban on arms sales to Tajikistan
which had existed for eight years – although “Tajikistan has a history of torture, suppression of political
opposition and the media, and arrests based on religion”, as Human Rights Watch (2002) complained.
19Vis-à-vis Russia, the Tajik leadership could use the awakened interest in Central Asia for appealing to
Russian fears that the United States were willing to take over its former sphere of influence for mobilizing
additional concessions and support (see e.g. Akbarzadeh 2006: 564). This has secured the regime
additional resources, because Russia – though initially approving of US engagement in Central Asia (see
Akbarzadeh 2006: 567) – became increasingly unwilling to abandon the region to US influence.
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have been significantly shaped by economic and security interests rather than the mere
motivation to help reconstruct a war-torn country (2004: 51). Although the United States
formally adhere to the official formula for reconstructing post-conflict societies – which
includes an emphasis on democracy, human rights and the free press – there is strong
evidence that “the United States has edged toward a policy aimed at preserving the status
quo for fear of destabilizing the region” (Akbarzadeh 2006: 563).20 Out of these reasons,
external engagement in Tajikistan since 2001 can be considered partisan.
7.3.2 Polity Dynamics in Tajikistan
The case of Tajikistan confirms the plausibility of many of the assumptions made about
‘You Stay Out’ polities above. This is illustrated below with respect to the four overarching
themes: dealing with commitment problems, competition for power, threats from within,
and external engagement for good governance.
a) Overcoming Commitment Problems
Unlike in Rwanda, external actors initially took a mediative stance in Tajikistan’s post-
conflict period. As in other cases of mediative engagement, they played a crucial role
in the initiation phase of the post-conflict polity, which became most clearly apparent
in the attempt to co-opt members of the armed opposition into the government. Despite
Russia’s strong affiliation with the Rakhmon regime, the first three years of the post-
conflict settlement are therefore more aptly classified as an instance of a ‘The Winner Took
it All’ polity (see A.18). Since the attempts to overcome the commitment problems in
post-genocide Tajikistan mainly took place during this period, the situation is certainly not
comparable with Rwanda, where external engagement has from the beginning on been
partisan. Although no clear lessons for ‘You Stay Out’ polities can be drawn from that, the
following section nonetheless offers a brief summary of disarmament and related activities
for overcoming the commitment problems in Tajikistan.
The main operational responsibility for conducting DDR activities in Tajikistan lay
in the hands of UNMOT, UNHCR and UNDP (see Torjesen and MacFarlane 2007).
With respect to the disarmament and reintegration of former combatants into the national
army, Tajikistan is a special case. Unlike in most other cases discussed here – where
the aim is to disarm and demobilize the rebels before integrating them into a joint army
– “[r]eintegration was prioritised over demobilisation and disarmament in Tajikistan’s
peace process” (Torjesen and MacFarlane 2007: 311). In this sense, the experience with
respect to DDR in Tajikistan “runs counter to key elements of what has been termed the
‘post-conflict reconstruction orthodoxy” (Torjesen and MacFarlane 2007: 311). In total,
20This is also confirmed by the criticism from numerous civil society groups, which have criticized external
actors for their reticence regarding the democratic shortcomings of the regime and argued that this may
be interpreted by the regime as a confirmation of its policies (see Schmitz 2004: 53).
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about 6,000 former UTO combatants were reintegrated into the national army and other
security institutions, although many of them later left the service or were forced to leave
(see e.g. Lynch 2001: 62). The majority of rebel combatants was integrated as whole
and often fully-armed units, which “produced some level of trust in the peace process as
well as a sense of security on the part of mid- and top-level UTO commanders” (Torjesen
and MacFarlane 2007: 316). Why has this worked in Tajikistan? The most important
reason for this was a strategy of co-optation of former militia commanders according to
which “those who were prepared to sacrifice their political and military independence have
been incorporated into the elite networks” while non-cooperative elements were crushed
by the regime (Matveeva 2009: 166). This buying-off strategy has “deprived opposition
field commanders of a single power base from which to mobilize against the president”
(Matveeva 2009: 166) and may be seen as the primary reason why the security situation in
Tajikistan has remained relatively stable (see also International Crisis Group 2004g: 1).
Another important mechanism for creating trust among the belligerents was the require-
ment to pass an amnesty law, which granted immunity against prosecutions for war-related
crimes and atrocities to all former belligerents. It called for “criminal charges against for-
mer civil war combatants to be dropped, with the exception of certain serious crimes (such
as the killing of non-combatants, rape, terrorism, and drugs smuggling)” (International
Crisis Group 2004g: 6–7). This was a precondition for allowing the former belligerents to
“enter legitimate politics and to be given state appointments in the security sector, which
created incentives for them to side with the government and exploit the system rather than
to contest it” (Matveeva 2009: 169). However, the implementation of the law was slow
(see Smith 1999: 245) and the amnesty was in part ineffective because Rakhmon and his
affiliates found other pretexts – most notably crimes not explicitly listed in the law – in
order to get rid of disturbing former opposition members (see International Crisis Group
2004g: 6–7).
All in all, the case of Tajikistan indicates that the commitment problems could, thanks
to the mediative engagement by external actors, be successfully overcome. However, the
main reason for this outcome were not security guarantees but rather the rebels’ readiness
to be bought off and effective agree to an ‘unconditional surrender’. This has contributed
to a sense of security shared, most notably, by mid-level commanders. The way with
which this was achieved was largely unusual, most notably the reintegration of entire and
fully-armed rebel units into the state institutions. In addition to that, Rakhmon’s strategy
of either buying-off top-level commanders or forcing them to cooperate has contributed
greatly to the relative degree of stability that Tajikistan has experienced over the ensuing
years. However, behind the facade of this reconciliating stance the regime has been able
to entrench itself more and more and has taken an increasingly coercive stance against
potential rivalries over time (see the sections on political competition and threats from
within below).
284
7.3 Tajikistan
b) Manner of Political Competition
Competition for political power in Tajikistan has been very much in accordance with
the situation in Rwanda. Two aspects stand out in this regard: the widespread use of
‘virtual cooperation’ strategies with which the Tajik regime tried to maintain a veil of
democratic governance, and the regime’s attempts to exploit international concerns about a
rise of religious fundamentalism in the region by de-legitimizing the Islamic opposition
parties. Although observers argue that the crackdown on the Islamic opposition was
counterproductive (it radicalized a religious scene that had until then been relatively
moderate), these moves helped to bring the message across that Rakhmon is the only
real alternative for political competition in Tajikistan. Anna Matveeva has argued that
the government’s legitimacy “thrives on a lack of choice, as no viable alternatives to the
current regime appear available” (2009: 167).
‘Virtual cooperation’ practices mainly became apparent in the regime’s efforts to adopt
democratic gestures at the surface while tacitly creating an authoritarian regime. In
the eyes of John Heathershaw, the Tajik government has “consciously incorporated the
language of democracy into its legal framework and public pronouncements, [but] it is
unconstrained by either democratic mechanisms or a pluralistic political culture” (2007:
224). Elsewhere, he describes the practices of the Tajik regime as “the simulation of
‘democratisation’, ‘opposition’ and ‘multiparty politics’ [. . . ]” (2009a: 93). Although
the constitution formally guarantees basic rights and freedoms and the regime formally
consults with opposition parties and civil society, these measures are, in Matveeva’s eyes,
“devoid of political competition” and mainly serve the purpose of legitimizing the decisions
made by the regime elsewhere (see Matveeva 2009: 163–164). Observers of Tajik politics
have stated that members of the Rakhmon regime have little interest in a true dialogue
with the opposition and contend that the regime only participates in these events in order
to boost its outward appearance (see also Schmitz 2004: 22). Along a similar line, the
International Crisis Group remarked that “much of this apparent pluralism has always
been window-dressing” (2004g: 1). Behind the facade of these democratic maneuvers the
government has taken measures to secure its exclusive hold on power in the long run, for
instance through the constitutional referendum addressed above.
The elections regularly held since 1997 also fall under this pattern and were characterized
by large-scale irregularities, as numerous international observers have confirmed (see e.g.
Nichol 2009). During the first round of national elections held in 1999 and 2000 (on
the parliamentary and presidential level, respectively), Rakhmon and his party gained a
sweeping victory. Opposition parties and civil society groups criticized the elections as
flawed and marred by irregularities, but external observers from the east and the west alike
have generally welcomed them as a great step forward. Observers from the CIS even
“sanctioned the poll as free of misconduct and endorsed its results” (Akbarzadeh 2006:
575). Though western observers were more critical, their overall conclusion was that the
elections constituted “a great advance in pluralism” (Heathershaw 2009a: 89).
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This gives rise to the impression that elections in Tajikistan “tend to function as a
procedural exercise for approving outcomes already determined in advance by the executive”
(Matveeva 2009: 164). External actors at least implicitly helped the government to keep up
the illusion that the voting was part of a larger democratic process. However – maybe as a
result of the heightened attention that Tajikistan has meanwhile enjoyed – international
criticism during the 2005 parliamentary polls was somewhat louder. International observers
generally agreed that the elections were worse than the previous ones and underlined that
they did not meet international standards (see Heathershaw 2007: 221). Only the Russian
embassy continued to praise the elections as a “considerable step forward towards the
further democratization of society” (quoted in Akbarzadeh 2006: 575). Meanwhile,
domestic opposition parties were deeply shocked by the irregularities and “accused the
government of interfering with the electoral process and a deep-seated aversion to a
genuine multiparty system” (Akbarzadeh 2006: 573). The presidential polls held in 2006
were not any better, as they were characterized by the lack of any effective opposition
candidate. Instead of challenging the incumbent president and engaging in real political
competition, the four candidates that ran besides the incumbent president “praised Rahmon
and campaigned little”; not surprisingly, he received nearly eighty percent of the votes
(Nichol 2009: 5). All in all, the widespread use of ‘virtual cooperation’ strategies have
discredited democracy in the eyes of many Tajikistanis (see Karagiannis 2006).
In addition to that, the government has made use of ‘blaming and shaming’ strategies,
aiming at delegitimizing the political opposition. The environment has been less polarized
than in Rwanda, but the tensions between proponents of the secularist approach advocated
by the ruling party and the Islamic approach advocated by some of the opposition parties
provided a potential for political mobilization that Rakhmon and his supporters willfully
exploited. Tajikistan’s heightened strategic importance after 11 September 2001 greatly
played in the hands of the incumbent regime. Historically, Tajikistan had been the first
country in Central Asia which experienced a resurgence of political Islam, most notably
due to the influence of Pakistan in the 1970s and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in
the 1980s (see Karagiannis 2006: 2). According to Dov Lynch, these old networks “were
important channels for popular mobilisation and organisation before and during the civil
war” (2001: 54). However, observers of Tajik politics agree that Islamic influence in
the country today is rather moderate and that the “heterogeneities of Islam in Tajikistan
make it an unlikely vehicle for radical politics” (Heathershaw 2005: 23; see also Schmitz
2004: 38). Two major Islamic parties are active in the country: the Islamic Renaissance
Party (IPRT), which has been included in the government since 1997, and Hizb ut-Tahrir,
which views itself a pan-Islamic movement and aims at unifying all Muslim countries
into a pan-Muslim state, the Caliphate. Both groups have officially denounced terrorism
and distanced themselves from terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda (Karagiannis 2006). Hizb
ut-Tahrir is undoubtedly the more radical of the two parties and has repeatedly criticized
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the IPRT for betraying the Islamic heritage (Karagiannis 2006: 13), but it has done “little
so far beyond recruitment of supporters and distributing leaflets” (Matveeva 2005: 144).
Despite these moderate underpinnings, Islamic fundamentalism has generally been “por-
trayed as the scourge of Central Asian societies”, most vehemently by secular governments
like the one in Tajikistan (Heathershaw 2005: 23). The Tajik government has pictured
Hizb ut-Tahrir as a terrorist organization, claiming that it aims at establishing an Islamic
state (see Matveeva 2005: 143). It is estimated that about 500 alleged members of the
organization were arrested between the years 2000 and 2005, although less than half of
these cases were brought before court. The government has also taken measures to “restrict
any Islamic group seen as a threat to national security” (Karagiannis 2006: 4).
The attempts to evoke the threat of Islamic fundamentalism in Tajikistan appealed not
only to the domestic but also to the international audience. The partisan support for the
government allowed it to present itself as the guardian of a secular state and the defender
against Islamic fundamentalism. The government’s rationale is most clearly illustrated
by the pace with which it has exploited the new political opportunities present since 9/11.
After news reports in 2002 claimed that three detainees in Guantanamo originated from
Isfara in northern Tajikistan, Rakhmon immediately exploited this opportunity in order to
launch a strike against Islamic forces in general and the IPRT in particular. Immediately
afterwards, Rakhmon held a speech in Isfara in which he denounced Islam as the main
source of instability in the country and criticized local officials “for allowing ‘extremist’
groups to proliferate, citing the existence in Isfara alone of 152 mosques, as opposed to
only 82 schools, serving a population of some 200,000” (International Crisis Group 2004g:
8). In the ensuing weeks, authorities dismissed some forty Imams and closed 33 mosques
in Isfara (Schmitz 2004: 27).
John Heathershaw remarks that the rhetoric of threats that the government was using
with regard to the Islamic opposition fitted well to the international community’s rhetoric
of ‘perils’ and ‘promises’ that shapes the international peacebuilding discourse. Since both
the government and external actors had a common enemy, Rakhmon was able to distract
from “the resolutely illiberal political process ongoing in Tajikistan” (Heathershaw 2005:
21). In order to back its engagement against the Islamic opposition with credibility, the
government has increasingly used sticks rather than carrots against members of the IPRT.
Many prominent IPRT politicians were arrested and charged with serious crimes (Schmitz
2004: 27). In this way, the government could present itself as the guarantor of security in
Tajikistan, which “remains the regime’s trump card, upon which much of its legitimacy
rests” (Matveeva 2009: 166). Ostensibly, the strategy worked. Many external observers –
including the US State Department – have come to believe that Rakhmon is “combating
an influx of Islamic extremists from Afghanistan and Pakistan” (Nichol 2009: 6), which
enabled the government to mobilize significant external support (see the paragraph on
good governance below).
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In sum, the above paragraph illustrates that the Tajik regime adopted some flimsy
democratic gestures, which masked its attempts to establish an authoritarian regime below
the surface. ‘Blaming and shaming’ strategies turned out as a crucial instrument for
facilitating this outcome. Rakhmon mainly exploited diffuse fears for the spread of Islamic
fundamentalism in the region as an instrument to curtail the opposition’s room for maneuver,
and he used his control of the state apparatus in order to manipulate elections and perpetuate
his rule. External actors largely remained silent about this creeping authoritarianism, which
facilitated the complete lack of a level playing field in Tajikistan.
c) Threats from Within
In order to deal with threats from within – most notably with respect to warlords and
potential spoilers, but also regarding public dissent voiced by members of the opposition –
the Tajik government has established an increasingly tight control of the political space
over the years. Although the human rights record of the government is not comparable to
the daunting record of the RPF in Rwanda, the general mechanisms which the government
applied in order to get rid of rivalries and potential spoilers were the same.
Warlords have posed the greatest challenge for the Tajik government in the post-conflict
period. In order to deal with them, the government has mainly relied on two strategies:
co-optation and coercion. During the civil war, the government “formed an alliance with
about a dozen of warlords who had solid constituencies and/or military power behind them
and used them to prop up the central authority of the victorious coalition” (Nourzhanov
2005: 121). In dealing with them in the post-election period, the Tajik government has
mainly relied on a strategy of co-optation and has effectively bought off recalcitrant elites
or warlords in order to secure their political support. For instance, the Tajik state has
deliberately turned a blind eye to certain criminal activities, most notably with respect
to drug-trafficking (see Torjesen and MacFarlane 2007: 328). Heathershaw contends
that “control and co-optation strategies are central to Rahmonov’s management of both
opposition parties and figures who were formally part of his ruling clique”, but also
highlights that this went at the expense of a free civil society and truly democratic processes
(Heathershaw 2005: 33). With the tacit acceptance of the regime, some powerful former
commanders engaged in barely legal economic activities which allowed some of them to
amass considerable fortunes. General Gaffor Mirzoev, a former member of the Popular
Front, opened a large casino in the capital Dushanbe, while Ali Akbar Turadjonzoda, a
former leading member of the United Tajik Opposition, gained control over the import of
wheat from Kazakhstan – a very profitable business (see Torjesen and MacFarlane 2007:
321). Also, the Rakhmon regime initially left former regional commanders significant
regional autonomy in their areas of control, most notably in the eastern Rasht Valley and
the Pamirs (see International Crisis Group 2004g: 1). In fact, “[m]ost of the police and law-
enforcement structures in these areas were initially composed of opposition fighters and
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commanders and there was little direct involvement or control from the central government
in local affairs” (Torjesen and MacFarlane 2007: 320).
Through such strategies, the government could successfully accommodate most opposi-
tion members. Over time, however, some of the regional warlords or commanders refused
to subordinate to central authority and became a threat to the stability of the incumbent
regime. The problem of “sub-national regionalism” continued to be a potential threat
for the government’s pan-Tajik orientation (see Nourzhanov 2005: 126). Observers have
repeatedly highlighted the secessionist tendencies in the regions Soghd (in the north) and
Mountainous Badakhshan in the east (see Nichol 2009: 4). For dealing with these threats,
the regime has adopted an increasingly confrontational strategy against these warlords
(see International Crisis Group 2004g: 1). This partly worked through a strategy that was
already used by the RPF in Rwanda: creating an environment of fear through a combination
of arbitrary arrests and crackdowns on opposition members. Before ending up in prison or
‘disappearing’, many recalcitrant opposition members chose the path of exile in order to
protect themselves from the government.
Arresting opposition members was unlawful because most of them were protected by
the general amnesty law that was adopted as part of the peace agreement. However, the
government has found a way to interpret the provisions in its own favor. Though, in
theory, most crimes committed by former combatants were covered by the amnesty, the
vagueness of some of the provisions and its incomplete coverage (it only included those
who joined the military or entered the state service) left the law enforcement agencies
significant latitude for arresting opposition members nonetheless. This resulted in former
commanders or combatants being “summoned for interrogation [. . . ], threatened with
imprisonment, and released only upon paying a bribe” (International Crisis Group 2004g:
7). The International Crisis Group speculated that the authorities have been “using the
threat of imprisonment to intimidate former opposition fighters who are not fully aware of
their rights” – in clear violation of the amnesty law (2004g: 7). This has enabled the regime
to depose of a number of prominent opposition figures, for instance Qurbon Rahimov, a
senior IRPT member, who was charged with various offenses, including the rape of a minor
(International Crisis Group 2004g: 6). Many other leading opposition politicians have been
arrested on other “likely politically motivated criminal charges” (Karagiannis 2006: 13).
Reportedly, Tajik security officials have systematically made use of “coercion to extract
confessions during interrogations” (Nichol 2009: 6). Overall, as in Rwanda the threat of
arrests has often already been enough to achieve the desired results. Reportedly, in 2004
“rumours of impending mass arrests by the ministry of internal affairs reportedly spurred
former UTO fighters to flee from Tojikobod into the hills” (International Crisis Group
2004g: 8). This shows that the Tajik regime has relied on informal and unconstitutional
instruments of political competition with the aim of bending the ‘playing field’ in its own
favor.
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In a similar vain, the government has systematically limited the sphere of civil society
in Tajikistan. Traditionally, Tajikistan has a thin layer of civil society organizations. Most
of them were founded only in response to a massive inflow of international aid money,
are small and comparatively weak and “clearly no substitute for a civil society which can
hold the state accountable” (Matveeva 2009: 165; see also Schmitz 2004: 47). Despite
that, the government has – possibly warned by the successful revolutions in other countries
– tightened its grip on civil society. A law on NGOs was passed that “placed greater
bureaucratic burdens on a required re-registration process that greatly reduced the number
of domestic and international NGOs in the country” (Nichol 2009: 6). This coincided with
the attempts for “reducing political pluralism, eliminating political opponents [. . . ] and
concentrating power in the office of the president [. . . ]” (Torjesen and MacFarlane 2007:
329). Journalists were not exempted from these attempts to exert exclusive control on the
political space. Though less systematically than in Rwanda, journalists have occasionally
been harassed through “warnings, prosecutions, and tax inspections”, and the state has
made sure that opposition parties had little access to state-run media during campaigns
(see Nichol 2009: 6). Just as in Rwanda, there is evidence that the international community
has tolerated the government’s increasingly authoritarian way of dealing with warlords
and spoilers, in particular after it has discovered Tajikistan’s geopolitical importance. As
the International Crisis Group commented:
“Frequently the international community is too willing to go along with the official
line which portrays the president as the sole guarantor of stability. The government is
adept at using this argument when international organisations push for faster change,
arguing that the priority is stability, and human rights and democratisation must be
postponed until that is assured” (2004g: 16).
Human Rights Watch and other human rights organizations have repeatedly criticized the
international community’s tendency to euphemize the human rights situation in Tajikistan.
Human Rights Watch, for instance, criticized that the EU has “too often welcomed ‘positive
signals’ by the Central Asian governments, without insisting on concrete improvements and
results, even while the situation in many of the countries deteriorated” and has underlined
that “[i]gnoring abuses will not bring reform” (Human Rights Watch 2007: n.p.). However,
such appeals have not been particularly effective. Overall, the impression prevails that
even the more critical actors like the OSCE and the UN have been “quite muted in their
criticisms of the regime and have often directed their activities into less confrontational
arenas” (International Crisis Group 2004g: 16). All in all, there is evidence that the
international community has generally welcomed the government’s attempts to curtail the
influence of warlords and restore central authority throughout the country. As Heathershaw
pointed out, the international community had identified “Islamic fundamentalism, resurgent
nationalism and reawakened tribalism” as the greatest threats to peace in Tajikistan (2009a:
43). It is plausible to assume that this convergence of preferences between the Tajik regime
and the international community has heightened the latter’s inclination to turn a blind eye
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to human rights violations associated with the decisive fight against spoilers and warlords.
Against this background, the International Crisis Group contended that “quiet diplomacy
has its merits but ignoring the problems of Tajikistan’s political development threatens to
undermine the very stability that the international community is dedicated to protecting”
(2004g: 19).
In reaction to this criticism, the international community has occasionally felt compelled
to distance itself from accusations that it supported the ruling regime in a partisan manner.
For instance, the chief of the mission of the US Embassy in Dushanbe stated that his
country had a general interest in the support of democracy, but not of individual leaders of
political parties (see Akbarzadeh 2006: 570). However, such rhetorical maneuvers have
almost never been backed by concrete measures to improve the situation. The United States
have been the largest bilateral donor to Tajikistan, donating nearly 800 million US dollar
to Tajikistan between 1992 and 2008 (see Nichol 2009: 1). Although little of this money
was channeled through the government and the majority was earmarked for humanitarian
aid, this indirectly strengthened the legitimacy of the government, which in the eyes of
most Tajikistanis mainly depends on outputs.
In sum, the above paragraph illustrates that former warlords and regional strongmen
with competing claims to power posed the greatest risk for the Tajik regime. Rakhmon
initially dealt with this threat through trying to accommodate these recalcitrant individuals,
but he increasingly reverted to a strategy of coercion with respect to those spoilers who
continued to challenge his rule. Creating an environment of fear and mistrust turned out
as an effective instrument in this regard. In violation of the general amnesty granted
in the peace agreement, he arbitrarily arrested members of the opposition and created
bureaucratic obstacles for civil society and the media. Vis-à-vis external actors, he sold
these activities as a measure to ensure the integrity and stability of the country, which
caused them to generously overlook his dubious manner of dealing with threats from
within.
d) Promoting Good Governance
The mechanisms for promoting good governance standards in Tajikistan since 2001 have
been very similar to those in Rwanda. Due to the partisan engagement by external actors,
their willingness and ability to promote good governance in earnest was significantly
reduced. As in Rwanda, external actors held a strong preference for maintaining stability
and the status quo, which was in part strengthened by the incumbent government’s ability
to exert ‘reverse leverage’ on external actors. Hence, external actors were in part unwilling
and in part unable to promote democracy and other good governance principles in Tajikistan,
which has effectively legitimized Rakhmon’s increasingly authoritarian claims.
External actors’ unwillingness to promote good governance principles in Tajikistan
became apparent through their strong emphasis on stability at the expense of democracy.
Initially, certain international actors had still viewed the abrupt rise of international attention
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since 9/11 as an opportunity to step up their engagement for democracy in Tajikistan. Tajik
civil society groups welcomed this rise in international attention and hoped that it would
boost democratic rule in their country (see e.g. Akbarzadeh 2006: 563). However,
the effects of external democracy promotion in Tajikistan have from the beginning on
been miniscule. Observers agree that it did not have “any great effect on Tajik political
praxis” (Heathershaw 2005: 33).21 The resurgence of the Taliban in Afghanistan fostered
international fears of Islamic fundamentalism spreading through the region and further
disappointed hopes for a thorough democratization.
In general, external (in particular US) engagement in Tajikistan has been driven by two
largely incompatible agendas: the democratization agenda, which has officially driven
external engagement in Tajikistan since 9/11; and the stability agenda, which has been
the true driving force behind external engagement and stands in stark contrast to the
democratization agenda (see e.g. Akbarzadeh 2006: 564). In particular since the beginning
of the international engagement in Afghanistan, there is evidence that “[t]he informal
contract between interveners and local elites shifted in favor of the preferences of local
elites, who prioritized authoritarian stability over democratic reforms” (Matveeva 2009:
184). The country’s sudden rise in strategic importance has “diverted Washington’s
attention from Tajikistan’s democratic state building [. . . ]” (Akbarzadeh 2006: 563).
Interestingly, the preference for stability was shared by Russia, which had always been
a strong supporter of the Rakhmon regime. Unwittingly, Russia and the United States
have therefore effectively been pulling on the same rope – despite their alleged rivalry over
influence in the region: “At face value, this preference for the status quo places Moscow at
odds with Washington and its democratic vision for Tajikistan” (Akbarzadeh 2006: 571).
As in Rwanda, this has expressed itself in the use of double-standards by external
actors, who have turned a blind eye to even the most blatant violations of good governance
principles. There are numerous examples for this. In Tajikistan, external actors have
generally been satisfied with interpreting minuscule achievements as steps into the right
direction. For instance, the head of the UN Tajikistan Office of Peacebuilding ipso facto
stated in 2002 that “there is a wish and will in the leadership of the country to introduce
democratic principles of governance and development in the society, in an effort to create
a vibrant civil society” (quoted in Heathershaw 2005: 26). Anna Matveeva argues along
a similar line: “Fascination with the formal attributes of democracy, such as elections,
overshadowed more meaningful notions, such as inclusive representation of the regional
interests and minorities” (2009: 181). In a similar vain, Schmitz contends that, in the
eyes of local observers, many donor organizations have confused the government’s lip-
service with actual commitment and have tended to overlook that the regime’s seemingly
cooperative stance is mainly driven by special interests and attempts to polish the regime’s
outwards appearance (see Schmitz 2004: 22). This explains why “there was little more
21Heathershaw contrasts the western notion of peacebuilding with the Russian term ‘mirotvorchestvo’, which
“implies a much more hands-on approach than that authorized by most UN peacekeeping mandates”
(2007: 225).
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than symbolic peacebuilding when the preferences of state elites diverged from those
of the internationals” (Matveeva 2009: 175). The unwillingness also expressed itself in
the very soft stance external actors have exhibited towards imposing conditionality on
loans and grants. As Matveeva points out, “political rights and freedoms in Tajikistan
grew increasingly restricted while aid increased” (2009: 180). She argues that this was
also a problem of wrong timing and that the international community “missed a window
of opportunity”, which was present in the short period between the signing of the peace
agreement in 1997 and the increased engagement in 2001. However, precisely at this stage
“there was only low-key external involvement” (2009: 184).
Next to a reduced willingness by external actors to promote democracy in earnest, the
case of Tajikistan confirms that ‘You Stay Out’ polities may also reduce external actors’
ability to exert leverage on the incumbent regime. Two factors have played a role here: a
general lack of effective ‘sticks’ with which external actors could have exerted pressure
on the regime, and the latter’s ability to exert reverse leverage on external actors. All
in all, this has allowed Rakhmon to “cooperat[e] with peacebuilders when there was a
convergence of preferences, but when the president’s agenda moved forward and opposition
forces no longer presented a serious challenge, he favored his own ideas for managing
the political process over international recipes” (Matveeva 2009: 175). External actors’
ability to exert leverage on the Tajik regime has been relatively low from the beginning on.
Although promoting democracy was a declared preference for many international NGOs
active in Tajikistan, the international community had “few tangible means to persuade
the government to pursue these objectives” (Matveeva 2009: 177). There is evidence
that since the adoption of the peace agreement in 1997 (which was mainly the result of
strong external pressure) external leverage has steadily declined.22 In this context, Anna
Matveeva points out that democracy “is a hostage to the reputation of those who promote
it” and argues that the weight of the West’s “moral message” in Central Asia has generally
declined in the past years (2009: 185).
This was accompanied by the regime’s ability to exert reverse leverage on external
actors, which is a particular feature of ‘You Stay Out’ polities. In Rwanda, it was the
‘genocide credit’ which has allowed the RPF to play out its moral superiority and exert
reverse leverage on external actors. In Tajikistan, two factors played a role: the regime’s
ability to sell itself as an anchor of stability in the region, and its ability to play off the
two most powerful external actors, the US and Russia, against one another. The first
aspect is relatively straightforward: As noted by many observers, Washington’s push for
democratization has been “constantly tempered by security calculations and the risks
entailed in a speedy transition to democracy [. . . ]”, which has placed “tangible restraints
22Already in 1999, Smith highlighted that while external leverage still constituted a significant reason behind
the adoption of the peace agreement in 1997, it has since become less effective in the implementation
phase: “other than persuasion and appeals to both sides to consider the future of the country, the
international community has few resources with which to persuade the government and the UTO and
their component parts of the benefit of peace” (1999: 247).
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on Washington’s approach to the ruling regime in Tajikistan” (Akbarzadeh 2006: 577).
This was already highlighted above in detail.
The second aspects requires further elaboration. There is evidence that the regime was
able to exploit the rivalry between the US and Russia for influence in the region in its own
favor. Before the international engagement in Afghanistan in the wake of 9/11, western
powers have generally accepted that the country was within the domain of Russia. This
has changed significantly after 2001, when the West and Russia began to compete over
influence in the region in general and Tajikistan in particular. The Tajik regime has been
the main beneficiary of this rivalry since it was able to play the different external actors
off against one another. The sudden growth of Western interest in the region was viewed
by the regime as a welcomed counterweight to Russian influence. Indeed, in the initial
years after 9/11, Russian influence in Central Asia has been systematically undermined
by the West. Rather than including Russia in diplomatic circles and initiatives dealing
with Tajikistan, the country was deliberately left out of the equation even though it was
initially still “keen to join” (Matveeva 2009: 186). This was to the great benefit of the
Tajik government, because the “decision not to work with Russia deprived international
actors of credible sticks, while providing to the Tajik government a comfort zone against
international pressure” (Matveeva 2009: 181). Although the West generally adopted a
democratization rhetoric with regard to Tajikistan, the government has not regarded these
developments as a threat since it believed them to have too little resonance in Tajik society
(see Matveeva 2009: 179).
The revolutions in Georgia (2003), the Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005) have
“made the government reconsider” (Matveeva 2009: 179). External support for civil
society organizations with “agendas alternative to that of the ruling regime”, although
never pursued in earnest by external actors, were still interpreted as a serious concern for
Tajikistan’s political leadership (Matveeva 2005: 151). Almost immediately, the regime
sought to balance external influence more carefully by re-activating the ties with its long-
time supporter Russia. Just as the Tajik government could exploit Western attention in
order to reduce Russia’s sphere of influence, it attempted to turn the tables when US
influence became too strong over the ensuing years. In 2004, the Tajik government signed
a 10-year basing agreement with Russia which gave the Russian army the right to establish
its “second-largest foreign military presence after the Black Sea Fleet in Ukraine” (see
Nichol 2009: 4 and Matveeva 2005: 153). This has created a strong counterweight
to growing external pressure for democratization, which stemmed most notably from
international NGOs active in Tajikistan. From the regime’s perspective, the move was
straightforward: “either provide for Russia’s security interests in Tajikistan and obtain
some tangible benefits and security backing for the regime internally, or face uncertain
prospects of Western support tangled with demands for reforms and level-playing field for
opposition” (Matveeva 2005: 152–153). All in all, this strategy was a complete success as
it effectively made the regime more independent from one-sided US influence. At the same
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time, Rakhmon knew that abandoning Tajikistan to Russian influence was not an option
for the United States because of Tajikistan’s heightened geopolitical importance. Putin’s
visit to Tajikistan was immediately followed by a visit from NATO’s Secretary General
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, which illustrates that the West feared its sphere of influence to
become marginalized (see e.g. Matveeva 2005: 153).
A few years later, the government again turned the tables around. After the Rakhmon-
Putin agreement, the Tajik regime became concerned that Russian influence in its country
now became too strong and took measures to balance the Russian influence by again
strengthening its ties with the West. Rakhmon announced an ‘open-door policy’, according
to which Tajikistan would cooperate “with any entity of international relations which has
good intentions and aims towards our country”, explicitly mentioning that this measure
would prevent Tajikistan from becoming a ‘puppet’ of certain unnamed “powerful countries”
(quoted in Nichol 2009: 3). All this can be interpreted as a skillful attempt to play external
actors off against each other. This underlines the highly strategic approach the government
adopted with respect to its dealings with external actors. Ostensibly, “[t]he president
understood the need to maintain good relations with the international community for
developmental and diplomatic reasons, and for the continuation of the flow of resources
to enable the outsourcing of key government functions in the social sphere (from which
the state had withdrawn almost completely) to external actors” (Matveeva 2009: 175).
By deliberately creating ‘reverse leverage’ for use against both Russia and the West, the
Tajik government could greatly enhance its scope of action. As Matveeva notes, the “[r]eal
or perceived competition between Russia and the West for influence in Tajikistan [. . . ]”
tends to undermine external actors’ main objectives, most notably the promotion of good
governance principles (2005: 154).
Rakhmon even used his own aid-dependence as a lever for creating additional external
support. The country suffers from significant external debt totaling more than 1,300
billion US $ in 2009 (see Matveeva 2009: 177). By constantly reminding the international
community of the anarchical situation that would follow a collapse of the Tajik regime,
Rakhmon could mobilize further external funds that were vital for the survival of his regime.
This has had a lasting effect. Despite clear violations of good governance standards and
hardly concealed authoritarian tendencies, the United States have repeatedly endorsed
the regime and disappointed opposition groups. For example, the U.S. Ambassador to
Tajikistan, Richard Hoagland, “praised preparations for the February 2005 parliamentary
election and implicitly dismissed criticism by opposition parties that had rejected the new
Law on Parliamentary Elections as favoring the ruling party” (Akbarzadeh 2006: 569). On
many other occasions, the United States gave rhetorical support to the incumbent regime.
In 2009, for instance, the Obama administration declared that Tajikistan was “on the
frontline of our ongoing military stabilization efforts in Afghanistan, [is] a strong supporter
in the war on terror [. . . ] and plays a key role in counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism.”
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He also underlined that the country was “key to improving Tajikistan’s role as a bulwark
against regional threats” (quoted in Nichol 2009: 1).
All in all, there is evidence that the combination of a reduced willingness and ability
to promote democracy has significantly hampered the promotion of good governance
in Tajikistan. As Akbarzadeh notes: “[The] concern with preserving stability seriously
undermines Washington’s democratic vision for Tajikistan [. . . ]. As a result, despite early
hopes for an external boost for democratization, geostrategic considerations appear to
have tempered the democratic experiment” (2006: 577). The spread of authoritarianism in
Tajikistan has also been accompanied by other problems of good governance. The Tajik
state has on various occasions been described as a ‘virtual state’ that is struck by corruption,
rent-seeking and patronage. John Heathershaw for instance points out that “[h]ierarchical
authority structures and submissive attitudes towards the state mean that corruption, abuse
of power, and a lack of political pluralism are more likely to be tolerated” (2005: 34). The
International Crisis Group recently contended: “It is no coincidence that the wealthiest
people are almost all in the government: access to state funds, including through the
misappropriation of budgetary allocations, is a key source of enrichment” (2009b: 15).
In accordance with the government’s widely practiced co-optation and accommodation
of political opponents, president Rakhmon has done little to prevent corrupt practices.
Hardly any lawsuits were filed against individuals suspected of large-scale and systematic
corruption, except when the government wished to get rid of a political opponent. Stina
Torjesen and Neil MacFarlane speak of a “wilful and uneven neglect of corrupt practices”
in this context (2007: 321).
However, it should be noted that the failure to promote good governance in Tajikistan
can certainly not only be attributed to the specific factors of ‘You Stay Out’ polities. Critics
of international peacebuilding efforts are generally not surprised by this outcome. John
Heathershaw, for instance, argues that it “may, to speak counterfactually, never have been
possible to create a vibrant party system, fair elections, decentralized government, or a
reformed security sector over the course of several years or even decades of peacebuilding
in Tajikistan” (Heathershaw 2007: 233). Anna Matveeva has argued that external actors’
operational capacity in Tajikistan has been greatly reduced by their “[p]oor historical
understanding, lack of established relationships and networks in the region, and limited
language skills” (2009: 178). Despite the presence of some pro-democracy civil society
groups, Tajikistanis are not overtly obsessed with democracy for its own sake. To many
Tajikistanis, values such as stability (‘stabilnost’) and authority (‘avtoritet’) are of greater
importance. As John Heathershaw highlights, “[t]he belief in stabilnost and avtoritet is not
simply the strategy of power hungry elites; it has a cultural resonance which to a certain
degree is shared by many citizens in the region, in particular those who hold positions
within state structures, including so-called reformers” (2007: 227). This suggests that
Rakhmon’s strategy of playing the “stability card” and portraying himself “as Tajikistan’s
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best guarantee of stability and prosperity [. . . ]” indeed had a certain appeal to many
Tajikistanis (Matveeva 2009: 176).
This also becomes apparent against the background of the issue of drug trafficking,
which has become a major source of destabilization in post-conflict Tajikistan. Sharing a
long border with Afghanistan, Tajikistan is the major hub for the opium trade with Russia
and the West. Until now, this has not led to a resurgence of armed conflict in Tajikistan
apart from occasional clashes between drug traffickers and Tajik or Russian border troops
(see Matveeva 2009: 166).23 External actors have regularly pushed the Tajik government
to take measures against drug trafficking. On the initiative of western donors, a “Drug
Control Agency” (DCA) has been set up in June 1999 and placed under the direct authority
of the president (Matveeva 2005: 140). The US State Department’s Bureau of International
Narcotics and Law Enforcement has labeled Tajikistan as a “frontline state in the war on
drugs” and “a major center for domestic and international drug trafficking organizations”
(quoted in Nichol 2009: 1). This created a significant dilemma for the Tajik government,
because a decisive fight of drug trafficking routes stands in stark contrast to the regime’s
strategy of accommodating and co-opting potential rivalries. As a way out, the government
confined itself to symbolic attempts for fulfilling external actors’ demands without actually
following up on its commitment: although small-scale drug couriers are regularly arrested,
“there have not been any police campaigns or court trials against the main organisers of the
drugs trade in Tajikistan – except for allegations of drug dealing made during seemingly
political trials against Rakhmonov’s opponents” (Torjesen and MacFarlane 2007: 321).
There is widespread agreement that by imposing a stricter policy against domestic and
international drug traders active in Tajikistan the government would have faced growing
political pressure and resistance. In addition to that, any serious attempt to deal with
international drug-trafficking cartels would most likely fail because of the widespread
corruption among Tajik law-enforcement agencies. Due to extremely low salaries paid to
the police, corruption is a normal and necessary means for many Tajikistanis for ensuring
the survival of their families (see Matveeva 2005: 139).
Summing up, the above paragraph suggests that external actors exhibited a clear prefer-
ence for stability as opposed to democracy. All in all, their engagement was characterized
by a low willingness to enforce good governance standards. However, their ability to evoke
a significant improvement of domestic governance was limited, too. The Tajik regime
successfully used its ‘helplessness as a lever’ and skilfully exploited the competition
between Russia and the United States for influence in the region. Hence, as in Rwanda,
the regime’s ability to resist external demands for democratization so formidably stems
from the ‘reverse leverage’ which the government could exert.
23Note that drug consumption in Tajikistan itself is low and the country does not grow or produce drugs in
any significant degree. The drugs trafficked through Tajikistan are mainly destined to Russia and the
European market. This, however, has only elevated international attention on the Tajik drug trafficking
problem (see Matveeva 2005: 139; Schmitz 2004: 15).
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7.4 ‘You Stay Out’ Polities: Conclusions
The two cases discussed as examples of ‘You Stay Out’ polities above exhibited significant
differences with respect to their general backgrounds and conflict histories. As a post-
genocide case, Rwanda differs significantly from all other post-conflict cases discussed
in this dissertation. The indiscriminate killing of an estimated one million Tutsi within
three months in conjunction with the international community’s inactivity during the
killings accounted for an environment in which the RPF could fully dictate the terms of
peace and impose its vision of post-genocide Rwanda without paying attention to external
or domestic criticism. The international community’s feelings of guilt (which the RPF
skillfully exploited) gave the impetus for the emergence of a partisan form of external
engagement. In Tajikistan, the sources for a partisan external engagement can mainly be
seen in the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and the ensuing ‘war against terrorism’,
in which Tajikistan became an important partner. The country’s sudden rise in geopolitical
importance has given the Tajik regime the ability to guarantee ongoing support from
external actors, who fear a surge of Islamic fundamentalism in the region. Overall, the
cases suggest the following conclusions with respect to the four analytical dimensions of
analysis (for a short summary, see table 7.1 on page 302):
First, with regard to overcoming commitment problems, I stipulated in section 7.1 above
that ‘You Stay Out’ polities offer an environment in which neither domestic nor external
actors have an interest in ensuring that commitment problems are overcome. In ‘You
Stay Out’ polities, a consensus exists between external actors and the ruling party that the
excluded party should not have any significant say in the polity. This leaves little room
for accommodating the opponents and inducing them to cooperate. Because the excluded
parties have no formal role to play in the polity, ‘overcoming’ the commitment problems in
‘You Stay Out’ polities effectively amounts to the unconditional surrender of the excluded
party. This potentially induces the government to enforce peace through a military solution
and makes it likely for external actors to turn a blind eye to the government’s attempts
to defeat the unwelcome opposition parties. The case of Rwanda by and large confirms
these stipulations. The perpetrators of the genocide posed a significant security threat in
post-genocide Rwanda after they had consolidated their power in Congolese refugee camps.
Through frequent cross-border raids from the DRC, they continued their attacks against
Tutsi civilians on Rwandan soil. Obviously, the génocidaires were highly unwelcome
in Rwanda from the perspective of both the government and external actors and there
was no room for accommodating them or inducing them to cooperate with the Rwandan
government (which the latter would never have accepted). As a result, the government
attempted to defeat the rebels militarily by launching attacks against Hutu residing in both
Rwanda and the DRC. External actors were even reluctant to provide security guarantees
for displaced Hutu refugees residing in refugee camps on Rwandan soil. When the RPF
seized the UN administered camp in Kibeho and committed a massacre among thousands
of Hutu civilians under the watching eye of UNAMIR peacekeepers, the latter did nothing
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to stop the RPF. Tajikistan does not offer any specific lessons for overcoming commitment
problems that are applicable to ‘You Stay Out’ polities because the first three years after
the settlement were still characterized by a mediative manner of external engagement.
Unlike in Rwanda, the government relied not only on coercion but primarily on co-optation
strategies in order to induce members of the UTO to subordinate to the state’s authority. One
idiosyncrasy of the Tajik case was that whole units of the rebel group were integrated into
the national army without enforcing their disarmament in the first place. This effectively
deprived the rebels of a common command and control structure and reduced their ability
to challenge the government militarily.
Second, it was assumed above that the manner of political competition in ‘You Stay
Out’ polities is characterized by the complete lack of a level playing field and marked
by attempts from the ruling party to exert tight control on the political space. In order to
ensure the continued support from external actors, de-legitimizing the political opposition
through ‘blaming and shaming’ strategies is a key instrument for the government to justify
its strong hold on power. Because external actors side with the ruling party and passively
or actively support their attempt to stay in power, the excluded party cannot hope to gain
power through fair electoral competition and is likely to make use of informal means
of competition, which potentially includes resource to armed force. In Rwanda this has
become apparent by the RPF’s quasi-totalitarian manner of exercising power. Despite the
presence of a formal power-sharing agreement and a flimsy demonstration of inclusiveness
by inviting Hutu members to participate in the government, the RPF has from the beginning
on exerted tight control on the political space and public opinion. As a result of its moral
superiority as the party that put an end to the genocide, the RPF has been in the position to
impose its own reading of the Rwandan genocide – which effectively portrays the RPF
as the ‘good guys’ who stopped the genocide and ousted an authoritarian regime – as
the dominant public discourse and charge those who deviate from the official party line
of ‘divisionism’ or ‘genocide ideology’. This turned out as an effective instrument for
getting rid of unwelcome individuals or banning opposition parties. In addition, since the
RPF had no realistic chance for winning competitive elections, it declared to postpone
the elections and systematically manipulated the outcome of the elections. Both of this
failed to attract external criticism. Similar dynamics could be observed in Tajikistan, where
Rakhmon’s authoritarian regime has become more and more entrenched under the surface
of a ‘symbolic’ democracy. The government exploited diffuse fears for a surge of Islamic
fundamentalism as an instrument to delegitimize its political opponents and boost external
support. Though his prospects to win an electoral contest have been better than in the case
of the RPF in Rwanda, Rakhmon likewise manipulated the outcome of elections and used
its control of the state apparatus in order to push through a referendum which enables him
to remain in power until 2020.
Third, the cases by and large confirm that attempts to deal with threats from within
in ‘You Stay Out’ polities can be expected to unfold in a highly confrontational manner.
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Because the excluded opposition parties have no prospects for gaining power through
formal-constitutional means, they have no choice but to fall back to informal ways of
gaining influence in the polity. In order to prevent this from happening, the ruling party can
be expected to exert a near total control on the political space and to create an environment
which discourages to challenge the official line of the government. Because external actors
do not have an interest of the excluded party to gain power, they are likely to become
tacit accomplices of the ruling party by turning a blind eye to the latter’s attempts of
dealing with the political opposition. In Rwanda, the RPF created an environment of fear
and mistrust by cracking down on opponents, intimidating critics and forcing opposition
politicians into exile. Charges of ‘divisionism’ were used as a universal instrument for
discrediting and delegitimizing for keeping external criticism at arm’s length. In addition,
the RPF launched several attacks against Hutu refugees in neighboring DRC in order to
preempt cross-border raids by members of the ancient régime. This caused thousands
of civilian victims. External criticism with respect to these human rights violations was
moderate and at some occasions external actors helped to brush the RPF’s excesses under
the carpet. In Tajikistan, the government’s control of the political space was less extreme,
but the general mechanisms were very much comparable. The greatest threat to the stability
of the Rakhmon government stemmed from warlords and regional leaders who opposed
the authority of the central government and formulated their own claims to power. The
government tried to deal with these disobedient elements through a combination of co-
optation and coercion. At the same time, it tried to discourage the emergence of new
strongmen by creating an environment in which arbitrary arrests of opposition politicians
(in clear violation of the general amnesty) remained a constant threat. As in Rwanda,
external actors remained silent about the government’s abuse of power.
Finally, the cases illustrate the specific dynamics with regard to attempts to promote
good governance standards in ‘You Stay Out’ polities. It was stipulated above that external
actors are likely to maintain a strong preference for stability and maintaining the status quo,
which clearly goes at the expense of democracy and fair political competition. As a result,
their willingness to promote good governance standards in earnest is likely to be lower than
in other polity types. At the same time, external actors’ bias for the incumbent government
enables the ruling party to exert ‘reverse leverage’ on external actors, allowing it to fence
off external pressure and depriving external actors of their ability to trigger significant
changes in the realm of good governance. In Rwanda, external actors’ preference for
maintaining the status quo and their inclination to turn a blind eye to violations of ‘good
governance’ standards has been obvious from the beginning on and found its expression
for instance in the explicit approval of the face elections in 2003. The influence of the
RPF’s ‘reverse leverage’ on external actors has become apparent with regard to the issue of
promoting post-conflict justice in Rwanda. Exploiting the ‘genocide credit’ and constantly
reminding external actors of their responsibility for the genocide, the RPF effectively
achieved that the mandate of the ICTR’s lead prosecutor Carla Del Ponte was not renewed,
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causing charges put forward against the RPF committed during and after the genocide to
be dropped. As Reyntjens argues, the RPF’s skillful exploitation of the genocide credit
“has made the regime nearly unchallengeable for the international community” (2010: 33).
In Tajikistan, external actors’ preference for stability at the expense of democracy has
become apparent after the terrorist attacks on 9/11. Although, for a short time, opposition
groups hoped that the unexpected influx of western NGOs would trigger an opening of the
political space, their hopes were soon disappointed by external actors’ strong support for
the incumbent regime. Rakhmon was quite successful in presenting himself as the sole
anchor for stability in the region. In addition, he could exert reverse leverage on external
actors by playing Russia and the West off against each other. This has secured the regime
support from both sides, which had effectively been competing for influence in the region
since 2001 (despite claims for the opposite). In effect, this undermined external actors’
ability to push for reforms and the maintenance of good governance standards.
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Aspect Rwanda Tajikistan
Commit-
ment Prob-
lems
External actors provided only marginal se-
curity guarantees to the Hutu and turned
a blind eye to the RPF’s attempts to de-
feat its opponents militarily; génocidaires
continued to play a highly disruptive role
in post-genocide Rwanda and made efforts
for disarmament illusionary; consensus be-
tween the RPF and external actors that the
Hutu radicals should stay out of the govern-
ment left no room for accommodation and
made the unconditional surrender the only
option for peace.
First post-conflict period was characterized
by mediative external engagement, there-
fore results cannot be generalized to ‘You
Stay Out’ polities; accommodation and co-
ercion were crucial for overcoming commit-
ment problems: constructive members of
the UTO were ‘bought off’ and co-opted
into state institutions whereas recalcitrant
members were crushed; ‘voluntary surren-
der’ deprived the former rebels of their
power base and reduced their ability to chal-
lenge the government.
Political
Com-
petition
RPF made flimsy attempts for adopting
a ‘symbolic democracy’ while authoritar-
ianism became more entrenched; Charges
of ‘divisionism’ and ‘genocide ideology’
(‘blaming and shaming’) were the main in-
strument for delegitimizing the political op-
position and provided a perfect pretext for
banning political parties; knowing that it
had no chance to win competitive elections,
the RPF extended the transitional phase and
manipulated elections, but this triggered lit-
tle criticism from external actors.
Rakhmon made flimsy attempts for adopt-
ing a ‘symbolic democracy’ while author-
itarianism became more entrenched; gov-
ernment exploited diffuse fears for Islamic
fundamentalism as an instrument to dele-
gitimize the opposition and present itself
as the only alternative for ruling Tajikistan;
Rakhmon used his control of the state ap-
paratus for manipulating elections and per-
petuating his rule (for instance through the
constitutional referendum enabling him to
remain in power until 2020).
Threats
from
Within
In order to discourage political opponents,
the RPF exerted an almost total control of
the political space; it created an environ-
ment of fear and mistrust through disap-
pearances, threats and intimidation of un-
welcome individuals, allowing it to cripple
civil society and the media and to discour-
age external criticism; continued military
engagement in the DRC led to large-scale
human rights violations, which external ac-
tors have brushed under the carpet.
Warlords and regional strongmen posed
greatest threat to the regime; Rakhmon
mainly used a strategy of co-optation and
coercion in order to deal with them; govern-
ment exerted a tight control of the political
space through creating an environment of
fear and mistrust through arbitrary arrests
of opposition members and creating bureau-
cratic obstacles for civil society and the me-
dia; external actors have remained silent
about the government’s abuse of power.
Good
Gover-
nance
External actors have had a clear preference
for stability as opposed to democracy; they
sanctioned the outcomes of elections de-
spite clear evidence for systematic fraud;
RPF’s ‘reverse leverage’ reduced external
actors’ ability to exert any significant influ-
ence on the Rwandan government, which al-
lowed the RPF to push through its demands.
External actors exhibited a clear preference
for stability as opposed to democracy; ex-
ternal engagement characterized by a low
willingness and ability to enforce good gov-
ernance standards; government could hold
external pressure off itself: by using its
‘helplessness as a lever’ and by playing the
West and Russia off against each other, the
Tajik regime could exert ‘reverse leverage’
on external actors.
Table 7.1: Dynamics of ‘You Stay Out’ polities
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This dissertation dealt with a problem that has become ever more pressing since the Cold
War ended: how can the international community address the rising problem of armed
conflict and how can it help war-torn societies to heal the wounds caused by civil wars?
Many countries have been subject to tremendous external statebuilding efforts in the past
two decades, guided by the assumption that they can be transformed into full democracies
within a short amount of time. This transformational optimism stands in stark contrast to
the actual statebuilding achievements in most post-conflict countries. Critical observers
have pointed out for a long time that only a small minority of these countries successfully
makes the transition towards consolidated statehood. In most post-conflict countries, the
legacy of civil war continues to have a strong impact on politics long after the has shooting
stopped. Unfortunately, this insight has so far not translated into innovative ways of dealing
with post-conflict countries. They continue to be treated either as in-between-stages on the
way to western-type statehood or as rather hopeless cases of failed statehood.
I offer a new approach for dealing with post-conflict environments: the notion of post-
conflict polities. It provides an answer to the research question that stood at the beginning
of this dissertation: If most post-conflict countries are neither phases of transition towards
consolidated statehood nor can be regarded (with few exceptions) as the result of concluded
processes of statebuilding, then how can we conceive of them at all? Through the post-
conflict polity concept, I suggest to turn the attention to the phenomenon of hybrid political
order in post-conflict settings and to focus on the permanent and idiosyncratic features of
post-conflict situations rather than exclusively on their prospects for becoming established
democracies. The argument advocated in this dissertation is that post-conflict situations
should be understood as specific forms of fragmented authority in which the main dynamics
unfold at the nexus between formal (state-like) and informal (non-state) authority, and at
the interface between domestic and external authority. A post-conflict polity was defined
above as a ‘specific constellation of interactions and relations among diverse authorities
that emerges after the settlement of a civil war’. In this perspective, post-conflict situations
are neither conceived as transitional arenas on the way to liberal statehood nor as failed
states, but as a specific regime type that is driven by its own, specific logic.
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The construction of the post-conflict polity concept is based on a number of analytical
shifts. First, it implies a rather unfamiliar usage of the polity concept; therefore some
effort was made in chapter two in order to justify its applicability to fluid and unstable
environments as they are present in the context of post-conflict countries. In short, it was
argued that while the polity concept has traditionally been used for describing formal-
constitutional characteristics of political systems (‘the rule of the game rather than the
game itself’), this understanding is not particularly helpful in the context of post-conflict
countries. Although most of them possess constitutions, the latter are often not more than
pieces of paper which are only remotely related to the actual dynamics taking place on the
ground. Post-conflict countries are environments where the characteristics of the political
system are rather determined by the de facto distribution of power among the various
post-conflict actors. I argued above that the polity concept is applicable to these contexts if
one extends the notion of structures as consisting of relations between actors. Second, the
post-conflict polity concept conceives of relations among post-conflict actors as structural
features of post-conflict situations rather than short-lived and fluid phenomena (see 2.1).
This forces us to acknowledge that relations between post-conflict actors are more than a
temporary mood that can change instantly. Until today, external actors seem to conceive
of the relations between the former belligerents in post-conflict situations as being as
unstable and fluid as weather phenomena. Even during periods of heavy rain, to speak
metaphorically, external actors constantly seem to hope for sunshine to come back day on
the next day – i.e. for obstructive relations to turn into constructive ones over night. The
post-conflict polity concept treats relations more as long term climatic trends rather than
short term weather phenomena.
Overall, this has a number of advantages over existing approaches. The cases discussed
in this dissertation confirm that the perspective of post-conflict countries as either transi-
tional stages on the way to consolidated statehood or simply failed states is unsatisfactory.
This is clearly demonstrated by the situation in Côte d’Ivoire (see 6.3 and A.6) – a case
where the inadequacies of the transition paradigm have become most clearly apparent.
When the United Nations dispatched a peacekeeping mission to the war-torn country in
2004, this happened in the expectation that democratic elections would take place within a
period of one year. Yet, it took five years longer than originally projected for the elections
to take place (they only took place in November 2010), and rather than being the starting
point for a democratic polity, they brought the country once more to the border of collapse.
From the perspective of the post-conflict concept, the period between the deployment of
the peacekeepers and Gbagbo’s final resignation is viewed as a specific polity type that
follows a certain internal logic. Recognizing this logic (rather than hoping for the parties
to finally stick to their promises) would help external actors to develop more realistic
assessments of the overall statebuilding prospects in these cases.
The shift in perspective of viewing post-conflict situations as specific forms of polities
almost automatically turns the attention to differences existing within this category, and
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gives the impetus for the attempt to differentiate between them. The vast profusion of
post-conflict countries that has come about in the past two decades makes clear that there
is a significant need for greater differentiation between different kinds of post-conflict
situations. Existing distinctions between post-conflict situations are mostly ad hoc and
partial and have so far failed to take stock of the variety of post-conflict situations in
a systematic way. No attempt has been made to look at the whole variety of existing
post-conflict cases in order to discover systematic differences between them. This lack of
a systematic distinction between post-conflict situations provided the ultimate motivation
behind this dissertation. Significant efforts were made in order to construct a systematic,
empirically grounded and intuitive differentiation between different types of post-conflict
polities. The most extensive step was the characterization and classification of 18 post-
conflict countries, which can be found in appendix A. The resulting typology is based
on three analytical dimensions: the distribution of executive authority among the former
belligerents (power-sharing or domination), the relations between the former warring
factions (constructive or obstructive), and the engagement of external actors in the post-
conflict polity (mediative, partisan or supreme). This led to the distinction between the six
types of post-conflict polities discussed in detail above (‘Let’s Share’ polities, ‘Doomed
to Share’ polities, ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities, ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities,
‘You Stay Out’ polities and ‘Benevolent Intrusion’ polities).
The cases discussed in this dissertation illustrate that the distinction between these six
types of post-conflict polities is plausible and meaningful. All post-conflict polity cases
contained in the sample can be subsumed under either of these categories. In addition, the
typology offers a clear-cut distinction between different post-conflict polity cases without
running the risk of developing overlapping categories. Therefore, the two main criteria for
judging whether a typology is meaningful – whether the identified types are exhaustive
and mutually exclusive (see 1.2.2) – are fulfilled by the typology. Beyond these technical
criteria, the more important question is whether the typology is substantially meaningful –
i.e. whether the differentiation between the types indeed leads to a meaningful distinction
between different cases. The chapters three to seven demonstrated that this is the case. The
distinction between ‘Let’s Share’ and ‘Doomed to Share’ cases, for instance, makes clear
that these two types are entirely different post-conflict situations. In ‘Let’s Share’ polities,
the parties have an interest in the power-sharing arrangement that goes beyond a mere
tactical opportunism. They are of the opinion that sharing power with their opponents
brings with it lasting benefits for both sides. The case of Macedonia demonstrated that this
enables the quick translation of power-sharing provisions into national law. By contrast, a
basic willingness to share power for its own sake is lacking in ‘Doomed to Share’ polities;
the DRC and Sierra Leone were illustrative examples in this regard.
However, the classification of different post-conflict cases is more than an intellectual
exercise that satisfies the curiosity of social scientists. A huge effort was made in the
ten case studies above in order to demonstrate that each of the post-conflict polity types
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follows its own internal logic – despite the fact that it may subsume cases from diverse
socio-historical backgrounds. In other words, the empirical chapters illustrated that polity
types ‘matter’ and that the structural constellation embodied by a certain polity type plays
a role for how the different parties interact. In order to get to this point, I first made a
number of assumptions about the interactions between post-conflict parties (see 2.1.2),
which culminated in a generic model of post-conflict interactions. This served as the basis
for developing a refined model of post-conflict interactions for each of the five1 polity
types discussed in detail above, which allowed to make more specific arguments about
the dynamics of each polity type. In a second step, section 2.4 presented a toolbox of
eight possible patterns of interactions which was derived from a preliminary comparison
of the different post-conflict cases. It turned out that most of the observed patterns can
be analytically captured by a two-by-two matrix, which draws a distinction based on the
question whether the interactions between the parties are genuine or virtual and whether
they can be characterized by a cooperative or a confrontational logic of action. This
provided the common vocabulary for the empirical analysis by offering terms such as
‘genuine cooperation’, ‘virtual cooperation’, ‘virtual enforcement’ and the like.
8.1 Summary of the Main Findings
The empirical analysis concentrated on four dimensions of interest: the prospects for
overcoming commitment problems in the implementation phase of post-conflict polities;
the manner of competition for political power; the prospects for dealing with threats
from within; and the prospects for promoting good governance standards (see 2.4.3). In
the following, the main findings of this dissertation are summarized for each of these
dimensions.
Overcoming Commitment Problems. The first dimension for which the role of specific
polity dynamics was demonstrated is about the prospects for overcoming commitment
problems in the implementation phase of post-conflict polities. This was mainly analyzed
with respect to the disarmament of the former warring factions and the formation of an
inclusive army. The theoretical discussion in section 2.2.2 suggests that commitment
problems may arise either due to malevolent intentions held by the former belligerents or
due to problems in the structural environment of settlement and post-settlement situations.
The cases demonstrated that the prospects for overcoming commitment problems are
highly influenced by the overall characteristics of a certain post-conflict polity case. It
could be shown that the prospects for overcoming commitment problems are better when
the relations between the former warring parties are constructive, when both of them hold
1To recall, the sixth polity type (‘Benevolent Intrusion’ polities) is not discussed in detail in the dissertation
because it mainly overlaps with the existing category of transitional administration cases, which is
already sufficiently researched.
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a share of formal authority and thereby a certain control over the means of coercion (most
notably the command of the national army), and when external actors are able and willing
to provide sufficient security guarantees for the parties by which to insure them against a
possible defection of their opponents.
Out of these reasons, the two constructive polity types provide the most conducive envi-
ronment for overcoming commitment problems. In ‘Let’s Share’ polities, all three of the
above conditions are fully met. The two cases – Macedonia and Burundi – generally con-
firmed these stipulations. As a ‘best-case scenario’ – a low-intensity conflict, constructive
power-sharing and a demonstrated willingness and ability by external actors to intervene –
it is no surprise that the disarmament proceeded smoothly in Macedonia. However, the
formation of a joined army succeeded also in Burundi, despite the fact that the conflict left
much deeper wounds and societal cleavages. It therefore appears plausible to argue that
‘Let’s Share’ polities offer a favorable environment for overcoming commitment problems.
‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities are also a comparatively conducive environment for
overcoming commitment problems because the constructive relations among the former
belligerents make it easier to create trust among the different parties. Yet, the inherent
asymmetry of this polity type – only one of the parties is part of the government (and
hence gains exclusive control of the security apparatus) while the other parties is excluded
– potentially constitutes an obstacle for successfully overcoming commitment problems
in the end. This requires significant attempts by external actors to bridge the divide
between the parties. This became most clearly apparent in the case of Mozambique, where
the parties maintained a ‘reserve military force’ in case peace fell apart but where the
disarmament process nonetheless succeeded in the end. An important aspect for inducing
RENAMO to cooperate were external attempts for enabling Renamo to successfully
compete against FRELIMO in the elections. A similar outcome was also observed for
El Salvador, where the FMLN initially even had maintained secret arms caches as a
‘life-insurance’ but ultimately became cooperative.
Because benevolent intentions are lacking, the obstructive polity types generally pro-
vide an environment where overcoming commitment problems is likely to be marked
by significant difficulties. The cases suggest that if the former belligerents have no real
interest in peace, there is little external actors can do in order to induce them to greater
cooperation. Beyond this general insight, it became apparent that the polity type matters
for the manner in which the parties react to their disarmament obligations in obstructive
polity types. From a theoretical perspective, ‘Doomed to Share’ polities constitute an
environment in which the prospects for overcoming commitment problems are better than
for other obstructive polity types because both parties at least formally hold a fraction of
governmental authority and hence a certain control of the security forces. However, in
the case studies no evidence was found that disarmament proceeded significantly better
in ‘Doomed to Share’ polities than in other polity types. Instead, it became apparent that
efforts for overcoming commitment problems were characterized by pronounced ‘virtual
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cooperation’ and ‘foot dragging’ gestures with which the parties tried to circumvent their
disarmament obligations, backed by ‘saber rattling’ and ‘calculated escalation’ strategies
in case this strategy failed. This became most clearly apparent in the case of the RUF in
Sierra Leone, which failed to meet any of the disarmament provisions contained in the
Lomé Peace Agreement. Instead, the rebel group initially relied on extensive ‘foot drag-
ging’ and ‘virtual cooperation’ gestures but made increasing use of more confrontational
measures (‘saber rattling’ and ‘calculated escalation’ gestures) over time. In the DRC, the
conduct of the parties was from the beginning on marked by an even more confrontational
manner, most notably because external actors turned out as both unwilling and incapable of
providing the security guarantees necessary for overcoming the commitment problems and
because the large number of warring factions (many of which came from abroad) impeded
an effective disarmament.
In ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities, the excluded parties do not participate in the
government and have little prospects for gaining governmental power in the near future.
Due to the obstructive relations prevailing between the belligerents, the excluded parties
must fear being exposed to one-sided acts of violence by the ruling party. As a result,
efforts for disarming the rebel factions can be expected to be highly confrontational and
to lack even a symbolic commitment. Liberia did not offer a suitable empirical basis for
supporting these stipulations because the main efforts for disarming the warring parties
took place before the elections in 1997, i.e. before a ‘The Winner Took it All’ polity was
formally in place. After the polity was established, Charles Taylor’s refusal to restructure
the army (as provided for in the Arusha Agreement) and his decision to maintain parallel
security forces demonstrates how mistrust and suspicion may impede the implementation
of core provisions from peace agreements. The case of Côte d’Ivoire illustrates that not
even extensive external security guarantees can induce the parties in ‘The Winner Took
it All’ polities to cooperate, since they managed to forestall the disarmament process for
more than three years.
In ‘You Stay Out’ polities, a consensus exists between external actors and the ruling party
that the excluded party should not have any significant say in the polity; therefore none of
them has a real interest in overcoming commitment problems. Instead, the excluded parties
are expected to agree to an unconditional surrender, which the ruling party is willing to
enforce if necessary. This became very clearly apparent in Rwanda with respect to the
RPF’s attempts to crush potential génocidaires and throw them out of the country, which
took place under the watching eyes of the international community.2
Manner of Political Competition. The second dimension analyzed was the manner of
political competition among the former belligerents. As the case studies illustrate, the
polity types differ greatly with respect to the manner in which the parties compete for
2Attempts for disarmament in Tajikistan are not directly applicable in ‘You Stay Out’ polities because
the first three years after the settlement were still characterized by a mediative manner of external
engagement.
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political power and influence. Using a broad brush, it can be argued that constructive polity
types are generally marked by more formal-constitutional ways of political competition
than obstructive polity types and that the future prospects for the parties are a key factor
for determining how political competition unfolds in the different polity types.
One of the defining features of constructive polity types is that the parties do not generally
contest the current distribution of formal authority and that both of them accept the status
quo and are ready to share power. In ‘Let’s Share’ polities, this has become apparent in
a genuine commitment to power-sharing, which seemingly makes this case a quasi-ideal
environment for post-conflict settlements. However not even ‘Let’s Share’ polities are self-
reinforcing because they provide a strong incentive for political hardliners or other potential
spoilers to mobilize public sentiments against the power-sharing provisions and engage in
attempts for political mobilization ‘on the cheap’. The case studies have confirmed what
critics of power-sharing have long pointed out: that power-sharing arrangements are likely
to being eroded by centrifugal tendencies or that they foster the segregation rather than the
integration of the different communities. This was generally confirmed by the two cases
discussed above. The case of Macedonia – which is an example for the consociational
model of power-sharing – was initially characterized by a highly cooperative manner of
political competition (as illustrated by the quick implementation of the key provisions
from the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’), but the competition for power intensified after
the conservative VMRO-DPMNE was outvoted in 2002. The case offers reasons for
assuming that the incentive for political hardliners to exploit the harmonious situation by
selling themselves as the real parties (political mobilization ‘on the cheap’) exposed all
parties to a ‘slippery slope’. Burundi, which leans more towards the integrative model
of power-sharing, was exposed to a similar ‘slippery slope’ because other Hutu parties
accused the CNDD-FDD of betraying the Hutu cause by collaborating with the Tutsi.
Strikingly, however, the requirement for mixed party lists has indeed reduced many of the
tensions that had characterized the relations between the Hutu and the Tutsi for several
decades.
In ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities, the prospect for both parties to have a realistic
chance for competing against each other in popular turned out as a crucial aspect for
inducing the reluctant parties to maintain their obstructive stance. For the excluded party a
feeling that ‘patience pays off’ – i.e. that they have a realistic chance for gaining power
through formal-constitutional means at some point in the future – was a crucial factor for
explaining its cooperative stance. This requires that political competition continues to be
carried out on a level playing field. In Mozambique, RENAMO’s chances for successfully
competing against FRELIMO in the elections mainly go back to external actors’ attempts
to bridge the asymmetry between the two parties and its good showing in the 1994 elections.
However, with accusations of electoral fraud accompanying subsequent elections, its calls
for political reforms grew increasingly louder. In El Salvador, the FMLN’s exclusion from
the government was less extreme, and although ARENA used all legal means in order to
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curtail its opponent’s political influence, it could not prevent the former rebel group from
improving its electoral performance more and more. When an FMLN candidate won the
presidential elections in 2009, it was clear that its patience over the preceding fifteen years
had paid off.
In obstructive polity types, the manner of political competition is significantly different.
Most importantly, a basic consensus about the status quo is lacking and the parties are
willing to increase their individual share of power immediately rather than waiting for their
chances in future elections. In ‘Doomed to Share’ polities, this has mainly manifested itself
in a highly confrontational manner of political competition in which the parties constantly
attempt to tip the balance of power in their own favor through making use of informal
and unconstitutional ways of political competition. However, since participating in the
government is often associated with benefits and privileges, the parties may also revert to
‘foot dragging’ and other ‘virtual cooperation’ strategies in order to make sure that they
continue to have access to these benefits. This could be confirmed in both the DRC and
Sierra Leone, where the opportunities for self-enrichment embodied by the power-sharing
arrangements accounted for extended foot-dragging gestures applied by the parties. At the
same time, the power-sharing arrangements were in both cases marked by a significant
conflict of interest between the presidents (Kabila in the DRC and Kabbah in Sierra Leone)
and the ‘junior partners’ (MLC and RCD in the DRC and the RUF in Sierra Leone) in
the transitional government: while the former had an interest in sitting out the transitional
phase in order to legitimize their rule through democratic elections, the latter knew that
they had little chances in competing against the government in competitive elections. As a
result, they conceived of the power-sharing arrangement predominantly as a temporary
‘safe haven’ for re-arming and collecting resources for launching their final blow against
their opponents.
The lack of consensus about the status quo also steers the manner of political competition
in ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities to informal and unconstitutional means. The excluded
party perceives the government’s rule as illegitimate and its own exclusion from power as
unfair and has little hopes for gaining power through formal-constitutional means. The
ruling party, in turn, fears that the opposition might become a threat to its rule; therefore, it
is likely to use its control of the state apparatus for constraining the political space for the
opposition. This accounts for the relations between the warring parties to be genuinely
confrontational. Despite that, the regime is likely to make some flimsy attempts to mask
its hold on power in order to prevent external actors from identifying with the goals of
the opposition and switching to a partisan manner of engagement. This was confirmed
by the cases. Although the Liberian president Taylor came to power through democratic
elections, he knew that the international community had doubts about his qualities as
a civilian ruler. As a result, he initially adopted a few conciliating gestures but almost
simultaneously reverted to exerting a tight control on the political space. The Krahn and
Mandingo opposition parties knew that they had little prospects for winning against Taylor
310
8.1 Summary of the Main Findings
in competitive elections and hence increasingly made use of violent means of political
competition. The situation was different in Côte d’Ivoire, where Gbagbo faced poor
prospects for gaining power through competitive elections and hence tried to perpetuate
his de facto rule. By a combination of ‘virtual cooperation’ and ‘saber rattling’ strategies,
he managed to prolong the transitional phase by a total of five years.
In ‘You Stay Out’ polities, finally, the manner of political competition is even more
openly confrontational. Because neither the governing party itself nor external actors have
an interest in truly democratic processes which could bring the unwelcome opposition to
power, attempts by the regime to control the political space and wind down democratic
standards are less likely to meet external actors’ scrutiny. External pressure for democrati-
zation is mainly rhetorical, which gives the ruling party significant latitude to control the
political space, accounting for the complete lack of a level playing field. In order to secure
ongoing external support and to underline its qualities as an anchor for stability, the ruling
party also engages in attempts to delegitimize the political opposition through ‘blaming
and shaming’ strategies. The RPF’s totalitarian manner of exercising power in Rwanda
closely matched these stipulations. The moral superiority it gained over its opponents
because it put an end to the genocide allowed the ruling party to get rid of unwelcome
individuals or banning opposition parties. At the same time, it implied that external actors
sanctioned its unilateral prolongation of the transitional phase and the fraudulent elections
it organized during the transitional period. This was similar to the situation in Tajikistan,
where the president’s claims to constitute a safeguard against Islamic fundamentalism
secured him significant external support and induced external actors to turn a blind eye to
the quickly progressing authoritarian drift.
Threats from Within. The third dimension analyzed in the case studies dealt more
generally with threats that may arise in post-conflict polities and with the parties’ attempts
for countering them. Because the nature of threats differs significantly with the polity types,
it was more difficult to formulate clear-cut assumptions about the possible interactions
observable in this dimension. On the most general level, it can be argued that the threats
to the stability of the polity become more imminent the more obstructive the relations
between the rebel groups are. Whether or not this leads to a collapse of the polity depends
at least in part on the polity type. The cases also suggest that power-sharing polities run
a greater risk of collapsing as a result of ‘threats from within’ than domination polities,
because they are inherently more fragile. Domination polities, in contrast, often deal with
threats in a highly authoritarian manner, mostly by harassing opposition members and
exerting a tight control of their activities.
Already among the two constructive polity types, the nature of the threats differs signifi-
cantly. In ‘Let’s Share’ polities, the main threats seem to arise from the aforementioned
temptation for spoilers and political hardliners to mobilize ethnic or ideological cleavages
for political gains. Their likelihood for success is particularly high in ethnically divided
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societies (as embodied by both Macedonia and Burundi), because they allow influential
individuals or radical parties to use the allegedly ‘unfair’ power-sharing provisions as a
pretext for triggering fears against the minority population. This entails a high risk of
undermining the constructive foundations on which this polity rests and hence for the
stability of the polity as a whole. This requires external actors to perform the role of
a ‘watchdog’ – i.e. to observe the political developments in the polity and be prepared
for short-term, decisive interventions if the conditions on the ground call for it. This
became apparent in both Macedonia and Burundi, although in slightly different ways.
In Macedonia, conservative politicians engaged in attempts to trigger imminent political
crises with the potential to derail the peace process – e.g. the referendum against the ‘Ohrid
Framework Agreement’ in 2004 or the VMRO-DPMNE’s refusal to coalesce with the
strongest Albanian party after the elections in 2006. Both instances required immediate
external engagement, which external actors were able and willing to provide. In Burundi,
the main threat arose from the refusal of the PALIPEHUTU-FNL to support the peace
process, which stemmed from its rejection of striking a compromise with the Tutsi. This
caused the CNDD-FDD to revert to an increasingly confrontational manner in dealing with
the recalcitrant rebel party, who sought to defeat them military in order to avoid making
concessions to them.
In ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities, the observed threats were more moderate,
which may have its reasons in the broader contextual conditions rather than the polity
constellation as such. On the one hand, threats to the stability of the polity may arise in
case the excluded party realizes that its prospects for winning future elections evaporate
and they come to the conclusion that patience does not pay off any longer, inducing them
to seek ‘shortcuts’ to political power. On the other hand, threats may also arise from
the ruling party if it fears to lose power against its opponents in competitive elections,
inducing it to curtail the political space for the opposition. In the worst case, this is likely
to cause the relations among the former belligerents to become obstructive over time. This
outcome could neither be observed in Mozambique nor in El Salvador. They nonetheless
demonstrate the potential for this to be the case. In Mozambique, RENAMO’s ongoing
electoral losses in conjunction with accusations that FRELIMO’s victory was the result of
electoral fraud mounted in a rising frustration and induced the party to adopt a few timid
‘saber rattling’ gestures in order to express its protest against these results. In contrast, the
prospects for winning elections had improved rather than decreased for the FMLN in El
Salvador, which made it unnecessary to make use of more confrontational strategies.
Obstructive polity types obviously face more imminent threats, but also more extreme
ways for dealing with them. In comparison to constructive polity types, there is a higher
likelihood for ‘saber rattling’ gestures and other confrontational maneuvers to escalate
into military confrontations between the antagonistic parties – in particular because the
disarmament process is often faulty and incomplete in these polity types. In ‘Doomed to
Share’ polities, the obstructive relations of the parties and the informal manner of political
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competition make it difficult to draw a clear line between power-sharing partners and
spoilers. Confrontations between the power-sharing ‘partners’ can potentially arise from
various different directions, for instance from splinter-groups who have an interest in
getting rid of the power-sharing arrangement and are willing to use armed force in order
to achieve their goal. This potential is vividly demonstrated by the RCD-Goma in the
DRC: while the leadership benefited from participating in the power-sharing government
in Kinshasa, the grass roots in Goma had little to gain from the transitional phase. Laurent
Nkunda’s dissident faction which emerged as a consequence of this dissatisfaction posed
a significant threat to the stability of post-conflict DRC. Afraid of disrupting the fragile
foundations for peace and unwilling to commit the necessary resources for a ‘genuine
enforcement’ mission, external actors failed to contain these spoilers. The RUF in Sierra
Leone effectively embodied the prototype of a spoiler. The main threat to the stability
of the polity arose from its repeated attempts to assert itself through ‘saber rattling’ and
‘calculated escalation’ strategies. Afraid to disrupt the fragile foundations of the Lomé
Agreement, external actors initially let the rebel group proceed and only found back to a
‘genuine enforcement’ strategy after the RUF’s provocations had reached an unbearable
level.
In ‘The Winner Take it All’ polities, threats to the stability of the polity are likely to
arise from confrontations between the former belligerents about the unequal distribution
of authority. Because a consensus about the status quo is lacking, the parties adopt
confrontational means, which either aim at inflicting serious harm on one’s opponents or
are motivated by fears about being overthrown themselves. The incomplete disarmament
process enables the parties to revert to armed force relatively quickly. This constitutes a
serious security risk for the government, causing it to outmaneuver the political opponents
and exploit every opportunity to gain a relative advantage over them. This caused the
incumbent presidents in both Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire to curtail their opponents’ room for
maneuver by exerting a tight control on the political space and maintaining unofficial forces
which harassed recalcitrant opposition figures. These forces – Taylor’s heterogeneous
group of security forces and Gbagbo’s unofficial ‘young patriots’ militia – allowed the
leaders to deny their responsibility for their actions and maintain a veil of cooperation
vis-à-vis external actors.
In ‘You Stay Out’ polities, the ruling parties are likely to face threats emanating from
opposition politicians who are trying to gain influence through informal routes because
they have no prospects for gaining power through formal-constitutional means. This may
either consist of continued military operations or attempts to spur public resistance against
the government by engaging in ‘blaming and shaming’ strategies, which aim at unmasking
the shortcomings of the regime. In order to curtail these activities, the government exerts
a tight control on the political space. In the two ‘You Stay Out’ polity cases analyzed in
detail, this happened primarily through creating an environment of fear and mistrust which
discouraged any activities directed against the regime. In Rwanda, the RPF achieved this
313
Chapter 8 Conclusion
by cracking down on opponents, intimidating critics and forcing opposition politicians
into exile. This harassment was backed by charges of ‘divisionism’ or ‘genocide ideology’,
which turned out as an effective measure for keeping external criticism at arm’s length.
External actors even kept silent on blatant human rights violations committed by the
Rwandan government at home and abroad. The mechanisms were similar in Tajikistan,
although the government’s control of the political space was much less extreme than in
Rwanda. Attempts for accommodating recalcitrant elites played an important role in
Rakhmon’s attempts to contain spoilers and hardliners, but the government increasingly
reverted to more confrontational means, mostly by trying to discourage the emergence
of new challengers through creating an environment of fear and suspicion (e.g. through
arbitrary arrests of opposition politicians). External actors largely remained silent about
these abuses of power.
Promoting Good Governance. The last dimension addressed by the case studies was
about the prospects for external attempts to promote good governance standards. Also in
this dimension, great variety could be observed with regard to the different polity types.
Not surprisingly, the cases confirmed that more constructive polity types offer a more
favorable environment for promoting good governance standards than obstructive ones,
but they also highlighted that constructive relations as such are not sufficient for good
governance principles to take hold. All cases furthermore suggest decisive and long-term
external engagement is necessary for good governance principles to materialize even in
constructive polity types. Often, the necessary external engagement was lacking – either
due to a lacking willingness or a lacking ability to exert the necessary leverage on the
domestic parties.
The constructive polity types in principle confirm the conducive environment embodied
by these polities. However, they also suggest that external actors’ engagement is much
stronger in the initiation phase of these polities than in the implementation phase. The cases
suggest that external actors appear to fall into the ‘euphemistic blindness’ fallacy whenever
they deal with constructive polity types – i.e. the tendency to commit too little time and
resources to these polities out of the conviction that they are self-reinforcing polities. With
respect to ‘Let’s Share’ polities, it became apparent that external actors are likely to hail
them as show-cases for successful post-conflict peacebuilding, which can cause them to
lose the critical distance necessary for a grounded assessment of the developments taking
place. In this polity type, many of the formal success factors are in place: constructive
relations, a genuine cooperation by the former warring parties and an honest commitment
of all sides to share power. These cases are therefore suitable to be presented as success
cases to the world which require hardly any ongoing involvement from external actors. This
may give rise to a significant discrepancy between the effectiveness of external engagement
in the initiation phase and the implementation phase of ‘Let’s Share’ polities. In both
Macedonia and Burundi, external engagement was key for the establishment of power-
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sharing arrangements, but both cases differ significantly with respect to the degree of
external engagement in the implementation phase of these arrangements. Not surprisingly,
Macedonia – which is located in the center of Europe – was subject to a much greater
external willingness to promote good governance standards than Burundi. In addition,
by exploiting Macedonia’s perspective of becoming a member in the EU, external actors
were both able and willing to exert a strong and long-enduring influence on the domestic
parties. These were crucial factors for facilitating the implementation of good governance
standards across the board. In Burundi, external actors’ willingness and ability to engage
in the long term promotion of good governance principles was considerably lower. The
CNDD-FDD used the constructive features of the Burundian power-sharing arrangement
as an excuse for booting external actors out of the country after a relatively short period of
engagement. This deprived external actors of their ability to exert leverage on the Burundian
government and call for the compliance with good governance standards. This outcome
was in part also facilitated by external actors’ inclination to hail the country’s formal
peacebuilding achievements (as embodied in the constructive power-sharing arrangement)
and the resulting tendency to overlook or ‘gloss over’ existing shortcomings and dangers.
In ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polities, the phenomenon of ‘euphemistic blindness’
plays out in a similar way. Because of the presence of a stable government which enjoys
the legitimacy of even the excluded parties, one is tempted to draw the conclusion that this
is a relatively self-reliant polity type. This provides a good pretext for external actors to
confine their engagement to apolitical aspects and to refrain from direct confrontations
with the government, which potentially allows violations of good governance standards
to creep in by the backdoor. In Mozambique, this mainly became apparent through the
seemingly apolitical manner with which external actors engaged in these contexts by
pushing for the implementation of capacity building and liberalization policies, which have
diverted the attention away from more fundamental problems arising in other dimensions
– most notably FRELIMO’s attempts to hollow out democratic principles or the quickly
progressing poverty that has coexisted alongside strong growth rates. Similar observations
were made in El Salvador, where external actors failed to acknowledge the unfair manner
of political competition in which ARENA had at times engaged and instead concentrated
on imposing strong liberalization policies on the government. This illustrates that although
constructive polity types offer a favorable environment for promoting good governance
principles, they require ongoing external engagement. The latter may fail either due to a
lacking willingness of a lacking ability of external actors.
In obstructive polity types, the conditions for promoting good governance standards
are even less promising. The confrontational manner of political competition and the
pervasiveness of internal threats are factors that hamper the effective promotion of good
governance principles from the outset. The obstructive environment prevailing in ‘Doomed
to Share’ polities accounts for a very high likelihood that the antagonistic parties ignore
external actors’ policy preferences or good governance recommendations. In a context
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where political competition is characterized by an informal and unconstitutional manner
of engagement, attempts for promoting good governance cannot be more than rhetorical
commitments that fail to account of the realities on the ground. In this environment, the
best external actors can do is trying to prevent the occurrence of large-scale human rights
violations, which requires a significant willingness and ability to constrain the belligerents’
room for maneuver. The two cases – the DRC and Sierra Leone – confirm that external
actors are at best partially willing to fulfill this role. In both cases, they shied away from
engaging in ‘genuine enforcement’ strategies which would have been necessary in order
to prevent at least the most blatant violations of good governance standards. In a ‘virtual
enforcement’ manner, they mainly ‘muddled through’ the transitional phase and hoped to
reach the save anchor of elections before the polity fell entirely apart, thereby taking into
account that good governance standards became entirely eroded.
In ‘The Winner Took it All’ polities, external actors’ willingness to promote good
governance principles is even lower because the presence of a stable (and sometimes
even legitimately elected) government makes it more difficult for external actors to justify
ongoing involvement in the polity. Although – unlike in ‘You Stay Out’ polities – external
actors have a genuine interest in promoting good governance standards, this per se reduces
their ability to fulfill their own claims. This mainly became apparent in Liberia, where
external actors gave in to Taylor’s attempts to boot them out of the country despite
entertaining strong doubts about his qualities as a civilian ruler. Hence, after ECOMOG’s
withdrawal in 1998, there was no power left in the country which could contain Taylor and
his attempts to dominate the political system. This significantly hampered external actors’
ability to call for good governance standards or to prevent even the most pervasive human
rights violations. Only Taylor’s continued support for the RUF in Sierra Leone triggered a
change in external actors’ behavior, which expressed itself in the ultimate imposition of
sanctions against Taylor’s regime. The situation in Côte d’Ivoire was different, because
external actors had played a crucial role in putting an end to the armed conflict (by
establishing a zone of confidence) and never withdrew from the country. They still turned
out as incapable of enforcing good governance standards because they were increasingly
fooled by the parties’ ‘virtual cooperation’ and ‘foot dragging’ gestures.
‘You Stay Out’ polities, finally, constitute an altogether different environment for promot-
ing good governance standards. External actors’ willingness to engage in the promotion of
good governance is low because they do not have any interest in inducing the government
to implement measures (free elections) which could threaten its own survival. They have a
demonstrated preference for stability and maintaining the status quo, which also implies a
strong tolerance towards the shortcomings and excesses of the incumbent regime. However,
because it violates external actors’ own rhetoric if they openly support an autocratic or dic-
tatorial regime, they are likely to levy modest (mainly rhetorical) democratization pressure
on the incumbent government and expect it to exhibit at least a symbolic commitment to
democracy. This is demonstrated by the two cases – Rwanda and Tajikistan – discussed
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above. Although the ruling party’s commitment to democracy was in both cases not more
than a shallow facade, external actors largely remained silent about these abuses of power.
In addition, the cases illustrate that external actors’ ability to secure even this minimal
say in the polity may become eroded by the ‘reverse leverage’ which the ruling parties
in ‘You Stay Out’ polities can exert on external actors. In Rwanda, the ‘genocide credit’
gave the regime in Kigali significant leverage over external actors, which it used in order
to forestall the latter’s attempts to extend the ICTR’s jurisdiction to war crimes committed
by the RPF. In Tajikistan, Rakhmon skillfully exploited the fact that Russia and the West
were competing for influence in the region, which secured him support from both sides
and allowed him to limit the pressure exerted by each of them individually.
8.2 Caveats and Limitations
In larger research projects, it is often the case that the goals a researcher sets for himself
(or herself) cannot always be met to his full satisfaction. There are almost always practical
limitations that require to draw compromises or alter the goals in the middle of the process.
This dissertation is no exception. I encountered a number of limitations throughout the
research process which should be mentioned here in order to give the reader the ability
to evaluate how they might affect his interpretations of the results. In addition to that,
a number of caveats and restrictions should be noted that may not become apparent at
first glance but that nonetheless could have an influence on the generalizability of the
conclusions.
First, it should be noted that it is no coincidence that this dissertation is called ‘A
Typology of Post-Conflict Polities’. Next to the typology presented here, other researchers
may (or, certainly, will) come up with different distinctions between post-conflict situations.
During the process that led to the construction of the final typology, several intermediary
typologies were drafted and later discarded. The analysis of the cases showed, I believe,
that the typology ultimately yielded is both plausible and meaningful. However, the six
polity types identified above are not carved in stone. Therefore, it is not problematic if
further empirical evidence should convincingly suggest that the types need to be refined or
additional types added.
Second, despite the broad variety of cases that provided the basis for this dissertation,
the empirical basis for identifying the dynamics of the different polity types was not in
all cases ideal. In particular in those types where few cases are available (like ‘Let’s
Share’ polities), one has to live with certain limitations that are inherent to case material as
such. Whether by coincidence or not, the two power-sharing polity types not only differed
with respect to the characteristics contained in the typology, but also with regard to one
additional aspect, which certainly affected the observed results: the two ‘Let’s Share’
polities are cases in which the power-sharing provisions became firmly entrenched in the
countries’ constitution, whereas in the ‘Doomed to Share’ cases power-sharing was not
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more than a transitional mechanism to bridge the time until elections took place.3 This is
not utterly surprising, because one can easily imagine that it is intricately more difficult
(and possibly also pointless) to codify power-sharing provisions in an environment where
a basic consensus about the status quo is lacking. However, the lack of a real perspective
for former rebel groups to gain power through free and fair elections in the future was
identified as a major destabilizing factor of these polities. In cases where power-sharing is
more than a spontaneous and temporary form of elite co-optation, it can be expected that
this factor plays a less important role. This should be kept in mind when interpreting the
conclusions drawn above about these polity types.
Third, although it could be demonstrated that the three analytical dimensions of the
typology have an influence on the dynamics and interactions taking place in the post-
conflict phase, I do not claim these are the only factors that matter, nor that they are
necessarily the most important ones for predicting whether external statebuilding attempts
will be successful of not. There are numerous contextual factors which potentially have
an effect on the manner in which the parties interact, too. The case of Macedonia offers
a telling example. The presence of constructive relations and the parties’ demonstrated
willingness to engage in power-sharing in earnest were important preconditions for the
country’s ultimate success in maintaining peaceful post-conflict relations. However, it was
just as important that external actors exhibited an exceptional willingness and ability to
remain engaged in the polity in the long run and to ensure that the constructive spirit of
this polity did not become undermined by spoilers who engaged in attempts for political
mobilization ‘on the cheap’. This pronounced willingness and ability are contextual
factors that are exogenous to the theoretical framework itself and which cannot necessarily
be expected to be present in other ‘Let’s Share’ polities. In Burundi, external actors’
willingness and ability to exert a long-term influence on the domestic parties was much
lower, which enabled the ruling party to gradually undermine power-sharing and establish
an authoritarian system. Hence, the polity type itself does not determine which contextual
factors are present. However, as the case studies illustrated, they may determine how these
exogenous factors affect the post-conflict dynamics. This should be kept in mind when
interpreting the above results.
Finally, it should be stated that not all of the different patterns of interaction identified
in section 2.4 actually turned out as equally relevant. Although all of these patterns of
interactions are logically conclusive and are likely to be applied by the parties in any of
the different polity types, not all of them could be verified as equally important in the
cases investigated. ‘Virtual accommodation’ strategies for instance – according to which
external actors make concessions to the belligerents without making any specific attempts
to follow up on their promises – did not play a particularly important role in any of the
case studies discussed above. The only instance which could be subsumed under a ‘virtual
3This does not only hold true for the two ‘Doomed to Share’ cases discussed in detail in chapter four, but
also for the remaining ‘Doomed to Share’ cases contained in the appendix.
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accommodation’ strategy was the manner in which the international community dealt with
the ‘absolute and free pardon’ granted to the RUF leadership in Sierra Leone by the Lomé
Agreement, where the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General was instructed
to put an additional disclaimer under his signature that the amnesty was without effect in
case the RUF’s crimes were later declared as genocide or crimes against humanity. This
later provided the basis for the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (see
4.3.2). ‘Genuine accommodation’ strategies – according to which external actors seek
to maintain peace or post-conflict stability through accommodating the wants and needs
of the warring parties – was frequently applied by external parties, but it appears to be
too general a strategy in order to be analytically meaningful. These are not necessarily
limitations in the strict sense, but it should be kept in mind when assessing their relevance
in other possible contexts.
There certainly are more caveats and limitations which may be of relevance, but it
appears impossible and of little help to include them all at the end of this dissertation. For
this reason, I will now turn to the broader implications of the results identified above.
8.3 Implications of the Findings
Beyond the topics directly addressed in this dissertation, the above findings allow to draw
some more general conclusions about the contemporary practice of intervening in post-
conflict societies and the prospects for building the foundations for a lasting peace. The
goal here is to focus on the bigger picture and to present those key insights that become
apparent when taking one step back. Although none of the below implications can be
directly interpreted as policy recommendations, some of them contain lessons which are of
direct relevance for the future conduct of post-conflict intervention.
There is no self-reinforcing Peace. The first lesson to be drawn from this dissertation
has already been pointed out by numerous critics of the liberal peacebuilding paradigm:
that it is hardly possible for external actors to trigger a process of self-reinforcing peace
after the end of civil wars. To recall, the liberal peacebuilding paradigm is based on the
assumption that establishing democratic state structures creates incentives for the former
belligerents to commit to peaceful goals and strategies and to enjoy the ‘peace dividend’
(see chapter one). The evidence presented in this dissertation confirms once more that
skepticism with respect to this general claim is warranted. Little evidence could be found
anywhere in the cases that peace processes are self-implementing. In almost all of the cases
analyzed, an ongoing and often lengthy external engagement in the post-conflict period was
necessary in order to avert imminent threats to the stability of the polity or to ensure that
the parties comply with basic good governance standards. This holds true for constructive
and obstructive polity types alike. Not even the ‘most likely case’ scenarios (‘Let’s Share’
polities and ‘Let the Winner Take it All’) polities can be exempted. In Macedonia for
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instance, external actors’ role of a watchdog was crucial for preventing an early collapse
of the polity, and the lack of such an engagement in Burundi can at least in part be held
accountable for the tacit establishment of a one party state by the CNDD-FDD. The two
‘Let the Winner Take it All’ cases are arguably closest to the ideal of a liberal peace,
and a fair assessment should lead to the result that these countries have made significant
achievements in the past two decades. But even in these cases, tensions arose that may turn
out as a threat to the stability of these polities in the future. In obstructive polity types, the
notion of a self-reinforcing peace turned out as grossly misguided. All cases in which the
relations between the former warring parties were obstructive were either characterized by
pronounced authoritarian tendencies or led to the relapse into civil war. This suggests that
the theoretical foundations on which the liberal peacebuilding paradigm rests are faulty
and should urgently be revised. External actors should become acquainted with the idea
that rebuilding war-torn societies requires much more external engagement than what they
are currently able and willing to provide.
Obstructive Parties remain Obstructive. The second key insight of this dissertation is
that obstructive parties are very unlikely to switch to a constructive modus operandi without
any significant change in the broader structural environment taking place. The peacemaking
logic generally advocated by external actors seems to be based on the assumption that
obstructive parties instantly become constructive as soon as they sign peace agreements.
Whether in the case of Charles Taylor, Foday Sankoh or Laurent Gbagbo – external actors
based their peacemaking efforts on the assumption that even the most gruesome despots
would become more “statesmanlike” as soon as they have to “grapple with the demands of
governance” – as William Reno aptly put it with respect to Charles Taylor (2004: 134). A
look at the track record of these rulers illustrates that these expectations are highly naïve.
In fact, in none of the cases covered in this dissertation, obstructive parties became truly
constructive unless they were defeated militarily and forced to agree to an unconditional
surrender. Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh were subject to a military defeat and later
ended up in prison (where Sankoh died), whereas Gbagbo refused the outcome of the
elections of November 2010, which he had managed to postpone in the preceding five
years. This illustrates that if political leaders in post-conflict countries want to behave
obstructively, there is little external actors can do in order to induce them to cooperate.
This may be ‘bad news’ for external actors, who have until now invested significant time
and resources into hammering out peace agreements with political leaders who did not
exhibit the slightest inclination to follow up on the promises they made. The lesson to be
drawn from this insight is that external actors should stop the self-deception that has until
now accompanied their efforts for crafting peace. Expecting leaders like Taylor, Sankoh or
Gbagbo to discover a genuine commitment to peace is unrealistic. The crucial question is:
what is the alternative? Should external actors stop to seek settlements among obstructive
parties and simply abandon the respective countries to their own fate? The answer is a
320
8.3 Implications of the Findings
clear no. A settlement among obstructive leaders is still better than no settlement at all.
Even if the emerging polity turns out as unstable or if it amounts to the establishment
of an autocratic regime, it is arguably still preferable for the affected population than a
continuation of the war to the bitter end.
External actors are easy to deceive, even by notorious despots. The third main insight
of this dissertation is that external actors are very easily deceived by the tricks and ‘virtual
cooperation’ gestures of parties who are unwilling to commit to the terms of peace and who
simply pretend to cooperate. ‘Virtual cooperation’ strategies could be observed across all
polity types and were used by the parties for various different purposes. The most blatant
cases, however, were those in which external actors were fooled by parties whose conduct
was marked by a flimsy commitment to peace. Again, Laurent Gbagbo is the best example
for this phenomenon, whose oscillation between ‘virtual cooperation’ and ‘saber rattling’
gestures seems to have confused external actors to the extent which prevented them from
constraining his actions in any substantive way. After each obstructive maneuver, external
actors were easily convinced that, this time, he was interested in peace in earnest. This
allowed him to make a fool out of the international community and get away with false
promises and broken agreements without facing any negative consequences. This suggests
that external actors seem to be endowed with a sheer endless degree of goodwill in their
dealings with recalcitrant parties. When considering their aversion against engagements
which are costly both in a political and in a substantive sense, this outcome is not utterly
surprising. Standing firm against these leaders and engaging in a ‘genuine enforcement’
strategy is more costly in the short run than showing these leaders where their limits are.
However, the long term costs of not doing so are much higher, in particular if these ‘virtual
cooperation’ gestures only postpone a complete collapse of the peace process. The lesson
to be drawn from this is that external actors should stop to judge post-conflict actors by
their lip service and should instead become aware that ‘virtual cooperation’ gestures are
a normal characteristic of certain post-conflict polity types. Rather than meeting this
by a combination of accommodation and ‘virtual enforcement’ strategies, they should
be prepared to mobilize sufficient resources in order to switch to a strategy of ‘genuine
enforcement’ if necessary. If the ‘deceiving parties’ understand that repeatedly breaking
agreements and undermining the foundations for peace will be met by sanctions from
external actors, their inclination to test the latter’s nerves to the very end might decline.
Substance is more important than form. The fourth main insight is that external actors
put too much emphasis on the form or outward appearance of statebuilding processes and
ignore the substantive processes going on below the surface. The cases gave vivid proof
that external actors are too much obsessed with the formal ingredients of their statebuilding
agendas – most notably elections – which causes them to overlook or fade out the much
more imminent dynamics that really drive post-conflict dynamics. The cases illustrate
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that elections as such do not matter very much – even when they take place in a relatively
free environment. In the DRC, the international community concentrated exclusively on
organizing the polls in 2006, but rather than bringing democracy they gave the impetus
for establishing a firmly authoritarian system characterized by crack-downs on opposition
politicians and a tight control of the political space. In Liberia, they legitimized the rule of
Charles Taylor, who had been the de facto ruler of large parts of the country before and
who made little difference between his role as a warlord and his conduct as a president. In
many other contexts, elections are not more than carefully orchestrated acts of democratic
semblance. In Rwanda and Tajikistan, the fraudulent elections fulfilled the double purpose
of legitimizing the incumbent parties and of endowing external actors’ support for them
with a veil of legitimacy. Elections played a more promising role in Mozambique and El
Salvador, where they were accepted by the former warring parties as a neutral arbitrator to
decide who governed. However, it lies outside of external actors’ sphere of influence to
make sure that elections fulfill this more promising role. In addition, the preoccupation
with elections and other elements of the liberal statebuilding project diverts attention away
from more pressing problems that may become apparent in the post-conflict phase – for
instance systematic human rights violations or the emergence of parties who lose an interest
in peace and turn into spoilers. The cases illustrated that once an elected government is in
place, external actors have difficulties justifying their ongoing engagement and often have
to withdraw involuntarily. This was the case in the DRC, Liberia, Rwanda and Burundi.
This stands in stark contrast to external actors’ attempts to postpone their efforts to promote
good governance standards to the post-election era. Once external actors withdraw, there
ability to make sure that the polity continues to work according to established principles
of good governance becomes significantly reduced. This dilemma is well captured in a
quote by Peter Uvin: “[D]onors really only control the form, but not the substance, of
the institutions they help build. [. . . ] What they cannot ensure – or in any case not easily,
and not with the usual tools of the development system – is that these formal institutions
also effectively, substantively, act in the way donors expect or desire” (2001: 186). The
lesson to be drawn from this is that external actors should give up to view elections as
a panacea for the success of statebuilding projects. In many post-conflict polity types,
they do not really matter for the distribution of authority between the former warring
parties. Informal and unconstitutional instruments of political competition are by far more
important. Recognizing that a symbolic commitment to democracy is an ordinary feature
of many polity types would help external actors to concentrate on more constructive ways
of dealing with this fact.
External engagement often amounts to ‘Impotence in Denial’. The fifth main insight
of this dissertation is that the external actors’ ability to exert leverage on the former warring
parties is sometimes severely curtailed. While it was mostly the case that external actors
lacked sufficient willingness for a decisive intervention in the first place, there were also
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cases in which a more decisive engagement failed because external actors lacked sufficient
‘sticks and carrots’ in order to exert significant influence on the domestic dynamics.
Modifying Chandler’s phrase that contemporary statebuilding attempts reflect what he
calls “empire in denial” (2006b), post-conflict interventions are sometimes marked by an
‘impotence in denial’ – i.e. the inability to recognize that external actors sometimes have
little leverage for inducing parties to cooperate. This may not hold true for those prominent
countries on which external actors levied tremendous influence and in which there was
sufficient political will to remain engaged in the long run – for instance Afghanistan, Iraq,
Kosovo or Macedonia. But it holds true for the much larger group of countries with respect
to which external actors’ leverage was too small: the DRC, Burundi, Liberia (until Taylor’s
resignation), Sierra Leone (until the UK intervention) or Côte d’Ivoire, to mention only a
few. Recognizing this from the outset would make it easier for external actors to become
more modest in the statebuilding goals they advocate.
8.4 Concluding Remarks
The above implications underline that the current manner of external intervention suffers
from a number of flaws and ambiguities. All in all, they illustrate that a lot goes wrong
with regard to contemporary attempts to rebuild war-torn societies and that the potential
for improvements is tremendous. As illustrated above, the analytical shift advocated by the
post-conflict polity concept can be helpful in order to identify some of the main shortcom-
ings and derive a set of recommendations about how the effectiveness of externally-led
statebuilding attempts could be improved if the right goals were pursued. The typology
of post-conflict polities can help decision-makers to get a better idea of what they will
have to expect if a specific post-conflict constellation begins to materialize. The lessons
explicitly stated above only address a limited set of broader implications; more specific
lessons can certainly be drawn from the wealth of empirical material upon which this
dissertation relies. All in all, they suggest that if the international community sets certain
goals for itself, it should exhibit both a greater will and determination to actually pursue
them. Seeking excuses and early exit options might be a good strategy for saving face and
– in the case of military engagements by the west – accommodating the electorate at home,
but it often enables despots to terrorize their populations for years or decades. However,
it should also be noted that a new analytical shift as such is not a panacea for improving
the contemporary manner of post-conflict intervention. Many challenges will remain for
which no immediate solutions are available and for which there is no real perspective that
they will be transformed into anything resembling democratic states. The question is how
the international community should deal with these cases: become involved despite the
risk of giving birth to a new autocratic regime or stay out? The policy recommendation
here is certainly not to ‘let them fail’ or ‘let them fight it out among themselves’ – as some
people continue to argue (see 2.2.1 above). Civil wars are more than an annoyance; they
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cost tens of thousands of lives each year4 and often throw countries back for decades in
their economic development. In effect, they often continue to ‘kill and maim people long
after the shooting stops’ (Ghobarah and Huth 2003). Rather than fearing to support authori-
tarianism (which external actors are doing anyway without admitting it), they should make
all efforts to protect the populations of war-torn societies, most notably by not shying away
from taking sides in the post-conflict phase. Taking sides is often better than muddling
through.
4According to conservative estimates, the total number of direct battle-related deaths between 1989 and
2008 lay between 750.000 and 1.5 million (see Wischnath and Gleditsch 2011). This figure includes
both inter-state and intra-state wars; however, since most wars experienced in this period were civil wars
(see chapter 1), it can be followed that they accounted for the vast majority of the victims. The number
of people dying from the indirect consequences of armed conflict (hunger, disease, resource depletion) is
estimated to be much higher.
324
Appendix A
Characterization and Classification of the
Cases
Applying the case selection criteria formulated in section 1.3.3 to the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed
Conflict Dataset’ (version 4-2009) results in a list of 22 post-conflict countries, of which
four cases (The Central African Republic, Chad, Croatia and Somalia) were later exempted
from the analysis because it turned out that they are not suitable as potential post-conflict
polity cases.1 The remaining 18 cases are characterized and classified in this chapter.
A brief overview about the different cases and the results of the classification process
can be found in table A.1 on page 327. For each of them, it contains information about
their general background, their conflict and peacekeeping histories as well as their overall
post-conflict constellation. This last aspect is the most important one, since it allows to
distinguish different post-conflict periods and enables to classify them as specific post-
conflict polity types. Each country report is structured in three parts:
Country and Conflict Information. At the beginning of each case some very basic
background data is presented, taken from the 2008 ‘Countrywatch’ reports for the respec-
1The following considerations played a role for the decision to exclude them: The Central African Republic
and Somalia are cases which, despite the presence of a formal settlement, lack any effective governmental
order. The International Crisis Group described the Central African Republic in 2007 as being “worse
than a failed state: it has become virtually a phantom state, lacking any meaningful capacity at least
since the fall of Emperor Bokassa in 1979” (2007b: i #1655). Kenneth Menkhaus described Somalia as
the “longest-running instance of complete state collapse in postcolonial history” (2007: 187). Due to
the effective absence of any real formal government, these cases are ill-suited as typical post-conflict
cases. In Chad, no clear end-point for the civil war could be identified; the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict
Dataset’ lists ‘other’ as the outcome of the first armed conflict, whereas the second armed conflict ended
through conflict inactivity. This accounts for the absence of any specific post-conflict dynamics in the
case of Chad. Croatia, finally, was excepted because the armed conflict there should more adequately be
seen as a secession war with other countries from the former Yugoslav Republic than a real intra-state
conflict. Though the country certainly is a post-war country, it does not fulfill the conditions for an
intra-state armed conflict as presented in section 1.3.3. The UN Transitional Administration established
in Eastern Slavonia on Croatian territory between 1996 and 1998 (UNTAES) is also not considered a
post-conflict polity case because it was later integrated into Croatia rather than becoming an independent
state (see Chesterman 2004: 70–72).
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tive cases.2 This is followed by a very short summary of the historical background and a
brief overview of the conflict history, which are based on the qualitative information con-
tained in the ‘UCDP Database’ (UCDP 2010a). These summaries are shaded in light gray
in order to allow the reader to inform himself about the countries’ historical backgrounds at
a glance. The information is complemented by more detailed information taken from other
sources – mainly the 2008 ‘Countrywatch’ reports for the respective cases in combination
with additional sources (book chapters, articles and policy reports). After this historical
background, an overview of the countries’ conflict and peacekeeping characteristics is
provided, which is taken from the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’ and information
available from the UN’s Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
Post-Conflict Situation. After the historical overview, the post-conflict situation is
characterized. This fulfills two main purposes: First, it allows to distinguish different post-
conflict phases which provided the basis for identifying different post-conflict polity-cases
within one post-conflict countries. While there are some cases – for instance Mozambique
or Macedonia – where there was only one armed conflict in the period of interest (and
therefore only one clearly identifiable post-conflict period), there are other countries in
which either several conflicts occurred simultaneously or where armed conflict recurred
during the period of investigation (1990 – 2007). In addition to that, there are cases
where a fundamental change of the conditions on the ground requires a re-classification
of the polity even in the absence of renewed conflict. Second, it sheds light on the three
dimensions derived from the analytical framework presented in section 2.1.2: the role
of the formal government, the role of external actors, and the role of the former warring
parties. These descriptions are based on a variety of sources, including secondary literature
(books, book chapters and journal articles), Country Watch Country Reports, UN Security
Council Resolutions or Reports of the UN Secretary General to the Security Council, and
policy reports from the International Crisis Group and other institutions.
Assessment and Classification. The last two sections contain the assessment and clas-
sification of the different post-conflict phases, based on the dimensions of the typology
presented in section 2.2. It is decided here whether the situation must be treated as a
case of power-sharing or a case of political domination, whether the relations between
the warring parties in the post-conflict episode under investigation were constructive or
obstructive, and whether external actors were involved in this situation in a mediative,
partisan or supreme manner. This provides the basis for the selection of cases discussed in
detail in the empirical chapters above. A map can be found at the very end of each country
chapter.
2There are a few cases where these reports were not available; in this case the information is left out. In
some cases, the 2008 Countrywatch reports were either incomplete or not available; in these cases reports
from other years were used.
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Afghanistan since 2001 X
Angola I 1995–1998 X
Angola II since 2002 X
Bosnia and Herzegovina since 1996 X
Burundi since 2006 X
Cambodia I 1992–1993 X
Cambodia II since 1993 X
Côte d’Ivoire I 2004–2007 X
Côte d’Ivoire II since 2007 X
DRC I 2003–2006 X
DRC II since 2006 X
East Timor 1999–2002 X
El Salvador since 1994 X
Guatemala since 1997 X
Haiti I 1993–2004 X
Haiti II since 2004 X
Kosovo since 1999 X
Liberia I 1997–2003 X
Liberia II 2003–2006 X
Liberia III since 2006 X
Macedonia since 2001 X
Mozambique since 1994 X
Rwanda since 1994 X
Sierra Leone I 1999-2000 X
Sierra Leone II 2000-2007 X
Sierra Leone III since 2007 X
Tajikistan I 1996–2001 X
Tajikistan II since 2001 X
Occurrences (Total=28) 2 5 4 9 4 4
Table A.1: Cases and Classification Results
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A.1 Afghanistan
Population 27,089,593 as of 2007
Total Area 647,500 Sq. Km.
Total Land 647,500 Sq. Km.
Coastline 0 km (Landlocked)
Capital Kabul
Languages
Pashtu (Indo-European language) and Dari (Afghan Persian) are the major
languages; other Indo-European, Indo-Aryan and Indo-Iranian languages,
such as Balochi, Pashayi and Eastern Farsi, are also spoken; Turkic and
Altaic languages, such as Uzbek and Turkmen, are present; Arabic and
Tajiki are also used. Note: There are approximately 45 living languages in
total and a large degree of bilingualism
Boundaries
Pakistan: 2,430 km, Tajikistan: 1,206 km, Iran: 936 km, Turkmenistan: 744
km, Uzbekistan: 137 km, China: 76 km
Ethnic Groups
38% Pashtun, 25% Tajiks, 19% Hazara, 7% Baloch, 6% Uzbek, 2% Turk-
men, 1% Qizilbash, 1% Other
Religions
84% Sunni Muslim, 15% Shia Muslim, 1%.Other (including Zoroastrian,
Jewish, Hindu, Baha’i and Christian)
Source: Countrywatch (2008): Afghanistan 2008 Country Review (Coleman 2008b).
Table A.2: Basic Facts and Figures: Afghanistan
A.1.1 Country and Conflict Information
a) General Background
The territory of present-day Afghanistan comprises a large diversity of ethnic, religious
and tribal identities. In the 19th century, rivalries between the different ethnic groups were
fueled by the competition between Russia and Great Britain for influence in the region.
The country became a British Protectorate, reached independence in 1919 and became a
monarchy. Since then, members of the Pashtun ethnic group have dominated political life.
The monarchy was abolished in 1973 as a result of a rising degree of Socialist influence
in the country. A Soviet-sponsored coup in 1978 installed a Socialist government, which
triggered great resistance from anti-secular groups, referred to as the ‘Mujahedeen’ (see
UCDP 2010b).
328
A.1 Afghanistan
Afghanistan’s population is religiously very homogeneous, with 80 percent being Sunni
Muslims and 19 percent Shi’a Muslims. Yet, it is ethnically fragmented, with many of the
country’s borders dividing “coethnic populations”, most significantly so in the case of the
“largely independent, tribalized Pushtun population” (Thier 2006: 470). After reaching
independence, Afghanistan experienced a number of home-grown modernization move-
ments. First, the rule of King Amanullah, later of Mohammed Daoud and, finally, the rule
of communists from the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) all strength-
ened the central state and the army, developed the educational sector, and “strikingly –
all appropriated the rights and visibility of women as the central symbol of modernity”
(Suhrke 2007: 1295). However, from the beginning on, these modernization movements
were highly contested and, ultimately, all of them were defeated at some point. Although
the country has experienced violence of various sorts throughout its entire history, it only
reached the intensity of an armed conflict in 1978.
b) Conflict History
After the establishment of the Soviet-backed government, an intrastate conflict between the
government and the Mujaheddin broke out. The Mujaheddin revolt was mainly organized
by exiled Islamic groups. After one decade of massive armed conflict, the Soviet Union
withdrew its forces in 1988. However, their withdrawal created a power vacuum that gave
rise to a highly fragmented pattern of authority relying mainly on local warlords. The
chaotic situation gave rise to a new actor that emerged in the mid-1990s, the Taliban. They
managed to re-install central authority and imposed a strict sharia law. Their reign lasted
from 1996 to 2001, until they were ousted by a US-led multinational coalition in the course
of the ‘war against terrorism’ (see UCDP 2010b).
The mujahideen did not only comprise Islamic groups; they were “led by a mixture of
traditional and Islamist leaders”. They were supported by the United States, which saw
an opportunity to fight the spread of communism while “giving the Soviet Union its
Vietnam” (Thier 2006: 471–472). After the withdrawal of the Soviet Union in 1988, a
conflict between the different mujahideen groups broke out largely along ethnic-regional
lines, dividing the country into six to seven semiautonomous regions (Thier 2006: 473).
This status lasted until the Taliban was formed with support from Pakistan in 1994 as an
attempt to resolve the chaos. Suhrke describes the Taliban as a “socio-religious movement
committed to anti-modernity in all its aspects” (2007: 1296). Within two years they
controlled some 90 percent of the country and installed a fundamentalist regime. After
initial ignorance from the international community, the events of 11 September 2001 gave
rise to ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’, initiated on 7 October 2001, in which the Taliban
collapsed within only five weeks (Thier 2006: 474–477).
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In late 2001, a large-scale statebuilding project was set in motion in Afghanistan.
However, this moment cannot be seen as the end-point of the civil war, although suggested
otherwise by the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’ (where it officially lasted from
1978-2001; see below). The case certainly is an example for the external reconstruction
or ‘overhaul’ of state structures and is prominently discussed in collected volumes on
post-conflict peacebuilding (see e.g. Call 2008), but is precisely not a case of ‘post-conflict’
intervention. It must, together with Iraq, rather be treated as a case of post-occupation
intervention, which certainly is a special analytical category (see also Paris and Sisk 2009a).
Since 2006 at the latest, however, armed insurgents have been on the rise in Afghanistan
(see e.g. Jones 2008), and from this moment on at the latest, the situation becomes too
complex in order to be captured by the analytical framework advocated throughout this
dissertation. The following characterizations and assessments therefore refer exclusively to
the period starting with the Bonn agreement struck in December 2001 and the resurgence
or armed conflict in mid-2006.
c) Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview
Conflict parties Various organizations
UCDP Conflict ID 137
UCDP Episode ID 1371
Duration 1978 – 2001
Intensity war
Outcome One-sided victory
Victorious side Non-gov.
Peacekeeping UNGOMAP (May 1988 – March 1990)
Mission Mandate
UNGOMAP
“UNGOMAP was established in May 1988 to assist in ensuring the imple-
mentation of the Agreements on the Settlement of the Situation Relating to
Afghanistan and in this context to investigate and report possible violations
of any of the provisions of the Agreements” (Department of Peacekeeping
Operations 2009c).
Source: ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Table A.3: Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Afghanistan
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A.1.2 Post-conflict Situation
Afghanistan is a case in which the challenge lies in “executing a peace operation in
parallel with ongoing warfare” (Sherman 2008: 303). It is therefore questionable to which
extent the country is truly a post-conflict country, but arguably it fulfills many important
characteristics: decades of warfare (including a civil war preceding the Taliban regime), a
multi-national intervention, a peace-process along with a large-scale state-building process.
In the following paragraphs, the role of the formal government, the warring parties and
external actors are briefly discussed, before the case is classified in the next section.
a) The Formal Government
The Bonn Agreement of December 2001 laid down the principles of post-war reconstruc-
tion in Afghanistan. In Astri Suhrke’s assessment, the document was “basically a script
for transition to a liberal, constitutional democracy, served by an effective state apparatus
[. . . ] and a single army, with a commitment to ‘social justice’, respect for human rights,
and ‘sensitivity’ to the rights of women” (2007: 1298). One of its core functions was
to nominate a new government that would rule the country in lieu of the ousted Taliban
movement for an interim period of six months. Hamid Karzai, then 44 years old, was
chosen as the interim head of state. Six months later, he was confirmed by an Emergency
Loya Jirga (a Grand National Assembly) held in accordance with the Bonn Agreement
(see Coleman 2008a: 21).
The new government was, in effect, an artificially crafted construct comprising a care-
fully selected number of constructive elements. Though Karzai himself was a Pashtun, the
Interim Administration mainly comprised members from the Panjshiri Tajik armed faction
from the north which had already coalesced with the United States in order to overthrow
the Taliban regime. Thus, the government’s composition stood in stark contrast to the
Pashtun’s historic position of dominance, and consequently many Pashtuns were disap-
pointed both by the decisions made in Bonn and the outcome of the 2002 Loya Jirga (see
International Crisis Group 2003a: 8–10). Most importantly, the Taliban themselves were
excluded both from the Bonn conference and from participation in the interim government.
As a result of this and other factors, the Afghan government has enjoyed little legitimacy
from the population and has had only limited outreach: “In much of Afghanistan, there
is little, if any, state presence whether for delivery of security, justice, or other services”
(Sherman 2008: 314). The legitimacy of the government greatly depends on outcomes:
Afghans are likely to abandon the state if it is unable to provide basic public goods, above
all security (Sherman 2008: 314). The central government is still far from self-sustaining;
it depends primarily on international forces to protect state institutions and to fight the
insurgents (Sherman 2008: 316). Presidential and parliamentary elections took place in
Afghanistan in 2004 and 2005, respectively (see Burwitz 2007; Reynolds 2006). They
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confirmed Karsai in power and, after some time, also led to the incorporation of moderate
Taliban elements into the government.
b) The Role of External Parties
In Afghanistan at least three groups of external actors have been engaged simultaneously:
The ‘Coalition Forces’, the ‘United Nations Mission in Afghanistan’ (UNAMA), and the
UN-mandated ‘International Security Assistance Force’ (ISAF), established through SC
Res 1368 on 20 December 2001 (see Thier 2006).
United Nations With regard to UN involvement, Afghanistan is widely known for the
“light footprint” approach developed by SRSG Lakhdar Brahimi, indicating that the United
Nations tried to “work through the Afghan government, relying on as few international –
and as many Afghan – staff as possible” (Sherman 2008: 307). This approach is uniquely
different from post-conflict approaches in Bosnia, East Timor or Kosovo. Yet, the success
of the approach is questionable. In the words of Thier, the light footprint approach “led not
to a blossoming of Afghan-run government institutions [. . . ] but a critical lack of qualified
personnel” (2006: 553).
ISAF and Coalition Forces Militarily, two missions have been engaged simultaneously:
the coalition forces with the mandate to fight the insurgents, and the ISAF troops with a
mandate to support the statebuilding process (Sherman 2008: 318). The main decisions for
restructuring Afghanistan were made at the Bonn Conference, which set “two simultaneous
processes in motion: a state-building process and a peace process” (Thier 2006: 482).
However, external actors had a strong interest in security, “subordinating, at least in the
short term, other principles such as broad representativeness in government and human
rights accountability” (Thier 2006: 485). Strikingly, the international community was
unwilling to contribute sufficient resources in order to achieve these goals: “The number
of U.S. Troops per capita in Afghanistan was significantly less than in almost every state-
building effort since World War II” (Jones 2008: 24). In addition, the “U.S. Assistance to
warlords weakened the central government”, thereby again undermining this goal (Jones
2008: 26).
c) The Role of the Conflict Parties
The group of contenders and potential spoilers is very fragmented: On the one side there
are the Taliban, al-Qaida, and Hizb-i-Islami as the main insurgent groups, all inspired by
different schools of radical Islam (see Jones 2008: 27–29). “Together, the leaders of these
groups aim at overthrowing Hamid Karzai’s government and replace it with a regime that
adopted an extremist version of Sunni Islam” (Jones 2008: 29). Although the Taliban
enjoy wide-ranging support from the rural population, this support derives mainly from
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the fact that in many rural areas the Taliban were the only power able to establish some
sort of order (Jones 2008: 26). The Taliban, although quickly militarily defeated during
the 2001 offensive, continue their armed struggle mainly through insurgency techniques
and managed to control large portions of the country along with other local commanders
and factional leaders who largely bypass the central government. However, it is difficult
to assess how much support the Taliban actually enjoy. Although some support stems
from the disappointment of some Pashtun groups due to their initial marginalization in
the political process, support does not follow clear ethnic lines (see Jones 2008: 11–12).
By the same token, Al Qaeda, obviously, “had no stake in the peace process and would
continue seeking to derail it at all costs” (Thier 2006: 486). On the other side there are
numerous factional militias and local commanders and the fragments of the “Northern
Alliance” which was instrumental for the US-led military engagement (Thier 2006: 476).
The international community deliberately adopted measures to incorporate the more
moderate of these potential spoilers in the formal government institutions (Sherman 2008:
304). Over time it has realized that “as the Taliban are excluded from the state, they will
have no reason to support it” (Sherman 2008: 315). Since 2004, the government has
therefore attempted to trigger a dialogue with moderate Taliban, leading to the integration
of two former Taliban officials to the parliament in 2005 (Sherman 2008: 315). Yet, in the
initial years, “Karzai still found himself forced to accommodate rather than disarm factional
leaders” (Thier 2006: 486). Many of the different “commanders, warlords, and regional
power brokers” (Thier 2006: 489–490) (including the Shura-i-Nizar, Hezb-i-Wahadat and
Junbesh-i-Milli factions as well as Ismael Khan) have continued to undermine the official
role of the state:
“Few factional leaders have rejected the Bonn process outright, and so the goal of
keeping these leaders in the tent, and off the battlefield, has been accomplished. But
the transition to ‘peace’ has not been accompanied by a transition to the rule of law.
Even as these leaders have participated in political processes and disarmament, they
have entrenched themselves in opium trafficking, politics, and government, which
will have long-term ill effects” (Thier 2006: 539).
A.1.3 Assessment
The main contenders in the post-conflict situation clearly are the Taliban, which have from
the beginning on taken all efforts to destabilize and delegitimize the central government.
Although some moderate elements could be included in the country’s formal institutions
along with some other faction-leaders and local commanders, power-sharing in Afghanistan
is limited: The main contender, the Taliban, stands outside the government institutions
and will continue to act as a spoiler of the statebuilding process. Inclusion of moderate
Taliban elements into the government was merely instrumental. The formal government
is hence in a position of domination. Like in few other post-conflict cases besides Iraq,
external parties have clearly and openly intervened in a partisan manner in the conflict. In
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particular in recent years, their role has shifted from that of an ‘external’ party to that of a
genuine conflict party. The relations between the conflict parties – government supporters
on the one hand and the radical Islamic elements (Taliban and al-Qaeda) on the other hand
are obviously obstructive. Despite fulfilling many aspects of a post-conflict country, the
civil war is still ongoing with high intensity; therefore it is not a post-conflict polity case in
the strict sense. For these reasons, the case of Afghanistan can be classified as an instance
of the Partisan Obstructive Domination or ‘You Stay Out’ polity type.
A.1.4 Map of Afghanistan
Figure A.1: Map: Afghanistan. Source: United Nations Cartographic Division
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A.2 Angola
Population 13,313,553 as of 2007
Total Area 1,246,700 Sq. Km
Total Land 1,264,700 Sq. Km
Coastline 1,600 km
Capital Luanda
Languages
Portuguese; various African languages from Niger-Congo, Atlantic-Congo,
Volta-Congo, Benue-Congo, Bantoid, Bantu, Southern, Central, and Khoisan
linguistic families
Boundaries
Congo (DRC): 2,511 km; Namibia: 1,376 km; Zambia: 1,110 km; Congo
(RC): 201 km
Ethnic Groups
37% Ovumbundu; 25% Kimbundu; 22% Other; 13% Bakongo; 2% Mestico
1% European
Religions 47% Indigenous beliefs; 38% Roman Catholic; 15% Protestant
Source: Countrywatch (2008): Angola 2008 Country Review (Coleman 2008a).
Table A.4: Basic Facts and Figures: Angola
A.2.1 Country and Conflict Information
a) General Background
Angola had been a Portuguese colony for centuries. Independence of the Congo spurred
pro-independence movements (FNLA, MPLA; UNITA). Portugal left in 1975 without
handing over power to any particular group (see UCDP 2010c).
Angola is the result of arbitrary borders drawn at the Berlin Conference 1884-5, leading
to an ethnically composite nation. The main ethnic groups are Bakongo, Mbundu and
Ovimbundu, together comprising three-quarters of the population (Pereira 1994: 4). Com-
pared to other colonial nations, Portugal was more reluctant to “build national institutions
[. . . ] and inculcate a national language in its colonies” (Pereira 1994: 6). What is special
about Angola – and what directly matters for its conflict – is the country’s resource wealth,
most notably with regard to oil and diamonds: “Ranked the fifteenth most underdeveloped
country with the second worst level of under-five child mortality, Angola is also the second
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largest sub-Saharan oil producer and the fourth world diamond producer by value” (Le
Billon 2001a: 57). Oil production is concentrated in the north, in particular in the enclave
of Cabinda, which is separated from the rest of the country through a small strip of land
belonging to DRC.
b) Conflict History
The power struggles that were triggered by Portugal’s withdrawal quickly amounted to a
civil war. The Marxist MPLA was challenged by the FNLA and UNITA. While the FNLA
was defeated in late the 1970s, UNITA continued its fight. When elections took place in
1992, UNITA lost and continued its struggle. Only the assassination of UNITA leader
Savimbi in 2002 enabled a negotiated settlement (see UCDP 2010c).
The FNLA (‘Frente Nacional de Libertaçâo de Angola’) represented mainly agrarian
Bakongo people in the north. The MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola)
initially clung to a Marxist-Leninist ideology, representing urban Mbundu, mesticos
(a mixed race) and assimilados (descendants of a non-white 19th century bourgeoisie).
Challenging MPLA’s cosmopolitanism, UNITA (União Nacional para a Independência
Total de Angola) adopted an “ethno-populist view of the nation based on the language
and identity of the Ovimbundu” (Pereira 1994: 7–8). The FNLA was defeated in late the
1970s and hence ceased to be a warring party in the Angolan conflict. Upon its withdrawal
in 1974, Portugal initially hammered out a power-sharing agreement between the three
nationalist groups (Alvor accord), but it soon broke down, paving the way for a massive
civil war (Pereira 1994: 9, see also Ajayi 2006: 251). MPLA, supported by the Soviet
Union and Cuban troops, gained control of Luanda and oil-rich provinces in the north
and announced the creation of the ‘People’s Republic of Angola’ in 1975, which was
recognized by most other governments and the United Nations but struggled to establish
full control of its territory (Pereira 1994: 9). UNITA was heavily supported by South Africa
for two ‘strategic reasons’: to destabilize MPLA and hence the threat of communism in its
region of influence, and to prevent the Angolan example fueling anti-apartheid emotions.
Likewise, the US supported UNITA as part of its anti-Soviet reflex (Pereira 1994: 11). This
enabled UNITA to engage in a prolonged and intense battle against MPLA with external
support for UNITA continuing well into the 1990s.
Meanwhile, the Angolan state developed into a Soviet-type party-state, fostering the
provision of services primarily to privileged persons or those considered ‘strategically
important’ (Pereira 1994: 12–13). After the inability to reach a military success was
realized, the parties agreed to participate in the 1991 Bicesse Accords, which took place
exclusively between MPLA and UNITA and an international troika of the US, USSR
and Portugal, with little involvement of the United Nations (Pereira 1994: 14). The
Accords failed due to UNITA’s refusal to accept MPLA’s electoral victory, and the conflict
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continued with very high intensity (see below for more detail). A second chance for a
peaceful settlement were the Lusaka Accords, signed in 1994. They led to a short period
of conflict inactivity and facilitated the establishment of a Government of National Unity
(Governo de Unidade Nacional) established in 1997, but it soon collapsed and the conflict
continued for another four years. It only ended when Savimbi “died in an ambush by the
government army” (Ajayi 2006: 251). This led to the signing of the ceasefire agreement in
April 2002.
c) Conflict and Peacekeeping Information
Conflict parties UNITA, FNLA, MPLA faction
Conflict ID 131
Episode ID 1311 & 1312
Duration 1975 – 1995; 1998 – 2002
Intensity war
Outcome Conflict inactivity (1st); Peace Agreement (2nd)
Victorious side n/a
Peacekeeping
UNAVEM I (United Nations Angola Verification Mission I); January 1989
– June 1991 ; UNAVEM II (United Nations Angola Verification Mission
II); June 1991 – February 1995; UNAVEM III (United Nations Angola
Verification Mission III); February 1995 – June 1997; MONUA (United
Nations Observer Mission in Angola); June 1997 – February 1999
Mission Mandate
UNAVEM I
“UNAVEM I was established in December 1988 to verify the phased and
total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of Angola. The with-
drawal was completed by 25 May 1991. On 6 June, the Secretary-General
reported to the Security Council that UNAVEM I had carried out, fully
and effectively, the mandate entrusted to it” (Department of Peacekeeping
Operations 2000f).
Mission mandate
UNAVEM II
“UNAVEM II was established in May 1991 to verify the arrangements
agreed by the Government of Angola and the União Nacional para a Inde-
pendência Total de Angola, for monitoring the ceasefire and the Angolan
police during the ceasefire period, and to observe and verify elections, in ac-
cordance with the Peace Accords” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations
2000b).
Mission mandate UN-
AVEM III
“Established to assist the Government of Angola and the União Nacional
para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) in restoring peace and
achieving national reconciliation on the basis of the Peace Accords for An-
gola, signed on 31 May 1991, the Lusaka Protocol signed on 20 November
1994, and relevant Security Council resolutions” (Department of Peacekeep-
ing Operations 2000a).
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Mission mandate
MONUA
“MONUA was established on 30 June 1997 to assist the Angolan parties
in consolidating peace and national reconciliation, enhancing confidence-
building and creating an environment conducive to long-term stability, demo-
cratic development and rehabilitation of the country” (Department of Peace-
keeping Operations 2001c).
Source: ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Table A.5: Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Angola
A.2.2 Post-conflict Situation
a) The Role of the Formal Government
Since the outbreak of the conflict, the MPLA has constantly been the government-side
in the conflict. UNITA was only officially part of the government during the GURN,
established in 1997. This power-sharing arrangement did not lead to peace, but was
established in a period of lower conflict intensity (between 1995 and 1998, the ‘UCDP/
Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’ records a break of conflict activity). The Bicesse Accords of
1991 failed, but are nonetheless worth to discuss briefly.
The failed Bicesse Accords (1991). The Bicesse Accords of 1991 were the first serious
attempt to resolve the conflict since the end of the Cold War. In the accords the parties
agreed to hold presidential and parliamentary elections in September 1992, which took
place as scheduled despite the fact that a range of pressing issues remained unsettled,
including the demobilization of UNITA fighters. After it became clear that the MPLA
would be the clear winner of the elections, UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi refused to accept
the elections and continued its armed struggle (see Küppers 1998: 2–3). As a consequence,
the civil war continued, and the “ensuing two years of warfare led to more devastation
than had occurred throughout three decades of the independence struggle and Cold War
Conflict” (Le Billon 2001a: 59). The reason why UNITA took up arms again is that it had
“no negotiating power other than its military force”, since the Bicesse Accords allotted all
governmental power to the winner of the elections (Messiant 2004: 19). In addition to that,
UNITA still enjoyed US support in 1991 and had no doubt that this would translate into an
electoral victory now that the USSR had disintegrated. Thus, its electoral defeat clearly
came as a surprise, which might explain the intensity with which it resorted to violence
(Messiant 2004: 19–20). Nonetheless, the elections were declared relatively free and fair
by the international community and officially confirmed the MPLA in power (Messiant
2004: 20).
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Government of National Unity (GURN). After the failed Bicesse Accords of 1991 and
the widespread suffering and devastation caused by UNITA’s subsequent show of force,
the next serious attempt to establish peace was the Lusaka Protocol. It was signed by the
UNITA in November 1994 after a series of military setbacks and after the United States
had withdrawn their support had and officially recognized the Angolan government (that
is, the MPLA), thus clearing the way for UN sanctions imposed against UNITA (Messiant
2004: 20). The main provisions of the Lusaka Protocol can be described as follows:
“Among other things, the agreement called on UNITA to accept the results of the 1992
elections, to disarm and demobilize its forces, and to hand over territory it controlled
to the government. In return, the government would open a new ‘political space’
in which it would share political power with the UNITA rebels in a government of
unity and national reconciliation (GURN). Outside the formal agreement, a pact was
negotiated which would allow both parties to share in Angola’s economic wealth.
The protocol would be overseen by the United Nations Observer Mission in Angola
(MONUA), a force of 7,000 United Nations peacekeepers” (Spears 1999: 566).
The power-sharing arrangement that was set up on the basis of the Lusaka Protocol
incorporated a number of leading UNITA officials into the government, but did not offer
any real position to UNITA leader Savimbi. Instead, he obtained the dubious ‘special status’
as the leader of the main opposition party (Spears 1999). The GURN was an extremely
inclusive power-sharing arrangement, which included seven other parties next to the
UNITA and the MPLA. Of those, the MPLA clearly was the most powerful and dominant
one, holding 25 out of 29 ministerial posts; UNITA held four, and the remaining seven
parties held various deputy ministerial posts (Amundsen and Weimer 2008: 4). In addition
to that, UNITA was allotted seven deputy ministers, three provincial governors, more than
70 administrators on the district and community level, and two ambassadors (Amundsen
and Weimer 2008: 4). Hence, MPLA retained a dominant position in the government,
and UNITA was not more than a junior-partner. This clearly limited the effectiveness of
the power-sharing arrangement. However, the terms of the Lusaka agreement differed
markedly from that of the Bicesse Accords, and some effective sharing of power took
place; therefore it makes sense to treat the short period between the implementation of the
Lusaka Protocol and the recurrence of war (1997 – 1998) as a power-sharing case.
The 2008 Parliamentary Elections. The first post-conflict parliamentary elections
(since the elections in 1992) took place on 5 September 2008 and unfolded peacefully.
They led to a wide-ranging success for the MPLA, which gained some 82 percent of the
vote, while UNITA gained 10 percent. Although large-scale manipulation had not taken
place, a number of constraints on the electoral fairness could be observed (Oesterdiekhoff
and Büning 2008: 6–7). Overall, the elections worsened UNITA’s political marginalization:
while it was still part of the GURN government, its role has since then completely been
reduced to that of an opposition party. The elections fostered the further consolidation
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of a de facto one-party system that works according to a neo-patrimonial logic. Through
its command over tremendous oil rents, the MPLA was able to foster the ‘opportunistic’
production of public goods while at the same time satisfying its clientellistic networks – a
constellation that allows only minimal influence for the opposition party (Oesterdiekhoff
and Büning 2008: 12–13).
After the end of the conflict UNITA had been militarily demobilized and transformed
into a political party. It announced its support of the Government of National Unity
(GURN) that was founded in 1997 and in which the non-military arm of UNITA had
already been involved as a junior partner to the MPLA, but where it did “not have any real
power” (Amundsen and Weimer 2008: 28). Yet, today UNITA is politically ever more
marginalized, with both the political system and the economy being dominated by the
MPLA (Rimli 2005: 1–2). Angola currently has a presidential political system (not a
semi-presidential one as sometimes claimed), the constitution dates back to communist
times and was amended in 1991. Consequently, the system is very centralized with many
powers concentrated in the hands of the president and a limited role for the parliament
(Amundsen and Weimer 2008: 3–4).
b) The Role of External Parties
The role of external parties in post-conflict Angola can be characterized by three aspects:
First, the case exhibits a weak engagement of the international community. Although four
UN-Missions took place (UNAVEM I-III; MONUA), no UN troops have been engaged
on the ground since 1999, although one can only speak of a true post-conflict situation
after the assassination of Savimbi in 2002. Likewise, the United Nations only played a
marginal role during the Bicesse accords in 1992. Second, a number of states were directly
involved in the conflict and in attempts to make peace. The Soviet Union, the United States
and South Africa directly contributed to the conflict during the Cold War (see Ajayi 2006:
251), like in many other Cold War conflicts (Mozambique, El Salvador). However, there
was no truly neutral arbitrator present during the peace negotiations, as for instance the
Catholic Church in Mozambique (see A.15). Christine Messiant attributes the failure of
both the Biccesse and the Lusaka Accords to external actors’ strong influence throughout
the peace process and their constant pursue of vested interests at all times in the process
(2004). Finally, external powers continue to have vested interests in Angola’s stability
that are partly contradictory to the goal of building an accountable and transparent state.
Through trying to secure access to Angola’s oil endowments (it is by now the largest
producer of crude oil in Africa), they are adopting many (overt and covert) measures to get
into business with the regime (see especially Reno 2000: 224).
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c) The Warring Factions
Savimbi and his UNITA clearly were the main contenders, contesting a formal government
recognized by most other countries. Yet, this is not to say that the MPLA government
was a legitimate one given that it made its way to power through armed conflict and had
never been legitimized through elections before 1992. Savimbi, therefore, was also the
main obstacle to peace, which is vividly illustrated by the quick settlement following his
assassination in 2002. The killing led to an “unconditional surrender” of the remaining
UNITA leadership and greatly bolstered the position of the MPLA, which is now controlling
the government alone, with virtually no elements of power-sharing being implemented
(Ajayi 2006: 252). Yet, the crucial question is why the UNITA could continue to challenge
the government militarily until well after the end of the Cold War despite crumbling
external support – unlike RENAMO in Mozambique where the structural conditions
were very similar? This clearly has to do with the country’s resource wealth: unlike in
Mozambique, both parties could rely on an independent source of income, with MPLA
controlling the oil revenues and UNITA controlling the diamond mines in the hinterland
(Le Billon 2001a: 58). Kelly Greenhill and Solomon Major make the same point, arguing
that the UNITA managed to get control of the diamond mines in the north just before
the Bicesse accord was signed, which shifted the balance of power towards UNITA (they
make this argument in the context of their reformulation of the spoiler framework to
include changing opportunity structures) (Greenhill and Major 2007: 19). This can be
seen as a crucial factor explaining the rebel group’s ability to continue its armed struggle:
“Diamonds kept UNITA going, but rapidly increasing oil production determined the final
outcome” (Amundsen and Weimer 2008: 2).
Transformed into a political party after 2002, the UNITA can be seen as a cooperative
party which refrains from the use of violence:
“With peace settled in 2002 through the Luena Memorandum, the decapitated and
militarily defeated UNITA entered a completely new phase by joining the second
GURN government and by taking up their 70 seats in Parliament, for real. The party
held its 9th Congress in 2003, and appeared as renewed, transparent, and democratic
with its new leader Isaías Samakuva” (Amundsen and Weimer 2008: 28).
Despite its dramatic performance in the parliamentary elections, it quickly accepted the
election results (Oesterdiekhoff and Büning 2008: 2). This can be read either as an
indicator of its powerlessness relative to MPLA or its full transition to a democratic party.
However, it should also be noted that the UNITA had little other choice: it has been
financially dependent on contributions from the government and the political climate for
opposition parties has been tense, marked by intolerance, threats and occasional physical
assaults by supporters of the MPLA and its Youth Organization JMPLA (Rimli 2005: 2).
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A.2.3 Assessment
Government of National Unity (1995 – 1998). Characteristic for Angola’s post-conflict
polity is the strong centralization of the political system, which devotes governmental
authority exclusively to the strongest party. Despite that, the GURN devoted some power to
the UNITA, and some constructive UNITA elements made use of their room for maneuver.
Although this hardly constrained the MPLA’s exercise of authority, the agreement led to a
split between moderate UNITA members who wanted to cooperate with the government,
and radical UNITA elements who rejected the power-sharing arrangement and refused to
cooperate with the government. This qualifies the GURN as a border case between power-
sharing and domination. Here, it is argued that the GURN is still more appropriately treated
as a power-sharing case, despite the fact that the concessions made by the MPLA to UNITA
were clearly limited. It is also frequently included a case of power-sharing in most of the
relevant literature (see e.g. Hartzell and Hoddie 2003). At the same time, the relations
between the parties were clearly obstructive, because the hardliners around Savimbi had
continued to challenge the government militarily. This is most clearly reflected by the
country’s relapse into armed conflict by 1998. The involvement of external actors must be
considered mediative, because they were key for negotiating the power-sharing agreement
in the first place. This classifies the period of the GURN in Angola as a case of ‘mediated,
obstructive power-sharing’ or a ‘Doomed to Share’ polity case.
2nd Post-Conflict Period (since 2008). The second post-conflict period begins with the
official end of the conflict in 2002, which was facilitated by Savimbi’s assassination. In
this period, the domination of the political system by the MPLA has been undeniable.
In particular since the devastating election results in 2008, the UNITA has essentially
been reduced to an opposition party which depends financially on contributions from the
state. Its weak position was reflected in its quick acceptance of the election results. The
power-balance between the warring factions is therefore very unequal: MPLA is dominant
in all respects. As a result, the MPLA has been able to entrench itself more and more
and external powers have had little incentive to change this situation due to their own
interest in the regime’s stability. Hence, there is little doubt that Angola since 2002 must be
considered a case of political domination. External actors have by and large continued to
exert a mediative influence in post-conflict Angola, but they have also refrained from openly
criticizing the government’s attempts to dominate the political system and outmaneuvering
the opposition. All in all, this is too little in order to consider the case as a case of
partisan engagement, because there is little evidence that external actors have supported
the government in a systematic and intentional manner. The relations between the warring
parties since Savimbi’s assassination are also difficult to classify, because the UNITA had
effectively been defeated militarily. Concluding from that the relations turned instantly
constructive would be misleading, because the UNITA had no choice but to accept the
MPLA’s terms. The period between the UNITA’s defeat and the parliamentary elections
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therefore lies somewhere between constructive and obstructive relations; here, they are
tentatively coded as obstructive. The parliamentary elections in 2008, after which the
UNITA quickly declared that it accepted its defeat at the ballot-box, are a clear indicator
that the relations between the warring parties had become more constructive. (However,
since the period of investigations on which this dissertation is based ends in 2008, this
period is not classified here). Out of these reasons, Angola between 2002 and 2008 is
classified here as an instance of a ‘mediated, obstructive domination’ or ‘The Winner
Took it All’ polity.
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A.2.4 Map of Angola
Figure A.2: Map: Angola. Source: United Nations Cartographic Division
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A.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina
Population 4,672,165 as of 2007
Total Area 51,233 Sq. Km.
Total Land 51,233 Sq. Km.
Coastline 20 km
Capital Sarajevo
Languages Bosnian, Croatian, Serbian
Boundaries Croatia: 932 km; Serbia: 302 km; Montenegro: 225 km
Ethnic Groups 44% Bosniak; 31% Serb; 17% Croat; 6% Yugoslav; 2% Other; 2% Other
Religions
40% Muslim; 31% Orthodox; 15% Roman Catholic; 10% Other; % Protes-
tant
Source: Countrywatch (2008): Bosnia & Herzegovina 2008 Country Review, 1-2.
Table A.6: Basic Facts and Figures: Bosnia and Herzegovina
A.3.1 Country and Conflict Information
a) General Background
Bosnia-Herzegovina exhibited a heterogeneous ethnic composition in 1991: 43% were
Bosniaks (Muslim), 31% were Serbs and 17% were Croats. This gave rise to growing
nationalism after 1991, which soon triggered inter-ethnic tensions. Both Bosnian Serbs
and Bosnian Croats proclaimed their own states, called the ‘Serbian Republic of Bosnia
and Herzegovina’ and the ‘Croatian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, respectively. In
the north, rebellious members of the state presidency proclaimed an autonomous region
(Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia) (see UCDP 2010d).
Bosnia and Herzegovina had been one of the six republics of the Socialist Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia under Tito. The country declared independence in 1992, and was recognized
as an independent republic. The country has always been ethnically heterogeneous, with
about 44 percent comprised of ethnic Bosniaks, 31 percent of ethnic Serbs, and 17 percent
of ethnic Croats (Coleman 2008b: 9–10). This ethnic heterogeneity is one of the proximate
causes of the civil war that emerged in 1992; as “each community sought to ensure that it
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would not be a minority in a state dominated by any of the others” (Cousens and Harland
2006: 54).
b) Conflict History
Separatist tendencies led to fights against the government, which lasted from 1992 to 1995
and included the large-scale use of one-sided violence. The autonomous region in the
north was defeated. The other conflicts were settled by peace agreements (‘Washington
Agreement’ and ‘Dayton Agreement’). These agreements led to the creation of a new
state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, comprising two entities: The Federation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina (created from Croat and Bosnian Territories); and the Republika Srpska
(created from Serb Territory) (see UCDP 2010d).
The civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was triggered after a 1992 referendum held
by the government on the country’s independence. This sparked an armed resistance
by the Bosnian Serbs, supported by neighboring Serbia, with the aim of partitioning the
republic in order to allow for the Serb parts to join ‘Greater Serbia’ (Coleman 2008b:
9–10). As it could be expected, given the country’s ethnic composition, 62,68 percent
of the population voted for independence – pretty much the equivalent of the combined
Bosnian and Croat percentage of the population. This triggered “by far the largest and
bloodiest of the wars of Yugoslav succession” (Cousens and Harland 2006: 55). The
Croats soon initiated their own fight for independence, but this conflict could be settled
through the 1994 Washington Agreement, which created a joint Muslim/ Croat Federation
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The conflict with the Serb part of the country was concluded
by the 1995 Dayton Agreement, signed by the Bosnian President Izetbegovic, the Croatian
President Tudjman and the Serbian President Miloševic´. It effectively divided the country
into two autonomous regions: the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (created from
Croat and Bosnian Territories); and the Republika Srpska (created from Serb Territory)
(Coleman 2008b: 9–10).
c) Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview
Conflict parties
Croatian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Croatian irregulars;
Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbian irregulars
UCDP Conflict ID 0
UCDP Episode ID 0
Duration 1993 – 1994; 1992 – 1995
Intensity war (both)
346
A.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina
Outcome Peace Agreement (both)
Victorious side n/a
Peacekeeping
UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force); February 1992 – March
1995 UNMIBH (United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina); De-
cember 1995 – December 2002
Mission Mandate
UNPROFOR
“Initially established in Croatia to ensure demilitarization of designated areas.
The mandate was later extended to Bosnia and Herzegovina to support the
delivery of humanitarian relief, monitor “no fly zones” and “safe areas”. The
mandate was later extended to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
for preventive monitoring in border areas” (Department of Peacekeeping
Operations 2002b).
Mission Mandate
UNMIBH
“Set up in 1995, UNMIBH exercised a wide range of functions related to
the law enforcement activities and police reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The Mission also coordinated other UN activities in the country relating
to humanitarian relief and refugees, demining, human rights, elections and
rehabilitation of infrastructure and economic reconstruction. Following
the successful conclusion of its mandate, UNMIBH was terminated on 31
December 2002” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2002a).
Source: ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Table A.7: Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Bosnia and Herzegovina
A.3.2 Post-conflict situation:
a) The Role of the Formal Government
The Bosnian post-conflict polity is effectively an instance of transitional administration,
although this is less visible when compared to Kosovo or East Timor. A decisive amount
of power is embodied in the ‘High Representative for Bosnia and Herzegovina’, which is
the highest political authority in the country. The High Representative (formerly Paddy
Ashdown, since 2006 Christian Schwarz-Shilling) holds the position of a leading civilian
official endowed with the power to “overrule domestic authorities, impose laws, and ban
individuals” (Cox 2008: 250). External Parties thereby followed what Cox calls a “heavy
footprint” approach, with Bosnia essentially becoming a “protectorate of the international
community” (Cox 2008: 250).
At the same time, Annex 4 of the Dayton Agreement outlined “an elaborate architecture
for power-sharing” between the different ethnic groups (Cousens and Harland 2006: 62).
It provided for 51 percent of the territory to belong to the Bosnian-Croat Federation and
the remaining 49 percent to belong to the Bosnian Serbs (Republika Srpska). Both parts of
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the country were joined together in an “extremely loose federal structure with a minimum
of authority at the central level” (Cox 2008: 253–254).
The result is a complex structure which formally can be characterized by a unique
mixture of power-sharing under international supremacy, but de facto has amounted to
two highly autonomous and partly antagonistic republics being kept together by external
pressure and domination. Observers have therefore characterized Bosnia and Herzegovina
as “a paradoxical combination of a flawed democracy and a semi-international protectorate,
in which international actors often appeared reluctant to use their powers effectively”
(Chesterman 2004: 131).
b) The Role of External Parties
During the civil war, the international community was mainly engaged through UNPRO-
FOR (‘United Nations Protection Force’). The mission had originally been deployed to
Croatia in order to monitor the ceasefire of January 1992, but its headquarters were based
in Sarajevo (Cousens and Harland 2006: 54). It was a largely passive mission, refraining
for a long time from actively supporting the weaker Bosnian sides in the civil war in
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Only in late October 1995 UNPROFOR “for the first time, was
able to function as a true peacekeeping force” (Cousens and Harland 2006: 61). After
the adoption of the Dayton Agreement, NATO-led IFOR (‘Implementation Force’) troops
had been dispatched on 20 December 1995 in order to implement the agreement (Cousens
and Harland 2006: 61). With a strength of more than 60,000 troops, IFOR was a force so
overwhelming “that it never needed to be used” (Cox 2008: 255). It was renamed later
into Stabilization Force (SFOR).
External actors remained heavily engaged in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the post-conflict
period. The Bosnian peace process has been supervised by the Peace Implementation
Council, which has been endowed with the authority to override domestic decisions (Cox
2008: 255). Cox argues that the heavy involvement of the High Representative in domestic
politics has at least in part been detrimental to the goal of statebuilding: “The international
mission has pursued its own policy agendas so aggressively that it has displaced the
domestic political process” (2008: 265). In 2008, the Peace Implementation Council
decided to prolong the protectorate indefinitely, “making the closure of OHR [Office of the
High Representative, CR] conditional on a number of open-ended conditions” (Cox 2008:
267).
c) The Warring Factions
The former conflict parties in Bosnia are still clearly visible in today’s political system
and used the new federal structure mainly as a playing field for continuing their animosi-
ties. According to Cox, the central institutions “served mainly as venues for political
gamesmanship: boycotts and symbolic disputes to impress hard-line constituencies” in the
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first years after the Dayton Agreement (2008: 259). Today the former warring parties are
more willing to participate and engage constructively in the constitutional order: “a set of
incentives has been created for them to pursue their interests inside the new constitutional
order” (Cox 2008: 267).
A.3.3 Assessment
Several things appear characteristic for Bosnia’s post-conflict polity: First, the strong divi-
sion of the conflict parties along territorial lines, fostered by the international community.
The creation of a loose federation with a comparatively weak center led to a situation
in which the conflict parties were at the same time separated and joined together in a
common political entity. Especially in the initial years of the federation, this status did not
go beyond a mere coexistence, with little de facto elements of power-sharing. Yet, this
ambiguous character of power-sharing and coexistence places Bosnia somewhere between
the two categories, possibly starting out with coexistence and gradually turning towards
power-sharing as the central government becomes more established. Second, the role
of the international community is clearly different from that of many other cases. The
international community at large contributed heavily to the settlement struck between the
belligerents in 1995. At the same time, the military intervention of NATO forces were
clearly directed against Serbian troops. Before the settlement, the international commu-
nity’s involvement therefore depicted both mediative and partisan elements. However,
in the post-settlement phase external actors have so strongly shaped the character of the
Bosnian polity that their engagement is best described as an instance for supreme interven-
tion. Out of these reasons, the case is classified as an instance of the ‘supreme obstructive
domination’ or ‘Benevolent Intrusion’ polity type.
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A.3.4 Map of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Figure A.3: Map: Bosnia. Source: United Nations Cartographic Division
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A.4 Burundi
Population 8,075,188 as of 2007
Total Area 27,830 Sq. Km.
Total Land 25,650 Sq. Km.
Coastline 0 km (Landlocked)
Capital Bujumbura
Languages Kirundi (Official), French (Official), Swahili
Boundaries Congo (DRC) 451 km, Tanzania 451 km, Rwanda 290 km
Ethnic Groups 85% Hutu (Bantu), 14% Tutsi (Hamitic), 1% Twa (Pygmi)
Religions 62% Roman Catholics, 23% indigenous beliefs, 10% Muslim, 5% Protestant
Source: Countrywatch (2008): Burundi 2008 Country Review (Coleman 2008c).
Table A.8: Basic Facts and Figures: Burundi
A.4.1 Country and Conflict Information
a) General Background
The territory that was to become Rwanda and Burundi fell under the colonial control of
Germany in the 19th century and was taken over by Belgium after the end of WW I. Its
population had been relatively homogenous in terms of linguistic and cultural issues, but
nonetheless had been divided into three distinct social groups: the Hutu, the Tutsi and the
Twa. Originally the distinction was rather a social than an ethnic one; Hutu could, for
instance, become Tutsi through social advancement. The colonial powers capitalized on
these differences through supporting centralized Tutsi rule as an instrument of exerting
authority (although they constituted a clear minority). This was deepening the divide
between the different groups. At independence, the Hutu seized power in Rwanda, but
Burundi became a Tutsi monarchy (although about 85 percent of the population are Hutu).
This was violently challenged in Burundi since 1965. After some coup attempts, military
(Tutsi) regimes were dominant between 1966 and 1993, committing massacres among the
Hutu population (UCDP 2010e).
Burundi is an exception in the sense that it was a “political and geographical entity already
in pre-colonial times, and its people share a common socio-cultural and linguistic heritage”
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(Daley 2006: 658). Historically and culturally, it has close links with Rwanda: “No other
two states in the continent are more alike in their ethnic map, and none are more unlike
each other from the standpoint of their emergent polities after a decade of bitter civil
strife (Burundi) and one of the most appalling bloodbaths of the last century (Rwanda)”
(Lemarchand 2007: 4; see also Uvin 1999: 253). Ethnic distinctions between Hutu and
Tutsi were of minor importance in pre-colonial times, and the sharp differences in ethnic
identity existing today are to a large extent socially constructed (or: “superimposed” by
the colonial powers – see Uvin 1999) and exploited as an instrument for gaining political
control (Daley 2006: 663). Unlike Rwanda – where a ‘social revolution’ overthrew the
monarchy – Burundi became a Tutsi monarchy (though the country is predominantly
populated by Hutu), and the royalist UPRONA party (Union pour le Progrès National)
won the post-independence elections. Yet, the party’s leader, prince Rwagasore was soon
killed by the opposition, leading to competition for state power between three groups: the
Tutsi-Hima, the Tutsi-Banyarugugu, and “a small emerging Hutu elite” (Uvin 1999: 256).
Uvin attributes this to the high stakes associated with the control of the state, arguing that
“state control became the sole vehicle for Tutsi to retain their privileges, while conversely
it was the sole means of rapid social advancement for Hutu” (1999: 256). These tensions
increasingly expressed themselves in ethnic terms, triggering a massacre in 1972 in which
Hutu revolted against Tutsi domination, in the course of which an estimated 100,000 to
200,000 Hutu were killed. This event was largely ignored by the international community,
who simply denied the extent of the assaults (Coleman 2008c: 7).
b) Conflict History
A process of democratic openings commenced in the early 1990s, which led to the election
of Melchior Ndadaye, the first Hutu to become president in Burundi. However, Ndadaye
was assassinated soon after taking office, which led to the outbreak of mass violence
between the Hutu and the Tutsi in the years since 1994. In 2006, one of the main Hutu
rebel groups, the CNDD-FDD, agreed to enter a peace process, while a second Hutu faction
– the Palipehutu-FNL – continued its armed struggle. Peace negotiations (Arusha process)
led to a power-sharing agreement between the government and the CNDD-FDD (Hutu)
(see UCDP 2010e).
Following the general trend for democratic openings in the 1990s, presidential and parlia-
mentary elections took place in Burundi in 1993. After nearly three decades of Tutsi rule,
the Hutu opposition party FRODEBU (‘Front pour la démocratie au Burundi’) decisively
beat the formerly dominant party UPRONA, and its leader Melchior Ndadaye became
both the first democratically elected and the first Hutu president. He was killed already
some three months later when the army staged a coup on 21 October 1993 (Reyntjens
2006a: 117). The violence following his assassination led to the outbreak of mass vio-
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lence, in which an estimated 25,000 to 50,000 people were killed already in the first year.
Despite its intensity, the conflict initially triggered little attention from the international
community: “There was no official recognition of the violence, and no Western country
intervened” (Coleman 2008c: 8). The new regime took attempts to delegitimize Frodebu
and attempted to consolidate its rule – a strategy that “increasingly radicalized political
life and handicapped the search for a peaceful solution” (Reyntjens 2006a: 117). While
some Frodebu members preferred negotiations with the Tutsi government, some of the
more radical elements initiated an armed rebellion against the government. Two main rebel
groups were involved in this fight: the FDD (‘Forces pour la défense de la démocratie’),
which was the armed wing of a political party formed by the former Minister of the Interior
Léonard Nyangoma, called CNDD – ‘Conseil national pour la défense de la démocratie’),
and the FNL-Palipehutu (‘Parti pour la liberation du peuple Hutu – Forces nationales de
libération’) (see e.g. Vandeginste 2009).
In the aftermath of the 1993 military coup, several counter-coups took place. A success-
ful putsch in 1996 gave rise to the presidency of Pierre Buyoya (a Tutsi). His exclusive rule
and his decision to ban public gatherings in 1999 led to new tensions, organized mainly by
the Hutu-led FDD and triggering harsh reactions from the regime. Peace talks were held,
led by former Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere (in the process of which the FDD was
banned from the negotiation table) and were continued in 2000 (after Nyerere’s death) by
Nelson Mandela, who invited the FDD and the FNL back to the table. An agreement was
signed (Arusha Accord) on 28 August 2000 by 19 factions, but was refused by the FDD
and the FNL (Coleman 2008c: 11–12). The conflict continued, but international attention
had gradually begun to rise. Belgium – the former colonial power – became engaged on
2 July 2000 in an attempt to resolve the conflict. In the years between 2000 and 2005,
the conflict continued. The FDD became more cooperative over time and signed a peace
agreement in November 2003, but the FNL continued its fight until it finally signed a
framework accord in June 2006 in order to bring an end to the hostilities (Coleman 2008c:
11–12).
c) Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview
Conflict parties Palipehutu, CNDD
UCDP Conflict ID 90
UCDP Episode ID 903
Duration 1994 – 2006
Intensity war
Outcome Peace Agreement
Victorious side n/a
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Peacekeeping ONUB (United Nations Operation in Burundi); June 2004 – December 2006
Mission Mandate
ONUB
“Having determined that the situation in Burundi continued to constitute a
threat to international peace and security in the region and acting under Chap-
ter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council, by its resolution 1545 of 21
May 2004, decided to establish the United Nations Operation in Burundi
(ONUB) in order to support and help to implement the efforts undertaken by
Burundians to restore lasting peace and bring about national reconciliation,
as provided under the Arusha Agreement. ONUB successfully completed
its mandate on 31 December 2006. It was succeeded by the United Nations
Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB), established by Security Council res-
olution 1719 of 25 October 2006” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations
2009h).
Source: ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Table A.9: Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Burundi
A.4.2 Post-conflict situation
a) The Role of the Formal Government
In total, there were three power-sharing arrangements in Burundi: the 1994 ‘Convention
de Gouvernement’ (CG); the ‘Arusha Accords’ of 2000, and the post-2005 arrangement.
Pre-Arusha Power-Sharing. The earlier power-sharing arrangements were relatively
flawed. The CG, which was installed in the wake of Ndadaye’s assassination, “carried the
logic of power sharing to an extreme” – with even embassy staff being distributed along
ethnic lines – and was hence dysfunctional from the beginning on. It already collapsed
long before the July 1996 military coup (Lemarchand 2007: 9).
Arusha Accords. The Arusha Accords began in June 1998 and culminated with the
‘Peace and Reconciliation Agreement’ of August 2000 (Government of the Republic of
Burundi 2000). It, too, had “too many flaws to be called a success”, but Lemarchand
considers it an important process that paved the ground for a successful power-sharing
arrangement being implemented five years later. Observers widely agree that this agreement
“would not have materialized without the long-drawn-out preliminary negotiations that
went on in Arusha [. . . ]” (Lemarchand 2007: 9–10). The Hutu-led CNDD-FDD had
initially not joined the peace process; it was only in 2003 that it could be convinced to take
part in the negotiations due to the relentless efforts by the South-African mediators and
join the existing government (Lemarchand 2007: 9–10).
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Post-2003 Period. In the post-2003 period, Burundi is considered the clearest example
of true power-sharing in Africa: “No other state anywhere in the continent offers a more
faithful image of the ideal consociational polity” (Lemarchand 2007: 3; on this aspect
see also Falch and Becker 2008: 22). Lemarchand describes the characteristics of the
government as provided for in the ‘post-transition constitution’:
“The president is to be assisted by two vice-presidents, a Hutu and a Tutsi, and the
government will include 60 percent Hutu and 40 percent Tutsi. The same proportion
will hold in the National Assembly, whereas the Senate will have an equal number
of Hutu and Tutsi. The security forces, likewise, will include as many Hutu as Tutsi.
At the communal level, no more than 67 percent of the mayors are to belong to
either group. Women are expected to represent at least 30 percent of the members of
the National Assembly. Should the poll fail to produce the required quota of 60/40,
the constitution allows ‘the rectification of the imbalances through the co-optation
mechanism provided by the electoral code’ (Article 164)” (Lemarchand 2007: 8).
On the basis of the new constitution, elections were held in 2005, leading to a sweeping
victory for the CNDD-FDD. This required the power-sharing provisions to be applied for
the first time, causing the electoral commission to “co-opt 18 deputies, four Hutu, 11 Tutsi
and three Twa” (Lemarchand 2007: 8). Despite a clear victory for the CNDD-FDD in the
2005 elections, it fell short from a two-thirds majority necessary for passing legislation.
Hence, it has to cooperate along ethnic lines in order to govern (Reyntjens 2006a).
b) The Role of External Parties
Various sorts of external actors were involved at different stages during and after the civil
war. This had been crucial for the ultimate success of the negotiations. As Lemarchand
writes, “in the end much of the credit for bringing the dissident Hutu factions on board
goes to the South African facilitator, ex-Deputy president Jacob Zuma” (2007: 11). This
assessment is shared by Reyntjens: “The regional leaders and South Africa have played
a major role in forcing the Burundian political and military players into finding an ac-
commodation that would not have been achieved without considerable pressure. Indeed,
on several occasions, the region put Burundi under a de facto trusteeship and imposed
solutions” (2006a: 121).
After the CNDD-FDD signed the ceasefire with the government, the African Union
became involved through deploying the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB) in April 2003. It
contained a contingent of 3,000 troops from South Africa, Ethiopia and Mozambique and
was mandated to “monitor the peace process and provide security [. . . ]” (Murithi 2008:
75). Overcoming security problems in the implementation phase of the agreement became
a major concern for the mission: “One of the tasks of the AU force was to protect returning
politicians who would take part in the transitional government. Other peacebuilding tasks
included opening secure demobilisation centres and improving the ability of AMIB to
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reintegrate the former militia into society. These demobilisation centres supervised the
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) process that is a fundamental pillar
of peacebuilding” (Murithi 2008: 75). The United Nations were initially reluctant to
become engaged in Burundi. Peacekeepers from the African Union were present since
October 2003 and from the United Nations since 2004. The United Nations closed their
peacekeeping mission in early 2007, despite warnings that “the fragile sense of stability
gained from the peace process” could easily be undermined (Coleman 2008c: 19).
From the above, it can be inferred that external parties were by and large engaged in
a mediative manner, since they took great efforts to ensure that the CNDD-FDD took
part in the negotiations. As Reyntjens summarizes: “The wider international community
has supported the regional Burundi peace initiative, e.g. by offering financial and diplo-
matic backing and by turning the AU force into a UN one (ONUB), but has consistently
subcontracted leadership to the region” (2006a: 121).
c) The Warring Factions
The relations between the rebels and the government were clearly following ethnic lines –
no matter how constructed or ‘superimposed’ they may have been. During the initial years
of the civil war, when the fighting was intense, three rebel groups were fighting against the
government: The CNDD-FDD, the FNL (‘Front national de libération’), an armed faction
of the PALIPEHUTU (‘Parti pour la libération du peuple hutu’), and FROLINA (‘Front
pour la libération nationale’) (Reyntjens 2006a: 117). The initiation of the Arusha Accords
in 1998 was the starting point for the reconciliation of the two parties Uprona (Tutsi) and
Frodebu (Hutu). After 2001, they were represented in a transitional government. However,
the main rebel groups – most notably CNDD-FDD and PALIPEHUTU-FNL – refrained
from participating in the peace talks. But this was also because the CNDD-FDD had split
from the CNDD (the political wing) and its leader Nyangoma. While the ‘old’ CNDD
did take part in the Arusha negotiations, the CNDD-FDD, then under the leadership of
Jean Bosco Ndayikengurukiye, was still engaged in combat activities, launching attacks on
Burundi from DRC – allegedly with support from Kabila (McClintock and Nahimana 2008:
78). A ceasefire between the transitional government and the CNDD-FDD – now led by
Pierre Nkurunziza – could only be reached in 2003, paving the way for the 2005 elections.
“A fragile peace was achieved, but it was far from complete because PALIPEHUTU-FNL
was not a signatory to those agreements” (McClintock and Nahimana 2008: 80). Thereby,
the FNL became “the remaining Hutu group to have resisted the peace process for several
years” (Coleman 2008c: 18). After the 2005 elections, CNDD-FDD became the dominant
political party, but the power-sharing provisions have effectively forced it to collaborate
with other parties (Reyntjens 2006a: 132).
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A.4.3 Assessment
Of the three power-sharing arrangements discussed above, only the post-2003 situation,
beginning with the CNDD-FDD’s support of the peace process, can be considered a true
case for post-conflict power-sharing. (Formally, this may not be exactly true because the
FNL’s resistance to join the agreement meant that the conflict was still ongoing, but the
settlement between the government and the main rebel group is widely appreciated as the
starting point for peace in Burundi.) The detailed power-sharing provisions contained in
the post-transition constitution provided for an extensive degree of power-sharing, despite
the CNDD-FDD’s decisive victory in the elections. Out of this reason, post-2005 Burundi
can be considered a case of power-sharing – although, as the case study above illustrates,
some marked tendencies for political domination have become apparent over the course of
the polity. External actors in Burundi were greatly involved in facilitating a settlement in
Burundi and also contributed heavily to the ultimate addition of power-sharing principles
to the country’s post-transition constitution. Although the international community was
initially hesitant to devote attention to the civil war in Burundi, it ultimately became
engaged and effectively supported the peace process. In the post-election phase, ONUB’s
sudden withdrawal appears like a risky strategy, but at the same time confirms that external
actors did not maintain a systematic bias for either of the conflict parties which would
fulfill the relative strict requirement of a ‘partisan’ engagement. Out of these reasons, it
seems safe to classify external actors’ engagement in Burundi’s post-conflict phase as an
instance for mediative engagement. The relations between the warring parties in Burundi
are somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, since the CNDD-FDD’s support of the peace
process, the tensions between one of the main Hutu rebels and the former Tutsi-dominated
government began to improve significantly. After initial hesitations, they began to support
the peace process and became increasingly devoted to the principle of power-sharing. On
the other hand, another major Hutu rebel party, the FNL-PALIPEHUTU, had continued to
resist the peace process until 2006 and had portrayed the CNDD-FDD’s constructive stance
as a betrayal of Hutu interests. While the former aspect would speak for the presence of
constructive relations, the latter aspects would suggest the opposite: obstructive relations.
However, all in all there are good reasons for giving greater weight to the former argument,
for the simple reason that the origin of the conflict was about unsettled political tensions
between Hutu and Tutsi – and not between different Hutu factions. When the largest
Hutu faction began to support the peace process, this automatically meant that some of
the underlying root causes of the conflict could ultimately be addressed. Therefore, it
makes sense to describe the relations between the former warring parties since 2003 as
constructive. A few years after the settlement, the FNL-PALIPEHUTU gave up its armed
resistance and signed a peace agreement with the government. For the reasons stated above,
Burundi is classified as an instance of the ‘mediated constructive power-sharing’ or ‘Let’s
Share’ polity type.
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A.4.4 Map of Burundi
Figure A.4: Map: Burundi. Source: United Nations Cartographic Division
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A.5 Cambodia
Population 15,017,110 as of 2006
Total Area 181,040 Sq. Km.
Total Land 176,520 Sq. Km.
Coastline 443 km
Capital Phnom Penh
Languages Khmer (Official); French
Boundaries Vietnam: 1,228 km; Thailand: 803 km, Laos: 541 km
Ethnic Groups 90% Khmer, 5% Vietnamese, 4% Other, 1% Chinese
Religions 95% Theravada Buddhism, 5% Other
Source: Countrywatch (2008): Cambodia 2007 Country Review (Coleman 2007).
Table A.10: Basic Facts and Figures: Cambodia
A.5.1 Country and Conflict Information
a) General Background
Cambodia had been a French protectorate since 1863. After independence, political power
was transferred to King Sihanouk. Both right- and left-wing opposition against Sihanouk’s
rule grew in the mid-1960s and the “Khmer Rouge” (Red Khmer) initiated an armed
struggle in 1967. After a coup was staged against Sihanouk in 1970, he joined forces with
the Khmer Rouge against the new government (see UCDP 2010f
French rule in Cambodia initially lasted until 1945 when it was overthrown by Japan, but
after the end of WW II, France returned to Cambodia, making it an autonomous state
within the French Union. Cambodia reached independence in 1953 with King Sihanouk
as its king (Coleman 2007: 7). His rule is described as “paternalistic and authoritarian”
(Peou 2005: 109). Political conditions in Cambodia became complicated as a result of
the intensification of the Vietnam war since 1965, which led to the rise of a communist-
dominated guerrilla movement that was associated with the Viet Minh of Vietnam. Fearing
US domination, King Sihanouk broke with the US and sought an alliance with China,
triggering significant resistance from various opposition groups in the National Assembly,
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which formed an insurgent group led by the Communist Party of Kampuchea, the Khmer
Rouge. The king was overthrown in a coup led by pro-US General Lon Nol when the
king was abroad for medical treatment in January 1970, abolishing the monarchy a few
months later. With support from the United States, the Lon Nol government fought against
the Khmer Rouge, but with little success: “By the end of 1973, the Lon Nol government
controlled only Phnom Penh, the northwest and a small number of provincial towns, while
the Khmer Rouge controlled nearly 60 percent of Cambodia’s territory and 25 percent of
its population” (Coleman 2007: 7–9).
b) Conflict History
In 1975 the Khmer Rouge took power and established a highly totalitarian regime in
Cambodia. It is estimated that some 1.5 to 3 million people were executed or starved to
death during the 1975 – 1979 Khmer Rouge government. The group continued to target
civilians in opposition, especially focusing on ethnic Vietnamese. With support from
Vietnamese troops, a new Communist government was installed in 1979 and the Khmer
Rouge, Sihanouk, and another opposition group soon formed a new alliance, FUNCINPEC.
The conflict temporarily ended with a 1991 UN-sponsored peace agreement which was
followed by UN-administered elections. The implementation of the agreement was difficult
and the Khmer Rouge remained active until the last political leaders surrendered in late
1998 (see UCDP 2010f).
The history of conflict in Cambodia is complex and unusual since it was driven neither by
ethnic nor tribal motives, but rather by a “simple struggle for political power by different
factions” (Heininger, quoted in Richmond and Franks 2007: 31). The Khmer Rouge took
power in 1975 and carried out radical social and economic changes that led to approx. 1 to
3 million people being executed (Peou 2005: 110 and Amer 2007: 732–733). Sihanouk
collaborated with the Khmer Rouge and was installed as the president of the regime, but
was soon deposed and put under arrest. Khieu Samphan became the new head of state and
the notorious Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot became head of the government. The latter
aimed at realizing his vision of agrarian socialism through carrying out a genocide among
urban people, bourgeois and all other potential enemies of his agenda (see Chandler 1998;
International Crisis Group 1999: 19). The Khmer Rouge stayed in power until 1979, when
a Vietnamese military intervention overthrew them and gave rise to the formation of a new
government. At this occasion, the country was also renamed into ‘People’s Republic of
Kampuchea’ (PRK).
The new government was supported by Vietnam and the Soviet block, but failed to gain
international recognition. Domestically, the new regime triggered widespread opposition
from three different groups: the overthrown Khmer Rouge regime (‘Party of Democratic
Kampuchea’, PDK), the ‘Khmer People’s National Liberation Front’ (KPNLF) led by for-
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mer Prime Minister Son Sann, and the ‘Front uni national pour un Cambodge indépendant,
neutre, pacifique et coopératif’ (FUNCINPEC) led by Sihanouk (Amer 2007: 733). After
three years of guerrilla warfare against the government these three parties established an
exile government in Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia that gained the recognition of the United
Nations. Vietnamese troops withdrew in 1989, and Sihanouk returned to Phnom Penh,
which weakened the position of the government. A UN-brokered ceasefire agreement was
signed in 1991, leading to a transitional government led by Sihanouk called the ‘Supreme
National Council’ (Amer 2007: 735–736). In the course of the peace accords that followed
in Paris in 1992, the Khmer Rouge refused to disarm, which caused the civil war to break
out again (Richmond and Franks 2007: 34). On 16 March 1992, the United Nations
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) was established; elections took place in
May 1993 and a new constitution was adopted by September (Coleman 2007: 11).
The new government was continuously challenged by the Khmer Rouge (=PDK), and af-
ter negotiations in 1994 with them failed they were declared illegal. The PDK nonetheless
formed the ‘Provisional Government of National Unity and National Salvation of Cambo-
dia’ (PGNUNSC). It failed to gain international recognition, and after a large number of
PDK guerillas surrendered in response to an amnesty, the party had become significantly
weakened. Yet, this did not imply peace, as now the factions in the government became
more divided, with Hun Sen’s Cambodia’s People’s Party (CPP) and royalist FUNCINPEC
forces exchanging fire and challenges between deposed Prime Minister Ranariddh and
Hun Sen escalating. The international community withdrew its support. Elections to
the national assembly in 1998 led to a victory of Hun Sen’s party (the CPP) receiving
41.4 percent of the vote, followed by FUNCINPEC (31.7 percent). Both parties formed a
coalition government with Hun Sen as prime minister (Coleman 2007: 12).
c) Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview
Conflict parties KR, FUNCINPEC, KPNLF
UCDP Conflict ID 103
UCDP Episode ID 1032
Duration 1978 – 1998
Intensity war
Outcome One-sided victory
Victorious side Gov
Peacekeeping
UNAMIC (United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia); October 1991 –
March 1992
UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia); March 1992
– September 1993
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Mission mandate:
UNAMIC
“UNAMIC was established to assist the Cambodian parties to maintain
their ceasefire during the period prior to the establishment of the United
Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), and to initiate mine-
awareness training of civilian populations. Later, the mandate was enlarged
to include training in mine-clearance and the initiation of a mine-clearance
programme. The Mission and its functions were subsumed by UNTAC in
March 1992” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2003a).
Mission mandate:
UNTAC
“UNTAC was established to ensure implementation of the Agreements on
the Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, signed in
Paris on 23 October 1991. The mandate included aspects relating to human
rights, the organization and conduct of elections, military arrangements,
civil administration, maintenance of law and order, repatriation and reset-
tlement of refugees and displaced persons and rehabilitation of Cambodian
infrastructure” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2003e).
Source: ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Table A.11: Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Cambodia
A.5.2 Post-conflict situation
It is difficult to decide when the post-conflict situation actually started in Cambodia because
the conflict had continued despite the existence of peace agreements and the presence of
a UN transitional administration. In this context the term ‘post-settlement’ may be more
adequate, but since the Khmer Rouge withdrew its support from the Paris Accord one can
argue that it was not even a real settlement. Yet, although the conflict is coded to have
continued until 1998 in the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’ and ended through a
one-sided victory by the government, a lot still speaks for choosing 1993 as the starting
point of the post-conflict situation: this is the point when Cambodia for the first time in
20 years had an elected government, and it marks the end of UNTAC’s deployment in
Cambodia. But there is no doubt that ‘peace’ remained elusive for another five years after
the elections. Here, the period of the UN transitional administration (1992 – 1993) and the
period following the elections in 1993 are treated as two distinct post-conflict phases.
a) The Role of the Formal Government
Since the UN-brokered elections in 1993, there are concerns that Cambodia has effectively
become a one party system. “Hun Sen’s State of Cambodia (SOC) [the provisional
government established before the elections and comprised mainly of Hun Sen’s CPP,
CR] used the elections to legitimize its monopoly on power” (Richmond and Franks
2007: 34). Although the royalist party FUNCINPEC (and not the CPP) won most votes
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in the elections, Hun Sen “never relaxed his hold on the reigns of governmental power”
(Richmond and Franks 2007: 34). In 1997, he led a coup against the government and
defeated FUNCINPEC in the 2003 elections (Richmond and Franks 2007: 35). Against
this background, McCargo concludes that “elections have become little more than a
side-show, helping to bolster the electoral-authoritarian regime that Hun Sen has built”
(McCargo 2005: 98). These characteristics have inspired Richmond and Franks to speak
of a ‘virtual liberal peace’, in which “institutions may exist without being adopted by
those they are intended for [. . . ]” and in which “democratization, human rights, the
rule of law, freedom of the press, development and economic reform are deferred for an
uncertain period [. . . ] [and where] [t]here is little way of knowing whether this deferral will
become permanent or is indeed temporary” (Richmond and Franks 2007: 30). According
to McCargo, the parties have mainly been interested in gaining power and enjoying the
benefits of controlling the state apparatus: “Both parties [CPP and FUNCINPEC, CR] are
now effectively postideological; the pursuit of wealth and power forms the main concern
of each” (2005: 99). His assessment of the post-war Cambodian polity appears to be well
in line with the ‘virtual liberal peace’ argument:
“The nonprogress of this nontransition has gone largely unnoticed by an international
community eager to detect signs of improvement, and happy to view the holding of
virtually any elections as a step forward” (McCargo 2005: 107).
b) The Role of External Parties
Cambodia has always been influenced by its neighboring countries, in particular Thailand
and Vietnam, which have both played a strong historical role in Cambodia (see Chandler
1979). In the post-settlement phase, the United Nations were the most dominant external
actors. It was engaged through the UNTAC peacekeeping mission, which comprised
22,000 peacekeepers and was mandated to implement the Paris Agreement (Richmond
and Franks 2007: 28). UNTAC’s authority went way beyond a traditional peacekeeping
mission, since it possessed the power to overrule domestic decisions:
“UNTAC would be given powers to implement a comprehensive settlement. In
order to ensure a neutral political environment, conducive to the holding of free and
fair elections, Cambodian administrative units that could influence the outcome of
elections would be placed under direct United Nations supervision” (Amer 2007:
735).
Overall, the role of the UN was really critical in facilitating a settlement to the conflict
(although only a temporary and flawed one): “Without the UN intervention that led to
the election in 1993, the Cambodian factions would have not signed the Paris Agreement
and the country would not have seen its first multi-party election since the early 1970s”
(Peou 2005: 113). But this also indicates that UNTAC was not based on a ‘light footprint’
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approach: “The nature of peace that UNTAC intended to introduce in 1992 [. . . ] was to be
achieved by force and diplomacy, and would represent a constitutional peace, conceived,
instituted and imposed on Cambodia entirely from the ‘outside”’ (Richmond and Franks
2007: 32). There is a general consensus that the mission was a success (e.g. Doyle 1995),
but it is highly debatable whether it really laid the groundwork for a self-sustaining peace in
Cambodia. Its main failure, according to Richmond and Franks, was the inability to obtain
a complete ceasefire and fully disarm the belligerents (2007: 33–34). McCargo sees the
1993 elections only as a success if considered in narrow technical terms (they were secret),
but not in substantive terms, since they did not lead to a real transfer of power despite
FUNCINPEC’s victory (2005: 99). Long after its departure in 1993, the UN initiated
attempts that would eventually lead to a trial for some 20-30 of the remaining Khmer Rouge
leaders. Despite resistance from the Hun Sen government, this measure was approved
by the UN General Assembly in 2003 (Peou 2005: 111). After UNTAC’s departure,
a multitude of UN specialized agencies, international donors, financial institutions and
NGOs became engaged in Cambodia, and the international community disbursed some $4
billion dolor in funds between 1992 and 2001 (Peou 2005: 112).
c) The Warring Factions
While the Khmer Rouge still fought a guerrilla war against the CPP in the phase between
1991 and 1998, they essentially disappeared as a political and military force after 1998
altogether. Arguably, after 1998 there was no true contender present any longer in Cam-
bodia since FUNCINPEC had proven too weak (and Sihanouk too opportunistic) to truly
challenge Hun Sen’s CPP.
A.5.3 Assessment
UNTAC (1992-1993). The UN Transitional Administration (UNTAC) exhibited all char-
acteristics of a case of transitional administration, in which external actors have the
authority to override domestic decisions. Most of the literature on this subject (e.g. Caplan
2005; Chesterman 2004) include the case of Cambodia. In the context of this disserta-
tion, such cases are treated as instances of supreme external intervention. Because the
environment has clearly remained obstructive (the parties had continued to engage in
armed combat), the period of UNTAC is subsumed here under the ‘supreme obstructive
domination’ or ‘Benevolent Intrusion’ polity type.
Post-1993 Phase. What is characteristic about Cambodia since the elections in 1993
is the strong role of the CPP, which has essentially dominated the government. Little
true sharing of power has been present since the elections in 1993. There seem to be
two critical questions to answer for an adequate classification: 1) Was the international
community partisan or mediative? This is not (yet) altogether clear, but the tendency is
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more towards the latter. It did try to bring the parties to the negotiation table and made large
compromises to accommodate the Khmer Rouge in order not to threat the peace process.
Further, it stuck to its role as a peacekeeper and swiftly winded down UNTAC although
the Khmer Rouge acted as a spoiler. So, there is reason to argue that the international
community was taking a mediative stance. 2) Who is the real contender? Until 1998 this
clearly were the Khmer Rouge, but then they disappeared, and their remnants became
cooperative. How can we account for this in the analytical framework? I suggest that the
late cooperation of Khmer Rouge elements with the CPP is merely opportunistic: They
were defeated militarily and had no other chance than to cooperate. All in all, it seems
to make sense to confine the analyze to the period between 1991 and 1998, when it was
clearly an obstructive relationship. For the reasons stated above, Cambodia is classified as
an instance of the ‘mediated obstructive domination’ or ‘The Winner Took it All’ polity
type.
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A.5.4 Map of Cambodia
Figure A.5: Map: Cambodia. Source: United Nations Cartographic Division
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A.6 Côte D’Ivoire
Population 20,169,352 as of 2007
Total Area 322,460 Sq. Km.
Total Land 322,460 Sq. Km.
Coastline 515 km
Capital Yamoussoukro
Languages French (official); there are also over 70 native languages spoken
Boundaries
Liberia: 716 km; Ghana: 668 km; Guinea: 610 km; Burkina Faso: 584 km;
Mali: 532 km
Ethnic Groups
42% Akan; 18% Voltaiques or Gur; 16% Northern Mandes; 11% Krous;
10% Southern Mandes; 3% other
Religions 34% Christian; 27% Muslim; 21% no religion; 15% animist; 3% other
Source: Countrywatch (2008): Côte d’Ivoire 2008 Country Review (Coleman 2008e).
Table A.12: Basic Facts and Figures: Côte D’Ivoire
A.6.1 Country and Conflict Information
a) General Background
Côte d’Ivoire gained independence from French colonial rule in 1960 and subsequently
became the richest country in West Africa. Between 1960 and 1993, political life had been
dominated by the ‘Parti démocratique de la Côte D’Ivoire’ (PDCI-RDA), led by president
Felix Houphouët-Boigny. Côte d’Ivoire’s population comprises some 60 ethnic groups,
with Christians and animists living in the South and Muslims living predominantly in the
North. The president managed to avoid ethnic rivalries by balancing their appointment
to government positions. In the 1980s, a sharp recession set in that began to threaten the
economic miracle, and tensions forced Houphouët-Boigny to establish a pluralist political
system. Houphouët-Boigny’s death in 1993 triggered ethnic rivalries and competition for
political power, coupled with nationalist tendencies directed against the migrant population.
They were fueled by the introduction of a nationalist ideology called ivoirité into Ivorian
politics (see UCDP 2010h).
Côte d’Ivoire officially became a French colony in 1893. Since 1958 it was an autonomous
republic within the French community and was granted full independence in 1960. Its fate
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for the next 30 years was nearly completely determined by the country’s first president
and leader of the ‘Parti Démocratique de la Côte d’Ivoire’ (PDCI), Felix Houphouët-
Boigny, who had represented the country in the French National Assembly since 1946
and was a close ally of Francçois Mitterand. His political system can be described as a
‘paternalistic autocracy’, with his PDCI being the sole party permitted in the country until
democratization efforts took place in the early 1990s. The ‘Front Populaire Ivorienne’
(FPI) became the largest of the opposition parties, winning a mere 10 out of 175 possible
seats in the National Assembly (Coleman 2008e: 7–8; see also Akindès 2004: 5; Dozon
1989: 136; Hofnung 2005: 8–9; Woods 2003: 641).
After Houphouët-Boigny’s death in 1993 he was succeeded by his constitutional suc-
cessor, National Assembly President Henri Konan Bédié. Bédié took measures to control
public opinion and the opposition and eliminate his main opponent Alassane Ouattara (a
high-ranking officer at the IMF) through introducing a new electoral code built on the
ideology of ivoirité. This led to a boycott of the 1995 elections by the main opposition
parties (the FPI and ‘Rassemblement des Républicains’, RDR) (see Akindès 2004: 20;
Kipré 2005: 263; Toungara 2001: 67). Bédié gained 95.2 percent of the vote, which trig-
gered accusations of electoral fraud and gave rise to public protest, which was particularly
pronounced among the students and university scholars organized in the ‘Federation of
Scholars and Students of Côte d’Ivoire’ (FESCI) – arguably one of the groups that suffered
most severely from the economic decline (see Almås 2007: 10–12). Bédié continued to
suppress opposition parties, leading to the arrest of several members of the RDR, while
Ouattara escaped to exile in France. This triggered unrest and ultimately led to a successful
military coup in 1999 carried out by army General Guei. He subsequently installed the
‘National Council for Public Salvation’ – a power-sharing government in which power
was shared between the FPI and the RDR. However, despite democratic promises Guei
centralized power under the military, installed military leaders in the government, and
limited the freedom of press (Coleman 2008e: 9–10).
While Guei had drafted a new constitution which had been put to a referendum in
2002, the country has suffered increasingly from the north-south divide: “Northerners
view themselves as long ostracized by the southern nexus of power, while southerners
look at northerners as of dubious nationality” (Coleman 2008e: 10). The constitution
aimed at institutionalizing the ideology of ivoirité through limiting the candidacy for the
presidential elections to descendants of ‘true’ Ivorians, thereby excluding large parts of
the North and in particular Outtara from running for the presidency. Guei was ousted
in a public outrage after he had declared himself to be the winner of the October 2000
elections, and power was transferred with support from parts of the military to the true
winner, Laurent Gbagbo (see Hofnung 2005: 27–35). After Outtarra was again banned
from the parliamentary elections, riots and violence followed. A failed coup was staged
against Gbagbo in January 2001, which the government attributed to ‘foreign involvement’,
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and specifically to Outtarra supporters, triggering violence against immigrants and causing
many of them to flee (Coleman 2008e: 12–13).
b) Conflict History
Political riots and tensions followed the series of coups, counter-coups and electoral
manipulation. In 2002, an insurgency by a rebel group called MPCI (‘Coalition of Northern
Soldiers’) against the government started, which later united with other northern rebel
forces to form the ‘Forces Nouvelles’ (FN). This led to intense armed conflict and a division
of the country which lasts until today (see UCDP 2010h).
After the unrest triggered by the elections in 2000, Côte d’Ivoire had for a short period
become relatively stable and peaceful. In early 2002, matters began to look more promising,
as Gbagbo adopted a few conciliating gestures and had agreed to meet in person with Bédié,
Guei and Ouattara. He even considered to review the question of Ouattara’s nationality,
which prevented the latter from running for the presidency. However, stability had been
short-lived, since another attempt for a coup by ‘disgruntled military officers’ in September
2002 gave the impetus for a larger civil war emerging between the government and the
northern rebels from the MPCI. In the course of these events, the former military ruler
Robert Guei was killed (Coleman 2008e: 14). In response to the new unrest, French
troops arrived in Côte d’Ivoire in order to launch emergency evacuations of French citizens
(Willett 2005: 591). By late 2002, the government had consolidated control of the Christian
south of the country, while rebels controlled the Muslim north. A peace agreement (Linas-
Marcoussis Agreement) was hammered out in January 2003, providing for a buffer zone
to be established between the rebel-held north and the government-held south (see Harris
2007: 182). France and ECOWAS dispatched 10,000 troops to Côte d’Ivoire, and one year
later the United Nations deployed peacekeepers as part of the United Nations Operation
in Ivory Coast (UNOCI) (Harris 2007: 182–183). However, peace remained precarious
and the power-sharing arrangement turned out as dysfunctional. It took four years until
the parties could agree on a new peace power-sharing agreement, the Ouagadougou Peace
Agreement (see Government of the Republic of Côte d’Ivoire 2007). It was signed in
March 2007 in the capital of Burkina Faso between Gbagbo and rebel leader Soro, aiming
among other things at removing the existing buffer zone that had divided the country and
establishing a power-sharing government with former rebel leader Guillaume Soro as
prime minister (Coleman 2008e: 18–20).
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c) Conflict and Peacekeeping Information
Conflict parties MPCI, MJP, MPIGO, Forces Nouvelles
UCDP Conflict ID 225
UCDP Episode ID 2251
Duration 2002 – 2004
Intensity minor armed conflict
Outcome Peace Agreement
Victorious side n/a
Peacekeeping UNOCI (United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire); April 2004 – present
Mission mandate
“Having determined that the situation in Côte d’Ivoire continued to pose
a threat to international peace and security in the region and acting under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council, by its resolution 1528
of 27 February 2004, decided to establish the United Nations Operation in
Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) as from 4 April 2004. UNOCI replaced the United
Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI), a political mission set up by
the Council in May 2003 with a mandate to facilitate the implementation by
the Ivorian parties of the peace agreement signed by them in January 2003”
(Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2009i).
Source: ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Table A.13: Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Côte d’Ivoire
A.6.2 Post-conflict situation
Deciding from which moment on it makes sense to speak of a post-conflict situation in
Côte d’Ivoire is ambiguous. According to the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’,
the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire ended in 2004, and in April of that year the United Nations
deployed the United Nations mission in United Nations Operation in Ivory Coast (UNOCI)
(see Harris 2007: 182–183). However, the situation remained highly conflictual after
2004, with the United Nations supervising a buffer-zone between the rebel-held north
and the government-held south. All in all, the situation can be described as resembling
“neither peace nor war” (International Crisis Group 2004a: i). The situation changed after
the adoption of the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement in 2007, when the leader of ‘Forces
Nouvelles’ was suddenly invited to participate as Prime Minister in a new power-sharing
government. Here, the post-2004 and the post-2007 periods are treated as two distinct
post-conflict polity phases.
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a) The Role of the Formal Government
The outbreak of the conflict was triggered by Laurent Gbagbo’s dubious electoral victory
in 2000. The next presidential elections were scheduled for 2005, and the eligibility
to participate in the polls was one of the main incompatibilities between the different
parties. In the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement struck in January 2003, the parties agreed
that the issues of the eligibility to the presidential elections would have to be solved
before the presidential elections in 2005, but the parties failed to fulfill this goal (see
International Crisis Group 2004a: i). The Accords also provided for the establishment of
a Government of National Reconciliation, led by a “consensus Prime Minister who will
remain in office until the next presidential election” (see Government of the Republic of
Côte d’Ivoire 2003, Art. 3c). However, the transitional government was a “shaky political
and military deal from its outset”, since it “split power at the top between Gbagbo, who
stayed on as president, and Seydou Diarra, a Northern Muslim who became prime minister
charged with heading the government of national reconciliation” (Rothchild 2005: 252).
Dissatisfied with the process of power-sharing, the rebels soon left the power-sharing
government. In March 2004, power-sharing effectively ceased to exist (Rothchild 2005:
253). Presidential elections, originally scheduled for October 2005, were re-scheduled
twice. The UN Security Council extended Gbagbo’s mandate until presidential elections
finally took place, but at the same time requested that the management of the crisis should
be placed “in the hands of a prime minister endowed with real decision-making powers
until presidential elections could be organised”, trying to reinstate former Prime Minister
Charles Konan Banny (Chirot 2006: 74; International Crisis Group 2007e: 2). Gbagbo
immediately made clear that he would not respect the latter and tried to postpone the
elections as long as possible.3 In sum, despite the formal existence of a ‘Government of
National Reconciliation’, the three years between March 2004 (the end of the conflict
according to the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’) and March 2007 (the adoption of
the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement) can therefore not be considered a true example for
power-sharing between the belligerents.
The adoption of the Ouagadougou Peace Agreement in March 2007 brought an urgently
needed new impulse to the stalemated peace process in Côte d’Ivoire, as it led to the
renewal of power-sharing in Côte d’Ivoire by making the rebel leader Guillaume Soro
Prime Minister.4 As the International Crisis Group explicates:
“The Ouagadougou Peace Agreement (APO) signed on 4 March 2007 was a recogni-
tion of the military and diplomatic stalemate in which the two parties to the conflict
were locked. It was also, to a certain extent, an agreement between victors. Gbagbo
3Rescheduled each year between 2005 and 2009, the presidential elections finally took place in November
2010. However, Gbagbo refused to accept Ouattara’s victory, bringing Côte d’Ivoire at the brink of
renewed armed conflict as of this writing.
4In fact, power-sharing was not directly agreed in the Ouagadougou agreement but was agreed in a separate
document adopted shortly after the agreement was signed (see Bah 2010: 613).
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fought off the violent attempted coup of 19 September 2002 and succeeded in bypass-
ing all the international agreements and decisions that sought to compel him to give
up some of his power [. . . ]. Guillaume Soro is also on the winning side, even though
his position may turn out to be precarious. During the last four years, he has shown
himself to be a skilled politician, capable of leading an armed movement, maintaining
control over more than half of the country without provoking an outright and massive
rejection from the people in ‘his territory’ and gaining international credibility, which
is rather unusual for a rebel leader. [. . . ] However, the two victors are not equal: one
is president of the republic and the other is ‘his’ prime minister” (2007e: 3).
Most importantly, the agreement also contained provisions for the settlement of the citi-
zenship problem that had never been resolved satisfactorily before (see Bah 2010). The
International Crisis Group lauded the agreement as “a major turning point in resolving
Côte d’Ivoire’s armed conflict”, but also made clear that it was “only a first step in the right
direction” (2007e: i). Despite initial signs for improvement, implementing the provisions
contained in the agreement proved difficult and failed due to Gbabgo’s grip to power.
Gbagbo obstructed the holding of elections again in November 2009 and dissolved the
government in February 2010 (see Bah 2010: 614; International Crisis Group 2009a).
Despite this disruptive attitude, the period between March 2007 and early 2010 has closer
resemblance to power-sharing than the faulty power-sharing arrangement adopted on the
basis of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement.
b) The Role of External Parties
The history of Côte d’Ivoire has been characterized by a close involvement of external
actors ever since. Its former colonial power France has played a particularly dominant role
in the post-colonial period. The Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, adopted in January 2003,
called upon the international community (more specifically: France, ECOWAS and the
United Nations) to provide forces for the establishment of a buffer zone between the rebel-
held north and the government-held south (see Harris 2007: 182). In immediate response,
France and ECOWAS dispatched a total of 10,000 troops to Côte d’Ivoire in February 2003,
and the UN Security Council subsequently authorized their use of force (U.N. Security
Council 2003b). One year later, the United Nations Operation in Ivory Coast (UNOCI)
was established and incorporated the ECOWAS troop contingent, while the French mission
continued in parallel (Harris 2007: 182–183). The mission originally had a one-year
mandate, but has since then been repeatedly extended. The UN mission mainly aimed
at enforcing a ceasefire between the belligerents, but also provided security guarantees
for the rebels. For instance, in 2004 UN troops prevented an attempted government siege
against the rebel capital Bouaké and UN forces also protected rebel delegates in Abidjan
“who would otherwise have been killed” (see Chirot 2006: 73). However, French troops
have become increasingly drawn into the conflict and France’s involvement certainly went
beyond a traditional peacekeeping role, which became most vividly clear at the end of 2004.
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In November, nine French soldiers were killed after an attack by an Ivorian aircraft. In an
attempt to retaliate this attack, France launched an air strike itself, which destroyed the
entire Ivorian air force at once. This attack clearly had de-stabilizing effects and triggered
countrywide riots against French institutions and building (see Chirot 2006: 73; Hofnung
2005: 88–91).
c) The Warring Factions
After his dubious election in 2000, Laurent Gbagbo remained president during the entire
duration of the political crisis, representing the ‘government-side’ in the conflict. The
rebellion was originally driven by the ‘Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire’ (MPCI),
whose stated goal was to overthrow the Gbagbo government. It also launched the initial
coup attempt against him in September 2002. Shortly thereafter, two other rebel groups
emerged: the ‘Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix’ (MJP) and the ‘Mouvement Populaire
Ivoirien du Grand Ouest’ (MPIGO). The rebels soon regrouped and formed the ‘Forces
Nouvelles’ (FN) under the leadership of Guillaume Soro in late 2002 (Bah 2010: 604).
From this moment on, the FN were the main rebel group in Côte d’Ivoire.
The relations maintained by the warring parties during the first and second post-conflict
period differed drastically. During the first post-conflict episode, which lasted from 2004
to 2007, the relations between Gbagbo and the rebels were tense and uncompromising.
Despite the introduction of a shaky power-sharing arrangement and the adoption of various
peace and ceasefire agreements between 2002 and 2007, the parties (in particular Gbagbo)
showed no inclination to follow up on their promises. Gbagbo’s frequent re-scheduling of
the elections clearly aimed at prolonging his own hold on power. And, as mentioned above,
while being formally head of the ‘Government of National Reconciliation’, Gbagbo still
tried to defeat the rebels militarily. The parties’ mutual mistrust also becomes evident when
considering that the rebels had at no point in time been committed to their disarmament
obligations (Chirot 2006). The relations drastically improved after the adoption of the
Ouagadougou Agreement in March 2007. As Bakarr Bah argues, the agreement “was
predicated on assumed mutual trust among the belligerents and the facilitator, a spirit of
dialogue, and parity between the government and FN” (2010: 610). But this did not imply
the end of mutual deception and mistrust. Gbagbo continued to impede the holding of
elections, and the rebels continued to block their full disarmament (International Crisis
Group 2009a).
A.6.3 Assessment
The Post-2004 Episode. The first post-conflict phase in Côte d’Ivoire begins with the
UNOCI mandate of 2004. At least during the three years until the signing of the Oua-
gadougou accords in 2007, the country had been divided into two geographical entities,
with the North controlled by the rebels and the South by the government, while a buffer-
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zone was maintained by the United Nations. Although there were several power-sharing
arrangements in Côte d’Ivoire, the executive power firmly remained in the hands of the
government, with the rebels (and partly also the opposition parties) being systematically
excluded from formal governmental power. The relationship between the former belliger-
ents clearly was obstructive as armed struggles continued in the post-conflict phase and
little actual will to make serious commitments to peace became apparent. Despite the
strong role of France, external actors were by and large engaged in a mediative manner.
For the reasons stated above, the post-2003 period is classified here as an instance of the
mediated obstructive domination or ‘The Winner Took it All’ polity type.
The Post-2007 Episode. The post-2007 episode is different from the earlier arrangement.
At the time when the agreement was adopted, Gbabgo and his main opponents agreed
on an arrangement that led to the effective participation of the rebels in the government
to a degree that went far beyond the earlier ‘power-sharing’ arrangement. Although, in
retrospect, it turns out that Gbagbo only used this arrangement as a means to deepen
his grip on power in the long run, at the time of the adoption it looked like an honest
commitment to finding an end to Côte d’Ivoire’s political crisis. Nonetheless, describing
the relations between the rebels as ‘constructive’ would certainly go too far, which is most
vividly illustrated by the fact that the rebel groups never disarmed. The role of external
actors during this second post-conflict episode has not changed significantly. They have
worked for achieving a settlement between the belligerents and have openly lauded the
adoption of the Ouagadougou agreement in 2007, but at the same time their leverage on
the antagonists was severely limited. Out of these reasons, this situation is classified as an
instance of the mediated, obstructive power-sharing or ‘Doomed to Share’ type.
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A.6.4 Map of Côte d’Ivoire
Figure A.6: Map: Côte D’Ivoire. Source: United Nations Cartographic Division
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A.7 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)
Population 60,226,717 as of 2007
Total Area 2,345,410 Sq. Km.
Total Land 2,267,600 Sq. Km.
Coastline 37 km
Capital Kinshasa
Languages
French (official); Lingala; Kingwana (a dialect of Kiswahili or Swahili);
Kikongo; Tshiluba
Boundaries
Angola: 2,511 km; Congo (RC): 2,410 km; Zambia: 1,930 km; Central
African Republic: 1,577 km; Uganda: 765 km; Sudan: 628 km; Burundi:
451 km; Rwanda: 217 km
Ethnic Groups
n/a Luba; n/a Kongo; n/a Mangbetu Azande; n/a Other (more than 200); n/a
Mongo
Religions
50% Roman Catholic; 20% Protestant; 10% Kimbanquist; 10% Muslim;
10% Other syncretic sects and traditional beliefs
Source: Countrywatch (2008): Congo, Democratic Republic 2008 Country Review (Coleman 2008d).
Table A.14: Basic Facts and Figures: DRC
A.7.1 Country and Conflict Information
a) General Background
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) gained independence from Belgian colonial
rule in 1960, during which it had suffered from the notoriously brutal and exploitative
regime of King Leopold II. Since then, the country has been torn by internal armed
conflict and decades of repressive rule by post-independence predatory regimes. This today
accounts for its reputation as the ‘epitome of a collapsed state’ (see UCDP 2010g).
Congo was a Belgian colony that stood under the heavy personal influence of King Leopold
II. After independence in 1960, the country slipped into a state of anarchy until Colonel
Joseph Mobutu – who later called himself ‘Mobutu Sese Seko’ – seized power through a
coup and renamed the country into Zaire. During the Cold War, Zaire was a ‘bastion of
anti-communism’, which secured Mobutu significant support from the West (see Olsson
and Fors 2004: 323). Soon, the new regime managed to take control of the country’s
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rich natural resources. The end of the Cold War led to decreasing support for Mobutu’s
regime from the west, but the situation changed when Mobutu tolerated large inflows of
Hutu refugees from Rwanda into Zaire/ DRC in the aftermaths of the Rwandan genocide
(Olsson and Fors 2004: 324).
b) Conflict History
Intrastate conflict erupted on five occasions. First, two provinces (Katanga and South
Kasai) declared themselves sovereign directly after independence, which triggered an
armed conflict against the government. The conflict ended in 1962 with UN peacekeeping
forces who managed to gain back control. Second, in 1964-1965 the ‘National Liberation
Council’ (CNL) fought in the Eastern part of DRC in order to remove the government. It
proclaimed a revolutionary government in 1964 after controlling half of DRC, but lost its
territories again in 1965. Third, in 1977, a group called FLNC (‘Front for the National
Liberation of the Congo’) launched a military campaign from Angola trying to topple the
Mobutu regime. They were pushed back between 1977 and 1978 by French and Belgian
forces. Fourth, in 1996-1997, an armed rebellion led by a group called by ADFL (‘Alliance
of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo’), which was supported by Rwanda and
Uganda, managed to overthrow Mobutu. But the new regime was soon at war with three
parties: the RCD (‘Congolese Rally for Democracy’), the MLC (‘Congolese Liberation
Movement’), and the RCD-ML (‘RCD-Liberation Movement’). Years of negotiations led
to a peace agreement in 2003 and democratic elections in 2006. Fifth, a repeated conflict
activity occurred in Ituri and Katanga, inspired by ethnic tensions. Hema and Lendu fought
each other in Ituri, leading to massacres in the 2000s (see UCDP 2010g).
Of the many conflicts that took place in the DRC, one conflict is of primary importance
here5: the conflict that started in 1996 as the anti-Mobutu struggle and that – after the
latter’s defeat – continued as a rebellion against the de facto rule of Laurent-Desiré Kabila
and later Joseph Kabila. After the inflow of the Hutu refugees from Rwanda, Mobutu
soon increased the pressure on the Banyamulenge (Zairian Tutsi) traditionally populating
the eastern part of Congo, ultimately depriving them of their Congolese citizenship and
essentially forcing them to escape to neighboring Rwanda. At the same time, parts of the
Hutu militias who had committed the genocide in Rwanda and who came together with
the refugees to DRC used the Kivu region as the basis for their continued attacks on the
newly established Tutsi government in Rwanda. This triggered counter attacks by the
‘Rwandan Patriotic Army’ (RPA), joined by a number of other rebel groups, including
Laurent Kabila’s ADFL (see Olsson and Fors 2004: 324–325).
5The first three conflicts were concluded before the end of the Cold War and therefore do not fall into the
period under investigation here. The fifth conflict was limited to certain regions within the DRC and
therefore goes against the operational definition of a post-conflict polity case formulated in section 1.3.3.
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In the subsequent conflict, Kabila successfully managed to overthrow Mobutu’s army
and seized Kinshasa on 17 March 1997, forcing Mobutu to escape abroad where he soon
died of cancer. In this process, it is estimated that up to 200,000 Hutu refugees might have
been killed (Olsson and Fors 2004: 324–325, see also Emizet 2000: 163). The Kabila
government, however, was unable to grant stability to the country and establish effective
control of the eastern parts, which is the region with the most precious natural resources
– primarily timber, gold, diamonds, coltan. This triggered a long-lasting battle between
the different factions for the control of these resources, partly on behalf and under direct
participation of neighboring Uganda, Rwanda and Angola, who had effectively turned the
conflict into a regional war. Fighting between the different factions continued for about
one year, until a ceasefire agreement was brokered in 1999 – the Lusaka Agreement (see
Government of the Republic of Angola 1999). Rather than bringing an end to the fighting,
it triggered a lengthy negotiation peace process known as the ‘Inter-Congolese Dialogue’.
This process culminated in the ‘Global and Inclusive Agreement on Transition in the DRC’
(see Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2002a) signed in 2002. Since
peace had again remained elusive, all previous agreements were again endorsed by the
parties in another agreement known as the ‘Final Act’ (see Government of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo 2003). This finally gave rise to the establishment of a transitional
government, in which power was shared between president Joseph Kabila (the son of
Laurent-Desiré Kabila, who had been assassinated in 2001) and a number of key rebel
leaders. It was inaugurated on 24 July 2003 and remained in power until national elections
in 2006 confirmed Joseph Kabila in office (see Coleman 2008d: 26; Koko 2007: 36–37;
Miskel and Norton 2003: 2–5).
c) Conflict and Peacekeeping Information
Conflict parties AFDL, RCD, RCD-ML, MLC, Rwanda, Uganda
UCDP Conflict ID 86
UCDP Episode ID 864
Duration 1996 – 2001
Intensity war
Outcome Peace Agreement
Victorious side n/a
Peacekeeping
ONUC (United Nations Operation in the Congo); July 1960 – June 1964
MONUC (UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo); November 1999 – present
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Mission mandate
ONUC
“ONUC was established in July 1960 to ensure the withdrawal of Belgian
forces, to assist the Government in maintaining law and order and to provide
technical assistance. The function of ONUC was subsequently modified to
include maintaining the territorial integrity and political independence of the
Congo, preventing the occurrence of civil war and securing the removal of all
foreign military, paramilitary and advisory personnel not under the United
Nations Command, and all mercenaries” (Department of Peacekeeping
Operations 2001e).
Mission mandate:
MONUC
“The Democratic Republic of the Congo and five regional States signed
the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July 1999. To maintain liaison with
the parties and carry out other tasks, the Security Council set up MONUC
on 30 November 1999, incorporating UN personnel authorized in earlier
resolutions” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2009j).
Source: ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Table A.15: Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: DRC
A.7.2 Post-conflict situation
According to the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’, the anti-Kabila conflict in the
DRC officially lasted until 2001. However, at this stage the peace process had hardly
been in place and the parties had not yet agreed on a number of key issues. Therefore,
it appears more reasonable to take the year 2003 as the starting point of the DRC’s post-
conflict period. (Even then, using the term ‘post-conflict’ may be grossly misleading, as
both factional violence and violations of Congolese territorial sovereignty by Uganda and
Rwanda were continuing – see Coleman 2008d: 22). The three years of the Congolese
power-sharing government are treated here as the first post-settlement episode in the DRC.
A second post-conflict episode can be identified for the post-2006 period, since it entailed
a fundamental change of domestic governance structures and reinforced Kabila’s position
of domination in the DRC.
a) The Role of the Formal Government
Since the downfall of Mobutu in 1997, the government-side was first represented by
Laurent Kabila and, since his death in 2001 by his son, Joseph Kabila. Laurent Kabila had
never been elected and he essentially established a dictatorship after overthrowing Mobutu.
As the pressure from the rebel groups grew stronger, his way of governance became more
and more oppressive and violent, “ruling by fear rather than inspiration” (Coleman 2008d:
16). Kabila-the-son initially seemed to differ from his father in many ways. His more
conciliating stance led to the completion of the ‘Inter-Congolese Dialogue’ (Coleman
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2008d: 16) and, ultimately, the creation of the transitional government. It was agreed
that Joseph Kabila remained president but had to share power with four vice-presidents,
including the rebel leaders Jean-Pierre Bemba (MLC) and Azarias Ruberwa (RCD) (Tull
2009: 216). The composition of the government changed after the conclusion of peace
agreements in 2002 and 2003, which led to the creation of a transitional government.
The power-sharing arrangement lasted for three years, until national elections scheduled
for 2006 nominated a new president. Kabila won the elections and subsequently re-
established a relatively centralized system of rule that was characterized by a tight grip on
the opposition parties. This implied a serious regression of democratic principles in the
country, accompanied by a tightening human rights situation (see Human Rights Watch
2008: 16–17; International Crisis Group 2007c: 11). As Mvemba Dizolele explicates:
“President Kabila, rather than taking steps to strengthen the country’s nascent democ-
racy, is now posing the biggest threat to it yet – a brazen constitutional revision. [. . . ]
Political developments over the past four years, such as Kabila’s efforts to consolidate
all powers in his hands give ample reason to worry about a return to dictatorship”
(2010: 148–149).
Along a similar line, Englebert and Tull argue that the transition in the DRC “merely
ushered in an authoritarian and corrupt political and economic system similar to that of the
late president Mobutu Sese Seko [. . . ]” (2008: 112).
b) The Role of External Parties
External forces have played a central role in the DRC before, during and after the conflict.
Between independence and the end of the Cold War, Mobutu’s Zaire enjoyed the support
from many western nations, including the US and France. France allegedly even hired
mercenaries in order to stabilize Mobutu’s regime and prevent the total collapse of the
DRC/ Zaire. Neighboring countries, most notably Uganda and Rwanda, were directly
involved in the conflict and enriched themselves selfishly from DRC’s natural resources
(see e.g. Olsson and Fors 2004: 324).
In the period following the ceasefire and in the post-settlement phase after 2003, the
United Nations became involved in two ways: through MONUC, a clear peacekeeping
mission unable to prevent the escalation of violence following the withdrawal of Ugandan
and Rwandan troops in 2002/ 2003, and later through mandating an EU staffed multina-
tional force (U.N. Security Council 2003d). With 18,343 uniformed personnel in 2008,
MONUC counts as one of the “biggest and most expensive missions ever deployed by
the UN” (Tull 2009: 215). It unfolded in four phases: During phase one (1999-2002) it
was a classical peacekeeping mission which aimed at verifying and securing the ceasefire,
employing 5,037 soldiers. Phase two (2003-2004) commenced after the Pretoria accords in
2002 and aimed at supporting the transitional government in Kinshasa. During this period,
the UN was unable to prevent the escalation of violence in Bunia (Ituri district) and Kivu,
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leading to the deployment of the EU-staffed Artemis mission. Phase three (2004-2006) was
mainly about the organization of elections; phase four (since 2006) about the completion
of “daunting core tasks” (see Tull 2009: 218). The EU involvement had both military and
civilian components, making use of the full range of instruments the European Security and
Defense Policy offers: Artemis was an interim emergency multinational force staffed by
the EU and equipped with a Chapter VII mandate, EUPOL the European Police Mission,
EUSEC the EU Security Sector Reform Mission, and EUFOR the military operation in
support of the UN’s MONUC mission (see Morsut 2009: 262).
In the post-2006 period, external actors have largely remained silent on Kabila’s attempts
to wind down the democratic facade and establish an ever more authoritarian regime. This
has “emboldened Kabila and his associated in their dangerous grab for power and sent a
negative message to the parliamentary opposition” (Dizolele 2010: 150).
c) The Warring Factions
A big problem posed by the case of the DRC is to differentiate the different warring factions
from each other because of their large number and factionalization. During the war that
brought down Mobutu, the dominant contender was Laurent Kabila’s AFDL (Alliance of
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire). The various anti-Kabila opposition
groups from the eastern part of the country that were formed after Laurent Kabila’s rise to
power became known as the ‘Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie’ (RCD), led
by Emile Ilunga and Bizima Karaha and were supported by Uganda and Rwanda. Later,
a splinter faction was formed under the leadership of Ernest Wamba (‘RCD-Kisangani’).
In November 1998, a new anti-Kabila rebel group was formed under the leadership of
Jean-Pierre Bemba, called “Mouvement de Liberation Congolais” (MLC), again backed by
Uganda (Coleman 2008d: 14–15). Though united in their objective to overthrow Kabila,
the different factions greatly engaged in factional battles, not least aiming at gaining
or extending access to the DRC’s natural resources. They continued to break ceasefire
agreements or were unwilling to sign peace agreements at various occasions. The factional
battles were particularly severe in the Ituri region after the withdrawal of Ugandan and
Rwandan troops, leading to gross human rights violations reaching genocidal proportions.
The withdrawal of Ugandan and Rwandan troops, was not fully completed because both
countries continued to cross the border, often under the pretext that they aim at limiting the
influence of rebel troops operating from within DRC (Coleman 2008d: 21–26).
A.7.3 Assessment
Post-2003 Episode. The DRC’s first post-conflict period, starting with the establishment
of a transitional government in 2003, is generally subsumed as a case of power-sharing.
Although the power-sharing arrangement suffered from many flaws and political tensions,
it led to an effective participation of various rebel leaders in the government. Throughout
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the three years of the power-sharing government, the various armed factions maintained
highly obstructive relations and at times even engaged in open combat. The parties were at
no time genuinely committed to power-sharing as such, but mainly used it as a temporary
means to secure their share of power in the long run. Therefore, the relations between the
warring parties can safely be considered obstructive. The role of external actors is highly
ambiguous in the case of the DRC. The country has historically always been a case where
external powers – Belgium, the United States, or, more recently, Rwanda, and Uganda –
have been strongly engaged and often ruthlessly pushed through their interests. At the same
time, a number of less self-seeking players has become engaged in the DRC’s conflict and
post-conflict phase, for instance the United Nations or the European Union. Only the latter
group deserves the name ‘external actors’, because the former were essentially parties to
the conflict itself. Through the deployment of MONUC or the EU-led Artemis operation,
these external actors have tried to keep the shaky peace and stabilize the chaotic situation
on the ground. This engagement is considered here as a case of mediative engagement.
Out of these reasons, this situation is classified as an instance of the mediated, obstructive
power-sharing or ‘Doomed to Share’ type.
Post-2006 Episode. The elections in 2006 were not accompanied by a thorough paci-
fication of the country. The DRC has remained a hotspot of civil strive and instability
even after the conclusion of post-conflict elections. Therefore, the post-2006 constellation
continues to be characterized by highly obstructive relations. The role of external actors
has not changed significantly. MONUC has remained deployed even after the upholding
of elections, but has been largely unable to decisively constrain the behavior of external
actors (see the case study in chapter 4.2). The only real difference to the situation described
above lies in the role played by the government. Immediately after being confirmed in
office, Joseph Kabila took attempts to curtail opposition parties and get rid of his main
opponents. He successfully forced Jean-Pierre Bemba into exile and took a number of
other measures to secure, for himself, a position of dominance in the DRC. Out of this
reason, the post-2006 polity can be considered a case of political domination, characterized
by a widespread exclusion of Kabila’s former opponents. Out of these reasons, the DRC in
the post-2006 period is classified as an instance of the ‘mediated obstructive domination or
‘The Winner Took it All’ polity type.
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A.7.4 Map of the DRC
Figure A.7: Map: Democratic Republic of Confo. Source: United Nations Cartographic
Division
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A.8 East Timor
Population 980,84
Total Area 14,874 Sq. Km.
Total Land 14,874 Sq. Km.
Coastline 1,035 km
Capital Dili
Languages
12 Timorese languages of which Tetun is the most widely used; Portuguese
is the other major language; (both of these are official languages). Indonesian
and English are spoken within certain segments of the population.
Boundaries Indonesia: 200 km
Ethnic Groups
78% Timorese including Austronesian sub-groups, Papuan sub-groups and
Mestizos; 19% Indonesian; 2% Chinese; 1% Portuguese
Religions
92% Roman Catholics; 3% Protestants; 3% Other; 2% Muslims, Hindus and
Buddhists
Source: Countrywatch (2010): East Timor 2010 Country Review (Coleman 2010).
Table A.16: Basic Facts and Figures: East Timor
A.8.1 Country and Conflict Information
a) General Background
Note: East Timor is discussed in the UCDP Database as a part of Indonesia, therefore the
following paragraph first focuses on general issues related to Indonesia before turning
more specifically to the case of East Timor below. Indonesia consists of more than 17.000
islands and is culturally diverse. At independence, its exact borders were uncertain: The
political elite claimed some territories which had not been controlled by the Dutch, while
several local leaders rejected the Indonesian concept and favored self-governance. The
expansionist policies of Indonesia became more proclaimed over time and eventually led
to interstate conflict in 1962 against the Netherlands, which at the time controlled territory
in the western part of the island New Guinea (see UCDP 2010l).
East Timor had been a Portuguese colony for some 400 years until the withdrawal of its
colonial power in 1975. The pro-independence party Fretilin took power and unilaterally
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proclaimed the country’s independence, but Indonesia brutally occupied the territory only
a few weeks later in December 1975. This led to “a twenty-four-year brutal occupation,
costing between 108,000 and 180,000 Timorese lives” (Bowles and Chopra 2008: 273).
Different groups resisted the Indonesian occupation, joined together in 1987 under the
umbrella of the ‘Conselho Nacional de Resistência Maubere’ (CNRM) [whose name
was changed in 1998 into ‘Conselho Nacional de Resistência Timorense’ (CNRT)] and
represented militarily through Falintil (Bowles and Chopra 2008: 273). During the
occupation, it has been “reliably assessed that a third of the East Timorese population died
as a direct result of Indonesia’s administration” (Smith and Dee 2006: 394).
b) Conflict History
Internally, the Indonesian government had been challenged by Islamic movements as well
as breakaway factions from the armed forces, leading to intrastate conflict over the control
of the government in 1953 and 1958-61. The country also experienced several intrastate
conflicts over territory, starting in South Moluccas in 1950, and eventually followed by
on-and off fighting in West Papua in 1965-78, in the former Portuguese colony of East
Timor in 1975-89, 1992, 97-98, and in the territory of Aceh in 1990-91 and 1999-05.
During the second episode of the conflict in Aceh, the rebel group GAM (Gerakan Aceh
Merdeka, Free Aceh Movement), made use of one-sided violence (see UCDP 2010l).
After the resignation of Indonesia’s long term dictator Suharto in 1998, a window of
opportunity opened for the United Nations to address the East Timorese status ques-
tion. After talks about offering autonomy and assigning a ‘special status’ to East Timor
throughout 1998, the new Indonesian president B.J. Habibie surprisingly offered to hold
a UN-monitored referendum in East Timor, which should give the impetus for decoding
whether East Timor should remain an autonomous region within Indonesia or whether it
should become independent – a decision that may have been “in part a reflection of his
unpredictable and eccentric personality” (Smith and Dee 2006: 395). In tripartite talks
between Indonesia, Portugal and the United Nations, the conduct of the UN supervised
ballot – with Indonesian authorities maintaining security – was agreed on 5 May 1999
(Smith and Dee 2006: 396–397). Administered by the United Nations Mission to East
Timor (UNAMET), the referendum took place on 30 August 1999 and yielded a 78 percent
pro-independence vote (see e.g. Suhrke 2001: 2–5). The referendum was followed by
an orchestrated campaign of destruction, which could only be stopped by the arrival of
an Australian-led International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) (Bowles and Chopra
2008: 273). This was followed by UNTAET assuming authority over the territory between
October 1999 and May 2002.
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c) Conflict and Peacekeeping Information
Conflict parties Fretilin
UCDP Conflict ID 134
UCDP Episode ID 1343
Duration 1997-1998
Intensity minor armed conflict
Outcome Conflict inactivity
Victorious side n/a
Peacekeeping
UNTAET (October 1999 – May 2002); UNMISET (May 2002 – May 2005);
UNMIT (August 2006 – present)
Mission mandate:
UNTAET
“UNTAET was established on 25 October 1999 to administer the Territory,
exercise legislative and executive authority during the transition period and
support capacity-building for self-government. East Timor became an inde-
pendent country on 20 May 2002. Also that day, UNTAET was succeeded
by the United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET) [. . . ]”
(Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2001f).
Mission mandate:
UNMISET
“East Timor became an independent country on 20 May 2002, marking the
end of a three-year process towards independence under the guidance of the
United Nations. On that day, the Security Council established UNMISET
to provide assistance to East Timor over a period of two years until all
operational responsibilities were fully devolved to the East Timor authorities.
Subsequently, the Council extended mission’s mandate for another year to
permit the new nation, which had changed its name to Timor-Leste, to attain
self-sufficiency. UNMISET successfully completed its mandate on 20 May
2005” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2009g).
Mission mandate:
UNMIT
“Expressing its concern over the still fragile security, political and humanitar-
ian situation in Timor-Leste, the Security Council, by its resolution 1704 of
25 August 2006, established a new, expanded operation – the United Nations
Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT) – to support the Government in
“consolidating stability, enhancing a culture of democratic governance, and
facilitating political dialogue among Timorese stakeholders, in their efforts
to bring about a process of national reconciliation and to foster social cohe-
sion”. UNMIT took over from the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste”
(Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2009d).
Source: ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Table A.17: Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: East Timor
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A.8.2 Post-conflict situation
a) The Role of the Formal Government
The role of the formal government in East Timor greatly depends on the moment of
analysis. Two periods can be identified: the pre-independence period, the period of the UN
transitional administration (1999-2002), and East Timor’s period of independence starting
in 2002. Until the referendum of 1999 that triggered the violent campaign, East Timor
was de facto under Indonesian sovereignty, although no country except for Australia had
accepted the Indonesian claim for legitimate sovereignty. De jure, the country was still
under the sovereignty of Portugal as it was its former colonial power. Yet, as this period
is strictly speaking not part of the post-conflict situation, it can be safely ignored. The
period starting with UNTAET assuming responsibility on 25 October 1999 and ending with
Timorese independence on 20 May 2002 is the actual episode of transitional administration
by the United Nations. During that time, East Timor’s entire civilian administration was
run by the United Nations. After 2002, the country is difficult to classify as a post-conflict
case because the contenders (the Indonesian militias) had not been present in the country
any longer. Therefore, the classification confines itself to the period of the transitional
government.
b) The Role of External Parties
External parties were involved mainly in two ways during and after the conflict: through
the multinational military intervention that was staged following the post-referendum
violence (INTERFET), and through the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor
(UNTAET):
Multinational Intervention (INTERFET). The violence that succeeded the referen-
dum made it impossible for the United Nations to immediately establish their authority
in the territory of East Timor. Instead, it was necessary to design a peace enforcement
mission, endowed with a significant level of resolve, within a relatively short period of
time. INTERFET was led by Australia and, at its peak, reached a strength of 11,500 troops
(Chopra 2000: 28). It was an intervention in which the “humanitarian aim of bringing
violence against the East Timorese to an end was matched by the military means to achieve
that goal” (Philpott 2006: 144; see also Wheeler and Dunne 2001).
Transitional Administration (UNTAET). East Timor is a special case as it represents
the “most comprehensive transitional administration undertaken by the UN during the
1990s” (Suhrke 2001: 2). The status of East Timor before the referendum and the UN
intervention was relatively unclear:
“Indonesia had de facto but not de jure control, Portugal had de jure authority but
none de facto, and the East Timorese independence movement, Conselho National
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da Resistencia Timorense (CNRT), had a wide international solidarity network and a
Nobel Prize winner among its leaders, but no formal international standing and only a
one-man lobby at the UN” (Suhrke 2001: 3).
Out of these reasons, East Timor had been considered by the United Nations – together
with Portugal – a ‘non self-governing territory’ already for decades, which in part explains
the direct responsibility they assumed for the territory (Suhrke 2001: 3). Overall, the
Transitional Administration in East Timor was very much modeled after the similar mission
in Kosovo. The common challenge in both cases was that the missions were established
“following military conflicts that produced acute administrative vacuums in their wake”
(Caplan 2005: 93). As in Kosovo, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO)
dominated the planning and conduct of the operation, which marginalized the role of the
Department of Political Affairs (DPA), although the latter had been the “principal unit in
the Secretariat to handle East Timor” and had developed significant local expertise (Suhrke
2001: 6). According to Suhrke, this had detrimental consequences for the mission as it
essentially imposed the principles of a classical peacekeeping mission to a challenge that
went far beyond that (Suhrke 2001: 6–11). The central belief in the principle of neutrality
also led to an exclusion of local parties in the process, including the CNRT, which had
not been considered a legimitate independence movement, but rather a ‘faction’ or party
to the conflict (Bowles and Chopra 2008: 276, see also Suhrke 2001: 8). Together, these
factors greatly reduced the legitimacy of the mission in the eyes of the population, which
demonstrated that “the legitimacy of an international transitional administration rapidly
erodes if it is not based on local ownership” (Bowles and Chopra 2008: 299). It is for
these reasons that UNTAET has been criticized from many sides as being an “exercise in
benevolent colonialism” (Traub 2000: 75) and that it was “absurd and extraordinary” to
exclude the local population (Chopra 2002: 981).
c) The Warring Factions
East Timor differs from many other post-conflict situations in that the ‘government side’
of the conflict – that is the Indonesian political elites and the militias acting on their behalf
– left the territory after the INTERFET mission had been initiated (see e.g. Traub 2000:
75). As argued above, the ‘rebels’ in this conflict – the Timorese independence movement
CNRT and its armed wing Falintil – were effectively excluded from the political process
during the transitional administration. Historically, Falintil had been the armed wing of
the Fretilin political party (‘Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor’), but its
former leader Xanana Gusmão (president of East Timor from 2001 to 2007) distanced itself
from the party and transformed it into the armed wing of the unified resistance movement
already in the 1980s. Unlike in other cases, the former rebel-movements did not form one
coherent political movement in East Timor after the country had reached independence,
but remained largely divided and factionalized. The united resistance movement CNRT
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was dissolved in June 2001 – six weeks before the election – following UNTAET’s request
for forming individual political parties. Fretilin had left the CNRT already in 2000. Many
former CNRT members gathered under the umbrella of the Partido Democratico (PD),
a party Gusmão sympathized with but with which he had not formally alligned. This
left no serious competitor for Fretilin in the parliamentary elections of 2001 as the party
could successfully sell itself as “the main resistance organization that had fought [. . . ]
against the Indonesian occupation” (Bowles and Chopra 2008: 279–280). Gusmão – the
central Timorese figure of the independence movement and during the UN transitional
administration – successfully ran as an independent for the presidency and was endorsed
by all parties except Fretilin, which won a majority in the parliamentary elections in that
same year.
A.8.3 Assessment
The period of the transitional government in East Timor can be treated, together with
Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a case of supreme intervention by external actors.
The far-reaching exclusion of local stakeholders from decision-making processes within
the UNTAET administration makes clear how blatantly the United Nations overrode local
authority. By definition, this also classifies East Timor as a case of domination. What is
more difficult to assess are the relations between the warring factions, since the Indonesian
militias were largely disbanded after the INTERFET intervention in 1997. However, the
relations with Indonesia as a whole remained conflictual, and occasional clashes have
occurred on the ground both during and after the deployment of UNTAET. Therefore,
the relations between the warring factions as a whole can be considered obstructive. Out
of these reasons, this situation is classified as an instance of the supreme, obstructive
domination or ‘Benevolent Intrusion’ type.
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A.8.4 Map of East Timor
Figure A.8: Map: Indonesia. Source: United Nations Cartographic Division
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A.9 El Salvador
Population 6,672,218 as of 2007
Total Area 21,040 Sq. Km.
Total Land 20,720 Sq. Km.
Coastline 545 km
Capital San Salvador
Languages
Spanish
Nahua
Boundaries
Honduras: 342 km
Guatemala: 203 km
Ethnic Groups 90% Mestizo, 9% White, 1% Amerindian
Religions 86% Roman Catholic, 14% Protestant and other
Source: Countrywatch (2008): El Salvador 2008 Country Review (Coleman 2008f).
Table A.18: Basic Facts and Figures: El Salvador
A.9.1 Country and Conflict Information
a) General Background
El Salvador had been colonized by Spain before it became a member of the United
Provinces of Central America. It was declared independent in 1856. Post-independence
politics was largely controlled by an oligarchy known as las catorce, which had enjoyed
significant support from the military. After about one hundred years of autocratic rule,
radical leftist groups expanded rapidly in the 1970s (see UCDP 2010i).
El Salvador reached independence after the dissolution of the United Province of Central
America. After a coup d’état in 1932, politics were dominated by the military for the
upcoming 50 years, with authoritarian governments limiting freedom and employing
political repression (Coleman 2008f: 7–11). Opposition to their rule had grown sharply
in the 1970s, which eventually gave rise to guerrilla warfare in 1979. Although a reform-
minded group within the military ousted the right-wing government already in the same
year and formed a revolutionary junta with formerly exiled opposition leader José Napoléon
Duarte (Christian Democratic Party, PDC) leading the provisional government, parts of
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the guerrilla movements had not been satisfied by the reforms and demanded more radical
changes (Coleman 2008f: 7–11).
b) Conflict History
In 1979, a number of these groups initiated an armed fight against the government, and
later united into a rebel group called FMLN (‘Frente Farabundo Marti para la liberación
nacional’), named after Farabundo Marti, the communist leader of the peasant revolution
in 1932. The FMLN fought the government between 1980-1991. With the conclusion of
the UN-brokered Chapultepec Peace Accords signed in 1992, the conflict was terminated
(see UCDP 2010i).
The FMLN insurgents initiated a fight against the government in 1980. The group enjoyed
support from Cuba and the Soviet Union (Coleman 2008f: 7–11). This gave rise to a
decade-long civil war between the government and the FMLN in the course of which more
than 70,000 people were killed (see e.g. Allison 2010; Call 2003; Karl 1992; Reiber 2009;
Wantchekon 1999; Zinecker 2004: 9–10). Amidst an ongoing civil war, El Salvador held
its first democratic presidential elections in 1984. The former head of the revolutionary
junta, Duarte, won the elections, but his powers were greatly compromised by the military’s
continued say in domestic politics. Parties to the left of the PDC were effectively excluded
from participation in the elections (see Munck 1993 and Reiber 2009: 192). The United
States, determined to prevent a second Nicaragua in the region, heavily supported the
military-controlled government in El Salvador (Munck 1993: 77). With rising levels
of US support totaling US $ six billion throughout the duration of the war, the FMLN
realized that it was unable to win the armed conflict and changed its strategy to some form
of ‘low intensity warfare’ in 1984 (Reiber 2009: 192). The next elections took place in
1989, which gave rise to a peaceful governmental turnover. Alfredo Cristiani from the
right-wing ARENA party (Nationalist Republican Alliance) won a majority of votes. This
event marked the first peaceful transferal of executive power from one elected president to
another. Meanwhile, the end of the Cold War altered the external environment in which
the war was carried out, and in early 1990 the government and the FMLN met in New
York upon the invitation of the UN Secretary General. In September the parties signed
the New York Accord, which established the conditions for a peaceful settlement. The
final agreement (Chapultepec Accord) was signed on January 16, 1992, establishing a
nine-months cease fire. A ceremony held on 15 December 1992 marked the official end of
the conflict (Coleman 2008f: 7–11).
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c) Conflict and Peacekeeping Information
Conflict parties ERP , FAL, FARN, FPL, PRTC, FMLN
UCDP Conflict ID 120
UCDP Episode ID 1202
Duration 1979-1991
Intensity war
Outcome Peace Agreement
Victorious side n/a
Peacekeeping
ONUSAL (United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador); July 1991 –
April 1995
Mission Mandate:
“ONUSAL was established in July 1991 to verify implementation of
all agreements between the Government of El Salvador and the Frente
Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion Nacional, including a ceasefire and
related measures, reform and reduction of the armed forces, creation of
a new police force, reform of the judicial and electoral systems, human
rights, land tenure and other economic and social issues” (Department of
Peacekeeping Operations 2003c).
Source: ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Table A.19: Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: El Salvador
A.9.2 Post-conflict situation
El Salvador’s civil war was relatively ideological and highly influenced by the dynamics
of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War, therefore, played an important enabling
environment for the settlement of the civil war in El Salvador (see Burgerman 2000: 68).
The post-conflict period that emerged with the settlement of the conflict in 1994 neither led
to a power-sharing arrangement nor to a transitional government. Instead, the incumbent
government simply remained in power until new elections were held in 1994, which
confirmed the incumbent regime in office. 1992 can therefore be used as the starting point
for El Salvador’s post-conflict situation.
a) The Role of the Formal Government
During the conflict, the government-side in the Salvadorian conflict had mainly been
dominated by the military. Duarte was therefore unable to exert significant influence on
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the outcome of the civil war. Clearly, the ‘government’ must therefore not be equated
with the president, who was considered a communist by many of the right-wing military
leaders and possessed close to no bargaining power (Munck 1993: 78). This changed after
Cristiani was elected president in 1989, who was in a better bargaining position towards
the military and the conservatives. It was the starting point for a long period of ARENA
dominance in Salvadoran politics. In the 1994 elections, ARENA was confirmed in office,
gaining 39 out of 84 seats in the National Assembly, and their candidate Calderón Sol won
more than two thirds of the votes in the runoff elections for the presidency (see Lehoucq
1995: 179–180). However, also the FMLN was relatively successful in its first elections
as a political party: it emerged as the second-strongest force and even outperformed the
PDC6 (see Lehoucq 1995). Nonetheless, the election results caused the FMLN’s effective
exclusion from political participation: although ARENA lacked an absolute majority in the
National Assembly, the party refused to cooperate with the FMLN and instead engaged
in deal-making with smaller opposition parties, thereby effectively bypassing the FMLN
(Holiday 2005: 80). This resulted in a strongly polarized party system and also fostered
the ideological divide between the government and the largest opposition party (Azpuru
2010: 112; see also Reiber 2009: 205).
Despite that, the FMLN has been able to steadily improve its results. It gained a
majority of seats in the Legislative Assembly in 2000, causing ARENA (which still held
the presidency) to engage in even more absurd political tradeoffs in order to continue
its boycott of the FMLN (Holiday 2005: 79). In the end, this strategy has not worked
out: while an ARENA candidate (Elías Antonio Saca González) could once more win
the presidential elections in 2004, the FMLN’s candidate Salvador Sánchez Cerén won
the 2009 elections (Azpuru 2010; Colburn 2009; Greene and Keogh 2009). This event
marked the “first peaceful turnover of power since the nation-state became independent
[. . . ]” (Colburn 2009: 144).
b) The Role of External Parties
External actors in El Salvador have played an ambiguous role throughout the country’s
history. The United States have been by far the dominant external actor. During the Cold
War, El Salvador was of significant strategic importance and its civil war soon turned into
a proxy-war between the former super powers. The Reagan administration was determined
to prevent a victory of the Marxist FMLN insurgents and consequently supported the
Salvadorian government with significant resources (see Munck 1993: 78, see also Reiber
2009). Consequently, the implementation of peace was “contingent upon the USA itself
abandoning its support for a military solution”, which eventually took place with the end
of the Cold War and the change of the American presidency from Reagan to Bush (Reiber
6The PDC (Partido Demócrata Cristiano) was for a long time one of the most important Salvadoran parties.
Their candidate José Napoleón Duarte held the presidency between 1984 and 1989, before handing over
power to the ARENA candidate Alfredo Cristiani (see Stanley 2006: 104).
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2009: 89). Subsequently, the United States have contributed significantly to finding a
settlement between the parties and have since then generally supported El Salvador’s
transition process. At times, the country has used its leverage against the Salvadoran
government in order to speed up the implementation of the peace agreement (see Holiday
2005: 79). This indicates that the United States have over times managed to overcome
their partisanship for the government side.
Next to the United States, the United Nations have played a key role for facilitating the
settlement between the parties and contributing to an environment of mutual trust. They
have enjoyed a very good reputation among all major parties and their engagement is
generally considered a success (see Call 2003: 830; Reiber 2009: 230). Through providing
a level playing field during the peace negotiations, the UN were “central to the success of
the peace process” (Munck 1993: 83). ONUSAL had already been fully deployed by July
1991, even before a ceasefire agreement was negotiated. Its mandate was initially limited to
verifying the human rights agreement (see Burgerman 2000: 70). It was a relatively small
mission, employing not more than 380 military observers and some 600 police observers
(see above), but it nonetheless had important effects, for instance in that it “successfully
pressured the parties into backing away from a side agreement that threatened to corrupt
the new civilian police force” (Burgerman 2000: 71). ONUSAL was also responsible for
observing the 1994 elections (see Reiber 2009: 236).
c) The Warring Factions
In their opposition against the (military-led) government and driven by their Marxist
agenda, the FMLN had initially been convinced that it was able to overthrow the regime
relatively quickly. At the end of 1980, the FMLN launched a first big offensive that
marked the beginning of a decade of civil war, misleadingly called ‘final offensive’ by the
contenders (see Munck 1993: 77). Yet, the FMLN convincingly demonstrated that it was
not easily to defeat militarily either. It launched its largest military offensive in 1980, at
a time when external support had already started to crumble (Montgomery 1995: 141).
This offensive “made two things indisputably clear: the army’s lack of competence and
the FMLN’s inability to spark a popular insurrection” (Montgomery 1995: 141). Yet, it
is evident that the FMLN had developed a clear interest in peace at the end of the 1980s.
Once the peace accords were in place, the FMLN was quickly and smoothly transformed
into a political party, and has since then refrained from the use of violence.
A.9.3 Assessment
The post-conflict situation that emerged in El Salvador after the conclusion of the 1992
peace agreement resembles the situation in Mozambique (see A.15). The elections in 1994
gave rise to a situation in which one of the former warring parties (ARENA) dominated the
executive and effectively excluded the FMLN from political participation. Despite that, the
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FMLN accepted its electoral defeat and has since then remained a relatively constructive
party throughout the duration of the Salvadoran post-conflict polity. External actors were
engaged in El Salvador in a mediative manner. Out of these reasons, this situation is
classified as an instance of the ‘mediated, constructive domination’ or ‘Let the Winner
Take it All’ type.
A.9.4 Map of El Salvador
Figure A.9: Map: El Salvador. Source: United Nations Cartographic Division
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A.10 Guatemala
Population 12,714,458 as of 2006
Total Area 108,890 Sq. Km.
Total Land 108,430 Sq. Km.
Coastline 400 km
Capital Guatemala City
Languages Spanish; Indigenous languages
Boundaries Mexico: 962 km; Belize: 266 km; Honduras: 256 km; El Salvador: 203 km
Ethnic Groups 56% Mestizo; 44% Indigenous or predominantly indigenous
Religions
Roman Catholic; Protestant Sects; Traditional Maya Religions (percentages
not available)
Source: Countrywatch (2007): Guatemala 2007 Country Review (Coleman 2008g).
Table A.20: Basic Facts and Figures: Guatemala
A.10.1 Country and Conflict Information
a) General Background
The territory that today constitutes Guatemala had been conquered by the Spanish already
in the 16th century, who created the kingdom of Guatemala, which comprised several
other of today’s Latin American states. Guatemala (the country) reached independence in
1838. The landholding class soon established a ruling autocracy, which led to an unstable
political environment (coups, etc) continuing well into the 20th century. The conservative
governments and anti-communist regimes of the 1950s to the 1980s spawned resistance
from leftist organisations, which culminated in armed rebellions beginning in the 1960s
(see UCDP 2010j).
Guatemala gained independence from Spanish colonial rule in 1838. The greater part of
its post-colonial history was characterized by coups and counter-coups, which gave rise to
different authoritarian regimes. A notorious example was Gen. Jorge Ubico, who had ruled
the country in an authoritarian manner between 1930 and 1944 until he was overthrown by
the ‘October Revolutionaries’. This paved the way for elections held in 1945, in which Juan
José Arevalo was elected president. He quickly initiated social reforms, which were carried
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forward by his successor, Col. Jacobo Arbenz. The latter also enabled the legal registration
of the Guatemalan Labor Party in 1952 and enacted a land reform that raised the opposition
from foreign land owners, in particular the US-owned United Fruit Company (UFCO)
(Coleman 2008g: 8–9). After a significant portion of its territory was expropriated, the
company turned to its contact in the U.S. Government, which triggered a CIA sponsored
armed resistance against Arbenz from Honduras, led by Col. Carlos Castillo Armas in
1954. He reintroduced highly repressive measures, but was assassinated and replaced by a
military opponent, Gen. Ydigoras Fuentes, who was little better (Coleman 2008g: 8–9).
This triggered resistance from a group of junior military officers who revolted against the
president in 1960. Although their coup failed, this group “became the nucleus of the forces
that were in armed insurrection against the government for the next 35 years” (Coleman
2008g: 8–9).
b) Conflict History
From 1965 until the mid-1990s, the government of Guatemala faced an intrastate conflict
with leftist groups who wanted to bring down the government. They joined together to
create the URNG (Unidad revolucionaria nacional guatemalteca, Guatemalan National
Revolutionary Unity) in 1982. The government made use of one-sided violence. The
conflict was active until 1995, when negotiations that had begun in the late 1980s entered
their final stage. A concluding peace agreement was signed in the last days of 1996 (see
UCDP 2010j).
In the early 1960s, armed conflict erupted after a range of revolutionary movements – the
EPG (Guerrilla Army of the Poor), OPRA (Revolutionary Organization of Armed People)
and FAR (Rebel Armed Forces) – targeted government institutions through armed attacks.
In 1982, they were joined by a fourth group, URNG (Guatemala National Revolutionary
Unit), which had emerged out of the outlawed communist party. The rebels were repelled
in several counterinsurgency campaigns – made possible through US training for the
Guatemalan armed forces – between 1966 and 1974: “The government’s military forces
adopted a brutal, low technology approach to counterinsurgency, using ground forces and
draconian measures against civilian populations to deprive the guerrillas of support and
limit their area of operations” (Stanley and Holiday 2002: 426). Repression against the
population had been particularly severe during the presidencies of Col. Romero Lucas
Garcia (1978-1982) and Gen, Efrain Rios Montt (1982-1983). Montt was deposed by the
military, a new constitution was drafted, and general elections held in 1985, leading to the
presidency of Vinicio Cerezo from the Christian Democratic Party, who established a civil-
ian government. However, the civil war against the government and the counterinsurgency
campaign led by the army continued. In the next elections in 1990, Jorge Serrano from
the ‘Movement of Solidary Actions’ (MAS) was elected president. In a move that became
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known as an ‘autogolpe’, Serrano attempted to circumvent the Congress and re-establish
a more authoritarian system of rule, but failed and was replaced by the civilian interim
president Ramiro De Leon Carpio. In March 1994, the URNG signed a number of human
rights agreements with the government, and MINUGUA (‘United Nations Verification
Mission in Guatemala’) was established in November 1994. In the 1995 elections, the left
wing party FDNG (Guatemalan New Democratic Front) was allowed to take part in the
elections. In the runoff elections, Alvaro Arzú (from the ‘National Action Party’ – PAN)
narrowly defeated his competitor Alfonso Portillo (from the right wing party ‘Guatemalan
Republican Front’ – FRG). Arzú re-initiated the peace process, and signed a number
of agreements with the rebels in 1996. By 1997, the URNG was demobilized, and the
country slowly returned to peace (Coleman 2008g: 9–14). Guatemala’s civil war had
wide-ranging consequences. In total, more than 150,000 people were killed and some
50,000 ‘disappeared’ in the course of the war (see Stanley and Holiday 2002: 421).
c) Conflict and Peacekeeping Information
Conflict parties MR-13, FAR, EGP, PGT, ORPA, URNG
UCDP Conflict ID 36
UCDP Episode ID 363
Duration 1965 – 1995
Intensity minor armed conflict
Outcome Peace Agreement
Victorious side n/a
Peacekeeping
MINUGUA (United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala); January
1997 – May 1997
Mission mandate:
MINUGUA
“The United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala – the peacekeeping
mission within the larger civilian and humanitarian MINUGUA mission –
was established in January 1997 to verify the Agreement on the Definitive
Ceasefire between the Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolu-
cionaria Nacional Guatemalteca” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations
2003f).
Source: ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Table A.21: Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Guatemala
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A.10.2 Post-conflict situation
Together with Mozambique and El Salvador, the civil war in Guatemala had started at
the height of the Cold War and was largely affected by general Cold-War dynamics. The
settlement of the conflict in Guatemala took longer than in these other cases – a ceasefire
was only signed in March 1996, at a time when El Salvador and Mozambique had already
successfully completed their first post-conflict elections – but it can still be attributed to
similar dynamics, with the URNG having greatly lost ideological support and military
capacity after 1989 (see Stanley and Holiday 2002: 447).
a) The Formal Government
In Guatemala, the composition of the government had changed several times during the 36
years of the civil war. As outlined above, Guatemala had been ruled by various military
governments in the early phase of the conflict. This only changed in 1985, after the military
rule had become increasingly unstable and a group of reform-minded military officers
had paved the way for a reform of the constitution and national elections. They led to the
election of the Christian Democratic candidate Vinicio Cerezo for president (see Lehoucq
and Wall 2004: 487; Stanley and Holiday 2002: 427).
However, the military still continued to exert tight control of the policy process and
greatly influenced the government’s agenda. Cerezo only managed to stay in power “by
accepting the demos-constraining conditions set out by the military leadership” (Sánchez
2008: 137, emphasis original). The next elections five years later gave rise to the presidency
of Jorge Serrano Elías from the Movement of Solidary Action (MAS) party. This event
was the first transfer of power from one democratically elected government to another in
Guatemala’s history. Despite some marked achievements, Serrano attempted a ‘self-coup’
(autogolpe) by trying to dissolve the Congress and Supreme Court, allegedly in order to
fight corruption. Due to immense internal and external pressures, Serrano had to resign
and flee in 1993. The human rights ombudsman Ramiro De Leon Carpio stepped in as
an interim president and made significant progress towards restoring peace (Coleman
2008g: 9–14). Runoff elections to the presidency in January 1996 again gave rise to
another president: Alvaro Arzú, who narrowly defeated Alfonso Portillo – a “stand-in
for former dictator Jose Efrain Rios Montt, who opposed the peace process” (Jonas 2000:
13). Though Arzú successfully brought the peace agreement on its way, he failed to
push through important reforms and implement key provisions from the peace agreement
(see Jonas 2000 and Reiber 2009: 113–114). As all his predecessors, he was already
outvoted after his first presidential term in 1999, when he ultimately lost against Alfonso
Portillo (see Sánchez 2008: 128). In what were their first elections after being transformed
into a political party, the URNG participated under the name ‘New Nation Alliance
– Guatemalan National Revolutionary Union’ (DIA-URNG) and nominated their own
presidential candidate, Àlvaro Colom Caballeros. He won about 12 percent of valid votes
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in the presidential elections, and the party/ coalition as a whole was able to secure 9 out
of a total of 113 legislative seats only (Lehoucq 2002). Since then, the party has become
even more marginalized. During the last round of elections, held in 2007, its presidential
candidate gained a meager 2.1 of the valid votes, and the party‘s representation in the
parliament dropped to not more than two seats (see Azpuru 2008: 564).
As a result of this extremely high level of volatility, speaking of ‘the’ government-side in
the context of the Guatemalan conflict is misleading. Rather, the armed conflict took place
between a military acting relatively autonomously from the government and a number of
left-wing rebel groups. In comparison to the military, civilian governments have always
been relatively weak actors, and this has not changed immediately with the adoption of the
peace agreement. Since the introduction of an electoral democracy in 1985, all Guatemalan
presidents have “failed miserably in the attempt to get their respective parties re-elected”
(Sánchez 2008: 128). Parties generally play a subordinate role in politics:
“Twenty years after the onset of electoral democracy, Guatemalan parties have yet to
acquire centrality in the distribution of power in any meaningful sense. Simply put,
they have not emerged as autonomous institutions that wield genuine political clout,
enough to be able to effect economic or political change on their own. The center of
political gravity and power continues to lie outside of parties” (Sánchez 2008: 144).
The weakness of virtually all civilian governments in Guatemala has also been compounded
by the difficulties of the Guatemalan political system and the blossoming political apathy of
Guatemalans. The Congress is a particularly troublesome institution, as it is “notoriously
corrupt, divisive, and incapable of producing well-drafted legislation in a timely way”
(Stanley and Holiday 2002: 427; see also Reiber 2009: 115). This has prevented the
implementation of some key provisions from the peace agreement (see Jonas 2000: 30),
and frustration with the Congress is also seen as one reason behind Serrano’s autogolpe in
1993 (see Stanley and Holiday 2002: 433).
b) External Parties
Compared to other typical Cold War conflicts, external parties have played a less strong
role in Guatemala than elsewhere. Most importantly, the United States have drastically
scaled back their support for Guatemala’s military governments already in 1977 – in
the wake of President Jimmy Carter’s human rights policies – and have since then only
provided “sporadic assistance under various anti-terrorism and anti-narcotics waivers [. . . ]”
(Stanley and Holiday 2002: 426).
The United Nations played a key role for facilitating the 1996 peace agreement, though.
Peace negotiations had been ongoing in El Salvador already since the end of the 1980s,
but only became fruitful after the United Nations took on the role as the mediator. The
UN’s chief contribution during the negotiation phase was “to help the government to
translate its proposals into terms acceptable to the URNG” (Stanley and Holiday 2002:
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429; see also Reiber 2009: 112). Guatemala also experienced the deployment of a UN
mission. The ‘UN Verification Mission in Guatemala’ (MINUGUA) had already been
established by November 1994, two years before the final settlement. As ONUSAL in El
Salvador, it had initially been a human rights mission, but after the adoption of the peace
agreement its mandate was extended to include the verification of the ceasefire and the
demobilization of the combatants. A particularity of MINUGUA was that the mission
lacked an authorization from the UN Security Council, and instead ran under a mandate
from the General Assembly (and on the General Assembly’s budget). This “resulted in an
operation much smaller than ONUSAL at its full force” (see Burgerman 2000: 78).
c) The Warring Factions
As argued at length above, the civil war in Guatemala took place only formally between
the government and an insurgent movement. At least since the reforms introduced in
1984, a closer look at the case reveals that the true driving force of the conflict on the
side of the state was not the government but the military. The insurgents have formed an
equally heterogeneous and fluid group of actors. Throughout three decades of civil war in
Guatemala, the composition of the main insurgent groups changed significantly. Initially,
the rebels consisted mainly of three groups: the ‘Revolutionary Armed Forces’ (FAR), the
‘Guerrilla Army of the Poor’ (EGP), and the Organization of the People in Arms (ORPA).
Only in 1982, nearly two decades after the beginning of the war, these groups unified and
formed the ‘Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity’ (URNG) (see Stanley and Holiday
2002: 425). Despite this reunion, the Guatemalan insurgents never came close to the level
of military leverage that similar movements, for instance in El Salvador, could exert:
“The guerrillas, though resilient, never achieved sufficient military strength to pose
an imminent threat to the state. [. . . ] Their equipment was eclectic, and of variable
and generally poor condition. [. . . ] While obviously a threat to the individuals and
businesses that it attacked, the URNG was little more than a nuisance to the state by
the late 1980s” (Stanley and Holiday 2002: 425; see also Holiday 2000: 78).
This has also mattered greatly for their role during and after the peace process. As
David Holiday argues, “[t]he often-overlooked key to understanding the Guatemalan peace
process is that the two parties to the peace agreement – the ruling National Advancement
Party (PAN) and the URNG guerrillas – were relatively weak actors with minority support
within society” (2000: 78).
The newly elected PAN government seems to have used the quick completion of the
peace process as an opportunity to boost its domestic and international political standing.
After Arzú’s inauguration, the peace process “moved at a rapid pace”, with five different
agreements signed within not more than one year (Stanley and Holiday 2002: 436). The
URNG accepted Azrú as an honest broker, but was – due to its lack of leverage – unable to
wield noticeable concession from the government. At the same time, its effective degree
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of political support had been highly uncertain, because leftist parties were expelled from
participating in elections since the mid-1950s (Holiday 2000: 79). Against this background,
it is questionable why the party had still supported the peace process. There are good
reasons to argue that the URNG counted on a satisfactory performance during the first
post-conflict elections in 1999. The elections in 1995 were the first occasion in which
a party from the left – the New Guatemala Democratic Front (FDNG) – participated.
Despite a “hastily organized campaign and little money”, the party managed to gain six
congressional seats (Stanley and Holiday 2002: 435). After this positive example “[t]he
guerrilla leadership certainly gambled on the possibilities for greater electoral gains under
more peaceful circumstances” (Holiday 2000: 79). As it turned out, this expectation was
mistaken, as the URNG is today a marginalized political force without much remaining
leverage or political support. It has accepted its defeat in the elections, but obviously
without having any viable alternative.
A.10.3 Assessment
As highlighted above, the civilian governments have historically always been relatively
weak actors, and this has changed only slowly since the adoption of the peace agreement
in 1997. The PAN government was the strongest force in politics between 1996 and
1999, but at the same time it had been incapable of implementing key provisions of the
peace agreement or pushing through urgently needed reforms. This makes it difficult to
adequately place Guatemala into one of the categories offered by the typology. While
power-sharing can be ruled out at the forefront, the case is no example for an outright
situation of domination either. Most importantly, PAN is no warring party and cannot be
taken as a representative of the same government that the URNG has targeted with its
insurgency. Thus, when focusing exclusively on formal politics, Guatemala is difficult
to classify. However, when taking a somewhat broader look at the real balance of power
between different societal forces in Guatemala, it becomes apparent that the military and
former elites continue to exert a crucial influence on politics and ‘dominate’ politics behind
the scenes. Whether these rather conservative forces would accept an URNG still remains
to be seen, but one can only speculate that their resistance would be stronger than what
could be observed in El Salvador after the FMLN won the 2009 presidential elections (see
5.3).
The contribution of external actors to the peace process in Guatemala was certainly
important, but their engagement was relatively modest in both scale and scope. In general,
it appears that external actors’ stakes in Guatemala’s development have been much more
moderate when compared, for instance, to the strong degree of US involvement into the
post-conflict polity in El Salvador. The United Nations mainly contributed to the peace
process by addressing some of the most pressing issues of the conflict, mostly with regard
to the blatant human rights violations committed by the belligerents in the course of the 30
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year long war. In this sense, the engagement of external actors can be considered a modest
case for mediative engagement.
The parties that negotiated the peace agreement – PAN and URNG – were relatively
weak forces. This clearly is an unusual environment for conflict settlements, since, in
most cases, at least one party tends to possess extensive political power and leverage.
Out of this reason, the opponents had little to lose from the peace agreement, but their
gains were – in retrospect – also relatively modest. PAN did not manage to secure a
second electoral turn for itself, and the URNG has become increasingly marginalized in
the political system. Meanwhile, the old elites, certainly closely affiliated with the military,
could at least temporarily benefit from the peace process they had rejected to support,
which is most vividly demonstrated by the FRG’s victory in the 1999 elections. Though
this was certainly a frustrating situation and can be taken as an indicator for Guatemala’s
“precarious” peace (Holiday 2000), it also underlines that the parties have maintained, by
and large, constructive relations since the adoption of the peace agreement in 1996. For
the above reasons, the case of Guatemala is classified as an instance of the ‘mediated,
constructive domination’ or ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ polity type.
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A.10.4 Map of Guatemala
Figure A.10: Map: Guatemala. Source: United Nations Cartographic Division
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A.11 Haiti
Population 8,429,006 as of 2007
Total Area 27,750 Sq. Km.
Total Land 27,750 Sq. Km.
Coastline 1,771 km
Capital Port-au-Prince
Languages French (Official); Creole
Boundaries Dominican Republic: 275 km
Ethnic Groups 95% African descent; 5% European and Mulatto
Religions 80% Roman Catholic; 16% Protestant Sects; 3% Other; 1% None
Source: Countrywatch (2008): Haiti 2008 Country Review (Coleman 2008h).
Table A.22: Basic Facts and Figures: Haiti
A.11.1 Country and Conflict Information
a) General Background
Haiti, once a French colony, gained independence already in 1804. The post-independence
environment was highly unstable and characterized by political tensions between the blacks
and the ruling ‘mulattos’. In 1915, the United States invaded the country in order to restore
order, followed by nearly two decades of rule by an authoritarian military government. In
1957, the notorious reign of “Papa Doc” Duvalier began, who was a nationalist intellectual
who established a tight grip to power. His son, “Baby Doc” Duvalier, was appointed
president for life in 1964. Violent opposition against his rule erupted more than twenty
years later, and Duvalier was flown out of the country by the United States in 1986. Power
was then transferred to civilian Junta. (see UCDP 2010k).
Since Haiti gained independence, the country has been struggling to establish an account-
able political system. Authoritarianism and personal rule became most drastically apparent
during the reign of the “notoriously brutal Duvalier dynasty” between 1957 and 1986 (von
Einsiedel and Malone 2006: 154). Hopes for an improvement of the country’s democratic
record rose high with the December 1990 presidential elections, which brought to power
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the young Roman Catholic priest Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Though he made serious attempts
to tackle some of the country’s most pressing challenges, his increasingly personal system
of rule triggered opposition from within the military, and he was eventually overthrown in
a bloody coup by Colonel Raoul Cédras on 30 September 1991 (Malone 1997: 127). The
coup and the subsequent military regime had disastrous effects on the country: “Estimates
are that over 1,000 Haitians were killed in the days following the September coup, and
3,000 more were killed in the following three years” (Coleman 2008h: 12).7
b) Conflict History
In 1991, a military coup took place in Haiti, ousting the popularly elected President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide. The coup sparked an intra-state conflict. After some hesitation,
the United States intervened on Aristide’s behalf and helped to reinstall the president,
deploying a 20,000 strong US-led multinational force to Haiti in 1994. In 2000, Aristide
was re-elected, but he was subsequently accused of electoral fraud and lost popular support.
An armed insurgence group, the FLRN (‘Front pour la Libération et la Reconstruction
Nationales’) removed him from office in 2004. After that, René Préval was elected
president (see UCDP 2010k).
After the coup and the accompanying unrest, the UN Security Council approved the deploy-
ment of 700 military and 600 police personnel as part of UNMIH (‘United Nations Mission
in Haiti’) (Malone 1997: 129–130). Yet, the transport of Canadian and US peacekeepers
by a US warship was forestalled by the “de facto regime’s notorious henchmen – launched
into a noisy dockside demonstration, screaming ‘We are going to turn this into another
Somalia”’ (Malone 1997: 131). Surprisingly, the strategy worked, and the ship was ordered
back by Washington. The next year the UN authorized a US-led multinational force with a
robust (Chapter VII) mandate, marking the “first time the United States had sought UN
authority for the use of force within its own hemisphere” (von Einsiedel and Malone 2006:
156). In a deal brokered by Jimmy Carter, the United States achieved the consent from
the de facto regime in Port-au-Prince for the deployment of the mission in exchange for
an amnesty. To the irritation of many (including Aristide), the military regime was flown
out of the country in a US airplane at the time the mission was deployed in September
1994, and Aristide returned to Port-au-Prince (Malone 1997: 133). In January 1995 – after
the US force commander had certified a ‘secure and stable environment’ – the mission
was handed over from the multinational force to UNMIH. After two follow-up missions
– UNSMIH (‘UN Support Mission in Haiti’) and UNTMIH (‘UN Transition Mission in
Haiti’) – the only UN personnel remaining in the country by 1997 were civilians forming
7For a more detailed analysis of Haiti’s colonial and post-independence history, see in particular Fatton
(2006).
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part of the MIPONUH (‘UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti’) (von Einsiedel and Malone
2006: 157).
Meanwhile, the country’s newly reinstalled democracy experienced severe backdrops,
culminating in the rise of political violence and President Préval’s (Aristide’s hand-picked
successor as he himself was not allowed to run for the presidency again by the constitution)
decision to rule by decree and suspend the country’s lawmakers and mayors (von Einsiedel
and Malone 2006: 158). In 2000, Aristide was re-elected. But during his reign the
political tensions worsened and finally escalated in 2004, at the occasion of the 200-year
celebration for the independence of the country, when well-armed anti-Aristide militas
initiated an armed conflict. Aristide’s forces were unable to keep the riots under control,
and France and the US exerted pressure on Aristide to step down, just ten years after they
had reinstalled him in office (Coleman 2008h: 19).
c) Conflict and Peacekeeping Information
Conflict parties Tonton Macoute, Engine Lourd (1st), RARF, OP Lavalas (2nd)
UCDP Conflict ID 186 (both)
UCDP Episode ID 1862,19
Duration 1991 – 1991; 2004 – 2004
Intensity minor armed conflict (both)
Outcome One-sided victory (1st), other (2nd)
Victorious side Non-gov. (1st), n/a (2nd)
Peacekeeping
UNMIH (United Nations Mission in Haiti); September 1993 – June 1996
UNSMIH (United Nations Support Mission in Haiti); July 1996 – July
1997 UNTMIH (United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti); August 1997 –
November 1997 MIPONUH (UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti); Decem-
ber 1997 – March 2000 MINUSTAH (United Nations Stabilization Mission
in Haiti); June 2004 – present
Mission mandate UN-
MIH
“UNMIH was established in September 1993 to help implement provisions
of the Governors Island Agreement of 3 July 1993. The mandate was
later revised to enable the Mission to assist the democratic Government to
sustain a stable environment, professionalize the armed forces and create a
separate police force, and establish an environment conducive to free and
fair elections” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2003b).
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Mission mandate UN-
SMIH
“UNSMIH was established to assist the Government in the professionaliza-
tion of the police, maintenance of a secure and stable environment conducive
to the success of efforts to establish and train an effective national police
force, and to coordinate activities of the United Nations system in promot-
ing institution-building, national reconciliation and economic rehabilitation”
(Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2003d).
Mission mandate
UNTMIH
“Established to assist the Government of Haiti by supporting and contribut-
ing to the professionalization of the Haitian National Police (HNP). Tasks of
UNTMIH’s police element included training HNP specialized units in crowd
control, the rapid reaction force and Palace security, areas considered to be
of distinct importance” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2009l).
Mission mandate
MIPONUH
“Established to assist the Government in the professionalization of the
National Police. The mission placed special emphasis on assistance at
the supervisory level and on training specialized police units. Other tasks
included mentoring police performance, guiding police agents in day-to-day
duties and maintaining close coordination with technical advisers to the
Police funded by the United Nations Development Programme and bilateral
donors” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2009b).
Mission mandate MI-
NUSTAH
“Having determined that the situation in Haiti continued to constitute a
threat to international peace and security in the region and acting under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council, by its resolution 1542
of 30 April 2004, decided to establish the United Nations Stabilization
Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and requested that authority be transferred
from the Multinational Interim Force (MIF), authorized by the Security
Council in February 2004, to MINUSTAH on 1 June 2004” (Department of
Peacekeeping Operations 2009k).
Source: ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Table A.23: Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Haiti
A.11.2 Post-conflict situation
The case of Haiti is a somewhat unusual case of externally-led intervention because
external actors’ interference was not closely linked to a civil war in the classical sense.
While, in most cases, external actors try to facilitate a compromise between two warring
parties, external actors in Haiti intervened in order to re-install a president who enjoyed
international legitimacy and US-backing. While Aristide’s ousting was accompanied by
riots and tensions that can formally be considered a (minor) internal armed conflict, external
intervention aimed at a regime change and not primarily at reaching or implementing a
peace agreement. In this sense, the term post-conflict situation is misleading in the case of
Haiti – one would rather have to speak of a post-intervention situation that began with the
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US-led re-installment of Bertrand Aristide and ended, at the latest, with his second ousting
in 2004. (Nonetheless, in order to ensure the comparability of the different cases, the term
post-conflict situation I continue to use the term post-conflict also in the case of Haiti.)
After the riots in 2004, a second post-conflict situation emerged that can be considered a
post-conflict polity type of its own.
a) The Role of the Formal Government
Aristide’s Reign. Between 1994 and 2004, the government in Haiti had continuously
been ruled by Aristide – either directly as president or indirectly from the background.
Although he could not run for the 1995 presidential elections as “stepping down was one
of the conditions set by the international community for his return” (Mobekk 2001: 176),
René Préval – the elected president between 1995 and 2000 – was Aristide’s “hand-picked
successor” and was “largely dependent on him for his political legitimacy” (von Einsiedel
and Malone 2006: 157). Aristide never truly reduced his claims to executive power:
“constitutionally barred from succeeding himself in 1996, [he] had waited out one term
while his political ally René Préval held the presidency” (Coleman 2008h: 15). In the next
presidential elections on 26 November 2000, Aristide won with more than 90 percent of
the vote. However, the elections were “boycotted by much of the opposition, and it was
not observed in any official capacity [. . . ]” (Coleman 2008h: 15). The opposition was no
clear-cut, well-organized movement, but rather “a motley collection ranging from former
allies of Aristide to right-wing figures with ties to Haiti’s dictatorial past – promised to
form a shadow government” (Coleman 2008h: 16). Hence, forming a government proved
problematic.
Aristide’s ongoing grip to power and his refusal to enter a political dialogue with the
opposition forms the background for the unrest and the eventual ousting of Aristide in
2004. One of the triggers were the legislative and municipal elections of May 2000:
“Although the balloting itself was judged to be free and fair, subsequent tamper-
ing with election results allowed Aristide’s Lavalas party to further consolidate its
sweeping victory over Haiti’s helpless opposition groups” (Erikson 2005: 84).
This had triggered strong resistance both from within the country and from external
actors: “When the results were released showing a sweeping Lavalas win [. . . ] the OAS
and most Western democracies condemned the results as fraudulent” (Coleman 2008h:
15). Although the international community – on the initiative of the US administration
– severely cut foreign aid, Aristide remained uncompromising and his relations with the
opposition parties severely worsened, and “for three long years, their positions remained
mutually exclusive”, thereby jeopardizing all democratic progress that had been achieved
in the past years (Erikson 2005: 84).
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Post-Aristide Period. After Aristide had gone into exile for the second time in February
2004, an interim government was formed – led by Gérard Latortue, a former Foreign
Minister and long-time professional in the UN system. He “quickly assembled a cabinet of
principally nonpartisan technocrats, although several opposition figures landed key posts”
(Erikson 2005: 89). However, Lavalas, Aristide’s party, was not represented in the interim
government (Erikson 2005: 89). Elections, originally scheduled to take place in 2005,
were postponed several times and ultimately took place in 2006. In the runoff elections to
the presidency, Lavalas candidate Réné Préval won a majority of votes and continued the
legacy that began with Aristide’s re-installment as president more than a decade before
(see Coleman 2008h: 25).
b) The Role of External Parties
External actors (including certain states) have always held strong stakes in the development
of the country throughout the past century. However, their roles and affiliations have greatly
changed over the course of Haiti’s political crisis that had been triggered by Aristide’s
ousting in 1991. Initially, this period was characterized by a strong sense of disagreement
within the international community about how to react to the new challenge, with the UN
favoring a US-led multinational intervention. However, “[t]he US government was initially
not keen, believing the UN flag to be essential for wide participation in multilateral action
and also because Aristide was wary of a US-dominated mission” (Malone 1997: 132).
In the end, in part due to Aristide’s ability to organize substantial political support in the
United States, the US government changed its position. The US-led operation yielded
quick successes, and the Haitian army collapsed within days (Malone 1997: 132). The
United Nations, too, took a firm stance against the de facto regime in Haiti and strongly
supported Aristide’s cause. In mid-1993, the UN Security Council imposed economic
sanctions against the Cédras government, and the UN Security Council openly called for a
military (Chapter VII) solution under US leadership in Resolution 940 in order to solve
the Haitian crisis. After it temporarily lifted the sanctions in order to induce the regime
to cooperate, it not only reimposed them when it realized that the Haitian regime was not
cooperative, but additionally imposed a naval blockade against Haiti (see von Einsiedel
and Malone 2006: 155–156). All in all, this implied a number of novelties:
“The adoption of Resolution 940 was groundbreaking in several respects. It marked
the first time the United States had sought UN authority for the use of force within
its own hemisphere. The resolution was also unprecedented in authorizing force to
remove one regime and install another within a member state” (von Einsiedel and
Malone 2006: 156).
After the successful regime change, external actors increasingly shifted their attention
to institution-building and preparing the countries for the elections scheduled for 1996.
In March 1995, external responsibility was handed over from the multinational force
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(MNF) to UNMIH, and the latter’s responsibility was extended to include a civilian police
component (see Malone 1997: 134). UNMIH remained deployed until shortly after the
elections and – ironically – was dismantled at the very moment when the security situation
began to intensify again. It was replaced by three follow-up missions whose mandates
became increasingly narrow over time, and since November 1997 the UN’s presence has
been exclusively civilian (see von Einsiedel and Malone 2006: 156–157). At this very
moment, however, political tensions began to deteriorate. The parliament was unable to
agree on a successor government after Réné Préval was elected as president and, ultimately,
dissolved, “leaving Preval (sic!) to govern without a legislature, pending the scheduled
parliamentary elections of 2000” (Coleman 2008h: 14). This created a highly unstable
political environment.
After Aristide had been ousted for a second time in 2004, external actors’ behavior
differed greatly from before. Just as the international community had been in agreement to
support the ousted president in the 1990s, it commonly rejected his grip to power in the
course of the 2004 accusations of electoral fraud and openly called upon him to step down.
The United States, now under the reign of the Bush administration, stopped the support for
Aristide:
“It was clear that Aristide’s polarizing politics had cost him the significant support
he had once enjoyed during the Clinton administration. While US Republicans
were always skeptical of Aristide’s leftist politics, his government’s record of poor
management and lack of accountability increasingly alienated the broader international
community” (Erikson 2005: 86).
Under increasing domestic pressure, Aristide called for a renewed international engagement
in his own favor in order to ‘prevent the flow of blood’, but the international community
called for a political solution. In mid-February 2004, the Bush administration’s support
for Aristide still went as far as calling upon the main opposition candidate Andy Apaid
to accept a power-sharing deal with Aristide, but the latter clung to his presidency and
exibited no willingness for compromise (Erikson 2005: 87). Meanwhile, France took
behind the scene preparations for Aristide’s departure, and within days the United States
had taken the necessary measures. On 29 February 2004, Aristide was escorted by US
Marines to an aircraft that carried him into political exile to the Central African Republic
and later to South Africa. “Aristide said that he never resigned voluntarily from office but,
rather, he was compelled by the United States forces to do so” (Coleman 2008h: 19). In
the course of these events, the UN Security Council authorized another multinational force
to be deployed in Haiti for an initial period of 90 days in order to restore law, succeeded by
a UN mission (MINUSTAH) endowed with Chapter VII authority (Erikson 2005: 87–88).
c) The Warring Factions
Unlike in other civil wars where a clear ‘government-side’ and a clear group of ‘rebels’ can
be identified – as in Mozambique or El Salvador – clearly identifying the warring parties
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is trickier in the case of Haiti. What is characteristic for Haiti is that the contenders are not
stable groups that have emerged over time, but rather ad hoc groups of contenders whose
formation had been triggered by the increasingly intolerable conditions that emerged as
democratic rule crumbled. It is therefore worth quoting a longer passage analyzing how
the anti-Aristide rebellion came about:
“The first clue that the endgame had begun in Haiti came on February 5, 2004,
when a group calling itself the Revolutionary Artibonite Resistance Front torched
the police station of Gonaïves. [. . . ] Almost simultaneously, former Haitian police
chief Guy Philippe opened up a second flank, crossing over the eastern border from
the Dominican Republic. Philippe soon emerged as the cherubic public face of an
uprising that rolled with surprising ease through northern Haiti. [. . . ] Youthful and
charismatic, Philippe became an unlikely and controversial folk hero as his campaign
progressed, with hundreds of recruits joining his ‘rebel army”’(Erikson 2005: 85).
The rebels, therefore were a loose “group composed of various factions, such as former
gang members, convicted criminals, and disgruntled ex-soldiers from the old Haitian army”
(Coleman 2008h: 20). Yet, this movement was been directly aligned with the political
opposition, although there clearly were strong unofficial links between the two (Coleman
2008h: 20). Overall, the radicalization of the opposition movement is attributed to two
factors that have become most apparent since the flawed legislative and municipal elections
of 2000: “The deteriorating economic situation [worsened by the cessation of aid payments,
CR] and the lack of political dialogue with non-Lavalas members led to calls by opposition
forces for Aristide to step down” (Coleman 2008h: 20).
A.11.3 Assessment
Haiti experienced two distinct political crises in the post-1989 era, both of which are listed
in the UCDP Database as cases of minor armed conflicts. Analytically, we can therefore
distinguish two different post-conflict situations: The first starting with the deployment of
UNMIH in 1993 and lasting until the renewed unrest in 2004, and the second starting after
the deployment of MINUSTAH in 2004 and lasting until the 2006 presidential elections
replaced the interim government. In the following, these post-conflict situations are briefly
assessed and then classified.
Aristide’s Reign (1993-2004). Aristide’s Lavalas party controlled the presidency for
roughly a decade between 1994 and 2004, without any measures for power-sharing being
implemented. The dissolution of the parliament in 1997 greatly fostered the Lavalas
party’s position of dominance. Once in power, Aristide’s (or his proxy Préval’s) record
of governance was mixed. It was marked by dubious human rights record, with several
opposition politicians being shot dead or imprisoned (see Coleman 2008h: 14–17). Out
of these reasons, the reigns of Préval and Aristide can safely be recognized as cases of
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political domination. The role of external actors during the first political crisis in Haiti
clearly differed from their role during the second crisis. The main difference lies in the
strong support that external actors – the United States in particular, but also the United
Nations – initially mobilized in favor of Aristide. Their engagement effectively amounted
to an externally-induced regime change, imposed by the use of considerable military
force. When ignoring for a while the important fact that Aristide possessed the legitimacy
of an elected president, this manner of engagement closely resembles the cases of Iraq
and Afghanistan. External actors did more than simply mediating a crisis between two
political opponents. Out of this reason, their engagement must be considered partisan. The
(former) warring parties in the case of Haiti were a rather vague group. Before Aristide was
re-installed in power in 1994, his main opponent clearly was the military who had violently
removed him from power three years earlier. However, after the US-led intervention this
group was effectively dissolved. Aristide’s main opponents then consisted of supporters
of the former regime who were opposed to his return to politics. The relations between
Aristide’s party and the political opposition were clearly tense during the decade of his
rule, which is vividly illustrated by the aforementioned crackdowns of opposition members
or the inability of the national parliament to form a new government after Préval won
the presidential elections. Therefore, the relations between the opponents can safely be
considered obstructive. Out of these reasons, Haiti’s first post-conflict period is classified
as a case of the ‘partisan obstructive domination’ or ‘You Stay Out’ polity type.
Post-Aristide Politics (since 2004). The second post-conflict situation, beginning with
Aristide’s involuntary departure, can likewise be considered a case of political domination,
though in reverse direction. The interim government effectively excluded Aristide’s party
Lavalas from participation in the government, which triggered considerable resistance
from among Aristide supporters (see above). Ultimately, however, this form of reverse-
domination was short-lived, since Réné Préval managed to re-gain the presidency for
himself in the 2006 presidential elections. The same holds true for the relations between
the warring parties in the second post-conflict period. After Aristide’s departure, the
interim government’s exclusion of Lavalas representatives triggered occasional clashes
between supporters of Aristide and security forces. For instance, in late 2004 riots broke
out on the occasion of the anniversary of the military coup that had overthrown Aristide
in 1991 (see Erikson 2005: 89). Due to the worsening security situation, the United
Nations have remained in the country until long after the election in 2006, although the
UN Security Council had initially envisioned a deployment for six months only (Coleman
2008h: 24). This, too, is an indicator for the tense situation in Haiti’s second post-conflict
polity. Hence, we can assume the presence of obstructive relations also for the second
post-conflict situation. The engagement of external actors was different in the case of the
second post-conflict period. After external actors dropped the partisan support for Aristide,
their role was confined to restoring public order in a country struck by an ongoing political
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crisis. Thus, external engagement in the second case can be considered mediative. Out of
these reasons, Haiti’s second post-conflict period is classified here as an instance of the
‘mediated obstructive domination’ or ‘The Winner Took it All’ polity type.
A.11.4 Map of Haiti
Figure A.11: Map: Haiti. Source: United Nations Cartographic Division
415
Appendix A Characterization and Classification of the Cases
A.12 Kosovo
A.12.1 Country and Conflict Information
a) General Background
Note: Kosovo is officially part of Serbia, but enjoys widespread autonomy and unilaterally
proclaimed independence in 2008. Because official recognition by the UN General Assem-
bly is pending, Kosovo is still treated as a Serbian province in the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed
Conflict Dataset’. The following general discussion therefore focuses on Serbia, before
turning more specifically to Kosovo below. The Republic of Serbia was proclaimed in June
2006 after Montenegro (the other remaining part of the Yugoslav Federation) opted for
independence. (Before, the country was named ‘Serbia and Montenegro’). The Republic
of Serbia is the successor entity of the former Yugoslav Federation, which dissolved in
1991, after both Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence, leading to intra-state
conflict. It ended with the territories’ international recognition in the same year. Bosnia
and Herzegovina also declared independence and was recognized in 1992, but the Yugoslav
government intervened in the intra-state war on Bosnian territory on the side of Bosnian
Serbs. Macedonia seceded peacefully in 1991 (see UCDP 2010s).
Kosovo is of central importance to Serbian culture and history, as it is the location of
major Orthodox monasteries and the site of the “mythic Serb defeat by the Ottomans in
the Battle of Kosovo Polje (1389)” (Dziedzic 2006: 322). Although Kosovo’s population
is predominantly Albanian, it is regarded by Serbs as the “cradle of their civilization”
(Dziedzic 2006: 322). While Kosovo formed part of the Ottoman Empire until 1912, it
has since then had a turbulent history: it was annexed by Serbia in the First Balkan War,
formed part of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in the inter-war period, fell
under Italian control and was annexed to Albania during World War II, and held the status
of an autonomous province within the Serb Republic under Tito (1945-1980) – one of the
six republics that formed the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) (Dziedzic
2006: 321–322). This autonomy lasted until 1989, when Slobodan Miloševic´ reimposed
direct rule from Belgrade following his vision to unite all Serbs under ‘Greater Serbia’.
While Albanian resistance had initially been peaceful under the leadership of Ibrahim
Rugova and the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), the movement began to radicalize
after the Dayton Agreement had failed to address Kosovo’s status, fostering the formation
of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) [also known as the UCK] (Dziedzic 2006: 323).
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b) Conflict History
Kosovo-Albanian resistance to Serb dominance had sparked its drive for independence
since 1996. The conflict escalated in 1998. Yugoslav security forces battled with the
UCK. The conflict ended in 1999 with the NATO bombing campaign, forcing the Yugoslav
government to sign a peace agreement and withdraw its forces from Kosovo (see UCDP
2010s).
When Albanian resistance against Serb rule accelerated by 1998, the Serbs responded
with increased force, eventually aiming at the exodus of ethnic Albanians in the province
through a systematic ethnic cleansing campaign carried out by Serb security forces and
paramilitaries (see e.g. Posen 2000: 43). While international attention had already
heightened after the Srebrenica massacre in 1995, the international community first reacted
with a strategy of coercive diplomacy (see U.N. Security Council 1998a and U.N. Security
Council 1998b), but initially lacked a credible threat. Consequently the Serb campaign
in Kosovo continued “unconstrained by an effective deterrent” (Dziedzic 2006: 324).
Although the UN Security Council had been resistant to legitimize the further use of
force due to Russia’s hesitation, NATO began to prepare for the use of force, issuing an
‘activation order’ on 13 October 1998. In accordance with Resolution 1199, the ‘Kosovo
Verification Mission’ (KVM) under the aegis of the OSCE was deployed with a mandate
to monitor the ceasefire called for in the resolution, but it was “quickly sabotaged by
the KLA’s exploitation of its presence to recoup territory lost” (Dziedzic 2006: 325). In
early 1999, the discovery of forty-five Albanian bodies in the village of Racak fostered
international concerns for a renewed Srebrenica (Posen 2000: 43).
In February 1999, the international community (more precisely: the ‘contact group’
consisting of the USA, the EU and Russia) organized peace talks in Rambouillet with
the aim of restoring Kosovo’s autonomy, but the agreement failed due to the Serbian
refusal to accept the NATO presence and solving Kosovo’s final status within three years
time (Posen 2000: 46–47). The failure of the talks had not come as a surprise to many
informed observers, as deliberately withdrawing from Kosovo would have implied “a
crushing nationalist loss that would delegitimize any Serbian government that accepted
it” (Hagen 1999: 59). From this perspective, it appears “hard to imagine why the U.S.
Government or the other NATO powers really expected to acquiesce” (Hagen 1999: 59).
The Serb refusal culminated in the NATO bombing campaign (‘Operation Allied Force’),
which commenced on 24 March 1999. It was expected that a few days of bombing
would be enough to persuade Miloševic´ to surrender, but this was a miscalculation: the
Serbs continued their ethnic cleansing campaign in Kosovo largely unimpressed. Only
two months later – now facing the credible threat of a NATO invasion – Miloševic´ was
persuaded by the Russian envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin to accept the condition of a total
Serb withdrawal from Kosovo. He complied on 2 June 1999 (Dziedzic 2006: 324–326).
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Another UN Security Council Resolution (U.N. Security Council 1999a) authorized the
establishment of a NATO-led multinational military force, KFOR (‘Kosovo Force’), under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It also called for the establishment of an interim civilian
administration, UNMIK (‘United Nations Mission in Kosovo’), which was authorized
to exercise “sovereign prerogatives of a state for the first time” (Dziedzic 2006: 334;
see also Chesterman 2004: 80). However, although initially aiming at preventing the
continued use of violence against Albanians by Serb security forces,8 the situation on
the ground was quickly reversed: “The power vacuum left by departing Serb forces was
quickly filled by returning KLA members, who unleashed a wave of violence against the
Serb population, other minorities, and their perceived rivals within the Kosovo Albanian
community” (Dziedzic 2006: 350).
c) Conflict and Peacekeeping Information
Conflict parties UCK (KLA)
UCDP Conflict ID 218
UCDP Episode ID 2181
Duration 1998 – 1999
Intensity war
Outcome Peace Agreement
Victorious side n/a
Peacekeeping
UNMIK (UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo), (June 1999 –
present)
Mission Mandate:
“In accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1244, UNMIK estab-
lished an international presence in Kosovo. Over the eight years since, as
Kosovo’s Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG) were estab-
lished and gained capacity to assume more responsibilities, UNMIK has
moved back from an executive role to one of monitoring and support to
local institutions. UNMIK, in its present form, is now into its final chapter
before status resolution. Under the leadership of SRSG Lamberto Zannier,
UNMIK’s structure currently comprises the Democratization and Institution
Building Pillar (OSCE), where Ambassador Tim Guldimann is the head of
the OSCE Pillar” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2009a).
Source: ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Table A.24: Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Kosovo
8Resolution 1244 “demands in particular that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia put an immediate and
verifiable end to violence and repression in Kosovo [. . . ]” (U.N. Security Council 1999a, par. 3).
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A.12.2 Post-conflict situation
The NATO bombing campaign that ended the Serb engagement against Albanians in
the province of Kosovo was followed by an unprecedented transferal of authority to the
international community. The ‘post-conflict’ situation that emerged is special in two
regards: First, Kosovo was formally still part of Serbia when the international community
established its interim authority and has remained so for nearly one full decade (until
the unilateral declaration of independence in 2008). The international community has
deliberately left the question of Kosovo’s independence open (see Chesterman 2004: 80).
Although this formally stands in contrast with one of the case selection criteria (see 1.3), the
case is nonetheless included because its level of de facto autonomy has been tremendous,
unlike, for instance, in Chechnya. Second, the degree of international authority in the case
of Kosovo is extremely large, which accounts for post-conflict dynamics that are entirely
different from those that can be observed under the condition of ordinary peacekeeping
mission. Therefore, the post-conflict period that began with the deployment of UNMIK in
1999 is considered a potential post-conflict polity case here.
a) The Role of the Formal Government
Pre-independence Kosovo (1999-2008). With Serb troops leaving after the conclusion
of the NATO bombing campaign and the deployment of KFOR in June 1999, the province
was without any sort of government. Hence, UNMIK was established amidst an “acute
administrative vacuum”, despite attempts by the KLA to swiftly establish itself as the de
facto authority by attempting to create informal political and administrative structures
(Caplan 2005: 93). The extent of responsibilities taken by external parties in Kosovo had
until then been unprecedented, and the number of international bodies and nations involved
accordingly large. The international community obtained its authority for the military and
civilian components of its engagement through UN Security Council Resolution 1244 and
UNMIK’s first regulation (UNMIK 1999). It has from the beginning on interpreted its
authority as “unrestrained by considerations of sovereignty” (Yannis 2004: 69). Hence, it
“totally excluded Yugoslav authorities from any administrative role in the territory”, thereby
effectively reducing the latter’s sovereignty to a “mere fig leaf signifying nothing more
than that UNMIK could unilaterally change the status of the territory and its internationally
recognized borders” (Yannis 2004: 70). But UNMIK was not the only administrative
authority on the ground. On 17 November 2001, elections for new self-government
institutions took place in Kosovo. Already one year before, municipal elections had taken
place. Though the elections constituted a landmark in Kosovo’s post-conflict environment,
the International Crisis Group noted that “[t]he powers of the new institutions will be
limited, and, despite the devolution of responsibility for the day-to-day running of affairs
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in many areas of government, the ultimate powers of the Special Representative of the
Secretary General (SRSG) are undiminished” (2001b: i).
Between 1999 and 2005, the international community had been largely neutral with
regard to Kosovo’s status question. Former SRSG Michael Steiner, the leader of the
UNMIK mission since 2002, proclaimed ‘standards before status’ as the leading operational
paradigm for UNMIK. His successor, SRSG Søren Jessen-Petersen, changed this strategy
by announcing that the question of status must no longer be ignored. The final decision
to begin status negotiations was made after the escalations of 2004, when an Albanian
mob attacked and murdered Serbs and representatives of other minority groups after
media reports about alleged killings of Albanian children (Džihic´ and Kramer 2009: 3;
International Crisis Group 2007f: 2–3). The former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari
was appointed as UN Special Envoy at the Kosovo status process in 2005. In 2007,
Ahtisaari submitted two documents to the Secretaty General: (a) a four-page “Report of
the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’s Future Status” (‘Ahtisaari Report’,
S/2007/168), and (b) a 63-page “Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement”
(‘Ahtisaari Proposal’, S/2007/168/Add.1). In the former, he gave a clear recommendation
for Kosovo’s independence “under international supervision”, while the proposal “can be
read as a blueprint for state formation, but is based on a delicate balancing between an
internationally supervised entity and an independent state” (International Crisis Group
2007f: 2–3). The Ahtisaari plan was never formally approved by the UN Security Council,
but effectively served as the basis for Kosovo’s independence process (International Crisis
Group 2008b: 1).
Post-independence Kosovo (since 2008). Initially, it was planned that the European
Union’s EULEX (‘European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo’) mission would
take over UNMIK’s tasks already in July 2008, but this was postponed to December
2008 because of Serbian opposition. Another major concession made by the international
community to Belgrade lay in the acceptance to continue using Resolution 1244 as a legal
basis for the EULEX, which implied that EULEX formally accepted Kosovo’s undeclared
status despite its declaration of independence (Džihic´ and Kramer 2009: 2). EULEX was
finally deployed on 8 December 2008. Despite the agreement with Belgrade, Kosovar
Serbs were opposed to its deployment.
b) The Role of External Parties
The major external parties involved include NATO (through the bombing campaign and
the deployment of KFOR), the United Nations Peacekeeping Department (responsible
for UNMIK, together with various sub-organizations like UNHCR), OSCE (responsible
for Pillar III of UNMIK – Democratization and Institution Building) and the European
Union (responsible for Pillar IV of UNMIK – Reconstruction and Economic Development)
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(Dziedzic 2006: 347–348). UNMIK’s role is discussed in the above paragraph about the
role of the formal government.
c) The Warring Factions
As in other cases, determining who constitutes the contenders depends on the time of
the assessment. At the time of the NATO bombing campaign, the true contender were
Serb security forces and paramilitaries committing atrocities in Kosovo. Yet, Serbia (or:
Yugoslavia) enjoyed de jure sovereignty over the territory, which is why these events
must be considered ‘one-sided violence’ in the classical civil war terminology. With
the deployment of KFOR, the situation changed, as the KLA now emerged as the main
contender, committing violent acts among the Serb minority population.
A.12.3 Assessment
The post-conflict situation in Kosovo is one of the most clear-cut cases of a transitional
administration. Yet, as noted above, what distinguishes it from other cases – and East
Timor most visibly – is the fact that during most of its post-conflict phase Kosovo was not
an independent state. The formal government in Kosovo has effectively been constituted by
the international community from the beginning on, which clearly plays a dominating role.
Its overall degree of authority clearly went beyond more traditional forms of involvement.
Though the engagement of external actors clearly was to the benefit of the Albanian side,
it goes beyond typical cases of partisan engagement; it must rather be seen as a case of
supreme intervention. The relations between the Albanian and Serb population of Kosovo
have remained contentious. Although none of the parties is likely to resort to arms on a
larger scale, there have been instances of armed conflict – most notably in 2004 – and
especially after the declaration of independence tensions and mistrust between Serbs and
Albanians remain. The relationship is therefore considered an obstructive one. Out of
these reasons, this case is classified as an instance of the supreme, obstructive domination
or ‘Benevolent Intrusion’ type.
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A.12.4 Map of Kosovo
Figure A.12: Map: Kosovo (Serbia). Source: United Nations Cartographic Division
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A.13 Liberia
Population 3,108,312 as of 2006
Total Area Total Area: 111,370 Sq. Km.
Total Land Total Land: 96,320 Sq. Km.
Coastline Coastline: 579 km
Capital Monrovia
Languages
English (official), 20 local languages of the Niger-Congo lan-
guage group
Boundaries Côte d Ivoire: 716 km, Guinea: 563 km, Sierra Leone: 306 km
Ethnic Groups
41% Other indigenous groups, 17% Kpelle, 10% Bassa, 10% Kru, 6% Gio,
6% Mawe, 6% Mawe, 5% Buzi, 5% Americo-Liberians
Religions 40% indigenous beliefs, 40% Christian, 20% Muslim
Source: Countrywatch (2008): Liberia 2008 Country Review (Coleman 2008i).
Table A.25: Basic Facts and Figures: Liberia
A.13.1 Country and Conflict Information
a) General Background
Liberia was never formally colonized, but founded in 1847 by former slaves returning
from the Americas with the help of the government of the USA. Liberia adopted the
US constitutional model. From the beginning on, the country’s political life had been
dominated by the so-called Americo-Liberians whereas ‘indigenous’ tribes were excluded
from state power. Although their civic rights were later acknowledged, the state continued
to be dominated by an Americo-Liberian elite. This elite was toppled by a military coup in
1980, when Samuel Doe took power, becoming Liberia’s first indigenous president. Doe
ethnicised the politics of Liberia and exacerbated the tensions between Liberia’s ethnic
groups (see UCDP 2010m).
The Americo-Liberians only make up a small portion of the population, but dominated the
country’s political scene for centuries. They formed a small ruling elite that systematically
exploited Liberians with non-American roots (see Adeleke 1995: 572; Outram 1999: 164).
The last president belonging to this Americo-Liberian elite was William Tolbert, who
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was overthrown and executed by the young military officer Samuel Doe. He was the first
president without American roots, but this also implied that he lacked access to traditional
patronage networks and had to rely on other means for maintaining the loyalty of his
supporters (Reno 1999: 86). With support from the United States, Doe established a strong
hold on power and soon became notorious for his ruthless exercise of authority. The list of
atrocities he can be held accountable for is topped by an ethnic cleansing campaign that he
launched in revenge for a failed coup attempt in 1985, led by his fiercest enemy Thomas
Quiwonkpa. Next to executing those directly responsible for the coup and demonstrating
their triumph (after Quiwonkpa was killed, parts of his body were reportedly publicly eaten
by Doe’s troops), people belonging to the same ethnic tribes as the rebels (mainly Gio and
Mano) were indiscriminately massacred, leading to an estimated 3,000 deaths (Huband
1998: 40). Doe’s regime was equally exclusive as the Americo-Liberian regimes before
him, with the only difference that the beneficiaries of his patronage system changed. His
regime mainly benefited his own ethnic tribe, the Krahn, and violently suppressed dissent
or opposition (see e.g. Ellis [1999] 2007; Huband 1998: 27–44).
b) Conflict History
Armed conflict erupted in 1989, to some extent along ethnic lines, when the Gio and Mano-
dominated National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) attacked the Krahn-dominated
government. Two episodes of armed intra-state conflict followed, 1989-1996 and 2000-
2003. During these armed conflicts, a number of factions made use of one-sided violence,
such as the NPFL, the two factions of the United Liberian Movement for Democracy
(ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K), the Liberian Peace Council (LPC) and the Armed Forces of
Liberia (AFL). Conflicts in Liberia since 1946 have included the intra-state and one-sided
categories of UCDP organized violence (see UCDP 2010m).
Liberia experienced two civil wars between 1989 and 2003. The first civil war was initiated
by Charles Taylor – leader of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) – when he
launched an attack against president Samuel Doe’s government forces in Nimba County
in December 1989 (Gershoni 1997: 55 and Abdullah and Rashid 2004: 180). Taylor was
once himself a member of the cabinet under Doe but later was persecuted after having
allegedly diverted US $ 900,000 of Liberian government funds in 1983 (Ellis 1999: 52–53).
After only six months of fighting, the NPFL succeeded to cover nearly 90 percent of
the Liberian territory, but had been unable to seize the capital Monrovia (see Gershoni
1997: 55; Outram 1999: 167). Fighting continued for six more years during which Taylor
had consolidated power in the territories under his control through establishing his own
patronage-system, becoming the de-facto ruler of a large part of Liberia (Reno 2004: 118).
A peace agreement in 1996 finally paved the way for national elections and, ironically,
it was Charles Taylor who won them. This facilitated a provisional termination of the
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conflict, but due to Taylor’s selfish style of (mis)governance, it also set the stage for the
renewed outbreak of armed conflict.
The second civil war commenced in 2000, after an offensive against Charles Taylor’s
government forces led by a group called LURD (‘Liberians United for Reconciliation
and Democracy’). Determined to defeat Taylor, LURD rebels launched an attack against
Monrovia in which more than 10,000 people lost their lives. Finally, this led to Taylor’s
resignation in 2003, paving the way for a power-sharing arrangement called the NTGL
(‘National Transitional Government of Liberia’), which consisted of representatives from
all major factions that have fought during the civil war (see Pham 2006: 43–45). Taken
together, the two civil wars had disastrous effects. In total, between 65,000 and 150,000
people lost their lives after the first civil war alone (see Ellis 1999), and nearly half of the
population had become displaced. The conflict led to the total collapse of the country’s
economy and the widespread destruction of its physical infrastructure (see Gershoni 1997
and Sesay 1996b: 395).
c) Conflict and Peacekeeping Information
Conflict parties NPFL, INPFL; LURD
UCDP Conflict ID 146 (both)
UCDP Episode ID 1462; 1463
Duration 1989 – 1995; 2000-2003
Intensity war (both)
Outcome Peace Agreement
Victorious side Victorious side: n/a
Peacekeeping
UNOMIL (United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia); September 1993 –
September 1997; UNMIL (United Nations Mission in Liberia); September
2003 – present
Mission mandate:
UNOMIL
“UNOMIL was established to exercise good offices in support of the efforts
of the Economic Community of West African States and the Liberian Na-
tional Transitional Government to implement peace agreements; investigate
alleged ceasefire violations; assist in maintenance of assembly sites and
demobilization of combatants; support humanitarian assistance; investigate
human rights violations and assist local human rights groups; observe and
verify elections” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2001b).
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Mission mandate:
UNMIL
“The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established by Se-
curity Council resolution 1509 (2003) of 19 September 2003 to support
the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and the peace process; pro-
tect United Nations staff, facilities and civilians; support humanitarian and
human rights activities; as well as assist in national security reform, includ-
ing national police training and formation of a new, restructured military”
(Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2009e).
Source: ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Table A.26: Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Liberia
A.13.2 Post-conflict situation
a) The Role of the Formal Government
Various different government constellations and arrangements can be identified in Liberia:
Transitional Governments prior to 1997. As part of the multiple initiatives for restor-
ing peace in Liberia it was at several times attempted to establish transitional governments.
In total, four such arrangements were established between 1991 and 1997:
1. The ‘Interim Government of National Unity of Liberia’ (IGNU) was founded already
in August 1990 on the initiative of the All Liberia Conference – a meeting of 17
Liberian political groups and parties initiated by ECOWAS’s Standing Mediation
Committee (SMC). It elected Prof. Amos Sawyer as the country’s transitional
president (Howe 1996: 154).
2. The ‘Cotonou Peace Agreement’ of 25 July 1993 (S/26272) provided for the es-
tablishment of a new transitional government, the Liberia National Transitional
Government (LNTG).
3. The ‘Abuja Accords’ of 19 August 1995, signed by all major warring factions,
contained provisions for the establishment of a new transitional government (LNTG
II), a six-member ‘Council of State’ in which all major factions would be represented
as co-chairs with equal status (S/1995/742).
4. The ‘Supplement to the Abuja Accords’, signed on 17 August 1996, again entailed
provision for a new transitional government (LNTG III).
By and large, all these arrangements were rather fragile, and most of them operated at a
time when the war clearly had been ongoing. The first three arrangements may therefore
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safely be dismissed as instances of post-conflict polities. The last transitional government
(LNTG III) might be taken into consideration, as the overall situation was becoming more
peaceful at that time, and because it prepared the country for the 1997 elections.
Taylor’s Presidency. In 1997, Taylor was elected for the presidency with 75 percent of
the votes – in an election considered relatively free and fair by international observers
(see Harris 1999; Reno 2004: 125). His victory might in part have to do with the pressure
he could exert on the voting population, because a “destitute, starved, and traumatized
population recognized that in these conditions it was preferable to vote for the strongman
who could defeat the other factions, and perhaps leave Liberians to their own devices to
survive” (Reno 2004: 125).
The National Transitional Government (NTGL). Taylor’s resignation from the presi-
dency paved the way for a transitional power-sharing arrangement named NTGL (National
Transitional Government of Liberia). It “consisted of an executive, a legislative assembly,
a judiciary, and a number of commissions whose senior officials were selected through a
formula of power sharing among armed groups, political parties, and civil society” (Sawyer
2008: 179). It was headed by Gyude Bryant, a Monrovian businessman with no prior links
to any of the warring factions, who was highly welcomed by the international community.
The NTGL was inaugurated on 14 October 2003 for a period of two years, until the
2005 national elections brought forward a democratically elected government. Its main
task was to implement the provisions of the Accra Peace Agreement (International Crisis
Group 2004f: 12–14). The transitional government was heavily supported by the so called
‘International Contact Group for Liberia’ (see below). Its main task was to ensure that the
different conflict parties adhered to the provisions of the peace agreement, and in that role
it effectively “exercised sovereign authority and was the driver of the transition process”
(Sawyer 2008: 180). A similar viewpoint was expressed by the International Crisis Group
in 2004, when they contented that Liberia “has become in effect a UN protectorate” (2004f:
i).
The NTGL, however, quickly began to disintegrate, mainly because it was seen as
a “license to plunder” by most participants (Sawyer 2008: 180). Considerable tension
arose from the warring factions’ rejection of Bryant as true head of the state. Rather, they
considered him as an outsider to the NTGL, while the true power rested with the three
warring factions that negotiated the Accra Agreement. This is why the International Crisis
Group stated in 2004 that “[t]he NTGL along with the Transitional Legislative Assembly,
is effectively run by members of former rebel movements” (2004f: 14). Battles over
positions in the NTGL consumed much of its time and energy and corruption was endemic
(Reno 2008: 389). As the International Crisis Group stated in 2004, “LURD and MODEL
leaders have decided that Liberia and all top government positions are theirs by right of
conquest” (2004f: 8).
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The post-2005 Arrangement. After Liberia had been governed by the NTGL for two
years, national elections were held on 11 October 2005. In the first round of the presidential
elections, no candidate won the necessary absolute majority of votes. Former football star
George Weah, running for a party called CDC (‘Congress for Democratic Change’), was
first, with 28 percent of the votes. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf – a former member of various
Liberian governments and member of the UP (‘Unity Party’) – emerged second, gaining
about 20 percent of the votes. However, in the November 8 runoff presidential elections,
the picture turned once again, and Johnson-Sirleaf was elected with a total of 59.4 percent
of the votes, while Weah came out second, collecting 40.6 percent. Interestingly, the results
of the parliamentary elections did not mirror these figures very closely. In the Senate,
COTOL (‘Coalition for the Transformation of Liberia’) won a majority of 23 percent of
the votes, followed by the UP with roughly 13 percent. Weah’s CDC was on the fourth
rank, with a total of about ten percent of the votes. In the House of Representatives the
CDC ranked first with a total of 23 percent, while this time UP was on the fourth rank
with about 12 percent of the votes (Harris 2005: 383–389). As a consequence of these
election results, “[t]he party of the winning presidential candidate [. . . ] leads neither house,
and is the main opposition party in just the Senate” (Harris 2005: 392). In the eyes of
David Harris, the 2005 election was unusual when compared to other African post-conflict
elections out of three reasons. He notes that the different rebel groups essentially ceased
to exist as political forces in the post-conflict setting – unlike in Mozambique, Angola or
Burundi – and he contends that there lacked an incumbent president or any other force
which could potentially dominate the scene once Taylor was forced into exile. In addition,
Harris underlines the fragile nature of the electorate’s loyalty for specific political parties,
which led to “a patchwork of party victories in the Senate and House of Representatives
across the 15 counties” (2005: 376–377).
b) The Role of External Parties
Neighboring States. The first group of external parties engaged in Liberia were single
neighboring or nearby countries with high personal or political stakes in the events in
Liberia. A number of Francophone west African countries supported Taylor’s insurgency,
including Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso. Houphouët-Boigny – Côte d’Ivoire’s former
president – was possibly primarily interested in taking personal revenge because Liberian
President Samuel Doe was responsible for the killing of his son-in-law Bennedict Tolbert
(Jaye 2003: 646).
ECOWAS/ ECOMOG. The ECOMOG deployment to Liberia had been a landmark
development, as it “became the first subregional military force in the third world since
the end of the Cold War, and the first subregional military force with whom the United
Nations agreed to work as a secondary partner” (Howe 1996: 146). Just as in Sierra Leone,
the deployment of ECOMOG goes back mainly to Nigeria’s initiative and insistence.
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ECOMOG (‘ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group’) was created on 7 August 1990,
after first attempts for seeking a political solution to the conflict had failed. Its mandate
encompassed both peacekeeping and peace enforcement components. Despite committing
to high aims – ‘restoring law and order’ and creating the ‘conditions for free and fair
elections’, among other things – ECOMOG suffered from a number of problems. Among
the first was ECOWAS’s divide between its Anglophone and its Francophone members.
Some of the latter even supported Taylor’s insurgency, thereby actively working against
ECOMOG. Another difficulty arose from the fact that the creation of ECOMOG had only
been decided by the Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) – an ad hoc committee created
in April 1990 in order to support a political solution to the crisis in Liberia – and had
not even been sanctioned by ECOWAS’s supreme body (see Howe 1996: 151–154). On
the ground, ECOMOG’s engagement had oscillated between peacekeeping and peace
enforcement. It collaborated with different factions in order to overthrow Taylor – with
mixed results. On the one hand, it was thanks to the support from ULIMO and AFL (see
below) that ECOMOG could defend Monrovia from the rebels. On the other hand, the
factions proved unreliable and clearly acted as spoilers at various stages of the peacemaking
process. The LPC (‘Liberian Peace Council’), for instance, threatened one of the numerous
peace agreements (Cotonou, Benin, in July 1993) by starting a new offensive against the
NPFL (Howe 1996: 159–161). Therefore, despite some marked collaboration, “ECOMOG
did not control the factions” (Howe 1996: 160). By 1995, twelve peace agreements had
failed, and at that point ECOWAS had changed its strategy by including all rebel groups
in an executive council of state while simultaneously working towards their disarmament
(Abdullah and Rashid 2004: 181).
United Nations/ UNMIL. The United Nations deployed three different missions in
Liberia: UNOMIL (‘United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia’) aimed at supporting
ECOMOG with the implementation of the 1993 peace agreement. UNOL (‘United Nations
Peace-building Support Office in Liberia’) was a small support mission established after
the 1997 elections with the aim of assisting the government in its efforts to consolidate
peace. Achieving this goal was undermined by the systematic exclusion of the opposition
from state power and the quickly deteriorating security situation, among other things.
UNMIL (‘United Nations Mission in Liberia’) was finally put into effect on 19 September
2003 with the adoption of Resolution 1509 by the UN Security Council. It consisted of
a contingent of 15,000 UN peacekeepers and more than 1,000 police officers, was based
on a robust Chapter-VII mandate, and aimed at the realization of a broad range of goals
(see United Nations 2005b). In 2005, the UN Security Council – acting under Chapter
VII of the UN Charta – adopted Resolution 1638, through which UNMIL’s mandate was
specifically amended to “apprehend and detain former President Charles Taylor in the
event of a return to Liberia and to transfer him or facilitate his transfer to Sierra Leone for
prosecution before the Special Court for Sierra Leone” (United Nations 2005c).
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ICGL (International Contact Group for Liberia). The ICGL comprised three main
actors: the United States, the European Union and ECOWAS. The different parties fulfilled
different roles:
“ECOWAS provided leadership in mediating the transitional political process, while
the United States and the European Union, working largely through the United Nations,
funded much of the security and other humanitarian operations. The International
Crisis Group, an international think tank, contributed substantially to the intellectual
and analytic perspectives of the ICGL” (Sawyer 2008: 180).
c) The Warring Factions
Throughout Liberia’s two civil wars, a number of different factions and splinter groups had
emerged. The factions were mainly organized by affiliation to certain tribes and some of
them heavily engaged in inter-factional battles that at least in part aimed at gaining control
of valuable natural resources (Reno 1999: 105). In combination, the different factions had
a strength of roughly 33,000 fighters, divided upon the different groups as follows:
“Of the 33,000, NPFL was the largest faction, accounting for 12,500 fighters. Doe’s
old Armed Forces of Liberia counted 7,000 fighters, ULIMO-K had 6,800, ULIMO-J,
3,800, and LPC counted 7,000 fighters” (Reno 2004: 121).
Most of these factions have disappeared after Taylor was elected president in 1997, mostly
out of fear for retaliation and revenge (International Crisis Group 2002a: 8). In the
following, the different factions are characterized further:
NPFL. The NPFL, led by Charles Taylor, was the main contender throughout the first
civil war and is clearly the party that is directly responsible for the outbreak of the war.
The attractiveness of the NPFL stems mainly from its opposition to the Doe regime, which
– due to its exclusive grip on power – has raised significant resistance from most of the
non-Krahn population (Reno 1999: 92). But in the areas controlled by Taylor – variously
called ‘Taylorland’ or ‘Greater Liberia’ – people had little choice than supporting the
NPFL, as it used brute force in order to secure support from the population. The NPFL
also heavily relied on urban and rural youth, and a significant portion of the rebel group
was comprised of “abducted and orphaned children” behaving “notoriously brutal and
rapacious” (Abdullah and Rashid 2004: 182).
INPFL. The INPFL (‘Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia’) was an early
splinter group of the NPFL, led by Prince Yourmie Johnson. It was directed against
both the NPFL and Doe’s Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL). It initially collaborated with
ECOMOG and enjoyed unlimited access to its headquarters, but exploited this confidence
in order to abduct former president Doe from the ECOMOG compound on 9 September
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1990, killing 70 of his bodyguards and assassinating Doe in a nearby site a few hours later
(see Ellis 1999; Howe 1996: 154). The INPFL actively fought until late 1992 and was not
part of the various peace agreements that were negotiated later (Howe 1996: 156). Prince
Johnson participated in the 2003-2005 transitional government (NTGL), and he currently
represents Nimba County in the Senate (see Sawyer 2008: 19).
ULIMO. ULIMO (‘United Liberation Movement of Liberians For Democracy’) has its
roots in Krahn and Mandingo refugees who had escaped to Sierra Leone when Taylor’s
insurgency began. Among them were many former soldiers from Doe’s AFL (‘Armed
Forces of Liberia’) (Howe 1996: 156;Jaye 2003: 646). ULIMO consisted of several
groups, most notably the LPC (‘Liberian Peace Council’), headed by George Boley, who
was a former adviser to President Doe, the LUDF (‘Liberian United Defence Force’), led
by a former office holder in the Doe government, General Albert Karpeh, the MRLM
(‘Movement for the Redemption of Liberian Moslems’), founded by Doe’s former Minister
for Information, Alhaji Kromah, and the aforementioned elements of Doe’s army which
had fled to Sierra Leone. Its foundation goes back to the initiative of Alhaji Kromah (Reno
1999: 102–104). After Taylor had sparked the RUF insurgency in Sierra Leone in 1991,
ULIMO took the offensive by crossing into Liberia in 1992. Initially united in their goal of
overthrowing Taylor, ULIMO split into two factions along ethnic lines in 1994, with most
Mandingos joining the ULIMO-K (led by Kromah) and most Krahn joining ULIMO-J
(led by General Roosevelt Johnson) (Howe 1996: 156). ECOMOG relied on the ULIMO
factions in its fight against the NPFL, which for them constituted a ‘low cost strategy’ for
fighting the war. ULIMO and AFL support was also decisive for withstanding Taylor’s
anti-Monrovia offensive ‘Operation Octopus’ of October 1992 (Reno 1999: 104).
LURD. LURD (‘Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy’) first appeared
on the scene in July 2000 as a largely unknown actor. The International Crisis Group
described it as being “essentially a loose coalition of anti-Taylor forces, drawing upon
a variety of militia factions and refugee groups [. . . ]” (2002a: 4). It had close ties with
Guinea, from where it launched its first invasion against Liberia. Guinean support for
LURD drastically increased after LURD successfully retaliated Taylor’s counterattack on
Guinean territory (International Crisis Group 2002a: 4–5). LURD was known for its close
links with some of the earlier rebel groups, in particular ULIMO-J and ULIMO-K, but not
with its former leaders Alhaji Kromah and Roosevelt Johnson. After the Accra Agreement,
LURD suffered from leadership struggles, as the former leader Sekou Damate Conneh
had “lost the respect of his fighters”, and his leadership role in the party was challenged
by his own wife. Conneh also refused to participate in the NTGL – possibly out of his
disappointment for not having been nominated as chairman, which further marginalized
his role in the post-conflict environment (International Crisis Group 2004f: 9–10).
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MODEL. MODEL (‘Movement for Democracy in Liberia’) was another anti-Taylor
rebel group, and next to LURD the second main rebel group that took part in the offensive
that removed Taylor from office. It was founded in March 2003 in Côte d’Ivoire and was
chaired by Thomas Yaya Nimley. (International Crisis Group 2004f: 10–27). Just like
LURD, MODEL appears to be mainly a coalition of convenience. For both groups, it “has
been difficult knowing where they stand ideologically and many of their documents are
vague along these lines” (Jaye 2003: 645). Jaye speculated that “[t]hey may have come
together to achieve one fundamental goal – getting rid of Taylor but there are elements
within these movements whose interests strongly coincides (sic!) with those of the previous
regime: loot the economy and bastardise the system” (2003: 645).
A.13.3 Assessment
Taylor Presidency (1997-2003). Taylor’s presidency is a clear case of one party dom-
inating the executive. His quasi-dictatorial style of governance effectively drove most
other potential authorities out of the country. At the same time, the relations between the
former belligerents (in this case the factions formed out of the former government troops
and various other anti-Taylor factions) remained conflictual. While, initially, Taylor’s
opponents virtually disappeared as many of them went into exile, they soon reformed and
started another insurgency against the Taylor government. Thus, the relations can safely
be considered obstructive. Finally, assessing whether the engagement of external actors
was mediative or partisan is more difficult. Complexity arises from the highly partisan role
that ECOMOG played during the war. On the one hand, it had effectively tried to beat
Taylor’s NPFL militarily, often in coalition with some of the other warring factions. This
clearly violated established principles of neutral peacekeeping. On the other hand, it had at
several times made attempts for mediating between the warring parties, leading to 13 peace
agreements and four transitional or interim government bodies. Although the ECOMOG
intervention clearly was an anti-Taylor intervention, ECOWAS was split politically and
needed to make concessions due to Taylor’s repeated successes on the battlefield. During
the war, ECOMOG’s role was clearly more leaning to the partisan side of the scale, but
there is reason to argue that ECOMOG switched to a mediative manner of engagement by
1995. After 1997, its role became more and more marginalized, as the mission was forced
to withdraw from Liberia. Also the UN only played a neglectful role during Taylor’s reign.
At the same time, the parties (including ECOWAS) contributed heavily to the adoption of
the peace agreement. Thus, it appears most appropriate to classify external engagement
as mediative. Therefore, the presidency of Charles Taylor is considered an instance of a
‘mediated, obstructive domination’ or ‘The Winner Took it All’ polity.
NTGL (2003-2005). The NTGL was a power-sharing arrangement, although it suffered
from a number of shortcomings. The interim president lacked substantive power, and
the former warring factions – GOL/ NPFL, LURD and MODEL – largely dominated
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the scene. Although this arrangement was far from an ideal case of power-sharing, it
fulfilled its main tasked successfully: preparing the country for the 2005 national elections.
In the post-2003 polity, external parties have played a much stronger role. The United
Nations now employed one of its largest peacekeeping missions (UNMIL), which has been
continuously engaged in Liberia until today. It played a highly intrusive role during the
NTGL period, to the extend that some observers even refered to the UN as the de facto
authority in the territory. The intervention was clearly mediative, as the military role of
the UN was much more confined to that of a traditional peacekeeping force. One would
need to consider whether the high level of intrusiveness would even justify to code it as
a supreme form of intervention. But this would appear misleading, because local actors
have dominated the dynamics on the ground much stronger than in cases like Kosovo or
East Timor. Out of these reasons, this situation is classified as an instance of the ‘mediated,
obstructive power-sharing’ or ‘Doomed to Share’ type.
Johnson-Sirleaf’s Presidency (since 2006). Johnson-Sirleaf is the elected president of
the country and not part of any official power-sharing government. However, she is not
the undisputed Liberian leader. While the rebel groups have largely dissolved, many of
the former faction leaders are still represented with high ranks in the government and
effectively maintain strong claims to power. In addition, Johnson-Sirleaf’s party lacks a
majority in both houses of the parliament, which makes her dependent on close cooperation
with other parties. However, since there is no formal power-sharing arrangement in place
and because Johnson-Sirleaf defeated her opponents in competitive elections, the case
is considered a case of political domination here. The relations between the warring
parties during this period have significantly improved when compared to earlier periods
in Liberia’s post-conflict history. However, considering them constructive would go too
far, because the United Nations continue to play a key role for contributing to security in
the country. Many observers believe that a withdrawal of the UN force could trigger a
relapse into factional violence (see also Reisinger 2009a). As a result, they should still
be considered obstructive. The engagement of external actors has remained mediative,
as they have continued to play a key role for providing stability and fostering societal
reconciliation in Liberia. As a result, this situation is coded as an instance of the ‘mediated,
obstructive domination’ or ‘The Winner Took it All’ polity type.
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A.13.4 Map of Liberia
Figure A.13: Map: Liberia. Source: United Nations Cartographic Division
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A.14 Macedonia
Population 2,056,894 as of 2007
Total Area 25,333 Sq. Km.
Total Land 24,856 Sq. Km.
Coastline 0 km (Landlocked)
Capital Skopje
Languages
Macedonian, Albanian, Turkish, remnants of Serbo-Croatian language ty-
pology also spoken in certain areas
Boundaries Greece: 228 km; Serbia: 221 km; Albania: 151 km; Bulgaria: 148 km
Ethnic Groups 67% Macedonian; 23% Albanian; 4% Turks; 2% Roma; 2% Serb; 2% other;
Religions 67% Eastern Orthodox; 30% Muslim; 3% Other
Source: Countrywatch (2008): Macedonia 2008 Country Review (Coleman 2008j).
Table A.27: Basic Facts and Figures: Macedonia
A.14.1 Country and Conflict Information
a) General Background
Upon the disintegration of the Yugoslav Federation in 1991, Macedonia made its own
moves towards independence, in particular after the nationalist parties won the first multi-
party elections in 1990. The secession was peaceful, leading to the new state of the ‘Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ (FYROM). It became a parliamentary democracy,
with the two most important groups being ethnic Macedonians (67% of the population)
and ethnic Albanians (23% of the population), but in the new constitution only ethnic
Macedonians were regarded as the constituent people of the republic (see UCDP 2010n).
The name Macedonia is ambivalent. It refers to the larger historical area called Macedo-
nia, a Greek area, as well as the contemporary Macedonian nation-state, formally called
the ‘Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ (FYROM). Until the dissolution of Yu-
goslavia, Macedonia was one of the six constituent republics of the Yugoslav Federation.
When the grip of the Yugoslav Federation loosened at the beginning of the 1990s, Mace-
donia introduced multi-party elections, out of which a coalition government between
two newly formed nationalist parties – the ARF (‘Alliance of Reform Forces’) and the
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VMRO-DPMNE (‘Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for
Macedonian National Unity’) – and the Communist Party (LCM-PDR) emerged. In 1991,
Macedonia declared its sovereignty through a plebiscite, but a name dispute with Greece
prevented its recognition as a sovereign state by the European Community. Responding to
Greek objections, Macedonia was recognized by the United Nations as a sovereign state
under the name ‘Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia’ in 1993 (Coleman 2008j: 7–11).
The country is ethnically and religiously heterogeneous: 67 percent of the population are
ethnic Macedonians of Roman Catholic belief, while some 23 percent are ethnic Albanians
and hence Muslim. The remaining ten percent of the population consists of Turks, Serbs
and Roma, among others (Coleman 2008j: 2). This makes FYROM today “one of the last
truly multi-ethnic states in the Balkans” (Chivvis 2008: 142).
b) Conflict History
The one-sided pro-Macedonian provisions in the constitution triggered sentiments among
the Albanians of being second class citizens. Over time, the tensions amounted to an armed
conflict between the government and the UCK (‘Ushtria Clirimtare ë Kombëtare’, National
Liberation Army) in 2001. The purpose of this conflict was to force a constitutional
revision so as to eradicate the perceived discrimination against the Albanian people.
The conflict lasted from January to August 2001, when a peace agreement containing
constitutional revisions was signed, which called for numerous power-sharing provisions
to be implemented. As a consequence of the agreement, a NATO-led peacekeeping force
was deployed to the country. After constitutional amendments in 2005, the Macedonian
government proclaimed that the peace agreement had been fully implemented (see UCDP
2010n).
In 2001, Macedonia experienced an armed conflict of much lower intensity than the ones
experienced by some other former Yugoslavian states. The case is nonetheless of central
importance, because the conflict could have easily turned into a large-scale civil war (see
Chivvis 2008: 144). Though Macedonia’s ethnic groups have “co-existed uneasily” since
the country had declared independence in 1991(International Crisis Group 2001f: 1), they
by and large maintained peaceful relations:
“The major grievance expressed by the ethnic Albanians was that their cultural
distinctiveness was not publicly recognized. They demanded not only state protection
of individual rights but protection of collective cultural rights” (Stanisevski and Miller
2009: 557).
This state of peaceful coexistence changed in 2001, when an armed conflict erupted due to
rising unrest of the Albanian minority with regard to Macedonian/ Slavic dominance. It
commenced with an attack against a police station in the town of Tearce on 22 January
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2001, in which one police man was killed. A group called NLA (‘National Liberation
Army’) claimed responsibility for the attack. Further clashes occurred in the upcoming
weeks, most notably in Tanusevci. In Tetovo, 30 kilometers west of Skopje and populated
by a clear Albanian majority, violence escalated in March 2001 (Friedman 2009: 213;
International Crisis Group 2001f: 3–8). Initially, the government was undecided in its
attempts to contain the rebellion. The ethnic Macedonian parties were split between
hardliners, who saw the conflict as an opportunity to “crush the Albanian minority once
and for all”, and more moderate elements, who sought a settlement with them. The
hardliners initially gained ground, which triggered a retaliation campaign against the rebels
and which forced the Albanian party to leave the coalition government (Chivvis 2008: 144).
As a consequence, the conflict escalated between March and May 2001. A turning point
was reached with the secret ‘Prizren Agreement’, which was struck between two Albanian
political parties (DPA and PDP) in May 2001. This “gave the NLA something that came
very close to a legitimation and gave a mandate to the ethnic Albanian political parties
to represent the interests of the rebels” (Balalovska et al. 2002: 31). As a consequence,
“from that moment on, a military solution to the conflict was no longer a political option”
(Balalovska et al. 2002: 31).
Nonetheless, fighting continued until August 2001 when the ‘Ohrid Framework Agree-
ment’ (see Government of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2001) was signed.
Among other things, it was agreed that “Macedonia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”
as well as the “multi-ethnic character of Macedonia’s society must be preserved” and a
range of constitutional amendments was adopted (Government of the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia 2001, par. 1.2 – 1.3 & Annex 1). This ultimately marked the end
of the violence. Three origins of the crisis have generally been identified: The first views
the crisis as a secession war aiming at the establishment of a ‘Greater Albania’ carved
out from Albania, Kosovo and parts of the Albanian-populated parts of Macedonia. The
second sees the conflict as imported from Kosovo, from where the NLA originates. The
third explanation focuses on “the dysfunctional nature of the Macedonian state and its
treatment of the Albanian minority throughout the 1990s” (Chivvis 2008: 141–144).
c) Conflict and Peacekeeping Information
Conflict parties UCK
UCDP Conflict ID 223
UCDP Episode ID 2231
Duration 2001 – 2001
Intensity minor armed conflict
Outcome Peace Agreement
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Victorious side n/a
Peacekeeping
UNPREDEP (United Nations Preventive Deployment Force); March 1995 –
February 1999
Mission Mandate:
UNPREDEP: Established on 31 March 1995 to replace UNPROFOR in the
former “Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The mandate of UNPREDEP
remained essentially the same: to monitor and report any developments in the
border areas which could undermine confidence and stability in the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and threaten its territory” (Department of
Peacekeeping Operations 2000e).
Source: ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Table A.28: Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Macedonia
A.14.2 Post-conflict situation
According to the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’, the armed conflict in Macedonia
was of low intensity (‘minor armed conflict’) and lasted only throughout the year 2001.
The ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ is generally seen as the end-point of the armed conflict,
and it also significantly transformed the country’s political environment.
a) The Role of the Formal Government
Before the outbreak of the conflict, Macedonia’s government had essentially been dom-
inated by the ethnic-Macedonian majority: “Although minority parties were frequently
included in government coalitions, the political domination of the majority ethnic Mace-
donians was evident” (Stanisevski and Miller 2009: 557). During the uprising in 2001,
the government was effectively split along several lines. After the Albanian parties left
the government, Javier Solana attempted to convince the parties to form a government of
national unity, which was never implemented due to the precarious relations inside the
government:
“The right hand did not talk to the left: while ministries controlled by the Macedonian-
nationalist party VMRO-DPMNE sought to escalate the war, the Social Democratic-
controlled ministries sought to prosecute them for human-rights abuses. Meanwhile,
the two Albanian political parties, eager to avoid angering the international community,
remained officially in the government but, not wanting to cut themselves off from
their political base, did little to cooperate with it. Needless to say, the government
made no progress addressing Albanian grievances, while the rebellion continued to
gain favour with the local Albanian population, spreading out across the north and
west” (Chivvis 2008: 145).
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The August 2001 ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ decisively modified the character towards
a consociational model. It was “formulated as a broad policy framework for inclusion of
minorities in decision-making processes as well as recognition of cultural specificities of
cultural groups” (Stanisevski and Miller 2009: 558). However, the Agreement was difficult
to implement, mainly because many ethnic Macedonian parties believed the agreement to
be “imposed on them by ‘pro-Albanian’ Western powers” (Engström 2002: 2).
b) The Role of External Parties
Although Macedonia has not experienced the deployment of a large-scale peacekeeping
mission in its post-conflict phase, external actors have played a key role in bringing an end
to the conflict and pressuring the warring parties into negotiations. Leverage stemmed in
part from the fact that Macedonia was highly dependent on Western aid (Balalovska et al.
2002: 34). At least three groups of actors were involved: the NATO, the United Nations,
and the European Union.
NATO. NATO clearly was a key player during and after the conflict in Macedonia.
NATO forces were engaged at the time of the 2001 incident in neighboring Kosovo through
the KFOR mission. Like most other members of the international community, they were
highly concerned that Macedonia would turn into the site of another large-scale armed
conflict on the Balkans. Immediately after the events of Tanusevci, NATO increased its
control of the Kosovo-Macedonian border, and deployed an emergency team in Macedonia
(Balalovska et al. 2002: 21). After the adoption of the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’ in
August, NATO deployed a 4,500 strong mission (“Operation Essential Harvest”), which
aimed at disarming the rebels. This task was completed already by September 2001, and
NATO then remained engaged only through a small follow-up mission, by which the
observers of the ceasefire were to be protected (Kim 2001: 1).
United Nations. Unlike in neighboring Kosovo, the United Nations played a minor
role in Macedonia, as relations were relatively peaceful. Nonetheless, aware that events
could suddenly change in the opposite direction, UNPREDEP (United Nations Preventive
Deployment Force) was deployed between 1995 and 1999. It was the first preventive force
ever deployed by the United Nations, and was generally lauded as a success before the
outbreak of the conflict in 2001 – in particular when compared with the other cases on
the Balkans (Bellamy 2002: 127). However, in retrospect is appears ironic that the UN
withdrew its forces about one year before the conflict emerged.
EU and US. The European Union and the United States played a particularly important
role in the adoption of the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’, as it was only “accepted
under intense pressure from the international community (the European Union and the
United States) and with the possibility of a bloody civil war looming in the background”
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(Stanisevski and Miller 2009: 561). In the post-conflict period, the EU has played a key
role for inducing the Macedonian parties to continue to cooperate. It has also called upon
the parties to swiftly implement the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’. It systematically used
the perspective of a Macedonian EU membership as an instrument for exerting leverage on
the former belligerents (see Ilievski and Taleski 2009: 360).
In sum, these different groups of external actors have played important roles for pre-
venting an escalation of violence and finding a quick settlement to the conflict. In the
post-conflict phase, they have at various times prevented attempts by spoilers and hardliners
to derail the peace process and undermine the effectiveness of power-sharing in Macedonia.
As Chivvis remarks, “[i]t is highly unlikely that Macedonia would have remained stable
without the political and security support provided by NATO and the EU [. . . ]” (2008:
154).
c) The Warring Factions
In general, the relations between ethnic Macedonians and ethnic Albanians have been
tense since Macedonia achieved independence in 1991. The struggle was mainly about
official recognition of a distinct Albanian culture and identity:
“Albanians in Macedonia as a whole have demanded greater cultural and educational
rights, such as recognizing Albanian as an official language and providing state
support for their underground Albanian-language university in Tetovo. Albanians
have sought greater representation in the government, armed forces and police. They
have objected to the preamble of the constitution which refers to the Macedonian
nation, which they contend relegates Albanians to the status of second-class citizens.
They have claimed to represent as much as 40% of the country’s population, not the
22.9% recorded in the June 1994 census” (Kim 2001: 4–5).
Macedonians clearly were reluctant to give in to these demands – mainly out of fear that
greater Albanian autonomy would divide the country and because many were convinced
that the Albanian minority already enjoyed sufficient rights (Kim 2001: 5).
The main conflict parties were the National Liberation Army (NLA) and the ethnic-
Macedonian government, led by the Macedonian-nationalist party VMRO-DPMNE. The
NLA had links to the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and received parts of its weapons
and ammunition from Kosovo. However, the NLA was in a difficult position since its
victory would have essentially implied a division of the country: “As for the NLA, they
knew they could not win a war without dividing the country in two, since they had local
support only in the northwest of Macedonia, and that territorial division was not something
the international community would accept” (Balalovska et al. 2002: 35). After the
settlement, the NLA was transformed into a political party and the relations between the
former antagonists became moderately constructive. Despite occasional complaints and
attempts by the parties to capitalize on underlying the incompatibility between the two
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ethnic groups, the overall atmosphere was conducive, in particular after the more moderate
opposition won a majority of votes in the 2002 parliamentary elections, which strongly
accelerated the implementation of key provisions from the peace agreement (International
Crisis Group 2003d: i).
A.14.3 Assessment
Macedonia’s post-conflict government entails important elements of power-sharing. In
particular due to the strengthening of the principle of proportional representation of ethnic
groups and the introduction of a minority veto to block decisions that threaten the Albanian
cultural identity, the post-conflict polity closely resembles the consociational model. The
post-conflict polity can hence be coded as a case of sharing of executive power. External
parties have played an unusual rule in Macedonia, because they were to a large extent
indirectly present. With NATO troops being deployed in neighboring Kosovo, a military
intervention by the international community must have constituted a very real and credible
threat to all those who would attempt to act as spoilers to the peace process. Due to
their successful efforts to adopt the ‘Ohrid Framework Agreement’, external actors have
shown that they by and large acted as a mediative force – despite ethnic-Macedonian
allegations that they have acted in a partisan manner. The relations between the conflict
parties were tense but peaceful before the outbreak of the armed conflict. Although –
as all observers have noted – the conflict entailed a true potential for developing into a
large-scale ethnic conflict, the parties nonetheless acted in a largely constructive manner,
which is documented by the various attempts to resolve the conflict that took place between
May and August 2001. In the post-conflict period, the relations can overall be considered
constructive, because all major players have supported the implementation of the ‘Ohrid
Framework Agreement’. Out of these reasons, Macedonia is classified here as an instance
of the ‘mediated, constructive power-sharing’ or ‘Let’s Share’ polity type.
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A.14.4 Map of Macedonia
Figure A.14: Map: Macedonia. Source: United Nations Cartographic Division
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A.15 Mozambique
Population 19,881,392 as of 2006
Total Area 801,590 Sq. Km.
Total Land 784,090 Sq. Km.
Coastline 2,470 km
Capital Maputo
Languages Portuguese (official), Indigenous dialects
Boundaries
Malawi: 1,569 km, Zimbabwe: 1,231 km, Tanzania: 756 km, South Africa:
491 km, Zambia: 419 km, Swaziland: 105 km
Ethnic Groups n/a Europeans; n/a Indians; n/a Euro-Africans; n/a indigenous tribal groups
Religions 50% Indigenous beliefs; 30% Christian; 20% Muslim
Source: Countrywatch (2008): Mozambique 2008 Country Review (Coleman 2008k).
Table A.29: Basic Facts and Figures: Mozambique
A.15.1 Country and Conflict Information
a) General Background
Mozambique, once a Portugal colony, experienced a pro-independence war that began in
September 1964, after a number of other colonial powers had been conceding independence
to their colonies in Africa. The struggle was led by the Marxist-Leninist FRELIMO (‘Frente
de Libertação de Moçambique’ – Front for the Liberation of Mozambique), which was
founded in 1962 by Dr Eduardo Mondlande (killed in exile in 1969) and later led by
Samora Machel. Mozambique became independent on 25 June 1975, after a bloodless
coup in Portugal paved the way for a more liberal political leadership (see UCDP 2010o).
FRELIMO, formed in Dar es Salaam in 1962 by exiled Mozambicans, aimed at eradicating
colonial structures and implementing a range of socialist policies in Mozambique, thereby
appealing to the impoverished rural population (Reed 1996: 276). After more than a decade
of anti-colonial struggle, FRELIMO was handed over power in 1975, when the right-wing
dictatorship in Portugal was overthrown in what became known as the Carnation Revolution
(Hatton et al. 2001: 19; Manning 2002: 38; Pitcher 2006: 92). However, FRELIMO’s
Marxist-Leninist ambitions were perceived as a massive threat to other governments in the
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region, most notably Rhodesia and South Africa, which were willing to support violent
insurgencies on Mozambican territory in order to destabilize FRELIMO. This led to the
founding of RENAMO in 1976 (see Morgan 1990: 610; Reed 1996: 278).
b) Conflict History
In 1977 a new armed struggle commenced – this time an intra-state conflict over the control
of the government. The incumbent FRELIMO government was violently challenged
by a group called RENAMO (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana, National Resistance
Movement of Mozambique), which enjoyed the support from Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe)
and South Africa in retaliation for the FRELIMO-regime’s support of the anti-apartheid
movements. Between 1985 and 1990, Zimbabwean troops were deployed in support of
the FRELIMO government. The conflict lasted fifteen years (1977-1992) and ended with
the 1992 Rome peace agreement. The conflict had devastating effects: millions had to flee
(within and outside the country) and civilians were killed in high numbers as RENAMO
made use of one-sided violence as one of its primary tactics (see UCDP 2010o).
Mozambique’s civil war is closely connected to the country’s colonial history and the
specific dynamics of the Cold War.9 The FRELIMO government was challenged by a
group called RENAMO (‘Resistência Nacional Moçambicana’), which had been sponsored
by Rhodesia and South Africa as a counterweight to FRELIMO’s socialist influence in
the region (see Manning 2002: 38; Pitcher 2006: 92). An armed conflict between the two
parties commenced shortly after FRELIMO’s rise to power. Enjoying high levels of external
support, RENAMO quickly transformed itself into a tightly organized military group that
over time became an ever more destructive force, leading to an ongoing intensification of
the conflict (see Costy 2004: 148–149; Morgan 1990: 610). In total, the conflict lasted
for nearly sixteen years and had devastating results. More than one million people died as
a result of the direct and indirect consequences attributed to the conflict and six million
people became internally displaced (see Manning 2002: 38; Schnabel 2002: 10). This was
accompanied by a large-scale destruction of the country’s economy and infrastructure (see
Costy 2004: 150; Schnabel 2002: 10). The civil war formally came to a close in October
1992, when the government and the rebel movement signed the General Peace Agreement
(GPA).
9This section is – with minor modifications – quoted from an earlier paper presented at the 50th Annual
meeting of the International Studies Association (ISA) in New York (Reisinger 2009c).
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c) Conflict and Peacekeeping Information
Conflict parties RENAMO
UCDP Conflict ID 136
UCDP Episode ID 1361
Duration 1977 – 1992
Intensity war
Outcome Peace Agreement
Victorious side n/a
Peacekeeping
ONUMOZ (United Nations Operation in Mozambique); December 1992 –
December 1994
Mission Mandate:
“ONUMOZ was established to help implement the General Peace Agree-
ment, signed by the President of the Republic of Mozambique and the
President of the Resistência Nacional Moçambicana. The mandate included
facilitating the implementation of the Agreement; monitoring the ceasefire;
monitoring the withdrawal of foreign forces and providing security in the
transport corridors; providing technical assistance and monitoring the entire
electoral process” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2001d).
Source: ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Table A.30: Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Mozambique
A.15.2 Post-conflict situation
Mozambique is generally considered a typical Cold War conflict, in which both sides
enjoyed significant material and ideological support from external parties. The sudden
end of the conflict in 1992 can at least in part be contributed to the end of the superpower
confrontation and the drying up of external funds.
a) The Role of the Formal Government
Unlike many other cases discussed in this dissertation, there was no transitional government
established in Mozambique after the adoption of the peace agreement. Instead, the
incumbent FRELIMO government stayed in power and the parties agreed to hold post-
conflict elections within a time-frame of one year. Originally scheduled for fall 1993,
the elections were again postponed by one year due to delays with the disarmament and
demobilization process (see Alden 1995: 107). The elections finally took place in October
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1994 and were the first democratic elections in Mozambique’s history. The period before
the elections was overshadowed by political disputes between the parties, with RENAMO
declaring its withdrawal from the elections one day before they were scheduled to take
place. Yet, these difficulties could be resolved, and elections took place in October 1994,
generally declared “free and fair” by international observers (United Nations 2001b). With
65 percent, voter turnout was relatively high. FRELIMO’s Joaquim Alberto Chissano was
confirmed as president, although with a surprisingly small margin, and his party won only
129 of 250 seats in the parliament (see Hatton et al. 2001: 20). Already in December,
ONUMOZ began to dismantle its operation. Although many peacebuilding challenges
remained, Costy notes that the country at that time was “an altogether different place than
it had been just twenty-four months earlier” (2004: 157).
Besides facilitating elections, another key task of the peace process was to agree on
the basic institutional design of the country. A particular challenge was to find the right
balance between elements of centralization and decentralization (West and Kloeck-Jenson
1999: 461). Until the end of the civil war, Mozambique’s administrative structures had
been dominated by strong authoritarianism from above – first imposed by the colonial
power Portugal nearly 400 years ago and later continued by FRELIMO after independence
in 1975 – and elements of traditional authority from below, exercised mainly by local
chiefs and churches (Alexander 1997: 2–4). As a result, Mozambique’s political system is
relatively centralized and contains little elements of power-sharing, devoting much power
in the political process to the leading party (Manning 2002: 24–26). This practice has
repeatedly been a source of contention.
Since the end of the civil war, FRELIMO has won all presidential and parliamentary
elections, which clearly limited RENAMO’s influence on the political process. RENAMO
has therefore frequently challenged the election results, often resulting in clashes between
supporters of the two parties (African Elections Database 2007). A last serious dispute
emerged after the presidential elections in 2004, in which FRELIMO’s Armando Guebuza
could acquire an absolute majority of 63.7 percent of the votes. Accusing FRELIMO of
severe fraud, RENAMO first rejected the election results and filed an official complaint
with the country’s National Electoral Commission, but later withdrew its boycott, although
some evidence for irregularities could be found. Nevertheless, the elections were declared
“free and fair” by a number of international observers (Freedomhouse 2006). Despite these
differences, Mozambique is today a relatively stable multi-party democracy, which greatly
adds to its reputation as one of the most successful cases of post-conflict peacebuilding in
Africa (see Costy 2004).
b) The Role of External Parties
A key component of the peace process in Mozambique was the UN peacebuilding mission
(ONUMOZ). In total, more than 10,000 troops were deployed to Mozambique (see United
Nations 2001b). In line with the General Peace Agreement, ONUMOZ’s mandate included
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four main issue areas: political guidance of the peace process; military aspects, including
monitoring the ceasefire as well as disarming and demobilizing former belligerents; moni-
toring the electoral process; and providing humanitarian assistance (see United Nations
2001b). Disarmament was difficult to achieve since both FRELIMO and RENAMO were
more than reluctant to give up the control over their territories (Costy 2004: 153–155).
A further problem was that ONUMOZ destroyed much less weapons than originally pro-
jected, partly due to its weak mandate in that regard. This led to an uncontrolled flow
of weapons throughout the region (see Vines 1998a: 205). Demobilization was very
successful. By August 1994, nearly 90 percent of the registered combatants had been
demobilized. Among other things, this success could mainly be achieved since the conflict
was generally ripe for resolution, and the reintegration program offered viable alternatives
to fighting (see Costy 2004: 153-155).
c) The Warring Factions
During the entire duration of the civil war, the composition of the warring parties remained
stable. FREMILO represented the ‘government-side’ and RENAMO was the only notable
rebel group to challenge the government. FRELIMO labeled itself a Marxist-Leninist
group, and soon after holding power began to establish an authoritarian one-party system.
It adopted a large spectrum of socialist policies, ranging from large-scale nationalization
of companies to an attempt to relocate a large part of the population to communal villages
(see Costy 2004: 146; Pitcher 2006: 92). In this sense, the beginning of FRELIMO’s
rule has “coincided with the end of formal political opposition of any kind” (Manning
2002: 48). Both from elements inside and outside Mozambique, these developments were
regarded with skepticism, and by some states (most notably Rhodesia and South Africa)
even perceived as a threat to their own existence (Costy 2004: 148–149). Support for
FRELIMO in the government-controlled areas can mainly be explained by a general “sense
of loyalty to the government”, which was often relatively distinct from the actual political
orientations pushed forward by FRELIMO (Schafer 2001: 223). FRELIMO’s record in
mobilizing and maintaining support is impressive. Despite all difficulties, it has been
able to rule the country for more than thirty years and has, as Pitcher puts it, “managed
to weather widespread discontent, oversee the rise and demise of socialism, conclude a
devastating war and survive three democratic elections in Mozambique without being
unseated from power, like many other ruling parties in Africa and Eastern and Central
Europe” (2006: 94).
RENAMO quickly grew from a small guerrilla organization to a military group com-
prising almost 10,000 combatants and controlling about a quarter of national territory
by the early 1990s. From the beginning on, it enjoyed heavy support from the apartheid
regime in South Africa, which used RENAMO as a means to undermine FRELIMO’s
regional appeal and credibility, ultimately in order to foster its own security after the
dissolution of Rhodesia (see Costy, 2004: 148–149). RENAMO was mainly perceived as
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“the party of the peripheral rural areas” where people felt a sense of exclusion from the
FRELIMO state (Schafer 2001: 222). In the post-conflict period, RENAMO has played
a very constructive role, which has become most clearly apparent by the acceptance of
its electoral defeats. Observers agree that RENAMO’s transition from a rebel group to a
political party was relatively unproblematic (see e.g. Weinstein 2002: 150). The party has
generally remained refrained from the use of violence and has since 1989 “insisted that its
goal was ‘constitutional reform”’ rather than a defeat of the government (see Walter 1999:
147).
A.15.3 Assessment
In post-war Mozambique, the formal government is highly centralized and run exclusively
by FRELIMO, whereas RENAMO has repeatedly lost presidential and parliamentary
elections and has become reduced to the role of an eternal opposition party. This is an
unusual level of domination of the post-conflict environment by only one of the former
conflict parties. External parties played an important supportive role prior to the 1994
elections. Although, dismantling ONUMOZ already a few months after the elections
certainly was a bold move, Mozambique indeed needed little external military presence
through a traditional peacekeeping force. Consequently, the involvement of external
actors has switched from traditional peacekeeping to a more open governance approach,
in which various specialized UN agencies and NGOs are involved simultaneously and
interdependently. Both ONUMOZ’s traditional peacekeeping presence and the involvement
of other third parties in the post-conflict environment suggest that the involvement of
external actors has been largely mediative.The relations between the former belligerents
in post-war Mozambique are surprisingly constructive, despite the fact that RENAMO is
virtually excluded from participation in the government. There have been minor tensions
and complaints due to alleged electoral fraud, but these skirmishes were mostly spontaneous
and locally restrained occurrences. The high level of cooperation between the parties is all
the more surprising when compared to the case of Angola, where a very similar conflict
took place. There, the main contender – UNITA – had extended its armed struggle until
well into the 21st century. Out of the above reasons, the case of Mozambique is classified
as an instance of the ‘mediated, constructive domination’ or ‘Let the Winner Take it All’
polity type.
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A.15.4 Map of Mozambique
Figure A.15: Map: Mozambique. Source: United Nations Cartographic Division
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A.16 Rwanda
Population 8,807,212 as of 2006
Total Area 26,340 Sq. Km.
Total Land 24,950 Sq. Km.
Coastline 0 km (Landlocked)
Capital Kigali
Languages Kinyarwanda; French; Kiswahili used in commercial centers
Boundaries
Burundi: 290 km; Tanzania: 217 km; Congo (DRC): 217 km; Uganda: 169
km
Ethnic Groups 84% Hutu; 12% Tutsi; 3% Twa (pygmoid); 1% Other
Religions
65% Roman Catholic; 25% indigenous beliefs and other; 9% Protestant; 1%
Muslim
Source: Countrywatch (2008): Rwanda 2008 Country Review (Coleman 2008l).
Table A.31: Basic Facts and Figures: Rwanda
A.16.1 Country and Conflict Information
a) General Background
The people that populated the colonial area that was to become Rwanda and Burundi
were linguistically and culturally homogeneous, but were still separated into three groups:
the Hutu, the Tutsi and the Twa. However, the prevalent societal order was more one of
social class than race (it was possible to become Tutsi through social advancement). After
independence, Rwanda became dominated by the Hutu, which violently repressed the Tutsi
(see UCDP 2010p).
Though very much linked to Burundi in terms of its ethnic and cultural composition, the
developments in Rwanda and Burundi took completely different paths. Like in Burundi,
the legacy of colonialism has “hardened distinction between the two ethnicities, not least
through the ascription of stereotyped characteristics to each of them, and aroused the
possibility of communal action, as Hutu or as Tutsi, which has barely been conceiv-
able in the pre-colonial situation” (Clapham 1998: 197, emphasis original). Rwanda
achieved independence from Belgian colonial rule in 1962, but already since 1958 the
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Tutsi monarchy favored by the colonial powers had been overthrown by “a small group
of Catholic-educated Hutu” – unlike in Burundi. This so called “social revolution” (Uvin
1999: 256) unfolded in three stages :
“In late 1959 there were localized anti-Tutsi violence and small pogroms in some
provinces. Hundreds were killed, and many Tutsi fled the country. In 1960 and
1961 legislative elections resulted in the massive victory of Parmehutu, a radically
anti-Tutsi party, and the subsequent overthrow of the monarchy. More Tutsi, including
the previous powerholders, fled the country” (Uvin 1999: 256).
Between independence and the outbreak of the genocide, Rwanda had known only two
regimes: the Kayibanda regime (1962-73), and General Habyarimana’s regime (1973-94)
– both making use of violence and oppression against Tutsi and opposed Hutu members.
Habyarimana gained power through a violent coup, which gave rise to the establishment of
a single party regime led by the MRDN (‘National Republican Movement for Democracy
and Development’). It effectively was a military dictatorship, which made use of systematic
assassinations of opposition members, tight internal security and surveillance, and the
upholding of farce elections in which Habyarimana regularly gained close to 100 percent
of support (see Traniello 2008: 37; Uvin 1999: 257).
b) Conflict History
The Rwandan government had been attacked by small groups of exiled Tutsi since the
1960s. In the 1990s, the attacks became more organized after the formation of a Tutsi rebel
group known as the RPF (‘Rwandan Patriotic Front’), which later invaded the country
from Uganda. This triggered intra-state conflict lasting until the RPF overthrew the Hutu
government in 1994. After 1997, remnants of the Hutu government and the Armed
Forces of Rwanda (FAR) organized an armed struggle from the eastern regions of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) – led by the FDLR (‘Forces Démocratiques de
Libération du Rwanda’) since 1997, later renamed into PALIR (‘Peuple en Armes Pour
la Libération du Rwanda’) – crossing the border into Rwanda. The conflicts in Rwanda
have been characterized by substantial amounts of one-sided violence. Of special note
is the Rwandan genocide of 1994, which was linked to the RPF’s struggle against the
government. During a few months in 1994, the government of Rwanda, the Armed Forces
of Rwanda and the so-called Interahamwe militia perpetrated mass-killings of ethnic Tutsi
throughout Rwanda, murdering around 1,000,000 people or more. In the years before
the genocide, the government of Rwanda had also killed many civilians of Tutsi origin,
as did the RPF government after it seized power in 1994 (but then targeting Hutu). The
government of Rwanda has been a secondary warring party to the conflict in the DRC
during several years in the late 1990s and early 2000s. It supported rebel groups that
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opposed the government of the DRC in an effort to wipe out Hutu rebel groups (see UCDP
2010p).
After the Tutsi-led RPF (‘Rwandan Patriotic Front’) had begun to attack the government in
the early 1990s, a civil war started in Rwanda. Although the civil war has been described
as “violent and bloody”, its overall intensity was lower than, for instance, in Burundi
(Coleman 2008l: 9). As Christoper Clapham points out, the ruling Habyarimana regime
reacted by attempting to “entrench itself”:
“Internally, it articulated an increasingly overt ideology of Hutu supremacy that has
never been far beneath the surface, and which was readily mobilized to confront the
largely (though not exclusively) Tutsi RPF [. . . ]. Externally, Habyarimana sought aid
from France which, under the presidencies first of Valery Giscard d’Estaing and then
of Francois Mitterrand, had incorporated the former Belgian colonies in Africa [. . . ]
into the French sphere of influence” (1998: 198).
France sent weapons and even a small contingent of troops in order to support the Habyari-
mana regime in its fight against the RPF (see Clapham 1998: 199). The conflict formally
came to a close with the adoption of the Arusha Accords on 3 August 1993 (see Reyntjens
2004: 177). Among other things, it provided for the establishment of a ‘Broad Based
Transitional Government’ in Art. 6, which has never been properly implemented, mainly
because “the Rwandan government had been dragging its heels and failing to produce the
transitional government” (Barnett 1997: 551). In order to monitor the peace agreement,
UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda) was deployed in October 1993.
However, events suddenly escalated when Rwandan President Habyarimana’s airplane
was shot down in the spring of 1994 – most likely by Hutu extremists within Habyari-
mana’s own administration. Immediately thereafter, a violent campaign against the Tutsi
was initiated, carried out by the Hutu-dominated Interahamwe militias. The result was a
genocide unprecedented since World War II, in which about one million people were killed
within roughly 100 days between April and July 1994 (Coleman 2008l: 9). The genocide
only came to an end after the RPF invaded Kigali on 4 July 1994. As a consequence,
around two million Hutu fled from Rwanda, most notably to DRC, Burundi, Uganda and
Tanzania, out of fear for Tutsi retaliation (Traniello 2008: 38). While the genocide came as
a surprise to many external observers, there is strong evidence that it had been well planned
and prepared – logistically as well as ideologically – by the then-incumbent Hutu regime.
As Hintjens notes, “[f]rom 1992 onwards, members of ‘Hutu power’ militias were being
trained in techniques of hunt and destroy operations, rather than in open armed combat”
(1999: 247).
452
A.16 Rwanda
c) Conflict and Peacekeeping Information
Conflict parties FPR
UCDP Conflict ID 179
UCDP Episode ID 1791
Duration 1990 – 1994
Intensity war
Outcome One-sided victory
Victorious side Non-gov.
Peacekeeping
UNAMIR (United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda); October 1993 –
March 1996
Mission Mandate:
“UNAMIR was originally established to help implement the Arusha Peace
Agreement signed by the Rwandese parties on 4 August 1993. UNAMIR’s
mandate and strength were adjusted on a number of occasions in the face of
the tragic events of the genocide and the changing situation in the country.
UNAMIR’s mandate came to an end on 8 March 1996” (Department of
Peacekeeping Operations 2001a).
Source: ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Table A.32: Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Rwanda
A.16.2 Post-conflict situation
According to the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’, the civil war in Rwanda lasted
until 1994 and hence also includes the genocide. However, the short period between the
conclusion of the Arusha Accords in August 1993 and the outbreak of the genocide in April
1994 should be considered a candidate for an independent post-conflict period, because it
entailed the formation of a new government and the deployment of a UN peacekeeping
mission. This situation clearly differed from the episode that began after the genocide. It
is clearly not comparable to other post-conflict situations, for the simple reason that the
genocide had such dramatic social and political effects that it by far overrides the dynamics
and consequences of the preceding civil war. Rwanda is more adequately described
as a “post-genocide society” (Uvin 2001). Nonetheless, for the sake of maintaining a
coherent terminology the following section continues to refer to post-genocide Rwanda as
a ‘post-conflict’ case.
453
Appendix A Characterization and Classification of the Cases
a) The Role of the Formal Government
Between the conclusion of the Arusha Accords in 2003 and today, the composition of the
formal government has changed three times in fundamental ways. The first constellation
was the power-sharing arrangement adopted on the basis of the Arusha Accords in 1993,
the second was the de facto rule of the RPF in the aftermath of the genocide (which was,
officially, still based on the foundations of the Arusha Accords and also involved elements
of power-sharing), and the third was the beginning of RPF leader Paul Kagame’s reign as
the officially elected president in 2003 (and later confirmed in 2008):
Arusha Agreement (1993). During the Arusha Agreement of 1993, a transitional con-
stitutional framework was devised that aimed at creating a ‘Broadly Based Transitional
Government’ (BBTG) and provided for legislative and presidential elections to be held
within a time frame of three years (s.o.). Yet, already after Habyarimana’s plane was shot
down in 1994, the agreement collapsed. The Arusha Accords provided for the following
distribution of governmental power:
“The power-sharing formula agreed upon at Arusha would have given the ruling pro-
Hutu Mouvement révolutionnaire national pour le développement et la Démocratie
(MRNDD) and the Tutsi-dominated Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) five cabinet posi-
tions each, the Mouvement démocratique républicain (MDR) four, the Parti social
démocrate (PSD) and the Parti libéral (PL) three each, and the Parti démocrate
chrétien (PDC) one. Excluded from the BBTG – and indeed from the negotiations
– was the pro-Hutu extremist Convention pour la défense de la république (CDR)”
(Lemarchand 2007: 4–5).
Lemarchand attributes the failure of the BBTG to four factors: The exclusion of the CDR;
the fact that the assassination of Burundi’s President Ndadaye “pulled the rug from under
the feet of the moderates”; the fact that the MRNDD and the RPF never trusted one
another, and the “intense fears and anxieties felt by most Hutu in the face of the RPF
invasion, the mutual hatreds born of atrocities committed by invaders and defenders, and
the climate of all-pervasive suspicion surrounding the Arusha talks” (2007: 5). He views
the negotiations as a continuation of civil war by other means, and points out that “the
participants were constantly reassessing their relative strategic positions on the battlefield”
and heavily rearmed themselves (2007: 6). A similarly negative assessment is given by
Marisa Traniello:
“If South Africa is the ideal model possessing all the necessary conditions for power-
sharing to thrive, then Rwanda represents the worst case scenario that played into
almost every criticism of the concept. The power-sharing settlement, the Arusha
Accords, failed to mitigate violence because it lacked such necessary factors as an
able and committed leadership, a shared destiny and the will to accommodate. In
addition, power-sharing led to the zero-sum scenario that South Africa managed to
avoid” (2008: 38).
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Post-Genocide ‘Power-Sharing’. After the genocide, it was again attempted to build
a broadly-based government along the lines of the Arusha Agreement, with the RPF as
senior-partner. Two parties were banned because of the leading role they had played
during the genocide: The former ruling party MRND and the extremist Hutu party CDR.
Faustin Twagiramungu, a Hutu from the MDR (‘Mouvement Démocratique Républicain’)
became Prime Minister (see Reyntjens 2004: 178). However, the RPF highly influenced
the provisions of the accords in its own favor:
“[A] number of amendments made unilaterally by the RPF to the Fundamental Law
profoundly modified the political regime agreed in Arusha. They introduced a strong
executive presidency, imposed the dominance of the RPF in the government, and
redrew the composition of parliament. The amended Fundamental Law was, in effect,
a subtle piece of constitutional engineering which attempted to mask the consolidation
of the RPF’s hold on political power” (Reyntjens 2004: 178).
Soon thereafter, the RPF took other means to tighten its grip on power, when in 1995
“three leading Hutu members of the coalition were forced to resign: Prime Minister
Faustin Twagiramungu, Interior Minister Seth Sendashonga, and Justice Minister Alphonse
Nkubito” (Lemarchand 2007: 7). After some other resignations in 2000 and the banning
of the MDR “on the eve of the legislative and presidential elections [. . . ] Rwanda had
become for all intents and purposes a single-party state” (Lemarchand 2007: 7). The
result of this shuffling around was that the “illusion of inclusiveness was soon shattered”
(Reyntjens 2004: 180). However, this insight needed a long time to materialize. As
Reyntjens argues, the RPF enjoyed a “genocide credit”, which accounted for the fact that
“for a long time it was not considered politically correct to acknowledge that the RPF
has not brought liberation, inclusiveness and democracy, but oppression, exclusion and
dictatorship” (2006a: 1104).
The 2003 Elections. The time between the end of the genocide and the first post-
genocide national elections was marked as a ‘transitional period’. Originally, it was
to last until 1999, but the RPF unilaterally extended it to last for four more years until
2003. The National Electoral Commission (NEC) was largely controlled by the RPF,
and the elections lacked a great deal of secrecy, as voters had to leave their fingerprint
on the ballot sheet. The major opposition party, MDR, was banned in May 2003, as it
was accused of ‘divisionism’. In the August 2003 presidential elections, Kagame was
re-elected with an astonishing 95 percent of the votes in an election that was reportedly
marked by irregularities, intimidation and fraud (see Reyntjens 2006a: 1106–1108). The
next parliamentary elections took place in 2008, confirming the RPF majority with 78
percent of the votes. Again, a real alternative to the governing party lacked, as most
relevant opposition parties continued to be banned (Stroh 2008).
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b) The Role of External Parties
Before, during and after the genocide, external actors of various sorts have been engaged
in Rwanda. The first group comprises international mediators, who have played a key role
for the ‘successful’ completion of the Arusha Accords. Clapham attributes the settlement
mainly to the demands of the international mediators to achieve an agreement – “a piece
of paper to which all of the parties involved could be persuaded to put their signatures –
entirely regardless of whether this agreement provided the basis for any workable political
settlement” (Clapham 1998: 204). Next to that, a number of single states was involved
in the country. France’s role in the early phase of the conflict – in particular its support
for the Habyarimana government – can possibly be interpreted as a “general defence
of francophonie” (Clapham 1998: 199). Uganda played an intermediate role for the
outbreak of the conflict because the RPF launched its first attacks against the Habyarimana
government from Ugandan territory. It is not clear whether this happened with or without
prior knowledge of Uganda’s President Musevini, although there seems to be “not doubt at
all as to Musevini’s general sympathy” (Clapham 1998: 199).
The United Nations played a particularly tragic role in Rwanda, not only because they
could not prevent the genocide, but primarily because they would not even attempt to do so.
Already before the genocide, UNAMIR was considered “under-funded and understaffed”
(Traniello 2008: 38). When the genocide unfolded, UNAMIR was clearly unprepared to
face the challenge, with only about 5,000 peacekeepers with light weaponry spread around
the country. The focal event that ultimately led to the UN Security Council’s decision to
withdraw nearly the entire force was the killing of ten Belgian peacekeepers (Suhrke 1998).
The UN Security Council’s main motivation behind this decision was its conviction that
the peacekeepers were unable to protect their own personnel (Barnett 1997). However, the
question emerges which role the United Nations could have played in order to prevent the
genocide in Rwanda. Clapham argues that in light of the parties’ determination to fight
it out, the UN could have only significantly influenced the dynamics on the ground by
decisively intervening on the side of one of the former conflict parties:
“Given the irreconcilable contradictions between the demands and expectations of the
‘Hutu power’ groups on the one hand and the RPF on the other, and the powerful forces
which each controlled, any peace-keeping force could have affected the outcome only
by intervening decisively on behalf of one side and against the other. [. . . ] To remain
‘neutral’, in the way that a UN force was bound to do, was to be condemned, as
eventually happened, to impotence” (1998: 206).
In the post-genocide context, the UN and other external actors were increasingly marginal-
ized by Kagame’s regime: “Kagame has effectively used the lack of United Nations and
other international action during the genocide to paint a domestic picture of a do-nothing
international force seeking control rather than assistance in reconstruction” (Coleman
2008l: 11-11). At least after UNAMIR’s mandate ended by March 1996, the situation is
essentially one in which no external actors have been present on the ground.
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c) The Role of the Conflict Parties
In Rwanda, the distinction between the ‘government-side’ and ‘the rebels’ is more clear-
cut than in other cases – Liberia, for instance. However, the two groups switched roles
throughout the conflict. Deciding who is the government and who are the rebels therefore
greatly depends on the moment of the analysis. The Habyarimana government was split
into two blocks: the Hutu moderates, represented by the president himself, and the ‘Hutu
Power’ extremists on whose account the shooting of Habyarimana’s plan most likely
goes. The moderate sections of the government were formally in charge of the Arusha
negotiations, which in part explains the large concessions made to the RPF. Despite being
the official negotiatiors, Christopher Clapham contends that they lacked a real power
basis within the government, mainly because they were “drawn disproportionately from
members of former opposition parties [. . . ] together with some Habyarimana supporters
from the more ‘liberal’ wing of the MRNDD” (1998: 203). This is key for understanding
the dynamics of the Arusha agreements:
“They were, in effect, using the framework of internationally mediated negotiations,
in order to bring about a shift in power within Rwanda, which they could not achieve
through their control on the ground” (Clapham 1998: 203).
The extremists, in turn, refrained from the Arusha negotiations, mainly because they
had little to gain from them. Before the accords, they had been the ones effectively
constituting the state through an authoritarian and patrimonial system. These privileges
were fundamentally threatened by the attempt to establish a broad-based and eventually
liberal democratic system. Consequently, “[m]embers of the Hutu factions associated
with the extremist wing of Habyarimana’s party created endless reasons, accompanied by
assassinations and other murders, to delay the hand-over of power” (Clapham 1998: 204).
The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) was in a dilemma situation at the beginning of the
rebellion, because in light of the vast ethnic dominance of Hutu it “desperately tried to
project itself as a truly national movement” – and not just a mere Tutsi campaign (Clapham
1998: 200). Initially the RPF faced some severe challenges, including the death of Fred
Rwigyema, “the movement’s charismatic leader” (Clapham 1998: 200). However, due to
its strength on the battlefield and its high overall level of organization, it was in a superior
negotiating position. In the post-genocide context, the relationship between the RPF and
those perceived as RPF opponents (mostly Hutu, but also former RPF hands) became
increasingly obstructive:
“From early 1995 Hutu elites became the victims of harassment, imprisonment and
even physical elimination. Provincial governors (prefets), local mayors, head teachers,
clerics and judges were killed in increasing numbers. In many cases the responsibility
of the Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA), which had become the national army, was well
documented” (Reyntjens 2006a: 1105).
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Nonetheless, the RPF has continued to deny the role of ethnicity. As some cabinet members
were formally of Hutu ethnic origin, the RPF continued to put forward the illusion of
a ‘government of national unity’. In reality, about 70 percent of office holders on all
levels of the administration were Tutsi by mid-2000 – a distribution that largely turns the
demographic reality upside down (Reyntjens 2006a: 1110). The RPF was also accused
of gross human right violations during its reign, which includes the reported killing of
tens of thousands of civilians on its own territory and abroad – in particular in the DRC
(Reyntjens 2006a: 1110).
A.16.3 Assessment
The RPF has essentially acted like a unitary government ever since it captured power in
Kigali in 1994 and over time gave up its attempts to conceal its authoritarian claims. The
August-2003 presidential elections only formalized what had already been the political
reality long before, namely that Rwanda had effectively become a one-party state and
that the RPF unilaterally controlled the political life entirely. For the entire post-genocide
context, the role of the formal government is aptly captured by the term domination. The
role of external parties is more difficult to assess. Before the genocide, they acted largely
neutral and without much commitment. The number of peacekeepers sent to protect the
provisions of the Arusha Agreement clearly was too small to fulfill this role effectively.
During the genocide, the international community chose a strategy of non-intervention by
withdrawing most of its troops. In the post-genocide context, the role of the UN and most
of its specialized agencies was increasingly restricted by the regime. However, due to the
‘genocide credit’ (Reyntjens 2006b: 1114) the international community at large supported
the RPF government and has for a long time tended to simply neglect its authoritarian
tendencies. Classifying this form of engagement is not easy, but, all in all, there is reason to
interpret this as a partisan form of intervention. Although the international community has
not actively taken action against Hutu parties or has actively impeded their participation in
the government, it has done nothing against Kagame’s attempts to centralize power and
has (unlike in other cases) not even used its rhetoric powers to criticize the government’s
actions. This is a much more moderate (in fact, passive) form of partisan involvement when
compared, for instance, with the anti-Taliban war fought by external parties in Afghanistan,
but it more aptly describes external actors’ behavior in the case of Rwanda than mediative
engagement. The relations between the conflict parties have clearly been marked by a
high level of obstruction and contention. Some remnants of the génocidaires continued an
armed struggle against the RPF regime from DRC, while the RPF/ RPA in turn committed
systematic killings and human rights violations directed against political opponents of
all kinds. Out of these reasons, post-genocide Rwanda is classified as an instance of the
‘partisan obstructive domination’ or ‘You Stay Out’ polity type.
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A.16.4 Map of Rwanda
Figure A.16: Map: Rwanda. Source: United Nations Cartographic Division
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A.17 Sierra Leone
Population 5,093,570 as of 2006
Total Area 71,740 Sq. Km.
Total Land 71,620 Sq. Km.
Coastline 402 km
Capital Freetown
Languages
English (official, regular use limited to literate minority); Mende (principal
vernacular in the south); Temne (principal vernacular in the north); Krio
Boundaries Guinea: 652 km; Liberia: 306 km
Ethnic Groups
30% Temne; 30% Mende; 10% Krio; 10% Other African (approx.17); 10%
Lebanese and Asian; 8% Yimba; 2% Maninka
Religions 60% indigenous beliefs; 30% Muslim; 10% Christian
Source: Countrywatch (2008): Sierra Leone 2008 Country Review (Coleman 2008m).
Table A.33: Basic Facts and Figures: Sierra Leone
A.17.1 Country and Conflict Information
a) General Background
Freetown was founded in 1787 as a place for freed slaves from the Americas. During the
colonization, the British had applied a strategy of indirect rule through using indigenous
power structures, leading to strong patterns of patrimonialism. After independence, one-
party rule led to economic decline and has caused grievances among the population (see
UCDP 2010q).
Despite its neopatrimonial tendencies (see above), Sierra Leone has had more experience
with democratic governance than most other African countries in the early years of its
existence. The first decade after independence even led to a peaceful shift of power
when the APC (‘All People’s Congress’) successfully challenged the SLPP (‘Sierra Leone
Peoples’ Party’) in the 1967 national elections. Unfortunately, after this short democratic
episode “there followed a decade of turmoil as a torturous series of coups, countercoups,
and rigged or boycotted elections led to the 1978 authorization of a single-party regime
under President Siaka Stevens” from the APC (Wyrod 2008: 72; see also Hirsch 2001:
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147). It was only then that the state became increasingly neopatrimonial, and when Stevens
retired in 1985 the country’s economy lay in ruins.
b) Conflict History
Intra-State conflict erupted in Sierra Leone in 1991, when the Revolutionary United Front
(RUF) (later joined by the ‘Armed Forces Revolutionary Council’ – AFRC) invaded and
attacked the government, trying to take power. The conflict lasted until 2000. The RUF
carried out acts of one-sided violence against civilians (see UCDP 2010q).
In the early 1990s, President Momoh came under increasing pressure for his reluctant
attempts towards reestablishing a multiparty system, and APC rule became more and
more marked by the abuse of power. On 29 April 1992, a group of officers from the
RSLMF (‘Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces’), including a military officer called
Valentin Strasser, staged a coup against Momoh. Momoh was exiled in Guinea, and
the putschists created an interim government called NPRC (‘National Provincial Ruling
Council’) (Berman and Labonte 2006: 145). Strasser became the country’s de facto leader
for the upcoming four years (Abdullah and Rashid 2004: 187; Coleman 2008m: 9). While
the NPRC initially respected basic civil rights, included civilian officers in their ranks, and
took attempts for a re-democratization of the country, it experienced increasing pressure
due to the rise of the RUF (‘Revolutionary United Front’). In 1995, the RUF launched
its first attack against the capital, Freetown, in order to take over the government, which,
in turn, hired the private military company ‘Executive Outcomes’ to counter the attack
(Coleman 2008m: 10).
Meanwhile, the NPRC promised to take measures for democratization, but severely lost
legitimacy because it denied the eligibility of 57 people to take part in the elections. In
early 1996, Strasser was overthrown by Capt. Julius Maada Bio in another coup, who
paved the way for elections to take place in February 1996. Ahmed Tejan Kabbah became
elected as the new president, and the 1991 constitution was reinstated. A peace agreement
(Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone 1996) between Kabbah and RUF leader
Foday Sankoh adopted at the end of the year never took effect, and the RUF continued
their insurgency (Berman and Labonte 2006: 146, see also John 2007). The peace process
was entirely derailed when Sankoh was arrested in March 1997. Becoming increasingly
weak, President Kabbah was ousted and forced into exile by yet another military coup,
this time led by army general Johnny Paul Koroma. Koroma invited Sankoh and the RUF
to participate in a new de facto government named AFRC (‘Armed Forces Revolutionary
Council’). International pressure against the new regime was mounting, ultimately leading
to international sanctions and a UN authorized military intervention by ECOWAS forces
(Berman and Labonte 2006: 148–149; Coleman 2008m: 11).
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Kabbah’s administration was reinstalled after months of fighting between pro-Koroma
and pro-Kabbah forces. In February 1998, ECOWAS and other pro-Kabbah forces were
able to regain control of Freetown, and in March Kabbah was restored to power. Conflict
between the AFRC/ RUF and government-loyal forces continued, and by December 1998,
the AFRC/ RUF had managed to capture the diamond-rich Kono district. In January 1999,
the rebels invaded Freetown again, dissipating the city in chaos and destruction. When
they were ousted by ECOMOG forces three weeks later, more than 50,000 civilians had
been killed and more than 5,000 homes destroyed (Coleman 2008m: 12). After this event,
pressure on the RUF was rising and the government issued an arrest warrant against Sankoh.
The AFRC decided to split with the RUF and support the government in its efforts to
capture Sankoh, which succeeded in May 1999. Meanwhile, the RUF continued to control
the diamond-rich areas of the country and set forth their rebellion against the government
(Coleman 2008m: 12–13). This gave it a relatively strong negotiation position in the peace
talks that were held in Lomé, Togo, in mid-1999 (Binningsbø and Dupuy 2009: 94). Two
of their demands were met and entered into a second peace agreement (Government of the
Republic of Sierra Leone 1999) that was adopted in July 1999: the release of Sankoh, and
the participation of the RUF in the government (Binningsbø and Dupuy 2009: 94). The
agreement came into effect, but it soon became clear that it constituted a “deeply flawed
platform on which to base peace operations in Sierra Leone” (Berman and Labonte 2006:
200).
Roughly at the same time, the ECOMOG engagement faded out after domestic support
for the mission in Nigeria – the largest contributor of troops to the mission – faltered,
and the United Nations took over by setting up the 11,100 strong UNAMSIL (‘United
Nations Mission in Sierra Leone’) force. The RUF rejected stronger international en-
gagement, and was in particular opposed to the UN’s efforts to disarm its troops. The
tensions culminated in a hostage crisis in May 2000, during which the RUF took some 500
UNAMSIL peacekeepers hostage and shot protestors in front of Foday Sankoh’s home in
Freetown. Immediately after this incident, the government issued a warrant to re-arrest
Sankoh, which succeeded on 17 May 2000 (see e.g. Berman 2000: 12). Hopes that this
would brake the RUF’s backbone, as President Kabbah asserted shortly after Sankoh’s
arrest, were misplaced. The RUF continued with their rebellion, and – void of Sankoh’s
leadership – split into two factions: the ‘old’ RUF led by General Issah, and a splinter
group led by Dennis ‘Superman’ Mingo (Coleman 2008m: 13). This “fracturing of the
RUF was a dangerous development as it changed the nature of the conflict, making it more
decentralized and more volatile” (Coleman 2008m: 14).
Nonetheless, the conflict lost in intensity over the next months, and by the end of 2000
the terms for a peaceful settlement began to improve. In November 2000, a ceasefire
agreement between the government and RUF was signed (Government of the Republic
of Sierra Leone 2000). Accompanied with a severe stepping up of the United Nations’
involvement, this ultimately facilitated the end of the fighting. In January 2002, President
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Kabbah declared ‘peace’ in his country, although the true challenges – including the
integration of thousands of child soldiers – had only started to become visible. In the 2002
presidential elections, Kabbah was re-elected with 70 percent of the votes. His party – the
SLLP – won 83 parliamentary seats, followed by 22 seats for the APC. The party formed
out of the RUF – the RUFP (‘Revolutionary United Front Party’) – gained a mere 1.7
percent of the votes and was not represented in the parliament (Coleman 2008m: 14–16).
In the elections following five years later, in 2007, the APC beat the SLLP in free and fair
elections, marking the first instance of a peaceful transfer of power to an opposition party
in a post-conflict country in Africa (Kandeh 2008: 607).
The civil war in Sierra Leone reached wide attention due to the notorious use of violence
against the civilian population: “Infamous for recruitment of child soldiers, mutilation of
civilians, and illicit diamond trafficking, Sierra Leone came to typify the worst elements
of contemporary civil conflicts and, to some, all that was wrong with Africa” (Wyrod
2008: 70). Though many seem to favor ‘economic’ causes for explaining the outbreak of
the civil war – including rebel leaders’ greed (see e.g. Richards 1996) – these accounts
appear unable to explain the incredulous level of violence. As Cramer points out, it appears
unconvincing that “[y]oung men could chop off poor farming women’s hands because this
ensured that they would not be able to harvest crops when the RUF rebels had passed,
so the women could not help government militias [. . . ]” (2006: 31). A key role in the
conflict in Sierra Leone is attributed to the so called ‘youth’. However, as in other parts of
Africa “the term ‘youth’ in Sierra Leone is a political label denoting political contestation
and social position rather than biological age”, and it is used “as a label for marginalized
young (and not so young) people, rather than for a whole population within a certain
age bracket” (Christensen and Utas 2008: 516–517). Already in the 1967 parliamentary
elections, the SLPP (and later also the APC) made use of urban youths (‘rarray boys’) in
order to intimidate voters (Christensen and Utas 2008: 517).
c) Conflict and Peacekeeping Information
Conflict parties RUF, AFRC, Kamajors
UCDP Conflict ID 187
UCDP Episode ID 1871
Duration 1991 – 2000
Intensity war
Outcome Peace Agreement
Victorious side n/a
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Peacekeeping
UNOMSIL (United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone); July 1998 –
October 1999 UNAMSIL (United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone); October
1999 – December 2005
Mission mandate:
UNOMSIL
“UNOMSIL was established in July 1998 to monitor the military and security
situation in Sierra Leone, as well as the disarmament and demobilization
of former combatants. It was also asked to assist in monitoring respect for
international humanitarian law. UNOMSIL was terminated on 22 October
1999, when the Security Council authorized deployment of a new and
significantly larger peacekeeping operation – the United Nations Mission
in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations
2000d).
Mission mandate:
UNAMSIL
“On 22 October 1999, the Security Council established UNAMSIL to coop-
erate with the Government and the other parties in implementing the Lome
Peace Agreement and to assist in the implementation of the disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration plan. On 7 February 2000, the Council re-
vised UNAMSIL’s mandate. It also expanded its size, as it did once again on
19 May 2000 and on 30 March 2001. UNAMSIL successfully completed its
mandate in December 2005. It was succeeded by a new mission – the United
Nations Integrated Office for Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL) – established by the
Security Council to help consolidate peace in the country” (Department of
Peacekeeping Operations 2009f).
Source: ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations;
Table A.34: Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Sierra Leone
A.17.2 Post-conflict situation
The conflict officially came to a close after the adoption of the Abuja Ceasefire Agreement
in November 2000. However, when it comes to deciding about Sierra Leone’s post-conflict
phase, it may make sense to start already one year earlier and also include the power-
sharing arrangement struck between Kabbah and the RUF in 1999 into the picture, as this
is a frequently discussed case that contains many important lessons for the dynamics of
faulty power-sharing arrangements (see e.g. Mehler 2009; Spears 2002). As a result, at
least two different ‘post-conflict’ periods can be distinguished: The short period of the
power-sharing government lasting from July 1999 to Sankoh’s arrest in May 2000, and the
episode that started with the conclusion of the Abuja Agreement in late 2000 (which can
be differentiated further, as discussed below in more detail).
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a) The Role of the Formal Government
Despite facing dull prospects for sustainable peace after the official end of the conflict in
2000 (see e.g. Radecke 2009: 22), Sierra Leone today has made considerable progress
and has surprised many pessimistic observers. As the International Crisis Group observed
in 2007, Sierra Leone today disposes of a “reasonable monopoly over the use of force”
(quoted in Radecke 2009: 6). In the following, the role of the formal government in
three distinct constellations is discussed: The post-Lomé constellation, the post-Abuja
constellation and the subsequent elections held in 2002, and the new constellation emerging
with the APC’s victory in the 2007 national elections.
The Post-Lomé Constellation. The first potential post-conflict polity can be seen in the
post-1999 Lomé arrangement. Strictly speaking, it is not a post-conflict polity because the
conflict officially continued for nearly three years after the conclusion of the agreement. It
could therefore safely be dismissed on formal grounds. Yet, the agreement is particularly
interesting, because it implemented a wide range of power-sharing measures, and although
it did not directly lead to peace, it may have performed other vital functions that have,
ultimately, contributed to peace. Binningsbø and Dupuy (2009), for instance, argue that
the Lomé Agreement may have been deliberately used by the ruling SLPP in order to
marginalize the RUF. The agreement introduced a wide range of power-sharing measures,
and even included an amnesty for the (notoriously brutal) RUF leadership. Although the
RUF leadership was, from that moment on, represented in the government in Freetown,
fighting continued with the RUF still being the main contender (Binningsbø and Dupuy
2009: 90–91). The agreement ultimately collapsed when the RUF took 500 UNAMSIL
peacekeepers hostage, and RUF rebels shot a number of protesters in front of Foday
Sankoh’s home in Freetown shortly thereafter. This led to the removal and arrest of leading
RUF personnel, including Sankoh, and paved the way for presidential and parliamentary
elections in 2002 (Binningsbø and Dupuy 2009: 90–92). The following quote aptly
summarizes the rationale behind the power-sharing deal (for a more detailed overview, see
Rashid 2000):
“Both during the Abidjan negotiations in 1996 and the Lomé negotiations in 1999,
the RUF’s main demands were a power-sharing government, the vice-presidency
for rebel leader Sankoh and the removal of foreign troops from Sierra Leone. The
government initially rejected these demands. During the 1996 negotiations, the
government had the upper hand militarily and was able to force Sankoh to sign the
Abidjan accord even though it included neither power-sharing nor Sankoh’s vice-
presidency. [. . . ] The RUF’s superior position by 1999 gave Kabbah little choice
but to negotiate a peace agreement (Abraham 2004). Both parties realised that the
conflict was not winnable. Kabbah was still viewed as the legitimate president of
Sierra Leone. However, rejecting negotiations would have led to losing international
and regional sympathy” (Binningsbø and Dupuy 2009: 94).
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One key provision of the power-sharing negotiations was to appoint a lucrative position to
Foday Sankoh in order to facilitate an acceptance among the rebels. He was offered the
chairmanship over the ‘Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National
Reconstruction and Development’ (CMRRD), which at the same time gave him the status
of a vice president. In particular, this endowed him with significant control of Sierra
Leone’s resource-rich areas. According to Binningsbø and Dupuy, this was “probably the
single most important element in convincing the RUF to sign the peace agreement” (2009:
96).
The post-Abuja Constellation. The Abuja Ceasefire Agreement, signed by the govern-
ment and the RUF in November 2000, put an end to the hostilities. Due to a decisive
engagement of the United Nations as part of the UNAMSIL mission the parties stuck to the
agreement this time (International Crisis Group 2001c: 1–2).10 It still took about one year
until President Kabbah announced the end of fighting in January 2002, declaring “di war
don don” (quoted in Binningsbø and Dupuy 2009: 91). The elections took place already in
May 2002. Obviously, the voters identified the rebels – mostly RUF, but also the AFRC –
as the forces most responsible for the civil war, which contributed to Kabbah’s clear victory
(see Radecke 2009: 25). The party formed out of the RUF was crushed during the elections
and not represented in the parliament (Coleman 2008m: 14–16). In this respect, “[t]he
ballot had spoken loud and clear about the people’s rejection of the RUF” (John 2007: 46).
The RUF itself is largely marginalized in today’s post-conflict context. Its former
leader Sankoh is dead, and many of the former belligerents today are imprisoned for
their atrocities committed in the past. In the 2002 elections many voters considered the
opposition parties – APC, RUFP and PLP – as the forces being most responsible for the
civil war. This assessment clearly contributed to the SLPP’s and Kabbah clear victories in
the parliamentary and presidential elections, respectively (see Radecke 2009: 25). Though
support for Kabbah was clearly following ethnic and regional patterns – the SLPP’s power
base is predominantly in the south-east, while the APC’s base is in the north-west – the
elections essentially created a “one-party, dominant type of parliament” in which the
opposition is largely marginalized. The APC’s subsequent abuse of power posed dangers
to national unity, and the Kabbah government had been exposed to increasing criticism for
its clientelist and corrupt mode of governance:
“Immediately after Kabbah’s election victory, the key ministries [. . . ] were delegated
to south-easterners. The vice-presidency had been delegated to a southerner in the
10Under the aegis of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the United Nations deployed two missions
to Sierra Leone: the ‘United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone’ (UNOMSIL, July 1998 – October
1999) and the ‘United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone’ (UNAMSIL, October 1999 – December 2005).
UNOMSIL was a small observer mission with a ‘maximum authorized strength’ of 210 military observers
and 35 medical personnel. In contrast, UNAMSIL was of a significantly larger size and based on a more
encompassing mandate. It had an initial troop ceiling of 13,000, which was raised twice to a maximum
of 17,500 troops in 2003 (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2010).
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person of Solomon Berewa. The pattern of such ‘juicy’ political appointments in
favour of those from the south-east alienated political elites and people from other
geopolitical regions, and gradually eroded support for the ruling SLPP government”
(John 2007: 49).
These and other reasons accounted for an increasing alienation of voters with the SLPP. The
choice of Solomon Berewa as Kabbah’s successor was unable to disperse peoples’ mistrust
in the government. John was remarkably right in his speculation that “[i]n post-war Sierra
Leone, having voted for peace in 1996 and 2002, the people will be voting for honest
governance and their socio-economic welfare and prosperity” (2007: 51). Though it is
too early to assess whether the APC will be able to contribute to these goals, voters were
seemingly convinced that the SLPP could not.
The 2007 elections. The national elections that took place on 11 August and 8 September
2007 were surprising in various regards. They were “the first post-conflict elections in
Africa in which an incumbent party was defeated” (Kandeh 2008: 607), and are considered
“the freest and most participatory in [Sierra Leone’s] history” (Wyrod 2008: 70). In the
presidential elections, the incumbent Kabbah was challenged by Koroma, Berewa and
Charles Margai (Wyrod 2008: 71). Margai is a former member of the SLPP who had lost
the leadership struggle with Kabbah in 1996. As a consequence, he separated and formed
his own party, the PMDC (‘People’s Movement for Democratic Change’), which “was to
prove a significant challenge to the governing party” (Ohman 2008: 765). The results of
the election were clear: “The SLPP was the main loser of the election, losing almost half
of its parliamentary seats [. . . ] and being forced to fight the presidential run-off elections
as the runner-up” (Ohman 2008: 766–767). Though the SLPP’s defeat may have been
the result of many factors – including the rising dissatisfaction with the APC – another
contributing factor lies in changes of the electoral system since the 2002 election from
a proportional representation (PR) to a majoritarian first-past-the-post system. In effect,
“[t]his led to strong SLPP districts such as Bonthe losing many of their seats, whereas
the Western Area Urban (around the capital of Freetown, with strong support for the All
People’s Congress (APC)) increased its allocation from 8 to 17 seats” (Ohman 2008: 765).
This changed the post-2007 situation significantly from the post-2002 situation. Unlike
the SLPP, “[t]he APC does need the support of other parties in parliament [. . . ]” (Ohman
2008: 767). But support comes exclusively from the PMDC, which occupies four minister
posts in the government, and not from the SLPP. The latter is effectively excluded from
government power now, and with regard to the former belligerents there is a clear situation
of dominance present (Ohman 2008: 767).
b) The Role of External Parties
By funding some 80 percent of Sierra Leone’s national budget, the international community
greatly contributed to the stabilization of governance in post-war Sierra Leone (Kandeh
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2008: 605). In total, three groups of external actors became engaged in Sierra Leone
during and after the civil war:
ECOWAS. ECOWAS played a major role in the Sierra Leonean civil war, in particular
before the deployment of UNAMSIL. It “took a lead role in restoring the Kabbah govern-
ment to office” (Hirsch 2001: 151). Nigeria played the main part in the realization of this
goal, both in material and political terms. It is estimated that by June 1999, some 12,000
ECOMOG troops were present, with Nigeria possibly contributing as much as 10,000
troops (Berman and Labonte 2006: 151–153). Nigerian commitment drastically declined
after the February 1999 elections in Nigeria, which subsequently led to the deployment of
UNAMSIL about one year later.
United Nations. Initially, the United Nations only engaged reluctantly in Sierra Leone.
The first mission, UNOMSIL, (deployed in April 1998) was a meager support mission
for the ECOWAS operation, consisting “mainly of the deployment of ten military liason
officers” (Berman and Labonte 2006: 150). Only in May 2000, when the conflict was
already coming to an end, the United Nations took serious efforts to secure peace through
the deployment of UNAMSIL. Its troop ceiling was raised to 13,000 and later to 17,500 –
the largest UN peacekeeping mission at that time – and in August the mission was given a
robust mandate to “deter and, where necessary, decisively counter the threat of RUF attack
by responding robustly to any hostile action or threat of imminent and direct use of force”
(U.N. Security Council 2000d; see also Berman and Labonte 2006: 164–165).
United Kingdom. As the former colonial power, the United Kingdom also played a
central role in supporting the efforts for peace in Sierra Leone, offering wide-ranging
support, which included “paying almost all the costs of the 1996 election” and “deploying
700 combat forces to Freetown in the wake of the RUF’s kidnapping of UNAMSIL
peacekeepers” (Hirsch 2001: 153; see also Berman and Labonte 2006: 180).
c) The Warring Factions
The RUF constituted the main rebel group in Sierra Leone. They had their origins in the
1980s, when Libyan leader al-Qadhafi funded a range of African revolutionary movements
in order to support their struggle against governments backed by the US. This included
Burkina Faso’s Blaise Compaore, Liberia’s Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh from the RUF.
It is striking that the RUF lacked any independent political identity that went beyond its
externals sponsors: “[T]he RUF lacks any independent political legitimacy. It is effectively
controlled by Liberia’s President Taylor, who uses it to advance his regional ambitions”
(International Crisis Group 2001d: 13). The rise of the RUF rebels can only be understood
in the context of a quickly progressing context of state dissolution starting in the early
1990s (Coleman 2008m: 10). Links between Taylor and the RUF were strong, in particular
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as the latter supported the initial campaign of Taylor’s NPFL against Samuel Doe in Liberia
in 1989. “In return, Taylor provided a base in Liberia for the RUF to launch its ‘revolution’
with the help of 200 Burkinabè regular soldiers and NPFL veterans on 23 March 1991”
(Abdullah and Rashid 2004: 185).
What is striking about the RUF is that it enjoyed little public support – unlike the NPFL
in Liberia. Its main constituency was a marginalized ‘lumpen proletariat’, in particular
“young illicit miners in the diamond-producing areas”, which gave rise to an “unholy
alliance of marginals, criminals, and social misfits” (Abdullah and Rashid 2004: 186).
Another difference to the NPFL is that the RUF “had no concrete program or systematic
explanation of its objectives except the vague and generalized pronouncements of its leader,
Foday Sankoh, to terrified residents in Kailahun” (Abdullah and Rashid 2004: 185). The
rise of the RUF therefore has probably less to do with the political prospects it offered
than with a combination of generally favorable conditions. By and large, the RUF was
able to “capitalize on the absence of international resolve, an incoherent strategy, a poorly
designed peacekeeping mission command and control structure, and discordant agendas”
(Berman and Labonte 2006: 159). The general disagreement about the root causes of the
conflict in Sierra Leone is also reflected in interpretations of the RUF’s character. Some
see the RUF simply as a relatively unorganized bunch of youths, while others see it as a
tightly organized military organization:
“Some see the rebels as angry, uncoordinated youths who have taken up arms to fight
corruption and hopelessness in their country. Others see them as a highly organised
armed group, bent solely on its own enrichment and power, that has skilfully walked
the line between war and peace, and kept the international community guessing, for
ten years” (International Crisis Group 2001c: 9).
Due to its marginalization in the 2002 elections, the RUFP essentially ceased to be
a contender on its own. After its leader Sankoh was arrested, the RUF split up into
two factions – the ‘old’ RUF led by General Issah, and a splinter group led by Dennis
‘Superman’ Mingo (Coleman 2008m: 13). This made its transfer to a political party
in 2002 extremely difficult. Nonetheless, the RUF still constituted a potential threat to
security, in particular since there was the constant possibility RUF hard-liners would
collaborate with those RUF fighters who had gone into exile to Liberia (see International
Crisis Group 2002d: 9). RUF’s former ally, the AFRC, did fare little better in the elections.
Its former leader Johnny Paul Koroma received three percent in the presidential polls, and
his party, the ‘People’s Liberation Party’ (PLP) received two parliamentary seats only
(International Crisis Group 2002d: 9). The International Crisis Group considered this
outcome both “surprising and alarming”, since a high percentage of people in the security
sector – including the army and the police – voted for Johnny Paul Koroma. In their eyes,
this “demonstrated the potential for sharp division between the SLPP leadership and the
security forces” (2002d: 9). Before the 2007 elections, it has merged with the APC, and
therefore some parts of what formerly constituted the RUF is part of the government today.
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A.17.3 Assessment
Post-Lomé Constellation. The short post-Lomé period can, for the reasons outlined
above, be treated as its own post-conflict polity case. This period is marked by an extremely
faulty and obstructive attempt for power-sharing, in which the belligerents were formally
part of the same government, but at the same time continued to challenge themselves on
the battlefield. Considering this situation as a case of obstructive power-sharing should be
relatively obvious. What is more difficult to assess is how to deal with the engagement of
external actors. At the time of the Lomé Agreement, ECOWAS maintained a strong peace
force in the country and had previously played a crucial role for re-installing Kabbah in
office. However, there is reason to argue that their engagement became more mediative
in the post-Lomé phase. After the Nigerian elections in February 1999, support for the
mission dropped drastically, and UNAMSIL took over already in October, taking a decisive
yet mediative stance. Out of these reasons, the post-Lomé constellation is classified as an
instance of the mediated, obstructive power-sharing or ‘Doomed to Share’ type.
Post-Abuja Constellation. The post-Abuja constellation is more unequivocally a post-
conflict case. It led to the complete marginalization of the RUF and the renewed democratic
legitimation of the incumbent President Kabbah and his party, the SLPP (‘Sierra Leone
People’s Party’) (Coleman 2008m: 14–16). The election created a situation of domination
by one of the former warring parties (the government side) amidst continuing obstructive
relations. The rebel group was severely marginalized by Sankoh’s final arrest and their
poor showing in the elections, but nonetheless remained a potentially dangerous force.
President Kabbah himself did little to foster more constructive relations with his former
enemies. Once in power, he was soon criticized for the exclusionary system of rule he
established. Hence, the relations between the former belligerents can also be considered
obstructive in the post-Abuja period. However, the engagement of external actors in the
post-conflict phase has not changed significantly. As already before, UNAMSIL mainly
aimed at helping to implement the provisions of the ceasefire agreement and contribute
to the overall stability of the situation in Sierra Leone. Therefore, it can be considered
mediative. Out of these reasons, this situation is classified as an instance of the ‘mediated,
obstructive domination’ or ‘The Winner Took it All’ type.
Post-2007 Constellation. The situation that emerged after the APC’s victory in the
elections is the third distinct post-conflict episode that can be observed in Sierra Leone.
Since it led to a change in government, it can be treated as a polity type of its own. In many
aspects, this polity type differed from its direct predecessor: First, UNAMSIL troops had
withdrawn in 2005, which greatly reduced the influence of external actors on the ground.
Yet, the international community was still involved, for instance through supervising
the elections and continuing to provide humanitarian and development aid. Second, the
relations between the domestic parties have changed significantly. Although Kabbah had
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used all means in order to create a one-party state, he was not reelected. Unlike in many
other cases discussed in this dissertation (for instance Imomali Rakhmonov in Tajikistan
discussed below), Kabbah was unable to gain a second term of office through wide-spread
electoral fraud, and he has accepted his defeat in the elections. Thus, there is reason to
argue that the relations between the domestic parties in Sierra Leone have slowly begun to
become constructive. Out of these reasons, this situation is classified as an instance of the
mediated, constructive domination or ‘Let the Winner Take it All’ type.
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A.17.4 Map of Sierra Leone
Figure A.17: Map: Sierra Leone. Source: United Nations Cartographic Division
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A.18 Tajikistan
A.18.1 Country and Conflict Information
a) General Background
Tajikistan reached its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. The old ruling
elite remained in power and a former Communist was elected president. This triggered
resistance from various anti-communist groups – democrats, nationalists and Islamic
parties. Together, they formed the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), a rebel group whose
aim was to overthrow the government (see UCDP 2010r).
Tajikistan is an artificial creation of the Soviet Union in Central Asia. It was created as
an autonomous republic within Uzbekistan, which was itself created as a Soviet Socialist
Republic in 1924. Tajikistan is a mountainous region with most of its territory lying above
3,000 meters. For geographical reasons, the different parts of the country have historically
experienced little interaction with one another, which accounts for the emergence of distinct
regional cultures (International Crisis Group 2001e: 1–2). As Tetsuro Iji puts it, “[n]o
strong sense of national identity existed among the Tajikistanis, whose identity was based
rather on affiliation to a particular region” – a crucial factor in the civil war that broke out
after independence (2001: 359). Two provinces – the region of Kulyob and the northern
region of Leninabad – constituted “the pillars of Soviet Tajikistan” (International Crisis
Group 2009b: 2). Tajikistan gained independence in 1991, and soon thereafter the civil
war broke out (International Crisis Group 2001e: 1–2).
b) Conflict History
The United Tajik Opposition began its fight against the government in 1992, and after
conclusion of several peace agreements the conflict was terminated by 1996 and the UTO
was represented in a power-sharing government. However, this triggered opposition from
another rebel group – the Movement for Peace in Tajikistan – which renewed the fight
against the government in 1998. They were quickly defeated, and the conflict has remained
inactive since 1999 (see UCDP 2010r).
The civil war in Tajikistan started after the former Communist leader Rakhmon Nabiev
from the Leninabad Province was elected president in 1991. The opposition gained
about 30 percent of the votes, but the election was considered flawed and the opposition
parties challenged their results. After the protests had been ongoing for nearly one year,
President Nabiev created a presidential guard with the aim of crushing the opposition.
Fighting broke out, but Russian troops intervened and the regime was forced to form
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a coalition government in which the opposition would hold eight out of 24 ministerial
posts (International Crisis Group 2001e: 2). Yet, after elites from both the Leninabad
and Kulyob Provinces rejected the arrangement, fighting became widespread, and Nabiev
was forced to resign. Subsequently, the little known Imomali Rakhmonov from Kulyob,
member of the Popular Front, seized the capital Dushanbe in December 1992 (see Iji
2001: 360; International Crisis Group 2001e: 2). Rakhmonov mobilized public support
through selling his coup as an active resistance against the attempt to establish an Islamic
state in Tajikistan, which secured him military support from both Russia and Uzbekistan
(International Crisis Group 2009b: 3). The new de facto regime triggered great resistance
from a group called UTO (United Tajik Opposition), which initiated an armed struggle
against the government in 1992. Most fighting had already ended by February 1993,
although the civil war officially continued until 1997 (International Crisis Group 2001e:
2). Despite its relatively short duration, the war was of high intensity. An estimated
60,000 to 100,000 persons died in the fighting, and more than 600,000 were internally
displaced. UN-administered negotiations between President Rakhmonov and the leader
of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), Said Abdullo Nuri, culminated in the June 1997
‘General Agreement on the Establishment of Peace and National Accord in Tajikistan’
signed in Moscow (International Crisis Group 2001e: 2).
c) Conflict and Peacekeeping Information
Conflict parties UTO, Movement for Peace in Tajikistan
UCDP Conflict ID 200
UCDP Episode ID 2001
Duration 1992 – 1996
Intensity war
Outcome Peace Agreement
Victorious side n/a
Peacekeeping
UNMOT (United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan); December
1994 – May 2000
Mission Mandate:
“UNMOT was established in 1994 to monitor the ceasefire agreement be-
tween the Government of Tajikistan and the United Tajik Opposition. Fol-
lowing the signing by the parties of the 1997 general peace agreement, UN-
MOT’s mandate was expanded to help monitor its implementation. The mis-
sion successfully accomplished the assigned tasks and on 15 May 2000 its
mandate was terminated” (Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2000c).
Source: ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’; UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
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Table A.35: Conflict and Peacekeeping Overview: Tajikistan
A.18.2 Post-conflict situation
According to the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’, the civil war in Tajikistan lasted
from 1992 to 1996 (see above). Thus, the settlement of the conflict in 1997 can be taken as
the starting point for Tajikistan’s post-conflict period. Although another insurgency started
shortly thereafter, it was defeated relatively quickly and did not leave lasting marks in
Tajikistan’s political environment. In the following, the post-conflict situation starting with
the settlement in 1997 is characterized in more detail.
a) The Role of the Formal Government
After the successful putsch in 1992, the de facto government under Rakhmonov initially
enjoyed no democratic legitimacy of any sort. However, in the November 1999 presidential
and parliamentary elections, Rakhmonov was elected, winning “an unlikely 97 per cent on
an even more implausible 98 per cent turnout” (International Crisis Group 2001e: 4). He
has managed to retain the presidency until today. In order to appear more ‘western’, he
changed his name to Rakhmon in the meantime by removing the Slavic suffix (International
Crisis Group 2009b: 2). Ever since he took power, he has embodied an extremely
centralized and personalized system of rule, in which “his presidential administration is
the source of all power in the country, while most ministers are little more than channels of
communication to the president, or implementers of his will” (International Crisis Group
2009b: 2). This is unlikely to change in the near future:
“Rakhmon seems now to be aiming to remain president for life. A change to the
constitution in 2003 extended the presidential term from five to seven years, with
the provision that the president could serve two consecutive terms. Rakhmon stood
for election under the new rules in November 2006. Both government officials and
opposition activists believe he plans to run again in 2013, and will find a way to
extend his rule after that date if his health permits” (International Crisis Group 2009b:
4).
The Tajik state has variously been described as a ‘virtual state’ that is struck by corruption,
rent-seeking and patronage. As in many other poor countries – be it in Central Asia or in
Africa – control of the state sector is one of the very few opportunities for elites to enrich
themselves. The International Crisis Group recently contended: “It is no coincidence that
the wealthiest people are almost all in the government: access to state funds, including
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through the misappropriation of budgetary allocations, is a key source of enrichment”
(2009b: 15). Not surprisingly, Rakhmon’s exclusive hold on power has also set back the
effectiveness of the power-sharing arrangement adopted in 1997. The General Agreement
provided for members of the UTO to be co-opted “into the structures of the executive
branch, including the ministries, agencies, local government, judiciary and law enforcement
bodies in accordance with a quota” (Government of the Republic of Tajikistan 1997, Art. 3).
However, observers generally agree that the government’s commitment to these provisions
has never been genuine and has hardly limited the power of the Rakhmon administration in
any meaningful sense: “The government and its strongmen feel they won the civil war and
see little need to make more than cosmetic concessions on the power-sharing issue” (Smith
1999: 247). For instance, soon after being implemented, Rakhmon’s cronies effectively
occupied all key positions in the government, and “opposition commanders have gradually
been removed from their positions” (Heathershaw 2009b: 1315; see also Heathershaw
2007: 220; Lynch 2001: 63).
b) The Role of External Parties
Throughout the conflict, a number of individual states was engaged in seeking a settlement
for the conflict in Tajikistan, most notably Russia and Iran: “Russia was the guarantor of
the survival of the Rakhmonov regime in both economic and military terms, whereas Iran
has cultural and linguistic affinities with Tajikistan and was the major foreign supporter
of the Islamic opposition” (Iji 2005: 192). The United Nations were engaged between
1994 and 2000 with an observer mission in order to monitor the ceasefire between the
government and the opposition. In this role, they cooperated closely with regional parties,
including the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE) and the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (Iji 2005: 195–197).
In the post-conflict phase, external actors have been key for securing the survival of the
regime. Though the regime itself is weak and “could, theoretically speaking, collapse at
any moment”, Rakhmon has used every opportunity to present himself as the only political
alternative in the country, and signaled to the international community to continue their
financial efforts in order to prevent the regime from collapsing (International Crisis Group
2009b: 19). In this sense, the regime has successfully used “its helplessness as a lever”
(International Crisis Group 2009b: 19). However, it must also be noted that “Tajikistan is a
very low priority in most world capitals”, and that western donors have limited stakes in
the country’s future development (International Crisis Group 2009b: 20).
c) The Warring Parties
Popular Front of Tajikistan. The PTF (‘Popular Front of Tajikistan’) emerged in the
Kulyob region out of opposition against Nabiev’s Communist government, and is seen
as the “incubator of the civil war” (International Crisis Group 2009b: 2). The region
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then represented the “centre of resistance to the new non-communist government”. It
had effectively seceded from the central government in 1992 and built up parallel state
structures, which included a central government and its own militia group, led by Sangak
Safarov. It received heavy backing from some other former Soviet republics, most notably
Russia and Uzbekistan. The militia later renamed itself into Popular Front, and was
a “heavily armed though poorly disciplined military force [. . . ] famous as much for
their looting and atrocities as their combat skills” (International Crisis Group 2009b: 2).
Although it initially challenged the central government, it came to represent the government
side itself after its successful 1992 coup.
United Tajik Opposition (UTO). The UTO was a coalition of ethnic groups from the
Garm and Gorno-Badakhshan regions, comprised of both liberal, democratic elements and
Islamists. They were opposed to the political domination of the country by Kulyob and
Leninabad groups, which Nabiev’s presidency embodied, and hence united in their goal
of overthrowing the government (International Crisis Group 2003f: 13). The relationship
between the UTO and the government in the post-conflict context is clearly obstructive:
“The president has gradually limited their powers and enforced the state’s writ, but in some
areas success has been only partial” (International Crisis Group 2004g: 1).
A.18.3 Assessment
Ever since Rakhmon took power in Tajikistan, the government has boiled down to the
presidency, who has been the only political authority in the country. Political opposition
has been harassed and elections have constantly been manipulated so as to secure the
victory for the president. Despite the presence of formal power-sharing, the role of the
formal government in Tajikistan must therefore be considered a case of de facto domination
in which the opposition’s scope of action is severely curtailed. The relations between
the former warring parties must overall be considered obstructive, although Tajikistan is
certainly not as high up the scale as other obstructive post-conflict cases in this regard.
Leaders of the UTO – the main rebel faction in the civil war – were co-opted into the
government at the end of the war, which indicates a certain willingness to accept the status
quo. However, this form of elite accommodation frustrated those who stood outside of the
deal and who have since then repeatedly resisted central authority. In addition, Rakhmon
has more and more attempted to hollow out the power-sharing provisions over time, which
has given rise to further frustration among the excluded opposition. The rise of another
armed insurgency in 1998 can be seen as a strong indicator for the general dissatisfaction
with the incumbent regime. Therefore, despite the fact that some key elites from the initial
rebel group UTO accepted Rakhmon’s policy of accommodation, it appears most plausible
to regard the relations between the former warring parties as being obstructive. The manner
of external engagement, finally, has changed significantly during Tajikistan’s post-conflict
period. The outbreak of the war in Afghanistan can be seen as the crucial turning point
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in this regard. Before, the situation had been marked by a pronounced indifference of the
west, which appeared willing to leave the country within Russia’s sphere of influence. This
has changed significantly after the international engagement in Afghanistan, in the course
of which Tajikistan gained significantly in strategic importance for the west. Therefore,
these two phases are considered as distinct post-conflict polity cases here:
The Situation before the ‘War on Terrorism’ (1996-2001). Although some external
actors (most notably) Russia supported the incumbent regime in a partisan manner during
the war, their engagement in the post-conflict phase (before 2001) must overall be regarded
as mediative. Although one can certainly assume that Russia had a tacit preference for the
incumbent regime, there is little evidence that it supported the ruling party in a systematic
and intentional manner after the end of the war. In combination with the two factors
identified above (political domination and obstructive relations), Tajikistan between 1996
and 2001 is thus classified as a ‘mediated, obstructive domination’ or ‘The Winner Took
it All’ polity case.
The Situation after 2001. After the ‘war against terrorism’ which was proclaimed by the
United States after 11 September 2001, Tajikistan suddenly gained in strategic important.
There is strong indication that external actors have since then maintained a vested interest
in the stability and survival of the Rakhmon regime. Two reasons played a role here: First,
although Rakhmon enjoys, at best, a dubious democratic legitimacy and only represents
the interests of a small fraction of the population from the Kulyob region, he is arguably
the only force which can guarantee stability in present-day Tajikistan. Second, he has
successfully portrayed himself as the only power being able to repel Islamic influence in
the country, which secures him Western attention and support (see International Crisis
Group 2009b: 3). This accounted for external engagement to be become partisan since late
2001. In combination with the two characteristics identified above (political domination
and obstructive relations), Tajikistan since 2001 is considered as an instance of the ‘partisan
obstructive domination’ or ‘You Stay Out’ polity type.
A.18.4 Map of Tajikistan
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Figure A.18: Map: Tajikistan. Source: United Nations Cartographic Division
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Appendix B
Detailed Overview of the Typification
Process
The following section gives a more detailed account of the typification process than the one
contained in section 1.2.3. As already noted, the process was roughly based on a four-stage
model for constructing so called ‘empirically grounded’ typologies1 formulated by Susann
Kluge. It contains the following steps: (1) establishing relevant analytical dimensions, (2)
classifying cases and analyzing empirical regularities, (3) analyzing the context/ coherence
of the classes and reducing them into materially relevant types, (4) characterizing the types
in an empirically rich manner (1999: 260–288; see also Kelle and Kluge 2010: 91–107;
Kluge 2000). These four steps are now described in more detail.
Deriving an Inductive, Explorative Typology (Taxonomy). The first step involved
in formulating a typology of post-conflict polities was mainly inductive. Based on the
question by which clusters of attributes is the phenomenon structured?, the purpose was
to identify obvious structural differences between different post-conflict countries based
on a subset of cases. It included the following cases (in alphabetical order): Afghanistan,
Angola, Cambodia, Côte d’Ivoire, East Timor, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone. They were
mainly analyzed on the basis of information from the UCDP Database (UCDP 2010a), the
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (Department of Peacekeeping Operations
2010), and the ‘UCDP/ Prio Armed Conflict Dataset’ (version 4-2008). The cases were
analyzed on the basis of the analytical framework (see 2.1.2) – i.e. with respect to the
role of formal government, the role of external actors and the role of the former warring
parties in the post-conflict phase. The aim of this analysis was to identify structural (and
not merely gradual) differences with regard to the interactions unfolding between the
different post-conflict actors. This led to a rough ‘taxonomy’ of post-conflict polities,
which consisted of four different types. They were called ‘polarized coexistence’, ‘partisan
intervention’, ‘constructive power-sharing’, and ‘opportunistic power-sharing’. They are
described below in more detail:
1In German: “Stufenmodell empirisch begründeter Typenbildung” (Kluge 1999).
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1. Polarized coexistence: In a ‘polarized coexistence’ polity, the former warring parties
are strictly isolated from one another, sometimes to the extreme that each of them
control a fraction of the country’s territory. External actors are typically trying to
make sure that each of the conflict parties respects the other’s sphere of influence –
for instance through maintaining a demilitarized zone established between the two
territories – while at the same time encouraging a peaceful dialogue between the
parties. As only one party is represented in the formal government, there is no
power-sharing taking place. The clearest example for this type is Côte d’Ivoire,
where an armed conflict between two rebel groups (MPCI, ‘Coalition of Northern
Soldiers’ and FN, ‘Forces Nouvelles’) against the government effectively split the
country into two parts, with the north being held by the rebels and the south held
by the government. After a peace-agreement in 2004 and the deployment of a UN
mission (UNOCI), efforts concentrated mainly on establishing and maintaining a
buffer zone between the two antagonistic groups. Although there were attempts for
power-sharing between the groups – and a formal power-sharing arrangement was
put in place – true cooperation between the former belligerents has been minimal.
2. Partisan Intervention: In a ‘partisan intervention’ polity, the relationship between the
warring parties is highly antagonistic – just like in the case of polarized coexistence.
However, the main difference is the role played by external actors. They are no
neutral arbitrators, but engage in a highly partisan manner by openly supporting one
of the parties they consider legitimate. Often – though not necessarily always – the
party enjoying the support of external actors also holds formal authority, while the
other party questions the legitimacy of the government and formulates competing
claims to power. The clearest example for this situation is Afghanistan, with external
actors supporting a fragile formal government considered illegitimate by large
portions of the population, while simultaneously actively fighting against the Taliban
and other insurgent groups considered illegitimate by the international community.
With reservations, this type also applies to East Timor, Kosovo, Iraq and Cambodia.
3. Constructive power-sharing: A ‘constructive power-sharing’ polity is characterized
by a real (i.e. not merely formal) sharing of governmental authority between the
former belligerents. In addition, the parties by and large maintain a constructive
relationship, with both of them being interested in maintaining peaceful relations.
The role of external actors is largely mediative and supportive. At a first glance,
Angola is a typical example for constructive power-sharing that was supported by
external actors in a mediative manner. Surprisingly, however, the number of cases
clearly fulfilling this category is small. More often than not, formal power-sharing
arrangements do not lead to an effective sharing of governmental authority between
the former warring parties, and often the parties remain in an obstructive relationship.
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4. Opportunistic power-sharing: Finally, in an ‘opportunistic power-sharing’ polity,
all relevant conflict parties are officially represented in the government, which is
supported by external actors. Yet, unlike in a truly constructive power-sharing
polity, not all of the parties are truly interested in maintaining peace. There is some
indication that at least some of them only refrain from resort to violence because
taking part in the power-sharing arrangement promises personal benefits for them. A
good example for this type is Liberia (after the second civil war). Though a formal
power-sharing arrangement had been established after the conflict’s end in 2004, the
former warlords continued to use the country’s political institutions for advancing
their private benefits.
Extracting Essential Analytical Dimensions (Property Space). The goal of the sec-
ond step was to transform the descriptive types identified in the first step to a higher level
of abstractness and generalizability. This was achieved by developing a heuristic typology
based on abstract analytical dimensions, which was directly based on the taxonomy devel-
oped in step one. Assuming that the latter depicts relevant differences between cases, it
was asked: by which combinations of attributes could these differences be systematically
expressed? In other words, the goal was to explicate those analytical dimensions on
which the first typology was already implicitly based, and combine them to a heuristic
typology portraying all logically possible combinations between the different attributes
of the variables. Through this procedure, classifying cases could be expected to become
easier and more systematic. This led to the identification of the three analytical dimensions
similar to those contained in section 2.2 above (‘effectiveness of power-sharing’, ‘external
actors’ degree of partiality’, ‘relations between the former belligerents’). Combining these
three dimensions leads to a heuristic typology containing eight logically possible types of
post-conflict polities.
Forming Semantically Meaningful Types. The added value of the heuristic typology
is that it enables an easier and more systematic typification of cases. This is of great
help when attempting to classify a large number of cases, as it was the case with the 18
post-conflict countries that were classified in the context of this dissertation. However,
relying exclusively on a heuristic is in some regards dangerous. Most importantly, it can
be expected that the different dimensions of the heuristic are simply imposed onto cases
in an overly positivist manner, thereby turning a blind eye to the true dynamics that can
be encountered in a specific case. Although the different types contained in the heuristic
are empirically grounded, this is not yet the same as deriving semantically meaningful
types of post-conflict polities. For this purpose, it was necessary to condense the property
space such that it contains (a) only those types that are internally coherent, and (b) those
types that actually appear in the real world. Achieving this required to engage in a process
of what Elman (2005) called compression and expansion. The former concept implies
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to erase all cells that appear logically inconclusive, whereas logical expansion implies
adding classes based on an abstract combination of the different analytical dimensions. By
the same token, empirical compression means erasing cells that do not ovvur in the real
world,2 while empirical expansion is about adding meaningful classes for those cases that
are not adequately represented by an existing property space (see Elman 2005).
The empirical basis for this exercise were the 18 post-conflict countries contained in
appendix A. They contributed significantly to an adaptation and refinement of earlier
versions of the typology. During this analysis, it became apparent that some cases fit
better into the existing types than others. Through the qualitative analysis of a broad
range of cases, a number of misfits and potential pitfalls could be identified and resolved.
In particular, classifying those cases in which external actors not only intervened in a
mediative or partisan manner, but where they effectively became the supreme authority
of the post-conflict polity – for instance as part of a transitional administration mission –
turned out to be particularly problematic. The typology therefore needed to be adapted
such that cases of transitional authority could be subsumed. The simplest way to achieve a
good fit between the dimensions of the typology and empirical reality was to rename the
dimension External Actors’ Degree of Partiality to the more general Influence of External
Parties, and to add the category Executive Supremacy to this variable. As this new category
does not make sense when combined with power-sharing – which by definition implies
that the former conflict parties jointly constitute the formal government – the new category
Surpremacy is treated as a special case of domination. The typology and its different
dimensions are discussed in further detail in the next section. This adds two new possible
polity types to the typology. At the end of this process stood the typology consisting of six
types of post-conflict polities, which is depicted in table 2.1 on page 44.
Characterizing the Types. The final step in the establishment of the typology aimed at
a rich empirical characterization of the types by choosing two typical cases for each of
them. The results of this process are presented in chapters three to seven above.
2However, although these cases do not form part of the actual empirically grounded typology, the classes
erased because they do not occur in the real world should still be retained in the property space since
they could potentially occur at some point in the future.
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Overview of Conflict Theories
This chapter aims at giving an overview of relevant literature about the broader complex of
civil wars and post-war interventions. This necessarily requires selectivity; consequently
not all aspects of potential relevance are covered or discussed in sufficient detail. ‘Civil war
is not a stupid thing’, one recent book claims in its title (Cramer 2006). This is indeed a
provocative claim, but it underlines that civil wars often make sense for those who wage it,
and that they may generally perform important functions as catalysts of social change. The
aim of this section is to shed some light on the complex phenomenon of internal warfare.
Though this dissertation is mainly on the effects of intervention in post-war situations
and not on civil wars, these two phenomena are obviously intimately related: Without
internal armed conflict there is no need for post-conflict intervention in the first place. A
profound understanding of conflict dynamics is therefore critical for everything else that
follows. More importantly even, much of the literature on post-conflict intervention is
disturbingly atheoretical, with the greater part consisting of “How-to-do-it books” aiming
at finding the ‘right’ recipe or determining the appropriate sequencing of interventionist
policies (Gilady and Russett 2002: 394; Seibel 2008: 501).1 Classical IR theory, too, is of
limited use when it comes to civil wars (see Doyle and Sambanis 2006: 41). What these
exclusively policy-oriented accounts often ignore is that ‘post-conflict’ is not synonymic
for the absence of conflict; it can at best be about a continuation of conflict by other means
– to reverse the famous phrase by Clausewitz.2 Conflict theories are therefore of central
importance to the subject matter, as they provide the theoretical backing for questions that
are key to successful post-conflict intervention: why does conflict break out, how does it
end, and why does it recur? Section C.1 covers theories about the causes and explanations
of civil wars, and section C.2 deals with theories about conflict termination and recurrence.
1Examples are the works by Paris (1997, 2004), who starts off with a theoretical critique of liberal
statebuilding but in the end provides a universalist and somewhat simplistic peacebuilding recipe
himself, which he calls institutionalization before liberalization. Doyle and Sambanis (2006) are a
notable exception as they at least differentiate between two different conflict structures (coordination vs.
cooperation conflicts), for which they suggest different peacebuilding strategies.
2The 19th century military theorist Carl von Clausewitz made the famous statement that ‘war is the
continuation of policy by other means’ (see e.g. van Creveld 2002: 12).
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C.1 The Causes of Armed Conflict
Shedding light on the origins of armed conflict belongs to the core of the discipline of
International Relations. Although scholars have for centuries been looking for answers
to the question why people begin to fight, a satisfactory answer has not yet been found.
Unlike in some other sub disciplines of International Relations, there are “few law-like
propositions, limited predictive capacities and no consensus as to what the causes of war
are”, and it is highly contested “whether it is possible to generalize about anything as
complex and context-dependent as war” (Levy 2002: 350). Despite these difficulties, there
is no lack of theories attempting exactly that. All major disciplines forming part of the
larger area of social sciences and humanities have developed conflict theories. In fact, the
abundance is so overwhelming that is becomes difficult to put them in some meaningful
order.
There are at least three ways to classify conflict theories: with respect to (a) the level
of analysis on which the theory focuses; (b) a theory’s metatheoretical basis; or (c) the
nature of its substantive arguments. Of those, the last category is least useful for devising
a systematic inventory of conflict theories, as the number of different categories can be
endless. Regarding the levels of analysis, a distinction between individual, intrastate, and
international or systemic3 levels (Bonacker and Imbusch 2006: 115–120) appears relatively
uncontroversial.4 Finally, when it comes to a theory’s metatheoretical claims, a distinction
between four different categories appears useful in the context of conflict studies: rational
choice, constructivism, essentialism, and structuralism (see Kaufmann 2005).5 Since
each metatheoretical perspective can (and does) make arguments on different levels of
analysis, it appears helpful to combine the two perspectives into a common framework of
analysis. This promises a systematic way for distinguishing between different sub-groups
of theories that depart from the same metatheoretical basis. In the following sections, the
four metatheoretical perspectives are discussed with respect to the three levels of analysis.
C.1.1 Rationalism
In the past two decades, the field of conflict studies has increasingly been dominated
by rational-choice explanations (see also Cramer 2002: 1846; Walt 1999: 5). Theories
3Note that ‘system’ can have two largely incompatible meanings. The first is descriptive and views a system
simply as a constellation consisting of various sub-entities, the other is functionalist and views a system
as an entity whose existence and stability is the unintentional reference point of all actions within the
system (see Zürn 1992: 41). Unless otherwise stated, systemic here refers to the international system
understood in a descriptive sense.
4But see for instance Christopher Daase’s critique (Daase 1999). The systemic and the national level have
been prominently discussed already in Singer (1961).
5Other distinctions would be those proposed for instance by Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger (1997), who
distinguish between interest-based, power-based and knowledge-based approaches. Doyle and Sambanis
draw a distinction between rational choice, constructivist, economic, psychological and political theories
(2006: 31–32).
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rooted in the rational tradition are based on methodological individualism as the underlying
ontological perspective, which attempts to explain structures and processes by reference to
actors’ behavior (Zürn 1992: 36). Actors need not be individuals, but can well be corporate
actors – social entities acting as if they were single entities. Furthermore, actions are
held to be intentional – they are explained through their intended consequences, no matter
whether they are ultimately realized or not (Zürn 1992: 40).
At least three broad understandings of rationalism are present, depending on the rigid-
ness of the underlying assumptions. In the narrowest understanding, rational choice covers
only those theories that deal with strategic interaction between individuals, mostly an-
alyzed through game-theoretic models. Stephen M. Walt is a proponent of this view,
arguing that models in which individual utility maximization occurs against an “exogenous,
noncalculating environment” do not form part of rational choice at all (1999: 10). In a
second viewpoint occupying the center position, rational choice can simply be viewed as a
methodological approach that explains outcomes in terms of “individual goal-seeking under
constraints”, which can be “technological, institutional, or arise from interdependencies
among actors’ choices” (Snidal 2002: 10). In this broader understanding, rational choice is
simply based on the assumption that agents “maximize their preferences in a microrational
way” (Kaufmann 2005: 181), which can well happen against a ‘non-calculating environ-
ment’.6 It is furthermore assumed that actors’ preferences are complete and transitory and
that they always seek to maximize their utility given certain external constraints.7 Since
both groups of theories are based on economic principles like cost-benefit calculations,
they can be subsumed under the heading economic rational choice theories (e.g. Doyle and
Sambanis 2006). The third group is constituted by political rational theories (Sambanis
2002), which explain rebellion “as a way to redress grievance” stemming from “political
oppression, collapsing institutions, system transition, or informational problems” (Samba-
nis 2002: 223). Political rational choice theories clearly differ from economic theories in
that the assumption of self-seeking behavior is collapsed, pointing to a different conception
of rationality. Using Max Weber’s distinction, it can be argued that economic theories
capture actions in terms of instrumental rationality (‘Zweckrationalität’), whereas political
theories imply a particular form of value rationality (‘Wertrationalität’) (Weber [1922]
2006: §2).8 Nonetheless, the assumption of intentional behavior holds in both versions:
actions can be explained by their intended consequences, which can be judged either in
6Note that the goals are not necessarily restricted to “self-regarding or material interests”, but could
potentially include “other-regarding and normative or ideational ‘goals”’ (Snidal 2002: 75).
7Microeconomic theory assumes further that ‘more is always better’, i.e. that consuming more of a
certain good produces a higher absolute utility, although the marginal utility gained from consuming an
additional unit is decreasing as the consumption of that good increases (see e.g. Pindyck and Rubinfeld
2001).
8Weber distinguishes four types of social action: Instrumentally-rational action is “determined by expecta-
tions as to the behavior of objects in the environment and of other human beings; these expectations are
used as ‘conditions’ or ‘means’ for the attainment of the actor’s own rationally pursued and calculated
ends”; value-rational action is “determined by a conscious belief in the value for its own sake of some
ethical aesthetic, religious, or other form of behavior, independently of its prospects of success; affectual
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normative (‘which consequence is good?’) or in instrumental terms (‘which consequence
is good for me?’). However, these differences between economic and political approaches
lead to decisively different substantive claims about the causes of armed conflict. This
has been captured most bluntly in David Collier’s and Anke Hoeffler’s work, in which
they reduce the explanatory focus of economic theories to ‘greed’ and that of political
theories to ‘grievance’ (Collier and Hoeffler 2002; 2004).9 Although this is overstated,
it underlines the necessity for a differential treatment of the two branches. For all three
levels of analysis, economic and political theories are therefore discussed separately.
On the individual level, rational choice theories on armed conflict generally try to
explain why it is rational for individuals to take part in an insurgency. Economic theories
focus on the general constraints and opportunities individuals are facing for explaining
their decision to join or not to join an insurgency. In this reading, civil wars are likely to
occur whenever for a particular agent the expected utility of fighting exceeds the expected
utility of maintaining peace. Armed conflict at large can be explained by the private
gains it produces, which may render it rational for some groups to wage war although
it is collectively suboptimal (see Doyle and Sambanis 2006: 43). In short – as Cramer
somewhat ironically notes – conflict can be expected when “homo oeconomicus goes to
war” (Cramer 2006: 124 /yeaonly; see also Cramer 2002). Scholars typically refer to
Grossman (1991) and Hirshleifer (1995) as the pioneers, other important contributions
include Fearon (2004) and Fearon and Laitin (1996 and 2003). Political theories instead
focus on the motives or ‘grievances’ compelling people to fight, irrespective of their
expected gains and opportunity costs. From this perspective, it would be rational to join an
insurgency if the perceived grievances are tense enough to motivate individual action for
changing matters towards the better. Scholars rejecting economic concepts of rationality
have used this as a pattern for explaining the dynamics involved in particular conflicts, for
instance that in West Africa. As Abdullah and Rashid argue, “[i]n both Liberia and Sierra
Leone, youths, students, and other subaltern forces learned that a change of government
was impossible through the ballot box” (2004: 176).
Theories on the intrastate level focus on the domestic context of states for explaining
their likelihood of experiencing a civil war. Economic theories tend to focus on opportunity
structures in which individual interest maximization occurs. One branch concentrates on
resource abundance as the critical variable by which civil wars can be explained. Two
versions can be identified: ‘Honey pot’ theories generally stipulate that natural resources
provide an incentive for non-state actors like warlords or rebel groups to seize control and
capture the resources for the private gains they promise (Kahl 2006: 14, see also Le Billon
action, which is “determined by the actor’s specific affects and feeling states”; and traditional action,
determined by “ingrained habituation” (Weber 1978: 24–25).
9Collier expresses a clear theoretical preference for greed-based over grievance-based theories, which he
justifies by arguing that “the provision of justice [. . . ] is a public good and so faces acute collective
action problems”. He furthermore underlines that when the rebels nonetheless “fight for a cause rather
than for their own self-interest”, predation may be the only mechanism by which to sustain the rebellion
(Collier 2000: 839).
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2001b; de Soysa 2002). ‘Resource-curse’ theories, in contrast, presume that the rents
associated with the exploitation of natural resources make ruling elites unresponsive to the
demands of their citizens. This leads to the emergence of typical rentier-states, exhibiting
at best rudimentary forms of statehood and always standing at the brink of collapse (see
Kahl 2006: 14). Typical examples include the regimes in Nigeria and Algeria, which can
sustain themselves exclusively through oil revenues (Karl 1999; Sandbakken 2006), or the
role of diamonds in Sierra Leone (Olsson 2007). Resources alone, however, are hardly
sufficient for triggering rebellions – otherwise Norway would run a similar risk as states
like Nigeria or Sudan. An important enabling condition is the lack of effective control
of these resources by the state, for instance because domestic institutions have collapsed
or are highly dysfunctional (e.g. Reno 1999). Political theories instead often focus on
grievances stemming from domestic conditions – be that political or economical – that
are believed to motivate people to rebel. Like in economic theories, natural resources
are considered an important motive. While economic theories focus on the abundance of
resources, political theories focus on their scarcity. These resource scarcity theories are
written in a so called neo-Malthusian tradition, which stipulates that “global ecological
constraints (related to resource use and emissions) [. . . ] have significant influence on
global developments in the twenty-first century” (Meadows et al. 2004: x). It is generally
argued that an overuse or degradation of natural resources has the potential to put severe
pressure on people whose livelihoods crucially depend on these resources, causing severe
poverty and destitution. This can – either directly or in conjunction with weak state
structures – trigger rebellions (see Kahl 2006: 8–10). The most comprehensive account of
scarcity-induced violence is given by Thomas Homer-Dixon and other researchers from
the so called ‘Toronto group’ (e.g. Ember and Ember 1992; Goldstone 2001; Homer-Dixon
1991; Percival and Homer-Dixon 2001).
Rational theories on the systemic level portrait the effects of systemic factors on the de-
cision of domestic actors to engage in rebellion. The explanas here lies in the international
environment. Economic-systemic theories focus on the global political economy and its
effects on the cost-benefit decisions of self-seeking rebels. The ‘new war’ literature (e.g.
Kaldor 1999; Münkler 2002) – discussed in more detail below – argues that the alleged
transformation of warfare in the post-Cold War era is a result of fundamental changes in
the international environment. In this reading, it is not primarily the presence of favorable
domestic opportunities through which rebellions are triggered and sustained, but their
embeddedness in a global political economy. William Reno for instance highlights the
crucial role of commodity sales on the international market for financing the rebellions by
self-seeking warlords, arguing that warlord politics “is a rational response to globalization
in weak states” (1999: 28). Just as with theories focusing on the intrastate level, weak
domestic institutions are an enabling factor for rebellions to occur, but they are often not
sufficient. Political-systemic theories locate the sources for violent uprising in grievances
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whose roots are systemic but whose effects are local. Conflict is particularly likely if these
grievances affect only some groups within a country while others benefit from them.
Despite its high proliferation, some scholars remain highly skeptical towards rational-
choice explanations of armed conflict, especially in their economic variant. Cramer argues
that despite their “apparent appeal and formal elegance”, these models are “extremely
reductionist, highly speculative, and profoundly misleading” as they are often based on
“an absurdly simplistic, overly direct rationalization of the role of material resources in
conflict” (2002: 1849). By the same token, Hutchful and Aning specifically criticize
Collier and Hoeffler’s binary choice between greed and grievance as highly simplistic and
reductionist, pointing to the large range of other potential factors that could play a role and
that is ignored by this research (2004: 200). Nonetheless, due to their high proliferation
and partly because of a degree of parsimony that other theories lack, rational explanations
present an important contribution to the literature on the sources of armed conflict that is
hard to ignore.
C.1.2 Structuralism
Structuralism, in its most general form, can be described as a theoretical position that
gives ontological preference to social structures over social actors (see e.g. Hollis 2007;
Zangl 1999: 30–34). Structural theories constitute the opposite of individual accounts as
represented by the rational tradition:
“Social theories that reduce system structures to the properties of individuals usually
construe the explanatory role of structures as one of constraining the choices of
preexisting agents, while those that conceptualize system structures as irreducible
entities underlying agents typically understand structures as generating or explaining
agents themselves” (Wendt 1987: 340).
Thus, although structural theories differ greatly with regard to their domain-specific
and substantive (‘first order’) claims, they share certain fundamental ontological and
epistemological (‘second order’) assumptions (Wendt 1999: 4–6). In the following the
core claims of different structural theories about armed conflict are portrayed, organized
according to the level of analysis on which the respective structure is located by the
different theories. As, by definition, a social structure cannot be located on the individual
level (only physical or mental structures, which are subsumed under essentialism in this
framework), the classification starts with theories on the substate/ intrastate level.
On the intrastate level, structuralist theories highlight the role of certain domestic struc-
tures in bringing about armed conflict. In analogy to the neorealist school in International
Relations, one group of theories locates the causes of armed conflict in the so called
intrastate or ethnic security dilemma (e.g. Kaufman 1996; Posen 1993; Roe 1999; Rose
2000). The arguments are directly adopted from the realist tradition in International Rela-
tions, such that “the failed state becomes a pocket international system and behaves like
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one” (Kaufmann 2005: 199). The central structural condition of the international system is
anarchy, that is, a situation in which there is no higher authority than national states, and
in which they consequently need to rely on self-help for guaranteeing their own security
(e.g. Waltz 1979). The result is a security dilemma10 in the sense that “states must always
fear each other and war between them is always possible” (Sørensen 2007: 354). Turning
to the domestic level, a security dilemma is likely to arise whenever a central sanctioning
authority is either absent in a specific state or too weak to provide security, and when the
different social groups – be they politically, ethnically or religiously defined – are uncertain
about each others’ intentions such that they resort to self-help (Roe 1999). A totally
different perspective is occupied by Johan Galtung’s ‘Structural Theory of Aggression’.
Instead of focusing on the domestic security dilemma, Galtung explains aggression – and
hence armed conflict – by reference to a structural condition called ‘rank disequilibrium’.
By this, Galtung understands an inconsistent ranking across various social dimensions
that individuals, groups, or nations are exposed to (Galtung 1972: 85). Rank disequilibria
emerge when either of these subjects scale high in some dimensions of a social rank, but
low in others. Social rank dimensions, as Galtung understands them, cover “the most
crucial things of life, the matters for which people live and die”, and can principally be
located on the individual level (education, income or ethnicity), national level (population
pyramid, per capita income) or global level (alliances or central vs. peripheral nation)
(Galtung 1972: 89).11 However, a rank disequilibrium in itself is no sufficient condition
for aggression to actually occur. Therefore, the theory is only partly structural, as it does
not attempt to explain aggression exclusively by reference to social structures.
On the systemic level, theories on armed conflict focus on the structure of the inter-
national systems and its implications for the domestic level. While some of the grand
theories in International Relations – in particular structural realism – traditionally focus
on interstate war as their explanandum and tend to ignore the domestic level both as
causes and effects of the international system, others explicitly highlight links between the
systemic and the domestic level. An important contribution in this regard are world-system
theories (e.g. Wallerstein 1974; 1979; 2004).12 Wallerstein defines a world-system as “a
multicultural territorial division of labor in which the production and exchange of basic
goods and raw materials is necessary for the everyday life of its inhabitants” (Wallerstein
in Chase-Dunn and Grimes 1995: 389). The core feature of all world systems is that they
exhibit an intersocietal hierarchy consisting of a core, a periphery and a semi-periphery
(Chase-Dunn and Grimes 1995: 390). The relations between these groups are characterized
10In John Mearsheimer’s phrase, “[t]he essence of the security dilemma is that the measures a state takes to
increase its own security usually decrease the security of other states” (2001: 36).
11In Galtung’s terminology, those who are ranked high in a given dimension are called ‘topdogs’ (T), while
those who rank low are called ‘underdogs’ (U). He believes that those who are T in one dimension and U
in another are likely to take T as their point of reference for both dimensions and strive for achieving it,
and that being ranked T in any dimension may imply a certain command over important resources that
can be used in the struggle to achieve T in other dimensions (1972: 88).
12For review essays, see Chirot and Hall (1982) and Chase-Dunn and Grimes (1995).
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by a clear tendency for states in the center to exploit those in the periphery (Galtung [1971]
2000). World-system theories are not per se conflict theories, but clearly underline the
conflictual potential of core-periphery relations. There have been attempts for explaining
ethnic mobilization by a country’s status in the world system, arguing that peripheral states
are more likely to face ethnic violence than non-peripheral states (Olzak and Tsutsui 1998).
A second set of theories attributes the weakness of many third-world states – and hence
their proneness for civil wars – to a structural organizing principle of the international
system: sovereignty (Jackson 1990; Jackson and Rosberg 1982). It departs from the
generous manner by which the international community has granted sovereignty to newly
formed Third-World – and especially post-colonial – states irrespective of their domestic
conditions. Jackson has called this custom the ‘negative sovereignty regime’, and showed
that many entities considered ‘states’ by the international community in reality lack central
requirements of empirical statehood:
“The study discloses an image of Third World states as consisting not of self-standing
structures with domestic foundations [. . . ] but of territorial jurisdictions supported
from above by international law and material aid – a kind of international safety
net. In short, they often appear to be juridical more than empirical entities: hence
quasi-states” (Jackson 1990: 5).”
While Jackson’s theory is not in itself a conflict theory, his concept of quasi-states and the
implications he postulates have readily been taken by conflict theorists.
C.1.3 Constructivism
In their extreme forms (rational) individualist accounts and structuralist accounts often
appear irreconcilable. While the former stipulate that structures are reducible to individual
agents and their interests, the latter postulates that individuals’ preferences and actions are
entirely determined by exogenous (super-)structures. The theoretical position that claims
the middle ground between the two extreme positions is social constructivism – at least
in the ‘thin’ version as it is proposed by Wendt (1999) and others. The core difference
between rational and constructivist accounts of social action is generally expressed in terms
of two different ‘logics’ of action. Rational accounts adhere to a logic of consequence,
whereas constructivist accounts follow a logic of appropriateness (March and Olsen 1989;
1998).13 Constructivist explanations of armed conflict focus the social construction of
beliefs, preferences and the routes by which they can lead to armed conflict (Sambanis
2002: 227).
Constructivist explanations have become particularly prominent with regard to ethnic
conflict (Horowitz 1999; [1985] 2000). Using a broad brush, one can distinguish two
theoretical perspectives on ethnic cleavages: the primordial or ‘hard’ perspective, which
13By the same token, it can be argued that structuralist accounts follow ‘logic of inevitability’, as individual
action so often is determined by the overarching social structure.
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believes that ethnic groups are “ascriptive, firmly bounded entities based on a strong
sense of communality [. . . ] and engendering a great willingness on the part of the group
to sacrifice for collective welfare” (Horowitz 1999: 346), and a constructivist or ‘soft’
perspective, which claims that “collective identities are constantly made and remade in
social discourse and do not reflect essential differences” (Kaufmann 2005: 197). These
two perspectives are clearly incompatible: “Constructivism differs from primordialism
mainly by considering identity as not inherently conflictual and focusing on the molding
of identity by leaders, social systems, or circumstance” (Sambanis 2002: 227). As an
essentialist perspective, primordialism is discussed in the respective section below.
On the individual level, constructivism deals with the question of how individual iden-
tities and loyalties form and develop. Russel Hardin, for instance, draws a distinction
between identities and identifications, arguing that while the former may simply be deter-
mined external factors like nationality, historical or cultural circumstances, the latter is in
part the result of an individual’s rational decision to identify with a certain group whenever
it is “potentially beneficial to be a member of the prevailing group” (Hardin 1997: 7, for a
critique see Kaufmann 2005: 183–184).14
On the intrastate level, constructivist theories play a key role in explaining nationalism
and ethnic warfare (e.g. Anderson 2006; Brubaker 1995). As Stuart Kaufman notes, “[t]he
constructivist position begins from the insight that the meaning of an ethnic identity [. . . ]
is a set of ideas” (2001: 23). Two generations or ‘waves’ of constructivist thought on
ethnic conflict can be distinguished: a strong form based on the premise that collective
identities are moldable to the extent that historical or cultural features become meaningless,
and a weak form underlining that once formed, ethnic identities can be ‘sticky’, inhibiting
attempts for easy manipulation (Kaufmann 2005: 197). Stuart Kaufman (2001) has studied
the phenomenon of nationalism and ethnic hatred based on a range of ethnic conflicts,
including Georgia, former Yugoslavia and Moldova. By attempting a synthesis between
constructivist and primordialist thinking, he arrives at a soft constructivist position by
which the “core of the ethnic identity is the ‘myth-symbol complex’ – the combination of
myths, memories, values, and symbols that defines not only who is a member of the group
but what it means to be a member” (Kaufman 2001: 25). He derives a theoretical position
called ‘symbolic choice’ – whose core assumption is that “people choose by responding to
the most emotionally potent symbol evoked” – mainly in delineation to rational-choice
positions (Kaufman 2001: 28). For him, the outbreak of ethnic war is contingent upon three
necessary conditions: (1) the presence of myths justifying ethnic hostility – in particular
in form of myths about past atrocities committed by antagonistic ethnic groups, and in
form of myths by which the political domination of a certain territory can be justified –,
(2) ethnic fear, and (3) the presence of opportunities to mobilize and fight (Kaufman 2001:
30–32).
14Note that Hardin acknowledges that identifications may also be purely irrational, for example those that
are “primordial, atavistic [and] inconsistent”, or that they can aim at satisfying the interest of certain
groups to which the individual belongs. He calls the latter extrarational motivation (1997: 14).
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Constructivist positions on the systemic level are most prominently represented for
students of International Relations through Wendt’s ‘Social Theory of International Politics’
(Wendt 1999) and the vast variety of other works that have emerged since then. Yet, as
with other branches of IR theory, these works are of little use when it comes to explaining
civil wars.
C.1.4 Essentialism
Essentialism subsumes those theoretical perspectives that focus on the ‘given’ character-
istics of subjects in order to explain certain outcomes. Clearly, this gives rise to a great
variety of possible theories. Subjects can be anything ranging from individuals to large
macro-sociological groups, and their characteristics can be formed by historic, ethnic, reli-
gious or otherwise identity-forming factors. When it comes to explaining armed conflict,
essentialist theories tend to focus either on certain psychological features of mankind ‘as
such’ on the level of the individual, or the inherently incompatible nature of characteristics
attributed to different identity-groups on the intrastate or systemic level – typically in form
of ethnicity, ideology, class, religion, cultural traditions, and the like. Unlike constructivist
theories, it is believed by proponents of essentialism that these are perennial and primordial
features that are not primarily the result of deliberate attempts for identity manipulation
(Geertz 1963; Shils 1957).
On the individual level, essentialist thinking with relevance to the causes of civil war
mainly originates from (social) psychology. Explanations focus on the psychological reac-
tions of human beings towards their outside world. A famous example is the “frustration-
aggression theory” formulated by Ted Gurr, in which he stipulates that “theory about civil
violence is most fruitfully based on systematic knowledge about those properties of men
that determine how they react to certain characteristics of their society” (1972: 36–37).
Interestingly, the theory shares certain assumptions with the rational-choice tradition in
that it defines frustration as “interference with goal-directed behavior” (1972: 36–37).
Yet, the provoked reactions are not merely instrumental – as rational-choice approaches
would stipulate – but typically contain a strong “appetitive” element that aims at injuring
or eliminating those against whom it is directed (Gurr 1972: 34–35, see also Kriesberg
2002: 33–34).
On the intrastate level, essentialist thinking treats concepts such as identity and ethnicity
as primordial characteristics ascribed to a particular group by a common culture and
history: “Essentialism’s core insight is that mass loyalties to communal identities reflect
deep psychological needs” (Kaufmann 2005: 195). Unlike constructivists who think that
ethnic identity is at least in part the result of social construction and hence susceptible to
manipulation by ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’, primordialists “view ethnicity as an exceptionally
strong affiliation that charges inter-ethnic interactions with the potential for violence”
(Sambanis 2002: 227). Among primordialists, different shades can be identified, with hard
primordialists/ essentialists believing that violence is the result of ancient hatred between
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groups, “rooted in old sources of enmity and memories of past atrocities” (Sambanis
2002: 227), and soft primordialists/ essentialists following constructivists by accepting that
identities can within limits be the result of manipulations, while at the same time insisting
on “essentialism’s original focus on psychological and emotional modes of explanation”
(Kaufmann 2005: 195).
On the systemic level, essentialist theories focus on deep-rooted cleavages and incompat-
ibilities between large identity blocks present on the systemic level. The most prominent
(and controversial) reference is Samuel Huntington’s ‘clash of civilizations’ argument
(1992; 1998):
“The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will
be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but
the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of
different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The
fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future” (Huntington
1992).
Civilizations are viewed as quasi homogenous cultural blocks with an inherent tendency
for incompatibility. Not surprisingly, this work has been heavily criticized by authors
attempting to unveil Huntington’s imprecision when it comes to delineating different
“civilizations” (e.g. Riesebrodt 2001; Senghaas 1998).
C.2 Termination and Recurrence of Armed Conflicts
Aside from the question why civil wars occur in the first place, scholars on armed conflict
are interested in two further questions: how do civil wars end, and why do they recur?
Again, the debate about termination and recurrence of civil wars is split along the lines
of different theoretical schools, although here the dividing lines and controversies are
probably less virulent as those about the causes of civil war. Here it is more appropriate to
distinguish theories according to the substantial claims they make rather than with regard
to their meta-theoretical affiliations.
C.2.1 Termination
In comparison to accounts about the causes of armed conflict, knowledge about the
mechanisms through which civil wars come to an end is sparse (Licklider 1995: 681). The
difficulty starts with delineating when a civil war can be considered terminated. Clearly
the end of a civil war must not be conflated with the end of the underlying conflict, which
often continues well beyond the actual fighting. Duffield (2001) even generally questions
whether a clear distinction between a state of war and a state of peace can be drawn (see
also Ferdowsi and Matthies 2003b: 28–30). For analytical purposes, it can only be said that
a civil war ends if at least one necessary condition of the underlying civil war definition
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ceases to be fulfilled (Licklider 1995: 682), and this depends, of course, on the underlying
conflict definition. The literature on conflict termination can be roughly divided into one
group emphasizing the role of structural factors, and a second group giving greater weight
to the importance of agency:
With regard to structural theories, a distinction suggested by Hartzell et al. in their work
about the determinants of post-conflict peace is helpful. They distinguish between two sets
of variables: the settlement environment, which includes the “characteristics of the country
in which the civil war takes place, the larger international environment, and the civil war
itself ”, and the settlement arrangement, where they examine “institutions and types of
protections often associated with negotiated settlements” (Hartzell et al. 2001: 187).
Theories focusing on the settlement environment presume that the factors affecting
successful conflict termination can be found in the structure of the country or the underlying
conflict (see Hartzell et al. 2001: 188–190). One argument focuses on the qualities of a
country’s political system, arguing that authoritarian regimes are less likely to accommodate
competing interests than democratic regimes. Consequently, civil war settlements are more
difficult to achieve, and conflicts are likely to last longer (see Hartzell et al. 2001: 189). A
second argument focuses on the nature of the issues underlying the conflict. It is postulated
that identity-based conflicts are more difficult to resolve than political or ideological ones
(see Licklider 1993: 15). However, the possibly single most important contribution goes
back to I. William Zartman’s notion of ‘conflict ripeness’, introduced in the early eighties
(1989). Simply put, Zartman argued that the initiation of peace negotiations (and ultimately
the settlement of conflicts) is most likely to occur when conflicts are ripe for resolution,
which in turn depends on the emergence of a ‘Mutually Hurting Stalemate’ (MHS) between
the warring factions (2000b: 227–228). The basic premise behind the concept is that “when
the parties find themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory
and this deadlock is painful to both of them [. . . ] they seek a way out” (2000b: 282). In
the absence of such a stalemate negotiations are very unlikely to take place. As long as one
of the parties believes being still capable of defeating the other(s) on the battlefield, they
almost always will try to do so (see Ferdowsi and Matthies 2003b: 30). Thus, the principle
underlying the parties’ decisions whether to continue fighting or initiating negotiations is
essentially a cost-benefit calculation. This may be conceptualized in game-theoretic terms
as the transformation of a negative-sum game (the stalemate) into a positive-sum game
(negotiations) (Zartman 2001a: 8–9).15
Arguments focusing on the settlement arrangements are mainly concerned with issues
like the effectiveness of specific mechanisms within peace arrangements, for example
power-sharing provisions, third-party enforcement, or territorial autonomy.16 In Nurturing
15Note that Zartman argues elsewhere that not all conflicts may be determined by “cost-benefit cultures”.
Specifically, he points out the existence of “true believer” cultures in which Mutually Hurting Stalemates
do not facilitate peace negotiations (2000b: 240).
16An excellent study on the long-term effects of different settlement arrangements (in German) is provided by
Ulrich Schneckener (2002), who studies the implementation of different conflict termination mechanisms
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Peace Fen Osler Hampson (1996a) explores why some peace settlements fail and others do
not, focusing on the characteristics and the implementation of the peace agreements. His
main insight is that peace agreements are not self-executing, but depend greatly on those
who implement them. Ongoing commitment and political will by third parties is therefore
central to a successful termination of a conflict after peace agreements (Hampson 1996a:
205–234). Nilsson (2008) concentrates likewise on settlement arrangements through
focusing on the inclusion or exclusion of certain conflict parties in peace process in order
to determine which representation promises a successful termination of the conflict.
Theories that give greater weight to agency focus on the characteristics and preferences
of the conflict parties. The possible best-known reference is the concept of civil war
spoilers introduced by Stedman (1997). Spoilers are “leaders and parties who believe that
peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use
violence to undermine attempts to achieve it” (1997: 5). Spoilers, therefore, only emerge
“when there is a peace process to undermine” (1997: 7). Stedman distinguishes between
limited, greedy and total spoilers, depending on their goals and commitments. Limited
spoilers follow certain limited goals, for instance motivated by certain grievances, but may
nonetheless be highly committed to their realization. Total spoilers, in contrast, are driven
by radical ideologies and are determined to realize their goals by all means. A medium
position is occupied by greedy spoilers, whose goals are contingent upon cost-benefit
calculations (Stedman 1997: 9–11). Agency of international actors is granted through the
strategies applied by international actors, which can decide about the success or failure
of spoilers. They have three strategies at their disposal: inducement, socialization and
coercion. He suggests that total spoilers can only be effectively managed by recourse
to coercion (either through the use of force or through what he calls the ‘departing train
strategy’); limited spoilers are best managed through an inducement strategy in which its
demands are accommodated into the peace process if possible (Stedman 1997: 9–11).
C.2.2 Recurrence
Scholarship about the recurrence of civil war is comparatively sparse, and what has been
written focuses mainly on the ‘conflict trap’ hypothesis (e.g. Collier 2003; Doyle and
Sambanis 2000; 2006). This hypothesis concentrates “on the characteristics or attributes
of the previous war to explain why a second or third war might occur” (Walter 2004: 372).
The ‘trap’ in this case lies in the presumed causal mechanism: poverty leads to armed
conflict, and armed conflict in turn leads to poverty. While low-income countries generally
face the highest risk of experiencing armed conflict, a prior conflict increases this risk
significantly, while at the same time undermining the prospects for economic development:
“Once a rebellion has started, a society risks being caught in a conflict trap. Ending the
conflict is difficult, and even if it ends, the risk that it will start again is high” (Collier
(minority protection mechanisms within states, bilateral minority protection mechanisms, consociational
democracy and territorial solutions) in the context of historical civil wars in Europe.
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2003: 91). However, in a large number of writings the recurrence rate of armed conflict is
simply overstated. It is mostly written that the rate of civil war recurrence in the first five
years after a civil war ended lies at around 50 percent, mostly by referring to the influential
work by Collier and Hoeffler (2002). Yet, as Suhrke and Samset point out, the figure has
some obscure origins and is hard to be arrived at by simple arithmetic. Analyzing the 49
countries listed in Collier and Hoeffler’s work, Suhrke and Samset find that “[i]n only 13
cases did a second civil war recur within the first five-year period, which gives an average
recurrence rate of around 26 per cent” (2007: 197). Thus, there is reason to believe that the
rate of conflict recurrence is actually only half of what most scholars and policy-makers
believe it is.
Obviously linked to the question of conflict recurrence is the duration of post-conflict
peace. Scholars have tried to determine under which conditions post-conflict peace lasts
longest, mostly by recourse to event-history analysis.17 Doyle and Sambanis (2000)
propose the concept of a “peacebuilding triangle”18 to study the effect of three interrelated
variables on the determinants of peacebuilding success. As “the first statistical analysis on
the correlates of successful peacebuilding and the contribution of UN peace operations
to peacebuilding outcomes” (Doyle and Sambanis 2000: 782), their study still uses cross-
sectional analysis instead of event-history techniques. Overall, they find that “multilateral,
United Nations peace operations make a positive difference” (Doyle and Sambanis 2000:
779).19 Using event history models, Virginia P. Fortna has studied whether external
intervention in post-conflict environments has a positive effect on the duration of post-
conflict peace. Based on her findings, she can confirm such an effect on both the likelihood
and the duration of peace, concluding that “[t]he efforts of the international community
to help war-torn states avoid a slide back to civil war are well worth it” (Fortna 2004:
288). Hartzell et al. investigate the effect of a range of key variables on the duration
of post-conflict peace. Their results suggest that peace is most likely to fail after civil
wars of high intensity in countries having little experience with democratic rule that end
with a negotiated settlement. Likewise, it is most likely to last in countries that were
democracies before the outbreak of the civil war, in which the intensity of the civil war
was low, in which the peace agreement includes provisions for territorial autonomy, and
in which third parties offer security assurances to the former belligerents (Hartzell et al.
2001: 202). Hartzell and Hoddie have studied the effect of power-sharing arrangements on
17Event history analysis (also called: survival analysis or failure time analysis) aims at describing, explaining
or predicting the occurrence of certain events of interest based on a set of covariates (see Allison 2004:
369). Event-history analysis is suitable for capturing questions of timing and political change (see
Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2003: 50), whereas cross-sectional analysis merely provides a snapshot based
on the assumption that the “state probabilities are fairly trendless or stable” (Blossfeld et al. 2007: 5–7).
A variety of both parametric and non-parametric models can be applied, but the most widely used model
in the social sciences is the so-called ‘Cox proportional hazard model’.
18The triangle consists of the three dimensions: the level of hostilities, local capacities, and international
capacities.
19An extended analysis employing also event-history models is provided in Doyle and Sambanis (2006:
69–143).
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the duration of post-conflict peace. Power-sharing goes back to Arend Lijphart’s concept
of consociational democracy and is based on the premise that divided societies are most
fruitfully governed when the different fractions share government power (Lijphart 1975;
1980). In their statistical analysis, they confirm this effect for power-sharing arrangements
after civil wars, finding that “[t]he more extensive the network of power-sharing institutions
contending parties agree to create, the less likely they are to return to the use of armed
violence to settle disputes” (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003: 330).
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Abbreviations
ADFL Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo-Zaire/ Alliance
of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo
AFL Armed Forces of Liberia
AFRC Armed Forces Revolutionary Council [Sierra Leone]
AMIB African Mission in Burundi
APC All People’s Congress [Sierra Leone]
APO Ouagadougou Peace Agreement [Côte d’Ivoire]
ARENA Republican Nationalist Alliance [El Salvador]
ARF Alliance of Reform Forces [FYROM]
AU African Union
BBTG Broadly Based Transitional Government [Rwanda]
BINUB United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi
CAFTA-DR Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement
CDC Congress for Democratic Change [Liberia]
CDR Convention pour la défense de la république [Rwanda]
CEO Chief Executive Officer
CG Convention de gouvernement [Burundi]
CIA Central Intelligence Agency [USA]
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CMRRD Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruc-
tion and Development [Sierra Leone]
CNDD Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie [Burundi]
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Abbreviations
CNL Comité National de Libération/ National Liberation Committee [Democratic Repub-
lic of the Congo]
CNRM Conselho Nacional de Resistência Maubere [East Timor]
CNRT Conselho Nacional de Resistência Timorense [East Timor]
CONADER Commission Nationale de la Demobilization et Reinsertion [Democratic
Republic of the Congo]
COTOL Coalition for the Transformation of Liberia
COW Correlates of War
CPE Complex Political Emergency
CPP Cambodia’s People’s Party, Commission for the Consolidation of Peace [Sierra
Leone]
DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DPA Department of Political Affairs [United Nations]
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operations [United Nations]
DR-CAFTA see: CAFTA-DR
DRC Democratic Republic of the Congo
DUI Democratic Union for Integration
ECOMOG ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EGP Guerrilla Army of the Poor [Guatemala]
ERP Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo [El Salvador]
EU European Union
EUFOR European Union Force [Democratic Republic of the Congo]
EULEX European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
EUPOL European Union Police Mission
EUSEC European Union Security Reform Mission
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FAL Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación [El Salvador]
FAR Rebel Armed Forces [Guatemala]
FARDC Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
FARN Fuerzas Armadas de Resistencia Nacional - Armed Forces of National Resistance
[El Salvador]
FDD Forces for the Defense of Democracy [Burundi]
FDLR Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda/ Democratic Liberation Forces of
Rwanda [Democratic Republic of the Congo]
FDN National Defence Forces [Burundi]
FDNG Frente Democratico Nueva Guatemala [Spanish: New Guatemala Democratic
Front]
FESCI Federation of Scholars and Students of Côte d’Ivoire
FLNC Front de la Libération Nationale Congolaise/ Front for the National Liberation of
the Congo
FLRN Front pour la Libération et la Reconstruction Nationales [Haiti]
FMLN Farrabundo Morti National Liberation Front [El Salvador]
FN Forces Nouvelles [Côte d’Ivoire]
FNL Front National de Libération [Burundi]
FNLA Frente Nacional de Libertaçâo de Angola
FPI Front Populaire Ivorienne [Côte d’Ivoire]
FPL Fuerzas Populares de Liberación [El Salvador]
FRELIMO Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, Front for the Liberation of Mozam-
bique
FRG Guatemalan Republican Front
FRODEBU Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi
FROLINA Front pour la Libération Nationale
FUNCINPEC Front Uni National Pour Un Cambodge Indépendant, Neutre, Pacifique et
Coopératif [Cambodia]
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Abbreviations
FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GAM Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Free Aceh Movement [Indonesia]
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GEMAP Governance and Economic Management Assistance Programme [Liberia]
GPA General Peace Agreement
GURN Governo de Unidade Nacional [Angola]
HNP Haitian National Police
IBL Institutionalization Before Liberalization
ICD Inter-Congolese Dialogue
ICG International Crisis Group
ICGL International Contact Group for Liberia
ICISS International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
IEMF Interim Emergency Multinational Force [Democratic Republic of the Congo]
IFOR Implementation Force
IGNU Interim Government of National Unity [Liberia]
IMF International Monetary Fund
INPFL Independent National Patriotic Front for Liberia
INTERFET International Force for East Timor
IR International Relations
ISA International Studies Association
ISAF International Security Assistance Force [Afghanistan]
JMPLA Joven Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola
KFOR Kosovo Force
KLA Kosovo Liberation Army [also UCK]
KPNLF Khmer People’s National Liberation Front [Cambodia]
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KR Khmer Rouge [Cambodia]
KVM Kosovo Verification Mission
LDK Democratic League of Kosovo
LNC Liberian National Conference
LNTG Liberia National Transitional Government
LPC Liberian Peace Council
LUDF Liberian United Defence Force
LURD Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MAS Movement of Solidary Actions [Guatemala]
MDR Mouvement Démocratique Républicain [Rwanda]
MHS Mutually Hurting Stalemate
MIF Multinational Interim Force [Haiti]
MINUCI United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire
MINUGUA United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala
MINURCAT United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MIPONUH UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti
MJP Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix [Côte d’Ivoire]
MLC Mouvement de Libération Congolais/ Movement for the Liberation of Congo
[Democratic Republic of the Congo]
MNF Multinational Force [Haiti]
MODEL Movement for Democracy in Liberia
MONUA Mission d’Observation des Nations Unies en Angola/ United Nations Observer
Mission in Angola
MONUC Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du
Congo/ UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
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Abbreviations
MPCI Coalition of Northern Soldiers [Côte d’Ivoire]
MPIGO Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest
MPLA Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola
MRDN National Republican Movement for Democracy and Development [Rwanda]
MRLM Movement for the Redemption of Liberian Moslems
MRND Mouvement Républicain National Pour La Démocratie Et Le Développement
[Rwanda]
MRNDD Mouvement Révolutionnaire National Pour Le Développement Et La Démocratie
[Rwanda]
NAFTA North American Free Trade Organization
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEC National Electoral Commission [Rwanda]
NLA National Liberation Army [Macedonia]
NPFL National Patriotic Front for Liberia
NPRC National Provincial Ruling Council [Sierra Leone]
NTGL National Transitional Government of Liberia
OAS Organization of American States
OAU Organization of African Unity
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHR Office of the High Representative [Bosnia and Herzegovina]
ONUB United Nations Operation in Burundi
ONUC United Nations Operation in the Congo [DRC]
ONUMOZ United Nations Operation in Mozambique
ONUSAL United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador
ORPA Revolutionary Organization of Armed People [Guatemala]
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
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PACMT Political Agreement on Consensual Management of the Transition in the Demo-
cratic Republic of the Congo
PALIPEHUTU Parti Pour la Libération du Peuple Hutu
PALIR Peuple en Armes Pour la Libération du Rwanda
PAN National Action Party [Guatemala]
PD Partido Democratico [East Timor]
PDC Christian Democratic Party [El Salvador]
PDCI-RDA Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire – African Democratic Rally
PDCI Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire
PDK Party of Democratic Kampuchea [Cambodia]
PDP Party for Democratic Prosperity [Macedonia]
PDPA People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan
PGT Guatemalan Party of Labour
PISG Provisional Institutions of Self Government [Kosovo]
PL Liberal Party [Rwanda]
PLP People’s Liberation Party [Sierra Leone]
PMC Private Military Company
PMDC People’s Movement for Democratic Change [Sierra Leone]
PPRD People’s Party for Reconstruction and Democracy [Democratic Republic of the
Congo]
PR Proportional Representation
PRIO International Peace Research Institute, Olso
PRK People’s Republic of Kampuchea [Cambodia]
PRTC Partido Revolucionario de los Trabajadores Centroamericanos – Revolutionary
Party of the Central American Workers [El Salvador]
PSD Parti Social Démocrate [Rwanda]
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Abbreviations
PTF Popular Front of Tajikistan
RCD-G RCD-Goma [Democratic Republic of the Congo]
RCD-K/ML RCD-Kisangani/ Movement of Liberation
RCD-K RCD-Kisangani [Democratic Republic of the Congo]
RCD-ML RCD-Movement for Liberation [Democratic Republic of the Congo]
RCD Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie/ Congolese Rally for Democracy
[Democratic Republic of the Congo]
RDR Rally of the Republicans [Côte d’Ivoire]
RENAMO Mozambican National Resistance
RPA Rwandan Patriotic Army
RPF Rwandan Patriotic Front
RSLMF Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces
RUF Revolutionary United Front [Sierra Leone]
RUFP Revolutionary United Front Party [Sierra Leone]
SC Security Council
SDSM Social Democratic Union of Macedonia
SFB Sonderforschungsbereich [Collaborative Research Center]
SFRY Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
SLPP Sierra Leone Peoples Party
SMC Standing Mediation Committee [Liberia]
SOC State of Cambodia
SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary General
UCDP Uppsala Conflict Data Program
UCK Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës (see KLA)
UFCO United Fruit Company [Guatemala]
ULIMO United Liberation Movement of Liberians For Democracy
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UN United Nations
UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMET United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNAMIC United Nations Advance Mission in Cambodia
UNAMIR United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNAVEM United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNGOMAP United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNITA União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola / National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola
UNMIBH United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNMIH United Nations Mission in Haiti
UNMIK United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMISET United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor
UNMIT United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
UNMOT United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan
UNOCI United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire
UNOL United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Liberia
UNOMIL United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNOMSIL United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNPREDEP United Nations Preventive Deployment Force
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force
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Abbreviations
UNSMIH UN Support Mission in Haiti
UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAES United Nations transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and
Western Sirmium
UNTAET UN Transitional Administration in East Timor
UNTMIH UN Transition Mission in Haiti
UP Unity Party [Liberia]
URNG Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca
US United States
USA United States of America
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
UTO United Tajik Opposition
VMRO-DPMNE Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for
Macedonian National Unity
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